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Anchoring International Organizations in Organizational Sociology / Ancrer les organisations internationales dans la sociologie des organisations / Die Verortung internationaler Organisationen in der Organisationssoziologie

Edited by Fanny Badache and Leah R. Kimber

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

Melanie Nussbaumer

Selbstverständlich – und doch umstritten

Wie sich Organisationen bezüglich Gleichstellung legitimieren

Im Fokus dieses Buches steht das Verhältnis von Organisationen und Gesellschaft im Bereich der Geschlechtergleichstellung in der Schweiz. Die empirische Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit dem Umgang von Unternehmen und Nonprofit-Organisationen mit dem Anliegen der Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern und beschreibt, welche gesellschaftlichen Diskurse in die Organisationslogiken einbezogen werden.

Die Analyse zeigt auf, welche Ziele im Gleichstellungsbereich legitim sind und wie diese in einem ersten Schritt als selbstverständlich dargestellt werden. Die Organisationen unterstützen das Gleichstellungsanliegen grundsätzlich, um auch einer wahrgenommenen gesellschaftlichen Erwartung zu entsprechen. Die Umstrittenheit des Themas kommt dann zum Vorschein, wenn konkreter über die Massnahmen zur Zielerreichung diskutiert wird. Dabei wird die Problemanalyse der bestehenden Geschlechterungleichheiten oft nicht vollzogen. Ein Verständnis für strukturelle Ungleichheiten wäre jedoch für die tatsächliche Gleichstellung vonnöten, um zielführende Massnahmen ergreifen zu können, wie Melanie Nussbaumer in der Studie argumentiert.

Melanie Nussbaumer hat sich im Rahmen eines trinationalen Forschungsprojektes der Fachhochschule Nordwestschweiz (FHNW) vertieft mit organisationssoziologischen und geschlechtertheoretischen Fragestellungen auseinandergesetzt. Die an der Universität Basel promovierte Soziologin lebt mit ihrer Familie in Basel, wo sie auch in der Politik aktiv ist.

Reihe
Geschlechterfragen

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Editorial

Rainer Diaz-Bone, Roman Gibel, Kenneth Horvath, Jörg Rössel,
and Stephanie Steinmetz

In the editorial of the first issue of the year of the Swiss Journal of Sociology (SJS) we usually look back on the past year, inform about personnel changes in the editorial team, and make an outlook on the coming year and upcoming projects.

In a first step, the year 2022 is examined in more detail from a publishing perspective. SJS received a total of 36 articles, from which 23 were published (publication rate of roughly 64 per cent). Last year, more than two-thirds of the accepted articles were methodically qualitatively oriented. This represents the highest percentage value since 2010 (whereby the mean value of 45 percent qualitatively oriented articles applies for the period 2010–2016). The trend towards qualitative methods, however, has been continuing since 2021, when two thirds of all accepted articles were already qualitative studies. By far the most articles submitted last year were in English (around 66 percent). However, the figure corrects substantially to under 40 percent when looking at the number of accepted articles, resulting in a relatively balanced language distribution between German, French, and English. Thus, the trend has continued since 2017 that mainly English-language articles are accepted and published. This is despite the fact that the regional "origin" of the first authors since 2017 has always been the French-speaking part of Switzerland, followed by the German-speaking part of Switzerland, which in 2022 was the larger group again for the first time since 2017 (just under 35 percent).

These are indicators that SJS is deliberately chosen as a journal for an international market and that English is therefore increasingly used. Furthermore, a slight trend can be seen in that authors from other European countries publish with the SJS (26 percent in 2022, before that steadily increasing since 2017). This can also be seen as a signal of international visibility. Another trend that has held steady since 2020 is that women make up the majority of first authors (over 56 percent in 2022).

Regarding the time between submission and decision, the following time averages emerged for manuscripts submitted in 2022: It takes 2.7 months between submission and the first decision (including desk rejects). If desk reject cases are not considered, the average time until a first decision is made is four months. Looking at final or reject decisions, it takes on average 3.5 months (with desk rejects) and 5.5 months without desk rejects. These are runtimes that signify fast processes in journal management and are certainly one of the qualities of the Swiss Journal of Sociology that should be emphasized, also in international comparison.

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Table 1 Swiss Journal of Sociology: Articles published and manuscripts submitted in 2022

	Articles published		Manuscripts submitted	
	N	%	N	%
Total	23	100.0	36	100
Methods				
Empirical qualitative	16	69.6	19	52.8
Empirical quantitative	7	30.4	11	30.6
Empirical mixed	0	0.0	3	8.3
Theoretical	0	0.0	3	8.3
Total	23	100.0	36	100.0
Language				
German	8	34.8	5	13.9
English	9	39.1	24	66.7
French	6	26.1	7	19.4
Total	23	100.0	36	100.0
Region of origin (first author)				
German-speaking Switzerland	8	34.8	9	25.0
French-speaking Switzerland	4	17.4	4	11.1
Italian-speaking Switzerland	0	0.0	0	0.0
Germany	6	26.1	8	22.2
France	1	4.3	5	13.9
Other European countries	4	17.4	2	5.6
Non-European countries	0	0.0	8	22.2
Total	23	100.0	36	100.0
Sex (first author)				
Female	13	56.5	17	47.2
Male	10	43.5	19	52.8
Total	23	100.0	36	100.0

In terms of content, two special issues last year placed a particular focus on the sociology of education and public administrations: The special issue "Experiments in the Sociology of Education – Promises and Experiences," edited by Rolf Becker, Joël Berger, David Glauser, and Ben Jann, and "Ethnicity and Public Service. How the State Deals with Ethnic Differences," edited by Esteban Piñeiro and Constantin Wagner. The range of articles outside of special issues was wide. From religious radicalization (Jürgen Endres), gender order reproductions in Austria (Sandra Maria Pfister), performative effects of intervention (Daniel Lambelet), aspirations of sans-papiers (Liala Consoli, Claudine Burton-Jeangros, and Yves Jackson), recruitment in low-skilled jobs (Eva Nadai and Robin Hübscher), teachers' and doctors' worldviews (Dominik Robin, Michael Gemperle, Michael von Rhein, Frank Wieber, and Sandra

Hotz) to changes in individual competencies at the end of school (Ariane Basler and Irene Kriesi) also with regard to migrant children (Sara Möser).

For the past year, the editorial board of the Swiss Journal of Sociology has been in a new line-up. Kenneth Horvath (Zurich University of Teacher Education), Roman Gibel (University of Lucerne) and Stephanie Steinmetz (University of Lausanne) have joined the team with Jörg Rössel and Rainer Diaz-Bone as of January 2022. Jörg Rössel (University of Zurich) and Rainer Diaz-Bone (University of Lucerne) will retire from the Editorial Board end of March 2023. We would like to take this opportunity to thank them sincerely for organizing the editorial board, for the comfortable introduction of the new editorial board members, and for the work they have done for the Journal. Nuria Sanchez-Mira (University of Neuchatel) will be joining the Editorial Board soon. The ongoing processes have settled down well, the Journal is well organized and smoothly running.

In the future, however, there will be some challenges for the Editorial Board. The contract with our online publisher Sciendo will be cancelled by the end of next year. The online publication system is intended to be moved to the SOAP2 platform. A crucial challenge will be the installation of a compelling online first tool, that will allow the journal even faster article processing. This development is closely related to the pursuit of an Open Access strategy, which the board aims for to be characteristic for the Swiss Journal of Sociology in the future. The editorial board will also explore new possibilities for indexing the journal.

For 2023, several special issues resp. focus issues have been launched. First, "Anchoring International Organizations in the Study of Organizational Sociology," edited by Fanny Badache and Leah Kimber, " Explorinig Life Courses in the Making: 20 years of TREE (Transitions from Education to Empoyment)", edited by Thomas Meyer, Ben Jann, and Sandra Hupka-Brunner, and the special issue "Digital Academia. Investigating Science and Higher Education in the Digital Age", edited by Luca Tratschin, Christian Leder, Katja Rost, and Philippe Saner. The SJS has also issued an ongoing open call for special issues proposals in order to plan upcoming issues early.

The editorial board: Rainer Diaz-Bone, Roman Gibel, Kenneth Horvath, Jörg Rössel, and Stephanie Steinmetz

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Anchoring International Organizations in Organizational Sociology

Ancrer les organisations internationales dans la sociologie des organisations

Die Verortung internationaler Organisationen in der Organisationssoziologie

Fanny Badache* and Leah R. Kimber**

1 Where We Begin: Studying International Organizations Through Organizational Sociology

Scholars have studied International Organizations (IOs) in various disciplines such as political science, history, law, economics, and anthropology approaching them through a variety of theoretical lenses. The present special issue focuses on the study of IOs and sociology, in particular the sociology of organizations. We are not the first in this endeavor. As early as 1988, Ness and Brechin (1988) made the case to bridge the gap between the study of IOs and the sociology of organizations. They provided us with a stimulating research agenda for the study of IOs around key sociological concepts: environment, technology, organizational goals, and structure. Ten years ago, Brechin and Ness (2013) re-assessed the gap between organizational sociology and the study of IOs and found that "both sides have moved closer to one another and have enriched their perspectives" (Brechin and Ness 2013, 14). However, they observed that this welcomed development is mainly due to the fact that IOs are now seen both more as organizations autonomous vis-à-vis states and as actors in their own right in international relations.

Following the footsteps of scholars such as Ness and Brechin (1988), Brechin and Ness (2013), Schemeil (2013) and Bourrier (2017; 2020), the main objective of this special issue is to show how both IO studies and organizational sociology can benefit from more cross-fertilization. While sociology has already been used to study international relations (Devin 2015), and IOs in particular (Lagrange et al. 2021), we argue that an approach through the sociology of organizations can also help study IOs as organizations in their own right within which various actors compete, develop strategies, and perform routines and practices. In turn they produce norms and values with the inherent target to have impact on a global scale. Organizational sociology conceives IOs as autonomous actors (Reinalda and Verbeek 1998; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Ellis 2010; Koch and Stetter 2013). On a theoretical level, it allows to go beyond rigid categories such as governmental / non-governmental (Nay

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2021), understand how IOs adapt using multiple strategies (Schemeil 2013), conceive IOs as non-unitary actors (Brun and Parthenay 2020), and perceive IOs not only as bureaucracies but "as structures, networks, amalgamations of individuals, and subjects of the environment with a variety of internal and external effects that can be measured and addressed through a wide range of methodologies" (Ellis 2010, 18). In a nutshell, organizational sociology provides a fascinating basis to study IOs not only from within, but also as organizations interacting with their environment.

Yet contemporary organizational sociologists argue that the discipline is declining (Grothe-Hammer and Kohl 2020) or even disappearing (King 2017; Besio et al. 2020). Organizational sociologists have allegedly done a poor job in tackling the big social issues of our time (Barley 2010). More conceptual work is needed to understand the dynamics of new organizational forms, especially regarding their unique constellation of formal and informal structures, power relations and sources of legitimation, and identity because they permeate all aspects of social life and remain powerful instruments for coordinating human activity (Besio et al. 2020). The potential for significant theoretical developments remains strong. Hence, focusing on IOs can reinvigorate the discipline. While so far international relations (IR) scholars – best known for their contribution to understanding how IOs contribute to global governance – appear to have been successful in integrating organizational theory into the study of IOs, sociologists have failed to "more fully develop a sociology of these transnational actors" (Brechin and Ness 2013, 16).[1]

The introduction is structured along two main parts. First, we continue from where Brechin and Ness (2013) left off and provide an updated literature review of studies using an organizational perspective on IOs since 2013. Second, we present the articles of this special issue and show how they contribute both to IO studies and to the sociology of organizations. We conclude with some thoughts related to methodology and avenues for future research.

2 What We Take Stock Of: What Organizational Sociology Has Provided IO Research

Looking back in 2013, Brechin and Ness (2013) noted Barnett and Finnemore's key contribution to IO scholarship with their book *Rules for the World* (2004). With the concept of bureaucracy developed by Weber, often considered as the forefather of organizational sociology, they theorized the power and pathologies of international bureaucracies. In this section, we do not provide a systematic review of the studies on IOs that use an organizational approach. Rather, as a sociologist and a political scientist, we share our observations regarding the evolution of this body of research. In our view three main research trends in organizational sociology have been mobi-

1 For an exception see for instance March and Olsen (1998).

lized for IO research since 2013: first, the study of IOs and / in their environment; second, the analysis of IOs and their need for legitimacy; third, IOs as actors to be examined through their practices, routines, interactions, and everyday doings.

2.1 IOs in / and Their Environment: Seizing the Complexity and Changing Structures of IOs and Global Governance

The study of IOs in their environment remains a prominent research strand in IR research, as it is the case in organizational sociology. More specifically building on the work of organizational sociologists such as Hannan and Freeman (1989), IR scholars have mainly used the concept of organizational ecology to study changes in the types of global governance institutions. The added value of the concept is to have population(s) of organizations as the units of analysis rather than the individual organizations. This perspective provides a framework to analyze the interactions among and between a given population in a specific environment.

For instance, scholars have used this concept to capture the proliferation of new organizational forms in global governance such as private governance organizations (Lake 2021) and private transnational regulatory organizations in global environment governance (Abbott et al. 2016). The ecological approach has recently also been used to understand why some IOs die, and others survive (Gray 2018; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2020). These authors emphasize competition within a policy area as the principal form of interactions between organizations which hence explains the emergence or disappearance of organizations (Morin 2020). Building on the latest advancements in organizational ecological theory, recent studies have demonstrated that organizations do not only compete for resources but are also able to co-exist and cooperate under certain conditions (Block-Lieb and Halliday 2017). For instance, Green and Hadden (2021) show that, in global environment governance, IOs and NGOs have a mutual relationship based on their complementarity. Downie (2022) shows that IOs cooperate in the energy policy area because of the existence of shared goals (i. e., Sustainable Development Goals).

With the concept of ecology, IR scholars have been successful in conceptualizing the environment of IOs as made up of a multitude of actors beyond simply states (i. e. NGOs, private organizations, etc.). They have hence shown how organizational sociology allows to grasp the complexity and changing structure of global governance.

2.2 IOs as Organizations in Need of Legitimacy: Self-Legitimation and Identity

The abovementioned scholarship conceives the adaptation (or lack of) of IOs to their environment as the result of rational calculations in terms of effectiveness and interests. However, institutionalist theory tells us that it is not always the case: organizations also change to conform to the dominant rules of their environment. Structure does hence not result from the need to perform but from the need to

maintain legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Institutionalist theory emphasizes the normative and ideational sources of change in organizational structure (March and Olsen 1983; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). As noted by Brechin and Ness (2013), new institutionalism has greatly been applied to the study of IOs. This is still the case nowadays. More so, IO scholars have recently used institutionalist theories as their point of departure to study both the legitimacy and the identity of IOs.

IOs are no different from other organizations as they need legitimacy to survive (Tallberg and Zürn 2019, 581). This is all the more true for IOs since they rely (almost) exclusively on their member states for resources. This observation has led to a growing research agenda on IO legitimacy and legitimation in the past decade. One of the main advancements has been the shift from a normative to a sociological approach of legitimacy that focuses on the beliefs of constituencies and that understands legitimacy as embedded in social contexts (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Tallberg et al. 2018). The literature has developed in two main directions. On the one hand, scholars have theorized the sources of perceived legitimacy building on political and sociological theory (for an overview see, Dellmuth et al. 2019). On the other hand, scholars have examined the "social practice of legitimation" (Zaum 2013, 10) or put differently, the management of legitimacy (Suchman 1995; Gronau and Schmidtke 2016). These studies show that IOs employ various strategies for self-legitimization.

Related to legitimacy is the study of how IOs build and sustain their identity. In an institutionalist perspective, the identity of an organization and its members is crucial for its perceived legitimacy: a clear identity that conforms to the environment's dominant norms is needed to be perceived as legitimate (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975 for a groundbreaking article). For instance with the concept of sensemaking in organizational sociology, von Billerbeck (2017; 2020) shows how IO staff members need to self-legitimize themselves to navigate their multifaceted – and sometimes conflicting – identities. Oelsner (2013) demonstrates that the institutional identity of The Southern Common Market, commonly known by the Spanish abbreviation MERCOSUR is composed of a political dimension (democracy), an economic dimension (the idea of a common market), and an external dimension (the need to form a bloc to matter in international affairs).

2.3 IOs as Processes at Play: Grasping the "Making" of IOs

In the 1990s, a fundamental shake occurred in organizational sociology: rather than a structure or an entity, organizational sociologists analyzed organizations as a process (Weick 1993). They since use verbs such as "organizing" for they suggest changing environments at various levels, for all actors, from individuals to all organizations, including nation-states (Brechin and Ness 2013). In the past 10 years, IO scholars have begun studying processes within IOs through practices and routines building on Pierre Bourdieu and Bruno Latour's contributions. More recently they started analyzing interactions drawing on Erving Goffman's seminal works of the first half

of the 20th century known for the interactionist theory in sociology. In doing so IO scholars manage to grasp both macro-phenomena such as order, institutions, and norms, as well as micro-processes such as rational calculations and meaning (Pouliot and Cornut 2015).

Formally inscribed in the "practice turn" in IR scholarship, the concept of practice is commonly referred to "socially organized and meaningful patterns of activities that tend to recur over time" (Pouliot and Thérien 2018, 163). The literature on practice theory and IOs have made important advancements to understand IOs "in the making" by shedding light on the micro foundations of how decisions are made and institutionalized. For instance we note the process leading up to Antonio Guterres as Secretary-General at the UN (Pouliot 2020). Such scholars typically analyze the way ideas, norms, and identities evolve through the lens of practices (Holthaus 2021) and take seriously the dimensions of social space and historical time (Bruneau 2022).

With "interaction" "as that which uniquely transpires in social situations, that is, environments in which two or more individuals are physically in one another's response presence" (Goffman 1983, 2), recent studies have highlighted the micro dynamics that forge multilateralism. The outcomes of the processes mentioned hereafter are the result of interactions that occurred among individuals. Albaret and Brun (2022) for example provided an understanding of Venezuelan contestations at the UN (2015–16). Nair (2020) tackled the art of face-saving in international institutions like diplomacy as a way to avoid embarrassment. Kimber and Maertens (2021) shed light on the power dynamics enacted in time and space to show how civil society is relegated to the margins.

This brief overview shows that sociological theories and concepts have been mobilized by scholars to analyze the ways in which people do things, in practice and in interaction, and how organizations sustain in their environment by adapting their structure and by maintaining legitimacy.

3 What This Special Issue Offers: Contributions to the Sociology of Organizations Through the Study of IOs

The articles in this special section contribute to IO studies by adopting concepts and theories borrowed from organizational sociology. However, instead of *simply* instrumentalizing concepts and theory from an over century old discipline, they also have the merit to contribute to the sociology of organizations.

Christian (this issue) provides an analysis of UN Secretariat staff behaviors and attitudes using the concept of organizational cynicism. He explains why IOs provide a fertile ground for the development of cynical attitudes among its staff. However, his analysis shows that cynicism has ambivalent consequences. At the individual

level, being cynical is a coping strategy for IO staff members that helps them face ambivalences and failure in their daily work. At the organizational level, cynicism can be dysfunctional as it may hamper change and reform. Christian therefore introduces the concept of "cynicism trap" in IOs and in doing so contributes both to the study of IO staff and the research in sociology on organizational cynicism.

Dairon (this issue) introduces the concept of "bureaucratic competence", drawing from the sociological concept of functional competence developed by Michel Crozier who built on Max Weber's – at the time novel – theory. In a climate of incertitude due to the characteristics of IO career systems, she shows that IO staff needs to develop a "bureaucratic competence" which consists in behavioral, relational, and cognitive capacities with the goal of navigating (and remaining in) the bureaucratic system. Her study provides a micro-sociological analysis of IO staff and contributes to the study of competence in bureaucratic organizations.

Kimber (this issue) understands civil society in intergovernmental negotiations at the United Nations as a "temporary organization". It allows her to make a claim towards practices of exclusion exerted by the First and Second UN, respectively member states and UN staff. Weaving in the concept of exclusion with that of "temporary organization" offers a relational perspective whereby civil society's temporariness induces mechanisms of exclusion and vice-versa. Yet by holding on to its autonomy enacted in its inherent temporariness she also nuances the relationship civil society maintains with the more permanent structure, namely the First and Second UN, than so far revealed in the literature. With the same token the theoretical framework combined with "temporary organizing" provides the sociology of organizations with a conceptual tool to rethink and reconsider the very nature of temporary organizations.

Guilbaud (this issue) also addresses the relationship between civil society actors and IOs, this time from the perspective of the international bureaucracy. She uses the concepts of "boundary organizations" and "boundary work" to show how IO staff classifies non-state actors which in itself redefines IO boundaries. With the concept of due diligence and risk evaluation applied to cases stemming from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), she demonstrates how IO staff performs tasks of classification and hierarchization. By combining various concepts in organizational sociology, her article provides an illustration of how IO staff relate to their environment.

Hošman (this issue) examines organizational transformation in IOs. He provides a micro-sociological analysis of IO staff during the development of the Economics Department at the World Bank in the mid-1960s. In addition, he argues for the need to broaden the analytical perspective on organizational change to account for larger organizational ecosystems. By showing that the strategies and choices of IO insiders are linked to their immediate organizational environment, he contributes to IO studies by emphasizing the role of this environment in understanding change

within IOs. His case study of the World Bank updates the issue of organizational change in the field of organizational sociology.

In conclusion, the articles in this special issue are well embedded in the current trends described above, with the trends even overlapping in some theoretical frameworks. Guilbaud (this issue) and Kimber (this issue) contribute to understanding how IO staff make sense of and interact with actors in their environment (i. e. civil society organizations). Hošman (this issue) provides an analysis of how the environment can be a source of structural change in IOs. Christian (this issue) and Dairon (this issue) zoom-in the daily practices of IO staff.

4 Where We See the Research Heading: Toward Greater Cross-Fertilization Between IO Studies and (Organizational) Sociology

The introduction to this special issue along with the five articles it hosts can be considered as a witness to the growing scholarly interest to analyze IOs through the prism of organizational sociology. Yet we make two observations. First, while IO scholars – typically embedded in IR departments and IR scholarship – increasingly use organizational sociology theories and concepts, rare (if ever) are the spaces where such contributions are discussed outside the field of international relations and global governance. Sites of knowledge production and diffusion (academic journals, conferences) still evolve in silos.[2] Second, in spite of the growing focus on IOs' organizational processes (i. e. practices, power dynamics, their functioning and relations) rare – too – are the contributions stemming from organizational sociologists who tackle IOs per se.

Nonetheless building on concepts and theories from organizational sociology, the contributions to this special issue make convincing claims that allow us to envisage further research to better seize the pressing issues of IOs in the 21st century. In particular, we see two research avenues for a deeper cross-fertilization between IO studies and organizational sociology. First, we believe that more work should be done on the link between IOs and the consulting industry (Seabrooke and Sending 2020). What kind of relations do they develop with one another? What are the consequences on their respective daily work? Second, zooming-in on IO staff, further attention should be given to new ways of working and their impact on both the organizations and the employees (Renard et al. 2021). Yet going forward such research avenues call for an openness to other sub-fields of sociology such as the sociology of professions and sociology of work which to a certain extent relate to organizational sociology.

2 For exceptions see journals such as *International Political Sociology* and *Journal of International Organizations Studies*.

IR scholars can likewise use organizational sociology to answer other research questions pertaining to IOs. However, IR scholars should remember that an organizational perspective on IOs goes far beyond the mere study of international bureaucracies, which is often what they do when claiming to use organizational sociology (cf. Barnett and Finnemore 2004).

This scientific endeavor will however only be attainable if researchers are admitted as such in IOs because access is *simply* not a given. Bourrier (2017) stands out and more so denounces the politics of these safeguarded organizations. She argues that by analyzing the way sociologists are "taken in" or rejected by IOs provides cues to grasp the ways in which IOs – paradoxically with worldwide impact – work with ebb and flow around welcoming and rejecting researchers. IO actions and reactions say a lot about what they want to portray to the world taking on the role at times as experts, at others as diplomats, and others as coordinators (Kamradt-Scott 2010; Bourrier 2020). And *in fine* their unpredictable behavior towards academics has immediate consequences on the type of research scholars will carry out, and the kind of knowledge they can produce and disseminate in the long haul.

To conclude, as IO scholars who adopt an organizational sociology stance, we take the opportunity of this special issue – hosted by the *Swiss Journal of Sociology* – to call organizational sociologists to study IOs to not only contribute to the study of global governance and multilateral scholarship, but also to set a momentum for scholars to develop new theories and hence contribute to the future development of organizational sociology.

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Working for World Peace: Between Idealism and Cynicism in International Organizations

Ben Christian*

Abstract: In International Organizations (IOs), noble ideals often clash with harsh realities on the ground. It should therefore come as no surprise if IO employees become cynical over time. However, while there is a large body of work on "organizational cynicism" in sociology and management studies, a systematic examination of cynicism is lacking in IO research. The article addresses this gap and explores the causes and consequences of cynicism among IO staff based on insights gained in 50+ in-depth interviews with staff members at the UN Secretariat from 2020 to 2022.

Keywords: Cynicism, international organizations, United Nations, hypocrisy, leadership

Arbeiten für den Weltfrieden: Zwischen Idealismus und Zynismus in internationalen Organisationen

Zusammenfassung: In internationalen Organisationen (IOs) prallen oftmals hehre Ideale auf harsche Realität. Es sollte daher nicht überraschen, wenn IO-Mitarbeiter:innen mit der Zeit zynisch werden. Doch obwohl wir einiges über Zynismus am Arbeitsplatz im Allgemeinen wissen, fehlt es bislang an einer systematischen Untersuchung zynischer Einstellungen in IOs. Der Artikel adressiert diese Forschungslücke und untersucht die Ursachen und Folgen von Zynismus in IOs anhand von Erkenntnissen aus über 50 ausführlichen Interviews mit Mitarbeiter:innen im UN-Sekretariat zwischen 2020–2022.

Schlüsselwörter: Zynismus, internationale Organisationen, Vereinte Nationen, Heuchelei, Leadership

Travailler pour la paix mondiale : les organisations internationales entre idéalisme et cynisme

Résumé : Dans les organisations internationales (OIs), les idéaux nobles se trouvent souvent confrontés à une réalité difficile sur le terrain. Il n'est donc pas étonnant que le personnel des OIs devienne cynique avec le temps. Cependant, alors qu'il existe un grand nombre de travaux sur le « cynisme organisationnel » en sociologie et dans les études de management, une analyse systématique du cynisme n'existe pas dans la recherche sur les OIs. Cet article se donne pour mission de combler cette lacune et d'étudier les causes et les conséquences du cynisme au sein du personnel des OI. Empiriquement, il se base sur une cinquantaine d'entretiens menés entre 2020 et 2022 avec des membres du personnel du Secrétariat de l'ONU.

Mots-clés : Cynisme, organisations internationales, Nations Unies, hypocrisie, leadership

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1 Introduction: Between Idealism And Cynicism in International Organizations

We are all cynical.
(Interview with a UN Secretariat staff member)

Working for an international organization (IO) like the United Nations is not a job like any other. IOs aim at nothing less than saving the world from the scourge of war, ending global hunger, or stopping climate change. They pursue extremely high ideals, and their employees often have a strong altruistic motivation (Giauque and Varone 2018). At the same time, however, IO staff repeatedly become painfully aware of the limits of their own ability to act: IOs almost always lack sufficient resources to fulfill their mandates and are politically constrained by their member states. Accordingly, lofty principles frequently clash with harsh reality on the ground. It should therefore come as no surprise if IO employees become cynical over time – and anecdotal evidence in the literature support this assumption (Barnett 2002; Weaver 2008; Neumann 2012; Niezen and Sapignoli 2017).

While there is a large body of work on "organizational cynicism" in sociology and management studies (Andersson 1996; Reichers et al. 1997; Dean et al. 1998; Fleming and Spicer 2003; Naus et al. 2007; Chiaburu et al. 2013; Schilling and May 2016), a systematic examination of cynicism is lacking in IO research so far. The present article addresses this research gap and aims at answering the following question: What are the causes and consequences of cynicism among IO staff? In shedding light on organizational cynicism in IOs, the article not only offers an innovative perspective for analyzing IOs "as organizations," but also contributes to our general understanding of cynicism in the workplace by highlighting its ambivalent nature.

The article is structured as follows: I begin with a brief review of the existing organizational research literature on cynicism (section 2). In a second step, I then take a closer look at cynical attitudes within *international* organizations (section 3). First, I argue that IOs provide particularly fertile ground for cynicism among staff and identify four IO characteristics that contribute to its development: (I) the clash of noble ideals and harsh reality, (II) organized hypocrisy, (III) ambivalences and dilemmas in daily work, and (IV) political appointments of senior leadership. Second, I discuss the ambivalent consequences of organizational cynicism in IOs. On the one hand, cynicism can be a coping strategy for IO employees when constantly dealing with failure and conflicting goals. On the other hand, cynicism can also become a threat to IOs as it stands in the way of organizational reforms succeeding and deficiencies being remedied, thus reinforcing its own origins like a self-fulfilling prophecy. Accordingly, my central argument is that cynicism is a *trap*: It may provide short-term relief for IO staff, but it also reproduces and perpetuates the very reasons why that short-term relief is necessary in the first place. In a third step, I illustrate and substantiate these theoretical arguments empirically, using insights from a case study of the UN Secretariat and more than 50 in-depth interviews with UN staff

members (section 4). I show that cynical attitudes are indeed widespread within the UN, analyze their causes and consequences, and present selected examples of their various manifestations.

2 What Do We Know About Cynicism in the Workplace?

"Cynicism" is a multifaceted and eye-catching term. It appears in many different contexts, and its history can be traced all the way back to the ancient Greek philosophers, the Cynics. However, a detailed terminological reconstruction is neither possible nor useful in the context of this article. Instead, the focus here will be on a very specific form of cynicism, namely cynicism in the workplace. The following section presents a definition and briefly discusses some known causes and consequences of cynicism among employees.

2.1 Definition

Cynicism in the workplace has been studied widely since the early 1990s, and has been labeled and defined in very different ways (cf., e. g., Kanter and Mirvis 1989; Andersson 1996; Reichers et al. 1997). One of the most prominent definitions in the field comes from Dean et al. (1998), whose concept of "organizational cynicism" has been taken up by many scholars. It provides a fruitful point of departure for the discussion in this article:

> *Organizational cynicism is a negative attitude toward one's employing organization, comprising three dimensions: (1) a belief that the organization lacks integrity; (2) negative affect toward the organization; and (3) tendencies to disparaging and critical behaviors toward the organization that are consistent with these beliefs and affect.* (Dean et al. 1998, 345)

It is worth taking a closer look at this definition. First of all, organizational cynicism is understood as an *attitude* (that can change over time) and not as a fixed personality trait. Furthermore, Dean et al. emphasize that organizational cynicism is directed primarily *against the organization* and not against specific individuals such as the direct supervisor.[1] This negative attitude toward one's own organization is composed of three components: a cognitive, an affective, and a behavioral dimension. The *cognitive dimension* refers to the belief that one's organization lacks integrity: Organizational cynics, for example, believe that in their organization "principles are often sacrificed

1 Of course, the (mis)behavior of specific individuals can contribute to employees' doubts about the integrity of their organization. However, organizational cynicism goes beyond this personal level: "Although occasional perceptions that organizational practices lack integrity may be attributed to the specific individual involved, perceptions that such behavior is widespread and enduring in the organization are more likely to be attributed to organizational characteristics" (Dean et al. 1998, 345).

to expediency" (Dean et al. 1998, 346). They think that "unscrupulous behavior is the norm" and "expect to see deception rather than candor" (Dean et al. 1998, 346). The *affective dimension* describes the negative emotions toward one's own organization – since "cynicism is felt as well as thought" (Dean et al. 1998, 346). Cynicism can encompass a variety of (negative) emotions, from anger to distress and "even shame" (Dean et al. 1998, 346). Finally, the *behavioral dimension* addresses tendencies for disparaging behavior toward one's organization be it sharp criticism, sarcastic jokes or simply frustrated eye-rolling (Dean et al. 1998, 346).

An advantage of this conceptualization of organizational cynicism as a "multidimensional construct" (Dean et al. 1998, 346) is that it can capture the varying degrees of cynicism. As Dean et al. point out, "the world is not divided into cynics and non-cynics" (Dean et al. 1998, 347). Instead of a simple dichotomy, organizational cynicism should be thought of as a continuum along several axes. Only this approach makes it possible to grasp organizational cynicism in all its varied manifestations and forms empirically.

2.2 Causes of Organizational Cynicism

What leads to organizational cynicism in the first place? What are the causes of cynical attitudes among employees? In line with the above definition of organizational cynicism as an "attitude," one important finding of research on the causes of organizational cynicism is that cynicism is a phenomenon that results from past experiences within the organization: "Individuals are not simply cynical when they join an organization, they *become* cynics during their employment" (Schilling and May 2016, 282; my translation and emphasis). Injustices and breaches of trust (e. g., "psychological contract violation", Chiaburu et al. 2013), lack of autonomy and involvement of employees, negative behavior of colleagues and superiors, as well as value conflicts are considered to be the main causes of organizational cynicism (Schilling and May 2016, 282).

These *value conflicts* in particular are repeatedly highlighted in the literature as a decisive factor in the emergence of organizational cynicism. We can distinguish between two related forms of value conflict: First, cynicism can result from perceived incongruences between personal values and the values of the organization ("person-organization fit theory," Kristof 1996). If employees have the perception that their organization does not share the same values, they may develop a cynical attitude toward it (Naus et al. 2007). Second, cynical attitudes can also arise from perceived discrepancies between the words and deeds of an organization, that is, inconsistencies between the values the organization refers to in official "talk" and its actual practices. It is well known that "the distance between the rhetorical pronouncements of the organization and actual activities" in particular can lead to "cynicism and alienation" (Alvesson and Spicer 2012: 1210; see also Costas and Fleming 2009). This includes

the perception that managers act purely out of self-interest (Schindler 2018, 108), which may also lead to cynicism among staff.

In this context, cynicism can be understood as a *protection shield* for employees – as a defense mechanism "shielding them from frustration and disappointment" (Naus et al. 2007, 197). For individual employees, cynicism can thus be quite functional in that it enables them to deal with the perceived discrepancy between their values and those of the organization:

> *We conceive of cynicism as a self-defensive attitude, aiming to preserve, defend, or live up to values, traits, and competencies, central to the self in situations of potential discrepancy.* (Naus et al. 2007, 197)

In other words, cynicism is a coping mechanism for dealing with the perceived lack of integrity of the organization without having to give up one's own integrity: It can be seen as a "matter of self-preservation" (Kanter and Mirvis 1989, 14) and an "effort to satisfy the need for self-consistency" (Naus et al. 2007, 189; Reichers et al. 1997, 50; Abraham 2000; see also Kunda 1992 for a similar, but slightly different understanding).

2.3 Consequences of Organizational Cynicism

But what are the consequences of this self-protection mechanism? What are the concrete effects of organizational cynicism? In a detailed meta-study, Chiaburu et al. (2013) distinguish between attitudinal and behavioral consequences of organizational cynicism. With regard to the attitudinal dimension, the study shows that cynical employees have less trust in their employer, are less optimistic and motivated, feel less connected to the organization and are generally less satisfied with their job than their colleagues (Chiaburu et al. 2013, 188; see also Schilling and May 2016, 281). With regard to the behavioral dimension, the study demonstrates that cynical attitudes can also have very practical consequences. Cynical employees, for example, are more inclined to quit their jobs (Chiaburu et al. 2013, 190) and organizational cynicism was found to "have a modest negative relationship with job performance" (Chiaburu et al. 2013, 190; see also Schilling and May 2016, 281). All in all, it seems that cynicism among employees is a *problem*: Most prominent management studies (Kanter and Mirvis 1989; Andersson 1996; Dean et al. 1998; Reichers et al. 1997) agree that cynicism is an "impediment to the smooth functioning" (Fleming and Spicer 2003, 160) of organizations.

In addition, another negative consequence of organizational cynicism must be mentioned here that is of particular importance in the context of this article. Cynicism can make organizational change very difficult or even prevent it, as cynical employees often do not believe that change is possible at all:

> *Cynicism about organizational change often combines pessimism about the likelihood of successful change with blame of those responsible for change as incompetent, lazy, or both.* (Reichers et al. 1997, 48)

In many cases, such cynicism about organizational change is a "reaction to a history of change attempts" (Reichers et al. 1997, 48) that have failed. This, then, results in a certain reluctance to try again and a disparaging attitude toward those who do. Cynicism leads to an "a priori certainty" (Schindler 2018, 99): Cynical employees simply *know* that a new change initiative cannot be taken seriously, they distrust the motivation "behind it" from the outset and do not believe in the possibility of real improvement. In this way, "cynicism … is an important barrier to change" (Reichers et al. 1997, 48).

3 Cynicism in International Organizations

The previous section has shown that we already know a great deal about cynicism in the workplace. "Organizational cynicism" is a well-established concept in the literature, and both the causes and consequences of cynical attitudes among employees have been extensively studied. In this section, I will now take a closer look at *international* organizations. In doing so, I pursue two goals. First, I want to better understand these international organizations, including their dysfunctions and pathologies (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). An explicit discussion of cynicism, which – to my knowledge – is missing in the IO literature so far, can be very helpful in this respect. Second, I am convinced that we can in turn also learn something new about the causes and consequences of cynicism in general by looking at these specific organizations in more detail. Ideally, then, the focus on cynicism in IOs can contribute both to the IO literature and to our general understanding of cynicism in the workplace.

The main argument of this section is that international organizations provide particularly fertile ground for cynicism among staff. Although cynicism has never been at the center of IO studies, the phenomenon is touched upon quite often in the IO literature: Various studies on the inner workings of IOs suggest that cynical attitudes are very common within such organizations. This is true, for example, of Barnett's study of the UN Secretariat (2002, 132) and Weaver's analysis of the World Bank (2008, 187). Neumann makes similar observations, citing diplomats who report deep-seated cynicism among colleagues ("I don't think the public knows how cynical we are", – Neumann 2012, 124), while Rauch describes a "flourishing cynicism in the development industry" (1993, 250). Last but not least, cynicism can also be observed among the inhabitants of Autesserre's *Peaceland,* "who are convinced that they can't do anything to change the state of the world they live in" (Autesserre 2021, 10; see also Bargués 2020, 239).

However, to move beyond scattered anecdotes and arrive at robust results, a more systematic examination of cynicism within IOs is needed. Consequently, in the following I will identify four reasons why IOs provide particularly fertile ground for cynical attitudes among employees.

3.1 Causes: Why IOs Provide Particularly Fertile Ground for Cynicism Among Staff

In this section, I discuss four characteristics of IOs that can foster the development of cynicism among IO employees: (1) the clash of noble ideals and harsh reality, (2) organized hypocrisy, (3) ambivalence and dilemmas in daily work, and (4) the practice of political appointment of senior leadership. Obviously, this is not an exhaustive list. Instead, I have selected the four factors that I believe have the greatest impact with regard to the context of this article. My selection is based on three reasons: First, the importance of these characteristics can be deductively derived from the existing literature on "organizational cynicism" as they relate to the arguments from sociology and management theory discussed in section 2 (e. g., psychological contract theory; value conflicts). Second, these factors also emerged inductively as the most salient in the course of my interviews (see section 4). Third and finally, these four characteristics are particularly pronounced in IOs compared with other organizations.

(1) Clash of noble ideals and harsh reality

One reason for the widespread cynicism within IOs may lie in the apparent clash of noble ideals and harsh reality on the ground that these organizations embody like few others. IOs can be seen as "palaces of hope" (Niezen and Sapignoli 2017): The UN, for example, aims to save the world from the "scourge of war" – as stated in the preamble to the UN Charter adopted in 1945. Other IOs want nothing less than to end global hunger or stop climate change. It is hard to imagine more ambitious organizational goals. In this sense, IOs pursue extremely high ideals – and therefore often attract individuals who have a strong altruistic motivation: "Most individuals join IOs because they want to make a difference and contribute to important societal issues" (Giauque and Varone 2018, 345).

At the same time, however, IO staff repeatedly become painfully aware of the limits of their own ability to act. It has been noted time and again that IOs are often inadequately funded in relation to their many tasks. Moreover, IOs are almost always active in highly politicized fields, and thus politically dependent on, and constrained by, major geopolitical powers, rich donor states, or host governments. Last but not least, some of their goals simply remain out of reach – at least for the foreseeable future. As a result, there is often a corresponding "disconnection between grand aspirations and the day-to-day reality" (Niezen and Sapignoli 2017, 21) in IOs. It should therefore come as no surprise if IO employees become cynical over

time. It may be assumed that the higher the expectations and hopes the greater the disappointment and cynicism when they are not fulfilled (Schindler 2018, 101).

(2) Organized hypocrisy

A second reason for the development of cynical attitudes among IO staff may stem from the necessity of "organized hypocrisy" for IOs.[2] Compared with private companies, IOs often face highly contradictory expectations and conflicting goals. Different international actors have divergent interests, all of which must be met by the IO if it is to survive in the long run (the "multiple audiences" of the UN; Daugirdas 2019, 226). For Brunsson, "organized hypocrisy" is the answer to the question of how organizations can deal with such contradictory demands. He defines this hypocrisy as a necessary "difference between words and deeds" (Brunsson 2002, xiii) – as it is precisely the "decoupling" of talk and action that allows organizations to fulfil contradictory expectations (Brunsson 2002: xiv; see also Meyer and Rowan 1977).

The functionality of organized hypocrisy for IOs has been addressed in several studies: By decoupling formulated principles and practical action, IOs ensure their organizational survival (Weaver 2008) and remain capable of action (Lipson 2007). At the same time, however, organized hypocrisy can also lead to problems within IOs (Christian 2022). Among other things, it can be assumed that perceived discrepancies between the organization's words and deeds evoke cynicism among IO staff. In section 2, organizational cynicism was defined as the belief that the organization lacks integrity – and hypocrisy is the exact opposite of integrity. According to the Cambridge Dictionary, integrity refers to "the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles".[3] IO employees who observe a discrepancy between "talk" and "action" will thus neither believe that their organization is honest nor that it has strong moral principles. Instead, it can be expected that they will become cynical in the face of perceived hypocrisy.

(3) Ambivalences and dilemmas in daily work

However, cynicism may not only be a reaction to deficiencies in the organization (shortcomings in actual implementation; hypocrisy with regard to noble ideals), but also a consequence of the inherent dilemmas that IO employees are confronted with in their daily work (see also Dairon, this issue). These dilemmas arise from the conflicting external expectations and demands that IOs face (see above). As a result, IOs develop multifaceted identities that often "dictate contradictory goals and practices" (Billerbeck 2020, 207) for IO staff:

> *Most IOs have operational, normative, and institutional… identities that are fragmented and often contradictory… This, in turn, renders it difficult*

2 The following argument is developed in more detail in Christian (2021; 2022).
3 Source: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/integrity (31.01.2022).

> *for IO staff to maintain a sense of their own legitimacy: if they are compelled to violate principles or behaviors appropriate to one side of their identity in order to comply with those appropriate to another, they are unlikely to feel an overall sense of the rightness or appropriateness of their wor*k. (Billerbeck 2020, 211; see also Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 26)

IO employees are thus forced to select one "identity" (e.g., normative vs. operational) and prioritize one set of principles above others to keep being able to take action. In doing so, IO staff members (have to) "violate" the principles and imperatives of other organizational identities: They can never satisfy all conflicting demands equally – they always do it wrong, *too*. Cynicism could be a necessary individual coping strategy in this regard.

Also of interest in this context is Capella and Jamieson's idea that cynicism can be contagious (1997, 210). Building on this idea, it could be argued that cynicism directed at IOs from the outside (by activists, journalists, diplomats) may affect the IO staff as well: Certainly not in the direct sense that cynical criticism from the outside automatically leads to employees being convinced that they are doing it all wrong, but rather in the sense that employees in IOs are permanently confronted with the *ambivalence of their own work*. Especially for IO employees – who often have high ideals and want to do "something good" – constantly experiencing ambivalence and failure could well lead to the development of cynical attitudes over time.[4]

Another dilemma IO staff face is that their daily work is inherently political, but must not be perceived as such (Louis and Mertens 2021). After all, it is – as Barnett and Finnemore put it – the "myth of depoliticization" (2004, 21) that gives IOs power in the first place. IOs and their staff therefore practice a form of "self-effacement" (2004, 21) to maintain this appearance of neutrality. Nair even calls these practices of IO bureaucrats "servant performances" that require "emotional labor" (2020, 573). While these strategies may be functional and necessary externally, they can cause frictions internally. Very often, IO employees are aware of the political nature of their work, and they know about the political processes at play. The fact that they nevertheless have to maintain the façade of apolitical neutrality to the outside world can lead to cynicism among IO staff, as it – once again – calls into question the integrity of the organization and everybody involved.

(4) Political appointments of senior leadership

A fourth factor that makes IOs a particularly fertile environment for cynical attitudes is the common practice of making political senior leadership appointments. High-level appointments are often made at IOs on the basis of political considerations – for example, to meet the demands of certain member states or to comply with a certain geographical proportionality (Oksamytna et al. 2021). In some cases, this can

4 For an example of IO staff being disappointed in themselves for failing to live up to their own ideals, see Barnett's analysis of the UN Secretariat during the genocide in Rwanda 1994 (2002, 132).

lead to candidates not possessing the required competencies to a sufficient degree. However, even those executives who have all the necessary qualities in abundance are confronted with a structural problem in such a setting. Political appointments are always a potential trigger for employees to devalue and delegitimize their managers: Politically appointed leaders are exposed to a form of generalized suspicion and a particular pressure to justify they have been appointed, as they do not benefit from the leap of faith that comes with (supposedly) meritocratic selection. Rather, IO employees often approach these managers with cynicism.

The "assumption of self-interest" (Schindler 2018, 97) lies at the heart of this attitude. A frequently raised accusation, for example, is that IO leaders who come "from the outside" are not as deeply rooted in the organization, and care more about their own careers and legacy than the success of the IO (Weiss 2012, 111; see for a critique Schindler 2018). Moreover, non-transparent political appointments can arouse suspicion of sinister machinations and political intrigues behind the scenes. This, in turn, leads IO employees to doubt the allegiance and integrity of their senior leadership: IO employees can never be completely sure – when push comes to shove – whether their superiors will represent the interests of the IO or the interests of their home country. Whether these assumptions and accusations are true or not is irrelevant: political appointments undermine the acceptance and authority of leadership and thus prepare fertile ground for cynical attitudes to form among IO staff.

3.2 Consequences: A "Cynicism Trap" in IOs

Having discussed the specific factors that make cynicism especially likely to emerge in IOs, this section takes a closer look at the possible consequences of cynical attitudes among IO staff. My central argument is that cynicism is a *trap*: It may provide short-term relief for IO employees, but by preventing organizational reform it also reproduces and perpetuates the very reasons why that temporary relief is necessary in the first place.

Cynicism, as has already been made clear, is a double-edged sword with ambivalent effects. Given the discussion in the previous section (3.1), the development of cynical attitudes may be quite functional for IO staff from an *individual* perspective. Cynicism can be understood as a kind of self-protection that allows IO employees to cope with lack of faith in the integrity of their organization as well as constantly experiencing ambivalences and failure in their daily work. At the same time, however, cynicism can also have negative consequences (see section 2). From an *organizational* perspective, cynicism is dysfunctional: It can diminish organizational performance and make successful change less likely.

With regard to diminished organizational performance by IOs, reference can be made to, for example, the work of Trettin and Junk on "spoilers from within" (2013). The authors advocate taking the "human factor" (2014, 24) more seriously

in IOs, arguing that "the individual civil servant can be one origin of a decrease in efficiency in bureaucratic organizations" (Trettin and Junk 2014, 17). They introduce to IO research the concept of bureaucratic spoilers – "individuals or a small group of actors … working against the interest of the organization" (Trettin and Junk 2014, 21) – and distinguish between three different manifestations (dissent-shirking, obstruction, sabotage). Although the authors themselves say nothing about individual motives for bureaucratic spoiling, it seems plausible that strong cynicism among IO employees could at least encourage such behavior.

Regarding organizational change, cynicism as a well-known "barrier to change" (Reichers et al. 1997, 48; see section 2) is particularly problematic in IOs because reforms and substantive change are generally already quite difficult in these organizations (Weaver 2008; Sondarjee 2021). Many IOs are engaged in constant reform loops – "perpetual reform" in the words of Brunsson (2009, 1) – that produce little actual change. These countless (and failed) reform attempts in the history of the organization not only generate dissatisfaction among IO employees (Weaver 2008; Christian 2022) but can also lead to cynical attitudes toward future change initiatives. Ironically, cynicism can thus become a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy:

> *Cynicism about organizational change can become a self-fulfilling prophecy if cynics refuse to support change. Their lack of support may bring about failure or very limited success. The failure then reinforces cynical beliefs, which further inhibit the willingness to try again.* (Reichers et al. 1997, 48)

A vicious circle begins: change is prevented by cynicism, the lack of change in turn reinforces cynicism, which again makes change more difficult. Inspired by Weaver's "hypocrisy trap" (2008), we can therefore speak of a *cynicism trap* in international organizations that is "easy to fall into and hard to get out of" (Weaver 2008, 8). Though cynicism may serve as a shield safeguarding the individual employee, the IO as a whole gets into trouble when cynical attitudes spread among IO staff. Cynicism then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that creates a dynamic from which the organization is scarcely able to free itself again (Jones 2019). Organizational cynicism thus poses the grave danger of paradoxically reinforcing and perpetuating the very problems and discrepancies in the IO from which individual employees actually want to protect themselves. Cynicism prevents organizational reforms from succeeding and deficiencies from being remedied; the existing problems are perhaps not completely ignored, but nevertheless accepted in the end.

In this sense, cynicism is to be understood as a "conservative force" (Fleming and Spicer 2003, 160) that preserves the status quo. It misleads IO employees into the *illusion* that they are distancing themselves from their own (hypocritical) organization and that they are not "complicit". While this provides IO employees with some sort of "breathing space" (Fleming and Spicer 2003, 160, 167) and short-term relief, it is in fact a form of self-deception. After all, this "resistance" has

no consequences at all because IO employees still end up reproducing the existing organizational practices: "Cynical employees have the impression that they are autonomous, but they still practice the corporate rituals nonetheless" (Fleming and Spicer 2003, 157). Employees distance themselves, and yet carry on as before – this is more or less how cynicism can be described in IOs, too. All in all, it becomes clear that cynicism is a *wolf in sheep's clothing* for IO staff: As tempting as cynicism may be as a coping strategy, ultimately it is a trap that poses a danger to both the IO and individual employee by preventing necessary change.[5]

4 Empirical Illustration: Cynicism in the UN Secretariat

4.1 Case Study and Methods

To illustrate and substantiate the theoretical arguments outlined in the previous sections, I draw on insights gained in 52 in-depth interviews with staff members in the UN Secretariat. The interviews were conducted as part of a case study on organizational learning processes in the UN Peace & Security pillar. Most of the people I interviewed were employed in the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), but I also spoke with staff from other departments and offices, such as the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (DoM), the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) or the UN Ethics Office.

The majority of people interviewed were mid-career staff (P3 to P5). However, my interviews cover many different positions and levels of hierarchy, including Assistant-Secretary-Generals, Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, Chiefs of Staff, Heads of Office, Directors, Team Leaders, Senior Officers, Political Officers, Policy and Best Practice Officers, Junior Officers and last but not least a (former) trainee. With only very few exceptions, all interview requests were granted; self-selection was thus not observed. All interview partners were guaranteed anonymity to allow open conversations. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, about half of the interviews were conducted online or by phone between October 2019 and July 2021, while the other half were conducted in person during a field research stay of several weeks in New York City.

In the interviews, I followed a loose interview guideline but tried to be as open as possible to the viewpoint of the people I was interviewing in order to avoid priming. It is important to note, for example, that I did not explicitly ask them about cynicism. Only when my interview partners brought up the subject on their own did I sometimes ask a follow-up question about it. The interviews were all transcribed

5 While the status quo-preserving effect of cynicism may be welcomed by some actors in an organization, inertia definitely becomes a problem in the long run as IOs must constantly adapt and change if they want to survive in an ever-changing environment.

and then analyzed – facilitated by MAXQDA software – using qualitative content analysis inspired by Kuckartz (2018, 100).

Before moving on to the empirical results, an important preliminary remark must be made. In the following, I will describe many examples of cynicism within the UN Secretariat. This, however, should not lead to a distorted picture or biased impression. It is important to note that not *all* UN employees are cynical. Such a description would not only be inaccurate, but would also be cynical itself. Even if some staff members describe it this way (see, for example, the quote at the beginning of this article, "We are all cynical"), this does not necessarily mean that it is true – because it is inappropriate to "treat allegations as facts" (Schindler 2018, 103). Instead, I will try to describe a phenomenon that indeed seems to be widespread, but certainly should not be viewed in overly simplistic black-and-white terms. It should thus be kept in mind that there are "varying degrees of cynicism" (Dean et al. 1998, 347) within the UN Secretariat.

4.2 Empirical Analysis

By zooming in on the UN Secretariat, I first show that cynical attitudes are indeed widespread among UN employees: The people I interviewed described themselves and their colleagues as cynical, although to varying degrees and for different reasons, which I present according to the structure of the four IO characteristics explored in section 3. Second, I discuss selected examples of the various manifestations of cynical attitudes among UN staff and their practical consequences. In line with the discussion above, the interviews demonstrate that cynicism can be an individual coping strategy, but also has serious consequences for IOs.

Causes of cynicism within the UN Secretariat

First of all, the interviews in the UN Secretariat support the assumption made at the very beginning – namely that many IO staff members are driven by a high degree of idealistic motivation. In line with the results of various surveys,[6] my interviewees attribute this altruistic motivation both to themselves and to their UN colleagues:

> *I'm in the UN because I want to make a difference.*
>
> *People come to the UN with a kind of vocation … You know, with this sort of calling thing.*

At the same time (or perhaps for that very reason), there is also a lot of cynicism among UN staff. According to many of my interview partners, cynical attitudes are widespread within the UN Secretariat:

6 See, for example, Giauque and Varone (2018, 350). Similarly, the internal "UN Staff Engagement Survey 2019" shows that of the almost 19 000 UN staff members surveyed, 89 % agree with the statement "I am proud to work for the UN Secretariat" (Lynch 2020).

Cynicism is something you find here a lot.

We are all cynical, you know …

There are many different reasons for this, but overall my interviews substantiate the theoretical assumptions discussed above (see section 3.1). First, the oft-perceived (1) *gap between noble ideals and harsh reality* is indeed portrayed as an important source of cynicism. For example, one interview partner refers to a "stark asymmetry" between a "totally value-driven work environment" on the one hand, and a "reality that is crashingly opposed to it" on the other. According to many interview partners, it is the "political realities" that often lead to the UN not following its own ideals and principles. This, then, evokes cynicism among UN staff – especially in the area of peacekeeping, as this interview quote illustrates:

> *For the Uighurs in China, we do fuck all. Because China is a veto power. In Myanmar, I'm still waiting for the peacekeeping mission to be set up. But what peace? They're not even in conflict, apparently.*

However, perceived (2) *hypocrisy* within their own organization can also be a reason for cynicism, since in the UN Secretariat "saying and doing are two different things," as one interviewee put it. In my interviews, UN employees repeatedly express doubts about the integrity of their own organization and its leadership:

> *We tell the world what to do – but in the meantime, within the system … How can you preach about something you are not doing in your own organization?!*

> *When high-ranking UN officials make idealistic statements, it's just rhetoric, just blah-blah. It's "talk" that gets adopted depending on what's in vogue at the moment. […] It's a theater, a game.*

Furthermore, cynicism is also described by some staff members as a coping strategy for dealing with the existing (3) *ambivalences and dilemmas* in daily work. According to one person interviewed, UN employees work in a "crazy organization" where certain protective mechanisms are necessary. Here, my interview partners refer, among other things, to the inherent ambivalences of working with (and depending on) member states, and to the fundamental dilemmas of conducting peacekeeping missions ("You will never get it right in peacekeeping"). Last but not least, the experience of repeated failures in UN peacekeeping also seems to be a frequent trigger for cynicism, as several of the people interviewed point out:

> *I was in the field … At some point you just don't believe in it anymore. Then you get really cynical, because you keep seeing or hearing bad things and you don't know whether the mission is actually doing any good.*

Finally, the issue of (4) *politically appointed leadership* also plays a major role in my interviews. Within the UN Secretariat there is indeed a general suspicion that high-

level executives often act only out of self-interest. My interview partners criticize "turf battles" and other internal disputes at the higher levels and are cynical about their leadership's willingness to bring about significant change:

> *Those who have made it to the top are often not those who really want to make a difference. They care first and foremost about their own careers.*

Consequences of cynicism within the UN Secretariat

The negative consequences of cynicism in the UN Secretariat are manifold and cannot be discussed in full detail within the scope of this article. Instead, I will highlight only a few selected phenomena that featured particularly prominently in my interviews. Showing that cynicism can foster demotivation and inertia, lead to exit from the organization, and frustrate organizational change, I demonstrate that cynicism is indeed a "trap" for IOs and their staff.

First, cynicism can reduce UN employees' motivation over time and make them more reluctant to try new things, as these two quotes illustrate:

> *When I came here 20 years ago I loved it. I gave my heart and soul to this place. But especially now, in my position, where I can really look behind the doors, behind the scenes, and see how bad it is … I'm not going to waste my time for these people.*

> *When you've run against the wall five times, then at some point you say: Well, the probability that it will work the next time … You know?*

However, cynicism also manifests itself in far more drastic forms. While some interview participants express despair, others openly think about leaving the UN:

> *I don't want to be so cynical, but I just don't see a path forward.*

> *At some point, you get fed up and decide to step out for the sake of your own health or integrity.*

In fact, some interview participants report that many former colleagues have left the organization in great frustration after initial euphoria. This is, of course, a problem for the UN, because the organization loses a lot of potential as a result. In addition to demotivation, despair, and exit, cynicism also impedes organizational change in the UN Secretariat, as anticipated in section 3. Some UN employees no longer take the ever new reform attempts seriously. They prefer to ride them out rather than to play an active role in shaping them:

> *Sometimes you just disconnect. You hear: "Oh, we're going to implement this great new reform!" And you're like: Oh my God, it's like every year there's something new. Can we just do our work?*

Interestingly, some interview participants themselves mention and reflect on the potential dangers of organizational cynicism. For example, they criticize the cynical attitude of some colleagues who think that UN staff cannot change anything and that leadership alone is responsible for all existing problems. The following statement, which explicitly refers to a "cynicism trap" (without me having asked about it), is a good example of many similar reflections in the interviews. Consequently, it is quoted at length here as a kind of conclusion:

> *I would say that cynicism is a coping mechanism, because when you see what's happening, you need to rationalize it one way or the other … But there is a risk, and some colleagues fall into that trap, that you end up being so cynical that you basically block everything and no longer believe that change is possible at all. And that's where we have a lot of problems. There are many people who say, "Oh, nothing ever changes, I shouldn't even try to make an effort or support any kind of change, no, I'll keep doing what I've always done and wait for retirement".*[7]

5 Conclusion: Cynicism in IOs and Beyond

The insights of this article can be briefly summarized as follows. First, IOs provide a particularly fertile ground for cynicism among staff. More specifically, I identified four IO characteristics that can foster the development of cynical attitudes within these organizations: (1) the clash of noble ideals and harsh reality, (2) organized hypocrisy, (3) ambivalences and dilemmas in daily work, and (4) political appointments of senior leadership. Second, this cynicism within IOs must be understood as a trap: It may provide short-term relief for IO staff (as a coping strategy), but (much like a self-fulfilling prophecy) it also perpetuates the very reasons why that short-term relief is necessary in the first place.

By taking a narrowly focused look at cynicism in IOs, this article makes a twofold contribution. On the one hand, it develops a fruitful lens for better understanding of international organizations "as organizations" (for an overview see Badache and Kimber, this issue). Shedding light on the causes and consequences of cynical attitudes among IO staff deepens our understanding of the inner workings of IOs and allows us to look at the internal pathologies of these unique actors in world politics from a new angle. On the other hand, the insights of this article also

7 Paradoxically, even those employees who succeed in getting things changed can fall into the "cynicism trap." Given the many obstacles to organizational change, some UN employees use informal ways to change certain processes. Ironically, however, these successful but informal practices can also lead to cynicism among UN employees: "There are these little changes that you can make at the informal level, but that's not gonna solve your cynicism. Because you're just like, 'Okay, look, this is just a proof of what I'm saying: this organization is so dysfunctional that the only way to get anything done is to do it informally. So it's almost like a vicious cycle."

contribute to our understanding of workplace cynicism in general. By examining IOs in more detail, we can – for example – learn something about certain causes of cynicism that have not yet been considered in mainstream organizational research, such as the internal consequences of organized hypocrisy or political appointments. My findings thus open up new avenues for research, especially for the analysis of similar organizations such as NGOs or public administrations at the national level. Based on the exploratory single-case study in this article, future analysis should therefore strive for more systematization and a comparison across different IOs or between IOs and other organizations.

Last but not least, the results of this article are also of political relevance: What happens when those who are supposed to make our world a better place do not believe in change themselves? What if those who are expected to focus their work on realizing our highest ideals turn out to be cynical? The answer to these questions could easily make one cynical oneself. However, the empirical results of this study also give reason for hope. My interviews indicate that many UN employees have a high tolerance for ambiguity and frustration. They look for coping strategies other than cynicism and transform their frustration into motivation to change things for the better – at least within their sphere of influence. Thus, the idealism of many UN staff is apparently much more tenacious than might be thought, as this concluding interview quote demonstrates: "We are all cynical, but that does not mean that we have lost our idealism".

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

Marc Szydlik (Hrsg.)

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Tochter, Sohn, Mutter, Vater. Wie ist das Verhältnis von Erwachsenen zu ihren Eltern? Welche Rolle spielen Spannungen und Konflikte? Wie stark sind Zusammenhalt und Unterstützung? Das Buch widmet sich den Beziehungen zwischen Erwachsenen und ihren Eltern in allen wesentlichen Facetten. Die Befunde basieren auf der schweizweiten SwissGen-Studie. Dabei werden die aktuellen Beziehungen zu den Eltern und die früheren Bindungen zu mittlerweile verstorbenen Müttern und Vätern untersucht.

Im ersten Buchteil geht es um Ambivalenz, Stress, Streit und Distanz. Dazu gehören gemischte und wechselnde Gefühle, Sorgen und Belastungen, Spannung und Konflikt, Gleichgültigkeit und Entfremdung. Der zweite Teil behandelt Bindung, Raum, Zeit und Geld. Dies beinhaltet emotionale Enge und Kontakt, Koresidenz und Entfernung, Hilfe und Pflege, aktuelle Transfers und Erbschaften.

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Internal Dynamics as Drivers of Change in International Organizations: The Economists' Takeover at the World Bank

Mirek Tobiáš Hošman*

Abstract: Using the largely untapped episode of the reconstruction of the World Bank's Economics Department in the mid-1960s, this article aims to augment our theoretical and empirical understanding of intra-organizational change in international organizations (IOs). By analyzing the instruments and mechanisms of dynamic staff agency, it highlights the capacity of norm entrepreneurs, professional groups, and internal administrative units to shape activities and initiate a change of IOs. The article makes a case for a more dynamic constructivist approach to the study of IOs and their ecosystems.

Keywords: World Bank, International Organizations, Constructivism, Organizational Ecosystem, International Public Administration

Interne Dynamiken als Treiber von Wandel in internationalen Organisationen: Die Übernahme der Ökonomen bei der Weltbank

Zusammenfassung: Anhand der weitgehend unerschlossenen Episode des Wiederaufbaus der Weltbank Mitte der 1960er Jahre, vertieft dieser Artikel unser theoretisches und empirisches Verständnis des intraorganisatorischen Wandels in internationalen Organisationen (IO). Durch die Analyse der Instrumente und Mechanismen der dynamisch Personalvertretung wird die Fähigkeit von Normunternehmern, Berufsgruppen und internen Verwaltungseinheiten hervorgehoben, Aktivitäten zu gestalten und Veränderungen in IO zu initiieren. Der Artikel plädiert für einen dynamisch-konstruktivistischen Ansatz bei der Untersuchung internationaler Organisationen und ihrer Ökosysteme.

Schlüsselwörter: Weltbank, internationale Organisationen, Konstruktivismus, Organisatorisches Ökosystem, Internationale öffentliche Verwaltung

Les dynamiques internes comme moteurs de changement des organisations internationales : la prise de pouvoir des économistes à la Banque mondiale

Résumé : À travers le cas peu connu de la reconstruction du Département des affaires économiques de la Banque mondiale au milieu des années 1960, cet article vise à élagir notre compréhension théorique et empirique du changement intra-organisationnel dans les organisations internationales (OI). En analysant les instruments et les mécanismes de l'agence dynamique du personnel, il révèle la capacité des entrepreneurs de normes, des groupes professionnels et des unités administratives internes à façonner les activités et introduire des changements dans les OI. De cette façon, l'article plaide pour une approche constructiviste plus dynamique dans l'étude des organisations internationales et de leurs écosystèmes.

Mots-clés : Banque Mondiale, organisations internationales, constructivisme, écosystème organisationnel, administration publique internationale

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1 Introduction[1]

Before Irving Friedman joined the World Bank in 1964, he had met for lunch with George Woods, the then-president of the Bank (1963–1968), who wanted to convince Friedman to accept the job of being his economic advisor. At that time, however, the position of economists and the role of economic analysis at the Bank was markedly different from what it is today. Nowadays, the World Bank is often portrayed as the reign of economists and it enjoys a considerable power in the discourse on economic development with scholars describing it as "an arbiter of development knowledge" (Bazbauers 2016, 410) and "the research powerhouse of the development world" (Broad 2006, 397). Yet, nothing like this was true before the re-emergence of the Bank's research department (the Economics Department) in the mid-1960s. Friedman was about to learn that "it would be a demotion in the Bank to be called an economist […] and death for a career" (Friedman 1974, 23–24). Thus, upon accepting Woods's offer, Friedman helped to initiate the elevation of economists and economic analysis to the top levels of the Bank's operations with considerable consequences on the Bank's activities.

This largely untapped episode of the establishment of the Bank's economic capabilities presents an interesting puzzle for theoretical approaches employed by scholars of international organizations (IOs), especially those which assume a monolithic nature of IOs and the decisive role of states on their behavior (Keohane and Nye 1971; Mearsheimer 1994/1995; Krasner 1995; Lake and McCubbins 2006; Rittberger et al. 2006; Da Conceiçao-Heldt 2010). On the contrary, the changes described in this article were primarily driven by events inside the Bank, without guidelines from the Bank's shareholders, and without following an explicit reorganization strategy promoted by senior management. Such endogenous dynamics often escape the notice of the mentioned theoretical perspectives (Koch 2013). Approaches building on the insights coming from organizational sociology try to account for the inner dynamics of the IOs in analyzing their change and behavior (for a literature review see Badache and Kimber, this issue), yet these approaches often remain overly concerned with structural features of the organizational environment and are generally inward-looking, ignoring the larger organizational ecosystem. The individuals working at IOs are usually analyzed as a more or less homogeneous group or a component of an organization labeled "staff". Attempts to introduce a more agency-focused view on IOs staff members often present a too narrow and overly

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schematic conceptualization of their behavior (some of the exceptions are Kardam 1993; Chwieroth 2008; Weaver 2008; Alacevich 2016; Nay 2020; Moloney 2022).

Using the reconstruction of the World Bank's Economics Department as a case in point, this article aims at improving our theoretical and empirical understanding of intra-organizational change of IOs. It analyzes the instruments and mechanisms of dynamic staff agency and highlights the capacity of norm entrepreneurs, professional groups, and internal administrative units to shape activities and initiate a change of IOs. From a theoretical perspective, insights from organizational sociology on bureaucratic culture, internal norms, and institutional resiliance elicit a more dynamic constructivist approach to the study of IOs and their ecosystems (Nay 2020; Dairon and Badache 2021). The empirical analysis, besides illustrating the theoretical points on an overlooked episode of the Bank's organizational life, also contributes to the examination of the role of economists and economic expertise in IOs, a field opened up by Bob Coats (1986; 1996) on which the archival research is still limited.[2]

The next section constructs a theoretical framework pursuant to sociological perspectives on organizations to the study of IOs. It emphasizes the bureaucratic and cultural features of IOs and their ecosystems and underlines the possibilities and limits of dynamic staff agency. The complex image of an organization arising from the theoretical section serves as the guideline for the subsequent empirical analysis of the reconstruction of the Economics Department at the World Bank in the mid-1960s. The last section concludes.

2 Theorizing Change in International Organizations

2. 1 IOs as Autonomous Bureaucratic Actors: The Birth of Constructivism

The theoretical analysis of IOs experienced an interesting evolution throughout past decades. Although it would seem natural for the scholarship to develop inside the field of international relations (IR), Verbeek aptly pointed out that the study of IOs had for a long time been considered as "the ugly duckling of the discipline of international relations" (1998, 11). Due to the prevailing statist ontology of the IR scholarship, IR scholars conceptualized IOs as unitary, monolithic objects whose operational autonomy was significantly constrained by their member states. Therefore, they ignored IOs as bureaucratic actors in their own right (Ness and Brechin 1988; Brechin and Ness 2013; Koch 2013) and mainly focused on the political dynamics among states taking place "under the roof" of IOs. Although the scholarship prioritized the position of states in the analysis of IOs' behavior, stud-

2 Coats had written extensively on the institutionalization and professionalization of economics and on the role of economists and their expertise in the public sector (1978; 1993; 2000). Berman (2022) provides a recent examination of the role of economic expertise in the US public sector.

ies based on principal-agent (PA) theory also provided the theoretical possibility of IOs acting as autonomous actors (Nielson and Tierney 2003; Hawkins et al. 2006; Tamm and Snidal 2014).

Yet once it was theoretically conceivable that IOs can act as autonomous agents, questions such as how IOs form their preferences, how and why they undergo changes, what inner processes shape their behavior, and which factors influence the ideas that IOs promote on the global scene surfaced. However, the scholarship suffered from its narrow view of IOs as facilitators of negotiations among states facing collective action problems, and the PA model generally failed in accounting for what the IOs do with their autonomy (Chwieroth 2008). To answer these newly emerged questions, scholars needed to look beyond IR to discover new perspectives and analytical tools.

The work of Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore showed the potential of sociologically-inspired views of IOs. Building upon their central thesis stating that "we can better understand what IOs *do* if we better understand what IOs *are*" (2004, 9, emphasis in the original) they started bridging the gap between organizational sociology and IOs scholarship by reconceptualizing IOs as "autonomous and powerful actors in global politics" (1999, 700) and thus directly challenging the predominant view, especially in the IR discipline. Their work has quickly become one of the most influential applications of sociologically-inspired perspectives in the IOs scholarship and served as the foundational basis for the so-called constructivist approach to the study of IOs.[3] What had once been perceived as a nearly insurmountable distance between the study of IOs and organizational sociology (Ness and Brechin 1988) began to shrink. As shown in the introduction to the present Special Issue (Badache and Kimber, this issue), studies of IOs using the concepts and theories from organizational sociology penetrated the field. Furthermore, the recognition of IOs as *organizations* recently inspired studies, which analyze international bureaucracies relying on the insights from the field of Public Administration (see Eckhard and Ege 2016; Bauer et al. 2017; Fleischer and Reiners 2021; Thorvaldsdottir et al. 2021).

Alongside opening the "black box" of IOs and acknowledging their bureaucratic setting as inescapable for the analysis of IOs behavior, the sociologically-inspired scholarship highlighted the importance of organizational culture and its effects on the behavior and functioning of IOs. The study of cultural features – such as shared ideas about the objectives of the organization, routinized patterns of interaction, and standard operating procedures – and their impact on the behavior of organizations has a long tradition in organizational sociology, especially among (neo)institutional theorists (see Selznick 1957; Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio

3 The constructivist approach takes its name from social constructivism, a sociological approach that emphasizes social constructs such as shared meanings, identities, norms, and other ideational factors in the analysis of social reality (Berger and Luckmann 1967). Regardless of the similarities, it should not be confused with the constructivist theory in IR, which has its origins in the work of Alexander Wendt (1999) and focuses on shared identities in international politics.

and Powell 1983; Meyer and Scott 1983). Following the early efforts of Berger and Luckmann (1967), institutionalists stressed the importance of regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive aspects of organizations and research on organizational culture thus tended to focus on symbolic elements, traditions, organizational practices, schemas and typifications (see Albert and Whetten 1985; Dutton et al. 1994; Scott 1995; 2004). From these discussions, organizational culture developed into a complex phenomenon; a product of collectively shared beliefs and internal conflicts that becomes institutionalized and passed on as the rules, rituals, and values of the bureaucracy (Vaughan 1996). Once entrenched, organizational culture provides the individuals working in the organization with the appropriate sets of actions, strategies, interpretations, and constraints.

Barnett, Finnemore, and other scholars who have been bringing the insights from organizational sociology to the study of IOs rightly point out that individuals with a diverse professional background, who are often integrated into different administrative units in IOs, can "develop their own cognitive frameworks that are consistent with but still distinct from those of the larger organization" (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 39; see also Martin and Siehl 1983; Kardam 1993; Reinalda and Verbeek 2004; Sarfaty 2009). Lines of conflict between different units, departments, and divisions as well as between different professions and expertise are constitutive of the character of the organization and its bureaucratic culture (Trondal et al. 2010). Due to these clashes among different internal subgroups with overlapping and often contradictory sets of preferences, organizational coherence is an accomplishment rather than a given. Hierarchical control is thus always incomplete, creating "pockets of autonomy and political battles within the bureaucracy" (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 724). This point is especially valid for compounded IOs such as the World Bank, which are often large, complex organizations with porous managerial structures and blurred multilayered divisions of executive authority (Trondal et al. 2010; Moloney 2022). If one wants to analyze the behavior and developments of such IOs, the usual assumption that IOs change because their stakeholders want them to change becomes insufficient. The reconceptualization of IOs as bureaucracies demands combining the analysis of exogenous factors with the analysis of the endogenous dynamics, which translates the exogenous factors into the life of the IO.

2.2 Accounting for Dynamic Agency and Organizational Ecosystems: Towards a Refined Sociological Perspective of IOs

In analyzing endogenous organizational changes, the constructivist approach towards IOs resorts to the concept of a norm entrepreneur, i.e. an inner actor who pursues changes in organizational culture in order to achieve a change of behavior of the IO. The success of norm entrepreneurs in promoting new cultural features depends on their discursive influence within the organization, which enables them to outperform the advocates of alternative views (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998;

Chwieroth 2008). However, organizational culture, once firmly rooted, becomes quite stable and robust as the prevailing cultural features will resist attempts of radical modifications (Momani 2005). By taking on a specific bureaucratic culture, the organization develops a concern for self-maintenance and acquires a distinguishable identity (Hatch and Schultz 2002; Pullen and Linstead 2005). Scott observes that "[m]aintaining the organization is no longer simply an instrumental matter of survival but becomes a struggle to preserve a set of unique values" (1995, 18–19). Organizational culture can therefore rarely be manipulated easily, even by powerful principals, and the changes are typically slow, path-dependent, and often come as incremental alterations in response to current deficiencies (March and Simon 1958; Martin and Siehl 1983; Kapur 2000; Leiteritz 2005; Nielson et al. 2006).

A classic dilemma of agency versus structure arises from the debates on the role and practices of norm entrepreneurs (Crozier and Friedberg 1980; Giddens 1984; Sewell 1992). If the organizational culture is constitutive of the behavior of the organization's officials, how can they act as agents and change it? This dilemma is only reinforced by prominent approaches among institutional theories that have adopted a rather deterministic view about the extent to which institutions shape agents' behavior (Bell 2011). One way of softening the dilemma is to better understand the behavior of norm entrepreneurs in IOs, especially during episodes of large organizational transformations. How these actors promote their viewpoints, how they are constrained by the organizational settings, how they select strategies of their action and what determines the success of these strategies – answering questions of this sort, both on the theoretical and empirical level, would contribute to the refinement of the constructivist approach to IOs, which has so far left these questions largely untouched. Quite the contrary, the IOs constructivists – together with institutional theorists in general – often tend to overlook the possibilities of staff strategic agency (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). As observed by Chwieroth, in the constructivist analyses of IOs "[s]taff are depicted as overly socialized creatures of habit that are incapable of looking beyond a particular world view and guided solely by the 'logic of appropriateness'. An unduly static understanding of staff behavior … plagues work on organizational culture" (2008, 492). In a similar vein, Nair observes that "[w]hile [international] bureaucrats' servant performances are widely acknowledged, we know very little about how bureaucrats actually perform servant roles, the mental, physical, and emotional labor that goes into staging them, and their effects in enabling bureaucrats to do more than what meets the eye" (2020, 586).

Besides the focus on the "micro-sociological lens on bureaucracy" (Nair 2020; Dairon, this issue; Christian, this issue), the dynamic agency and bureaucratic maneuvering of IOs norm entrepreneurs, broadening the analytical perspective to account for larger organizational ecosystems might also prove useful in refining our sociological understanding of IOs. The organizational ecosystems are made up of individual and collective actors such as experts, academic communities, professional

networks, and non-governmental organizations, which operate in its immediate environment (Nay 2020). Most importantly, the ecosystem also comprises the organization with its internal administrative units and gives it the central position in the analysis. This helps the analysis not to lose sight of the organization under investigation, which is often the case of other approaches focusing on organizational environments that stress the structural features of organizational fields or international regimes (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995; Verbeek 1998; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Greenwood et al. 2014). Recent work employing the concept of organizational ecosystem demonstrates its potential for the IO scholarship (Nay 2020; Dairon and Badache 2021).

The following investigation of the reconstruction of the World Bank's Economics Department in the mid-1960s adopts the refined constructivist approach discussed here. It relies on documents from the World Bank Group Archives and oral records of selected Bank's personnel from the World Bank's Oral History Program, especially those of Irving Friedman and Andrew Kamarck, the main proponents of the reconstruction. The historical interpretation of these documents brings attention to internal debates at the Bank and provides the analysis of endogenous dynamics sparking change of an IO.

3 Building Up the Economics Department: The Economists' Takeover at the World Bank

3.1 The "Black's Bank"

Under the leadership of its third president Eugene Black (1949–1962), the World Bank developed a strong global reputation as a conservative financial institution with sound judgment when it came to loans and their execution (Alacevich 2009; 2016). The "Black's Bank" was primarily involved in large infrastructure investment projects around the world such as building roads and dams. Although such a modus operandi proved financially successful, the Bank struggled with finding new bankable projects as the borrowers' loan requests often lacked the satisfying quality, regardless of the Bank's incidental attempts to educate the officials from borrowing countries in order to improve the quality of their loans proposals. Among the many factors contributing to this situation was the Bank's professional profile. The investment projects were prepared and executed by the Bank's bankers, lawyers, and technical engineers, i.e. professions which were effectively in command of the Bank's operations. As observed by Friedman:

> *The Bank was an institution of the highest kind of personal integrity, but the fact that you can go for seven years without making a loan to Brazil, or that you wouldn't make a loan to Greece because they still owed you five bucks*

> *from pre-war debts, that didn't seem to bother them. They were just being good, hard-headed bankers. The idea that, in the meantime, you were losing the opportunity to help the economic or social development of a country, that wasn't their job.* (1974, 28)

At that time, the central Economic Staff unit consisted of only a few economists, who were "kept on the leash" (Kapur et al. 1997, 129) since the Bank's reorganization in 1952. Central economists were not directly involved in the preparation and execution of loans and they mostly worked on the analysis of the creditworthiness of the borrowing countries (Alacevich 2016). Since this work was not directly linked to the Bank's operations, the interest in the activities of the department was not overwhelming as can be read in the documents from that time (de Wilde 1962; Avramovic 1964). In the early 1960s, it was a department more in concept than in reality. In fact, the Economic Staff unit lacked the departmental status, it was not allowed to build up, and it did not have a permanent director. Several internal memos pointed out the unsatisfactory setup (de Wilde 1962; Avramovic 1964; Gilmartin 1964; Mason 1964), but the appropriate reaction was missing, mainly because Black seemed content to let the Bank run itself in his last years as the president, after he was slow to recover from a surgery (Oliver 1995). It was generally understood that new incentives will have to come with new leadership.

3.2 From a Bank to a Development Agency: Raising the Voice of Economists

When George Woods became the president of the World Bank during the time of renewed global interest in development, he came to the office with a vision of transforming the Bank into a development agency by strengthening the role of the International Development Association (IDA), the Bank's affiliate, which provides zero to low-interest loans and grants for the poorest countries, and whose resources come from member states' contributions. Woods was aware of the discouraging position of economists at the Bank and of the importance of economic analysis for his objectives. This importance was further reinforced when it was decided that the Bank's president will be put in charge of the second IDA replenishment negotiations. The Bank had played a relatively passive role in the first replenishment, which was mainly the product of the US Treasury in consultation with other governments. Yet if the second IDA replenishment was to become a Bank-driven initiative, the Bank needed a position on how big it should be, how should the concessional money and grants be used, which countries could have access, and for what purposes (Friedman 1985/1986).

In Woods's view, IDA eventually needed to become bigger than the Bank. He explained to Friedman that countries which could afford to service the Bank's loans could get financing from other sources, but as he reportedly told Friedman "the IDA countries are the ones that no one is going to touch but us, so that's where our

emphasis should be" (Friedman 1985/1986, 15). As the gap between developed and developing countries grew and gained attention in global politics, Woods saw IDA as the potential bridge between them, and he assigned Friedman to help him build this bridge by rehabilitating the role of economic analysis at the Bank (Friedman 1974).

Friedman, however, did not find a receptive audience at the World Bank, as the Bank's officials were primarily oriented towards servicing infrastructure loans. They would have been able to "build a bridge", but they were not particularly interested in analyzing the gap between the poor and rich countries or in its economic consequences. Furthermore, Friedman was viewed as an outsider who came into the established institution to a top managerial position closely linked to the president's office, without first climbing the Bank's career ladder, which caused some unease (Demuth 1985). Despite having a strong international reputation for his economic and managerial work at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and earlier at the US Treasury, he did not enjoy the benefits of this reputation inside the Bank (Friedman 1985/1986; 1985a). Partly for this reason, he decided to appoint Andrew Kamarck as the Director of the Economics Department in February 1965 (Friedman 1985/1986).

Kamarck was a long-time Bank insider who worked as the economic advisor to the African Department and was highly regarded both at the Bank and in the economics profession.[4] Notwithstanding having him in the lead, however, only around one quarter of the professional staff with a Ph. D. in economics was willing to participate in the restructuring of the Economics Department. When Kamarck pondered the idea of bringing all economists from area and project departments to the central Economics Department from where they would be seconded to other departments, he quickly realized that "[h]ad they come [in], they probably would have sabotaged the program" (1985a, 24). Many of them liked their job of being economic advisors and a lot of them were skeptical that the central economic department would survive. When asked about his beginnings at the Bank, Friedman recalled in an interview for the Oral History Program that "a lot of people came and spoke to me … about how I wasn't going to last and why did I bother coming here … and [that] I'd be out of a job in a few months because [of] all the tightness of the place, the princes and the dukes of the place [who] would regard this as a threat" (Friedman 1985/1986, 54).

Once it became clear that it would not be possible to staff the Economics Department from the inside, Friedman, Kamarck, and other likeminded economists started recruiting from the outside, especially from academia (de Vries 1986). Their personal professional reputation as economists soon proved to be essential, especially if compared to the World Bank's reputation, which in the economics profession

4 Upon his arrival, Friedman asked selected people in the Bank to put down the names of five people whom they would regard as being most qualified to be the head of the Economics Department. Among others like Dragoslav Avramovic, John Adler and Gerald Alter, Andrew Kamarck was consistently either first or second on all the lists (Friedman 1985/1986).

was that of a place where good economists do not work (Friedman 1985a). In fact, professors of economics at Harvard University still remembered Kamarck from the time he had studied there, which enabled him to have their best students recommended for Bank's positions. Similarly, Friedman contacted people he knew from government agencies and international organizations.[5] Other economists and even new recruits were sending letters, asking their fellows for names of people who would be interested in working at the Bank and offering jobs to recommended candidates (Reutlinger 1968).

This semi-concerted effort resulted in a rapid growth of the department – in 4 years, more than 200 people were hired, which alone increased the staff of the Bank by 25 % (Oliver 1995). It is noteworthy that the hiring process did not follow any managerial strategy as the speed was more important than organizational clarity or strategy of staffing. Kamarck saw the window of opportunity provided by the enormous expansion of the budget and he wanted to fill the open positions as soon as possible. At the same time, the guidance of the department coming from the top managerial levels weakened. Woods, who did not want to be involved in the organizational aspects of the Economics Department in the first place, became largely preoccupied with the problems of the IDA replenishment (Alter 1985; Oliver 1995) and Friedman began to focus almost exclusively on his so-called Supplementary Finance Scheme proposal.[6] Importantly, member states also did not interfere in the building-up of the department. As Friedman pointed out: "[w]e were completely protected from any interference by governments; we never went to a government to ask to recommend anybody; we never even went to them for references" (1985/1986, 57–58).

3.3 "A Very Elaborate Bureaucratic Game"

With the rapid growth of the department, tensions emerged between economists from the area departments and the centralized economic staff of the Economics Department. This was accompanied by the deficient organizational mandate of Friedman. In his position of The Economic Advisor to the President, Friedman was formally responsible for all economic work done at the Bank, including the work done at area departments, although he did not have the administrative control over it (Friedman 1985/1986). Since many area economists thought it was wrong for the Bank to be concerned with the economic analysis of the sort generated by the Economics Department, they preferred to consult their own directors, who also often did not appreciate the new economic work and were reluctant to participate in it (Oliver 1995).

5 See the correspondence related to the recruitments in the archival collection at World Bank Group Archives on the activities of the Economics Department, Folder IDs: 1069863 and 1790412.

6 The Supplementary Finance Scheme was an attempt to deal with unexpected shortfalls of export revenues of developing countries.

This resulted in "a very elaborate bureaucratic game" (Friedman 1985b, 33). In front of Woods, people would not disagree with Friedman, but then they refused to cooperate in practice. If a department director was in favor of the increased role of economic analysis in the Bank, his economists would cooperate, but if he opposed it, his economists tended to be less cooperative (Friedman 1985b). Friedman tried to elevate the status of area economists by making them deputy directors of their departments and therefore by creating a joint leadership of the operational and economic side, but as he noted: "I never could get that accepted even when Woods was there. I was constantly opposed by people who muttered that economists were meant to be advising, that's all" (1985b, 32).

One attempt to reconcile the differences among economists based in different organizational units and thus strengthen the unified professional identity of economists at the Bank was the revitalization of the Economic Committee. The idea was to create a space where economists from all departments could meet, consult their work, and discuss issues with other economists who faced similar or related problems under different circumstances (Oliver 1995). To further facilitate the contacts among economists, Kamarck even initiated an informal monthly luncheon for all the senior economists in the Bank. This turned out to be successful in improving the cooperation among economists and the administration department supported the idea so strongly that it approved adding the costs to the Bank's budget for the first few years. Kamarck also tried to convince the directors of area departments to have monthly lunches with him, but many of them refused to attend (Kamarck 1985a).

As more and more economists were willing to actively participate in the meetings of the Economic Committee, the resistance towards it on the part of economists faded away and it was the centralized economics staff that was gaining the organizational ground as opposed to area economists. Even Sydney Cope, the director of the European Department and a strong adversary of the new dynamics of economic analysis at the Bank, gradually looked to the central economic staff to provide him with economic reports, as his department was constantly shriveling, and he was giving up his economists (Kamarck 1985b).

While tensions among economists weakened, the conflict between economists and other professional groups at the Bank became central as the revitalized Economic Committee was put on a par with the Loan Committee (Kamarck 1985a). The Loan Committee had the constitutional responsibility of recommending a loan for approval to the Board of Governors and it was thus directly involved in the Bank's operations. If Bank's officials wanted to have a loan proposal accepted, they first needed the approval of the Loan Committee. But now the revitalized Economic Committee also had to give its approval and both committees needed to collaborate on a joint memorandum for the Board of Governors. While the Loan Committee discussed the economics of the project, the Economic Committee discussed the

economics of the country and addressed the question of whether the loan proposal was sound from the point of view of development economics (Friedman 1985b).

Such a step represented a real organizational innovation as it elevated the economic analysis to the top levels of the Bank's operations and redrew the lines of inner organizational conflict. In the view of its custodians, the role of Bank's economists could not only be providing a background for decisions. The Economic Committee thus became the answer to the question of how to build a mechanism into the World Bank so that the economic analysis of a country became a major element in its decision-making (Friedman 1985a). The idea of having economists operationally relevant – and also the reason why it had been so strongly opposed at the Bank – led to the attempt to reconfigure the Bank's established modus operandi from the Black's era. The goal of the Bank's activity was now supposed to be the economic development of countries accompanied by changes in their economic policies and loans were supposed to be the carrot (Oliver 1995). The World Bank, in other words, needed to create its own views on economic development issues and have its judgment on the appropriateness of countries' policies (Friedman 1964; Kamarck 1970).

3.4 The Evolution of Economic Analysis at the Bank: External Audiences and the Rise of Non-Operational Research

The Economics Department started developing these views by researching various aspects of economic development such as external debt structure, resource allocation, commodity economics, balance of payments pressures, and international capital movements (de Vries 1986). The scope of the work ranged from analyzing pricing policies for public services to the taxation of agriculture (The World Bank 1968). A major focus of the Bank's economic work was on country economic reports – which reviewed and evaluated the performance of developing countries – and on their comparative analysis. The department also started receiving requests from area departments to help them examine the public finance sector in the countries where their missions were going and provide these missions with economic data and statistical services (Kamarck 1986).

Although much of the work was intentionally done in order to be operationally as relevant as possible, the attentiveness of the Economics Department to the economic performance of developing countries went far beyond the Bank's immediate lending needs (Friedman 1967). At the same time, a lot of the work was often not directly visible to the executive officials at the Bank who sometimes struggled to realize that the reports they were getting were often prepared largely by the Economics Department. Friedman and Kamarck had to constantly educate the Executive Directors and the senior staff about what the central economists were doing (Friedman 1966; Kamarck 1966). The operational relevance of their work thus became crucial as the emerging Economics Department had to make a convincing case that

its cause is worthy of the attention and resources. Non-operational research did not thrive at the Bank. When Friedman recruited economist Guy Orcutt from Harvard to establish a long-term basic research program, there was virtually no support for it and Orcutt eventually left in despair (Friedman 1985a; Kamarck 1985b).

One strategy for improving the position of economic analysis inside the Bank was to build its reputation in its broader organizational ecosystem. Kamarck realized that "[i]t would help the economists in the Bank to have people outside the Bank recognize the work they were doing" (1985b, 23). To achieve this, the Bank's publication program was established with the Occasional Papers series in 1966. The economic section was also added to the Bank's Annual Report, which set the scene for later publications like the *World Bank Atlas*, *World Tables* and the flagship *World Development Report* (Kamarck 1985c). The Bank also started providing financial support to the academic world, which became appreciated especially in the 1970s when many US universities were beginning to feel the squeeze of accelerating inflation and started having difficulties raising funds for long-term research (Friedman 1985c). Kamarck also tried to establish closer research collaborations with other international organizations and development banks, yet the World Bank sometimes found itself ahead of time since some of these institutions had not built up their research capacities. The IMF's economists were invited to participate in the meetings of the Economic Committee and cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNESCO, and other UN bodies intensified. Outside academics were invited to give lectures and participate in Bank seminars and the Bank's economists started to be approached by economists from universities and research centers around the world with requests to support and participate in their research or to give lectures and write articles on topics of their interest. Even some member states governments asked the Bank's economists to help them with the consultation and preparation of their development plans (Kamarck 1970).

By the time Robert McNamara became the World Bank's president in April 1968, the Bank had already built itself a reputation as the intellectual leader in economic analysis of the development world. Friedman recalled that "from then on, there was no intellectual controversy in development in which we were not deeply involved" (1985a, 36). An interesting reputational dynamic followed. The bigger the outside attention that the Bank's research enjoyed, the more academic this research became, adapting to the needs and preferences of its main audience, which began to form in the Bank's organizational ecosystem. While at the beginning it was important to connect the economic analysis to the Bank's operational activities, it was not the primary objective by the late 1960s, when the Bank's economists were already protected by their reputation embedded in the organizational ecosystem. The operational relevance of the Bank's economic research could thus be weakened.

This development was paralleled by the increased role of the quantitative analysis at the Economics Department. Although quantitative analysis had always

been present in the economic work at the Bank, most of the economists were not econometricians and Friedman and Kamarck did not want to give the mathematical approaches to economic analysis the leading role at the department (Kamarck 1983; Friedman 1985a). However, the weakening of the link between economic analysis and the Bank's operations, together with the arrival of McNamara and his economic advisor Hollis Chenery, reinforced the quantitative work. The long-term research division was established within the Economics Department which further enervated the operational relevance of the economic work as, in Kamarck's words, the division "got colonized by the model builders … Nothing useful has come out of it" (1985b, 22).

The Bank's economic research expanded enormously under McNamara, up to the point where the Bank arguably found itself facing the "capabilities trap", a situation where the presence of capabilities drives the desire to do more (Douglas 1986). Even some economists who originally contributed to the re-establishment of the Economics Department became skeptical of its new direction (Demuth 1985). Yet, the original bureaucratic culture centered around infrastructure projects was irrevocably dismantled. The voice of economists could no longer be ignored at the World Bank.

4 Concluding Remarks: International Organizations Staff as Agents of Change

The World Bank's Economics Department underwent an extraordinary reconstruction in the mid-1960s. From being regarded primarily as "a training ground for recruits to other departments and as a storehouse of personnel to be made available for ad hoc assignments" (Mason 1964, 8), it became one of the central administrative units at the Bank with significant influence on the Bank's behavior and operations. A variety of factors contributed to the reconstruction, such as a combination of formal and informal structures that facilitated the interactions among economists in the Bank, the unified professional profile of the department derived from the recruitment process, which helped to generate a specific economic subculture in the organization, reforms in the routinized patterns of interactions and in the Bank's operating procedures that were supposed to fruitfully exploit the tensions between economists and other professional groups in the Bank, the astute leadership and agency of norm entrepreneurs promoting the reconstruction, as well as the general support from the president. The reestablishment of the Economics Department also highlighted the constraints and limits of cultural changes in complex bureaucracies like the World Bank, especially when these changes begin to question the principal objectives of these organizations.

Several points follow from the analysis. Firstly, it shows how focusing on internal debates and struggles leads to new understandings of the functioning and

development of IOs, which are largely missing in the mainstream theoretical and empirical work in the IOs field. Such endeavor enriches the scholarship on IOs, but also offers an exciting and comparatively underexplored research area to organizational sociologists. As pointed out by Brechin and Ness almost a decade ago, sociologists have largely failed to fully develop a sociology of IOs, arguably due to their view of "organizations as simply organizations regardless of their placement in specific typologies" (2013, 16). Yet IOs provide sociologists with the opportunity of applying their theories and analytical tools to complex bureaucratic environments compounded by fragmented social worlds, competing ideas, and people with different professional, cultural, and political background. By exploiting sociological insights for the improvements of our understanding of IOs, scholars can also sharpen and rethink these insights themselves.

Secondly, the article joins the calls for a more dynamic sociologically-inspired approach to IOs (Chwieroth 2008; Badache and Kimber, this issue). The refined perspective should elaborate on the entrepreneurial behavior of IOs' insiders and deepen our understanding of when and how IO staff act as agents of change, under which conditions they succeed and which obstacles and limits they face. Although external factors and senior management remain crucial in analyses of IOs, women and men working in these organizations also have their say, which has been and continues to be rather overlooked. Connecting a better sociological understanding of the lives and works of international bureaucrats in IOs with established perspectives on the influence of leaders and external factors would provide a fuller and more complete view of IOs and allow us to analyze them in all their complexity.

Thirdly, strictly focusing on the dynamics within the organization may result in a too-narrow analytical grasp. The strategies and choices of IO insiders are linked to the organizational ecosystem and IOs scholars, regardless of their professional background, should therefore accommodate the immediate organizational environment to their analyses. Finally, more empirical work showing the novel insight and otherwise unattainable understandings that come with the refined constructivist approach is needed. Larger historical studies based on archival documents would be especially helpful in analyzing the combination of the external factors with the endogenous developments throughout episodes of substantial organizational transformations as well as throughout the periods of stability and consolidation.

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Civil Society at the United Nations Through the Lens of Organizational Sociology: Exclusion and Temporariness

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Abstract: Studying the inclusion of civil society in international organizations has grown in the last decade. This article repatriates the ongoing scholarly discussions of this inclusion within organizational sociology to answer what the nature of civil society is as an organization at the United Nations. With "temporary organizations" it proposes a relational perspective whereby civil society's temporariness induces mechanisms of exclusion and vice-versa. In practice civil society actors counter exclusion mechanisms by holding on to their autonomy.

Keywords: Inclusion, exclusion, civil society, United Nations, temporary organization

La société civile aux Nations Unies au prisme de la sociologie organisationnelle : exclusion et temporairité

Résumé : L'étude de l'inclusion de la société civile dans les organisations internationales s'est récemment développée. Avec la sociologie des organisations, on tente de comprendre la nature de la société civile en tant qu'organisation aux Nations Unies. Avec « organisations temporaires », on propose une perspective relationnelle où la temporalité de la société civile induit des mécanismes d'exclusion et inversement. Dans la pratique, lesdits acteurs combattent les mécanismes d'exclusion en conservant leur autonomie.

Mots-clés : Inclusion, exclusion, société civile, Nations Unies, organisation temporaire

Zivilgesellschaft bei den Vereinten Nationen durch die Linse der Organisationssoziologie: Ausschluss und Temporarität

Zusammenfassung: In den letzten Jahren hat sich die Forschung für die Einbeziehung der Zivilgesellschaft in internationalen Organisationen entwickelt. Mit Organisationssoziologie verstehen wir, wie die Zivilgesellschaft als Organisation in den Vereinten Nationen eingeschlossen wird. Mit «temporären Organisationen» bieten wir eine doppelte Perspektive. Die Temporarität der Zivilgesellschaft induziert Ausschlussmechanismen und umgekehrt. In der Praxis bekämpfen diese Akteure die Mechanismen der Exklusion, während sie ihre Autonomie behalten.

Schlüsselwörter: Inklusion, Exklusion, Zivilgesellschaft, Vereinte Nationen, temporäre Organisation

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1 Introduction

> *In terms of the Women's Major Group, I wanted to say that it is more of a space than an organization. So it's just a way to bring everyone together in terms of this process and you may or not have noticed that in the outcome document it doesn't talk about the Major Groups at all. So, there was a resolution by the General Assembly saying that the Major Groups would be this process for, you know be a vehicle in the process through this world conference. But after that there is really no clear role for the Major Groups whatsoever. So, it's kind of a confusing space, like now here we are all together and make sure to have a moment to speak in the official statements and name cards and sit and be able to be official in the negotiations and have that space, but it's not that the Women's Major Group is an organization or a group itself.* (Observation notes intervention of Ellen, the Women's Major Group's coordinator, at a dinner meeting, Sendai, 16.03.15)

While the literature in international relations has acknowledged civil society's presence, impact, and role in international organizations and global governance more broadly (Charnovitz 1996; Otto 1996; Gordenker and Weiss 1997; Trent 2007; Schwartzberg 2013; Tallberg et al. 2013; Anheier 2018), the extract above points to a rather ambivalent role the United Nations (UN) maintains with civil society. If scholars have referred to the United Nations as an organization composed of three UNs – the First UN as member states, the Second UN as staff and the Third UN as civil society (Carayannis and Weiss 2021) – what is the role and nature of the organization of the latter? While civil society members are invited – and expected – to participate in international negotiations typically by suggesting policy recommendations in either written or oral statements, in practice, however, their institutional involvement remains seemingly temporary.

Emblematic of international organizations, the UN founded in 1945 is instated in a founding act (treaty, charter, legal status) and embodied in a material framework (headquarters, funding, and staff) (Smouts 1995). It constitutes a coordination mechanism between members bringing "stability, durability and cohesiveness" in international relations (Duverger quoted in Archer 2014, 2). Yet international organizations (IO) – and the UN in particular – are not solely a group of member states: they are inextricably tied to both their bureaucracies and the state or non-state actors (Weiss and Thakur 2010; Badache et al. 2023).

In this article I delve into the non-state actors, commonly referred to as civil society organizations (CSO) or non-governmental organizations depending on the time period and context in which scholars or practitioners refer to them. To answer what the nature of UN's civil society organization is and how it impacts its inclusion within the UN, I consider the Women's Major Group (WMG) as a temporary organization. Responding to increasing involvement of civil society in world poli-

tics in a post-Cold War era the WMG, alongside eight other Major Groups, were proclaimed by the UN as a channel for advocacy and became institutionalized at the Earth Summit in Rio, Brazil, in 1992. As a case study, I analyzed the nature of the WMG – in the context of the Sendai process leading to the ratification of the Sendai Framework for disaster risk reduction – while embedded in the group. It provided me with hands-on experience and valuable data to explore on the one hand the temporariness of the WMG as an organization and on the other the strategies the WMG's members develop to counter exclusion in practice. Such findings allow to show the extent of which civil society is included in practice by relying on its situated experience of exclusion.

The concepts I develop throughout the article are temporariness and exclusion. I introduce temporariness as the temporal condition under which Major Groups are subject in intergovernmental negotations at the UN. I define exclusion as the outcome of mechanisms derived from UN's practices of inclusion. I hence suggest a novel way to understand the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of civil society at the United Nations understood here as the First and Second UN. On the one hand, I engage with literature in international relations especially the constructivist paradigm that considers the UN as three distinct actors (Weiss et al. 2009; Carayannis and Weiss 2021). Second, along the lines of IR scholars who long borrowed organizational sociology to deepen their understanding of IOs (Badache and Kimber, this issue), I build on the concept of temporary organizations (Lundin and Söderholm 1995) to further analyze the inclusion of civil society within the UN.

This article contributes to two bodies of literature. First, it adds to scholarship in organizational sociology by weaving into the concept of temporary organization the dimension of inclusion and exclusion which I argue needs to be understood in a relational perspective; here the temporariness of UN's civil society enables the UN to practice mechanisms of exclusion which in turn reaffirm the temporariness of its civil society. Second, it supplements the literature in the study of international organizations by using the sociology of organizations to give better insight into the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of civil society; here temporariness enables civil society to counter exclusion by developing adequate strategies. In doing so, civil society retains its autonomy with respect to the more permanent structure which I understand as the First and Second UN.

2 Civil Society and the United Nations: An Uneasy Relationship

Since the paradigm shift in the 1990s which compelled international relations (IR) to acknowledge and hence theorize the presence and role of civil society actors in IOs, constructivists have recently also provided insightful perspectives on their opening up. They typically refer to the inclusion of transnational and local civil society

organizations (CSOs) in policy-making and implementation (Holthaus 2021) assuming the emergent norm commits IOs to the granting of access and participation of CSOs (Dingwerth et al. 2020). Yet despite the growing presence of CSOs in IOs after the Cold War, the chances of advocacy groups shaping political agreements tend to be limited (Tallberg et al. 2018; Lucas et al., 2019). For instance, recent examples in the literature point to collaboration strains: the United Nations (UN) and CSOs have a hard time working together due to changing geopolitical and resource environment. Innovative ways to collaborate are hard to come by (Anheier 2018); NGOs as a representation of the elites gain access to global governance and reproduce the prevailing inequalities in the international system rather than being agents of change (Hasenclever and Narr 2018).

In the following section, I discuss the most prominent theoretical approaches researchers developed thus far to analyze CSO inclusion in IOs. Complementary to Lagrange et al. (2021) who structure their book along the three axes, interdependence, representation, and mobilization to highlight the uneasy relationship IOs maintain with civil society, I present the democratic principle and approach, a macro perspective, followed by mobilization theories, a meso perspective, before addressing how IR practice theory – a micro perspective – sets a gateway to understand CSO inclusion in a more fine-tuned manner. Each perspective impacts the way scholars give an account of inclusion.

2.1 The Democratic Principle: An Encouraging Approach for Inclusion

IOs include CSOs with three main incentives (Tallberg et al. 2013): the functionalist incentive; the incentive for legitimacy; the democratic incentive. The functionalist incentive places civil society as a resourceful actor when the UN is confronted with governance problems. With access to resources and skills different from the UN, civil society actors offer first-hand information, experience, and capacity (Willetts 2006). The second incentive speaks to the organization's legitimacy. Integrating CSOs allows the UN to claim legitimacy in policy making processes for they help identify global priorities, raise new issues, and build partnerships (Cohen 2004; Schwartzberg 2013; Agné et al. 2015). The third incentive concerns democratic values where the participation of actors within global civil society promises the democratization of global governance in policymaking (Willetts 2006; Bexell et al. 2010).

The democratic approach builds on the 1990s context where a clear majority of world governments became democracies in part due to CSO's major role in mobilizing pressure for political change. Supporting the democratic norm echoes what most states have "at home" (Mercer 2002). For IR scholars, CSO inclusion is the only way to ensure the stakeholders' arguments are voiced (Steffek et al. 2007; Agné et al. 2015). IOs thus open up to CSO actors (Tallberg et al. 2013; Tallberg et al. 2018), claim "inclusiveness" and hence counter the prominent discourse

around the democratic deficit in global governance (Scholte 2004; Steffek et al. 2007; Nasiritousi and Linnér 2016).

Tallberg et al. (2013) developed a measure of CSO inclusion with two axes containing the sum of range and depth to show evidence of IOs' opening up to civil society over time. However, this measure does not mention anything about the impact access has on influence; access to decision-making does not mean influence (Dür and De Bièvre 2007). Their measure only takes stock of inclusivity from the point of view of IOs and does not bear the point of view of organizations within the realm of civil society. Little is known for instance about whether and how CSOs legitimately represent the world's "Bottom Billion" especially in intergovernmental negotiations (Sénit and Biermann 2021). The democratic legitimacy of global policies is thus at stake and disputed questioning the democratic legitimacy of global policies altogether (Sénit and Biermann 2021).

2.2 Mobilization: Acknowledging the Hurdles of Inclusion

While democratic aspirations speak to the concepts of representation, minorities and civil society, mobilization theory emerges from the study of social movements where the term interest group – and specifically international non-governmental organizations (INGO) in IO contexts – is frequently used. Historically the study of social movements analyzed motivations for mobilization and the determinants for political consequences. Combining CSO inclusion with mobilization and hence interest group theories has led scholars to shift the focus from IOs' perspective on inclusion to that of CSOs'.

At an international level interest group theories tend to focus on inclusion at international conferences for it provides a tangible context and relevant starting point to study CSOs' activities, advocacy strategies, and influence (Betsill and Corell 2008; Hanegraaff 2015a; Rauch 2018; Kimber 2020). Two main mobilization theories have been used to understand CSO inclusion in IOs. First, from a "political opportunity" approach (Amenta et al. 2010), CSO inclusion can be nuanced and broken down into various dimensions such as institutional, resource-related, and policy factors shaping interest group politics (Betsill and Corell 2008; Hanegraaff 2015a; Dellmuth and Bloodgood 2019; Dellmuth 2020). Scholars analyze CSO's overall participation and its strategies, through the interaction with policymakers and influence at transnational conferences (Hanegraaff 2015a) whether or not reaching "goal attainment" (Keck and Sikkink 1999 25; Betsill and Corell, 2001). CSOs that mobilize earlier are usually better in ensuring effective representation at political venues in international conferences (Hanegraaff 2015b). Lucas et al. (2019) go as far as demonstrating that advocacy groups tend to be more solicited by policymakers when the latter are faced with increased levels of political pressure, hence supporting policymakers rather than providing expertise (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2017). Recently, Drieghe et al. (2021) built on Arnstein's citizen participation ladder

(1969) showing the different levels of CSO participation and inclusion in EU trade policy. With a 4-level ladder, they decipher when CSO is invited 1) to participate in the implementation process, but only to legitimize the organization; 2) to share its expertise and provide its views on the consequences of policy decisions; 3) to critically evaluate the policy decisions; 4) to actively participate in decision-making implying direct influence related to implementation. They conclude CSO is largely included at the logistics level (1) and partly at the information sharing level (2), whereas monitoring capacities remain limited (3) and impact on policymaking is quasi-absent (4) despite CSO's aim for policy impact.

Second, from a "resource mobilization and organizational forms" approach (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Minkoff and McCarthy 2005), scholars analyze CSO engagement through resources. Groups that have the resources to stay and keep close contact with policymakers (Dairon and Badache 2021; Dörfler and Heinzel 2022) experience benefits when aiming to influence policy outcomes where northern CSOs are clearly outnumbered (Hanegraaff et al. 2020).

While mobilization theory helps acquire knowledge about CSO's involvement and strategies in international conferences, it fails to analyze the organizational dynamics within an interest group because it essentially focuses on the outcome and not on the process.

2.3 Practice Theory: A Pragmatic Approach to Grasp Dynamics of Inclusion

Practice theory as the latest paradigm shift in IR scholarship (Kostova 1999; Adler and Pouliot 2011; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014; Autesserre 2014; Pouliot 2016; Bueger and Gadinger 2018; Bruneau 2022) has only recently proposed an analysis to "tease out the often power-ridden specificities of CSO inclusion" (Pouliot and Thérien 2018, 166; Holthaus 2021). Including CSO in IOs interacts with practices revolving around power, gender, race, and postcolonial legacies (Holthaus 2021). Practice theory can blend document analysis with participant observation (Cornut and de Zamaróczy 2021) allowing for an epistemological shift to explore non-Western or small IOs including country offices (Holthaus 2021).

Anderl, Daphi, and Deitelhoff (2021) analyze the reactions to the opening up of IOs by a transnational social movement. On the one hand, they show how reactions are shaped by activists' perceptions of the quality of the international opening up in conjunction with national and local context factors. On the other, they demonstrate that the perceptions significantly change over time depending on the experiences of interactions CSOs develop with IOs. Through the prism of time and space, Kimber and Maertens (2021) show how CSOs get excluded in intergovernmental negotiations at the UN according to two dimensions. On the one hand, by attributing decision-making power, chairs of negotiation sessions can for instance extend the sessions and prioritize member states' intervention over the ones intended for civil society. On the other, by sustaining hierarchical relations,

civil society cannot decide where an event takes place thus carrying the burden of resources to travel to different places. Guilbaud (this issue) demonstrates how IO staff performs tasks of classification and hierarchization that redefine the boundaries between civil society actors and IOs, and de facto exclude civil society.

Seized mostly with ethnographic methods, analyzing civil society's inclusion gives way to grasp the dynamics among actors. Practice theory considers the nuances at play encountered in habits, routines, and the everyday doings. Instead of focusing on the IO itself or the outcome respectively presented in the previous subsections, it gears the analysis towards the organizational processes of inclusion and exclusion.

However, despite the empirical and theoretical contributions pointing to a growing presence of CSOs in IOs, their objective and subjective inclusion remains relative (Mitrani 2013). Building on IR literature on the one hand, and the contribution of the sociology of organization on the other I draw on the concept of temporary organizations to answer an overarching question: Could CSOs' relative inclusion be understood by investigating the nature of CSO as an organization at the UN?

3 Rethinking CSO's Inclusion in Light of the Dynamics of Exclusion

Theaters and the construction sector have long been organized in a temporary fashion. Other sectors building on temporary organizational structures such as the consultancy sector have increased.

In this section I clarify the definition, nature, and the way organizational sociologists have approached temporary organizations.

3.1 Defining Temporary Organizations in Contextual and Paradigm Shifts

Back in 1976 Goodman and Goodman set the cornerstone defining the concept of "temporary systems". They investigated task effectiveness, innovation, and the professional growth in theater productions (Goodman and Goodman 1976) stating that role clarity inhibits professional growth and innovation. Along those lines, Lundin and Söderholm (1995) developed the notion of temporary organization to counter the mainstream idea, the assumption that organizations are or should be permanent. Temporary organizations have traditionally been defined in opposition to permanent organizations differentiated according to four dimensions, the 4Ts, namely time, task, team, and transition. Goodman and Goodman conceptualized temporary organizations with respect to tasks and Lundin and Söderholm emphasized the dimension of action, change, and transformation (Burke and Morley 2016).

What appears common to scholars exploring temporary organizations nowadays is twofold. First, they are defined in light of their termination point fixed either by a specific date or by the attainment of a predefined state (Burke and Morley 2016). The process is finite even if temporary does not mean short duration (Bakker et al.

2016). In contrast, "permanent" is understood as "indeterminate", "open-ended" with the intention of remaining permanent (Bakker et al. 2016). Second, the distinct characteristic has to do with the *team* (Goodman and Goodman 1976; Lundin and Söderholm 1995). Its members may be "unfamiliar with one another's skills" (Bechky 2006), or benefit from accumulating career capital through the mobility of teams (Burke and Morley 2016). Yet the team realizes activities and practices within a collective of interdependent individuals who pursue ex ante agreed-upon objectives (Goodman and Goodman 1976; Lundin and Söderholm 1995; Burke and Morley 2016) expectating the collaboration to terminate as agreed (Bakker et al. 2016).

Inherited by Weber's view of bureaucracies (1968 [1922]), this rather static understanding of organizations puts the emphasis on codified rules, hierarchical order, enduring routines, procedures and programs (Sydow and Windeler 2020). By reevaluating the 4Ts, Bakker (2010) suggests adding *context* because it describes how temporary organizations relate to permanent organizations and to a wider social context (Sydow and Braun 2019). Considering the time for which they are set up reveals for example the context for which they are important. It may mean ephemeral, where "ephemeral organizations" (Lanzerra 1983) emerge in the face of disasters, in the form of complementing rescue and relief organizations, and then disappear (Bakker et al. 2016) or disposable where "disposable organization" aim at high short-term efficiency but only modest adaptability (Bakker et al. 2016). Such an addition speaks to the dynamic environment in which organizations evolve.

3.2 From Temporary Organizations to "Temporary Organizing"

Up until the 1990s the literature tackled temporary organizations as structures (Lundin and Söderholm 1995) to seize organizational trends. Then Weick shifted the perspective from "organization" to "organizing" (1993) speaking to the network theory paradigm developed in the 1970s and 1980s used by psychologists and sociologists who examine interpersonal relations within and among organizations (Scott 2004). He set the gateway to look at organizations as a process with relations within and outside a given organization. Thereafter *temporary organizing* focuses on activities and practices enacted in processual forms over time (Bakker et al. 2016). "Permanence" and "temporariness" become rather fuzzy and intertwined, because *organizing* acknowledges impermanence (Weick 2009, 7). Since, scholars focus on the fabrication of permanence out of impermanence (Sydow and Windeler 2020). Including *context* (Bakker 2010) alongside the traditional 4Ts provides a tool to analyze *temporary organizing* in its enduring environment (Sydow and Windeler 2020) and a multi-level perspective to grasp processual understanding of relationships and inter-organizational governance (Sydow and Braun 2018).

3.3 CSOs as Temporary Organizing: Towards Practices of Exclusion at the UN

While I acknowledge the scholarly debate regarding the "strictness" of retaining the 4Ts I see its value with *context* to analyze the dynamics between CSO and the UN. Together they provide researchers with concrete and observable dimensions up against which CSO develops strategies to overcome exclusion in practice. They help shed light on CSO as a rather temporary form of organizing and the UN as a more permanent structure (Bakker et al. 2016) where "temporary systems depend more on the permanent contexts" (Sydow and Windeler 2020).

Furthermore, since the very nature of temporary organizations as *ephemeral* and *unstable* need to be reevaluated because inaccurate in practice (Bechky 2006), I suggest to re-read *temporary organizing* at the United Nations as groups subject to practices of exclusion; CSO is neither invited to take the floor, nor to attend decision-making venues, basically confined to policy arenas (Kimber 2020). *Organizing* enables to observe exclusion mechanisms in activities and practices. While the First UN (FUN) has the sole final vote, the Second UN (SUN) in agreement with FUN determines the inclusion of CSOs according to the 4Ts: 1) timeframe – predetermined time for involvement; 2) task – specific channel to advocate for specific agenda items; 3) team – accreditation through The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); 4) transition – the outcome of decisions made among FUN supported by SUN. The envisioned transitions and the project thus emerge because of the permanent structure's work (Sydow and Windeler 2020), namely FUN and SUN (FS-UN). Yet instead of using *temporary organizing* in a unilateral sense of dependency, I suggest looking at it in a relational perspective (Figure 1) because it gives insight into the organizing dynamics which occur between FS-UN and its CSO.

Figure 1 Relational Dynamics Between Temporariness and Exclusion



Source: Author's scheme.

In sum, I argue for a mutual reinforcing approach to grasp the temporariness of CSO at the United Nations. The temporariness enables practices of exclusion which in turn reaffirm the temporariness of CSO. Building on this interdependent dynamic, I investigate how civil society members experience and navigate the UN's mechanisms of exclusion in intergovernmental negotiations.

4 Observing and Experiencing Temporariness and Exclusion at the UN

Grasping the temporariness of an organization cannot be better done than by experiencing it firsthand. I rely on data produced and collected during my PhD research in which I investigated the relative inclusion and the dynamics of exclusion of civil society in the international negotiation processes (Kimber 2020).

With this goal in mind, I integrated the Women's Major Group. Ellen who was the group's focal point accredited me in the run up to the Third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. At the conference, the UN member states ratified the Sendai Framework, an updated document from the previous Hyogo Framework for Action. The framework provides guidelines to mitigate, manage, and reduce the social and economic impact of disasters. The process led by the The United Nations Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) began with the Preparatory Committee meetings held on 14–15 July 2014 and was finalized on 18 March 2015 in Sendai, Japan.

Accompanying the WMG members as a declared PhD student in their daily tasks, carrying out participant observation (Kimber and Maertens 2023), semi-structured (Albaret and Deas 2023) and ethnographic interviews (Kimber and Dairon 2023) with each one of them allowed me to experience "at a bodily as well as an intellectual level, the vicissitudes of translation" (Clifford 1983, 119). I witnessed the debates, was copied to email correspondences, and experienced the role as a gender advocate at the UN. Mirroring the methods traditionally used by organizational sociologists in their fieldwork (e.g. Crozier and Friedberg 1980, pioneers in France), I was able to shed light on the objective as well as subjective sense of temporariness and perennialism of the various actors in the negotiations. I hence touched upon the relative dynamics of exclusion the WMG was subjected to.

5 Practices of Exclusion

This empirical section builds on how the WMG as temporary organizing works – in practice – around the mechanisms of exclusion set by FS-UN as the more permanent structure.

I first present the contextual dimension of the WMG's engagement in the Sendai process for it highlights the organizational dynamics and helps reveal the wider social context of civil society's involvement in IOs. Then I break down the following 4Ts and show how the mechanisms of exclusion enable the WMG members to retain their autonomy and to develop practices to counter their sense of exclusion.

5.1 Context or How the "Home Institution" Is a Resource Guarantor

With IOs evolving in their environment, institutionalizing the Major Group structure in 1992 can be read as the direct consequence of the growing presence of CSO ac-

tors in world politics. However, the opening up to civil society in IOs has not been accompanied with systematic funding opportunities be it for travel, accommodation expenses, as well as time remuneration for individuals who want an active role in negotiation processes. As a reaction, CSO retain their autonomy as members to maintain their "home institution" – namely their primary source of funding – while gaining international experience pleading for a cause they deem worthy even by participating from afar via online discussions and debates around wording and sentences.

With this first example, despite being the most basic form of exclusion – financial drawbacks – CSO members still manage to overcome their sense of exclusion.

5.2 Time or How to Instrumentalize Time Acceleration

In consultation with SUN, FUN imposes a strict calendar months, even years ahead, which CSO actors need to comply to. Echoing the literature, the WMG only integrates the process and works as such after finding out about the timeframe and timeline for involvement. An NGO representative, an academic, or a professional must register by a given date to obtain accreditation and begin work alongside other actors. The email extract below points to the calendar, the deadline for registration, and the required steps to enter the UN as CSO in the Sendai process.

> *Dear Leah Kimber,*
>
> *Preparatory Committees in July and November 2014 in Geneva are processes leading to WCDRR in Sendai in March 2015. In order to participate in the First Preparatory Committee your organization (UNIGE) should be accredited or have Consultative status with ECOSOC. As special accreditation is only granted during meetings of the Preparatory Committee, non-accredited organizations are encouraged to join their major group, or other, delegations, in order to attend the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee. Deadline for application for special accreditation: 15th May, 2014. You may contact major group to request to be included in their delegation under their name. More information on Major groups is at http://www.wcdrr.org/majorgroups.*
>
> *Sincerely*
>
> *A***, WCDRR Team*
>
> *The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction*

The beginning of the process was set both with a deadline for registration as well as a date towards which all actors converged marking the start of the process (i.e. the First Preparatory Committee). Yet it was not clear nor stated ahead of time, when the Group would dismember or institutionally dissolve.

Given the finiteness hence temporariness of the process, the WMG organized itself around the given timeframe and instrumentalized the time of the process. With

the experience of both sudden intensity and deep slowness, its members transformed their daily routines depending on which speed prevailed be it amid negotiations or in between daily or monthly meetings (Kimber and Maertens 2021). At the Second Preparatory Committee in November 2014, Cassandra, a WMG member, worked through the night in her hotel room to deliver FS-UN a text on behalf of the Group. While the sense of time is slow between meetings, using deadlines to shrink this impression and getting the job done – accepting the accordion-like relation to processes – empowers the members to work around the calendar at their own pace and understanding of constraints.

5.3 Tasks or How to Push Boundaries

The way SUN ensures CSO engages in intergovernmental negotiations is determined by the major themes it enacts. They do so with three major tasks: 1) take the floor in meetings where they are allowed to voice their concerns and opinions; 2) recommend alternative wording to various member states either via email or in person; 3) edit draft documents SUN sends out to all actors involved in the process (Kimber 2020). The WMG members primarily advocate for gender issues, such as recognizing the social impact of gender inequality and hence fighting for the implementation of equality in areas such as decision-making, economic resources, and leadership at a national and a local level. They hence collaborate according to their task-relevant knowledge by representing different specialties (Goodman and Goodman 1976; Burke and Morley 2016).

> *Cassandra: I've been working on editing some of the language around the zero draft …We are also looking at the themes and making sure that all our messages are represented by insertion of ideas into that zero draft. We are making the comments in the interventions to also be consistent.* (Women's Major Group meeting with SUN representative, 17 November 2014)

As political actors, the WMG frames its issues to fit the UN's remit (Littoz-Monnet 2012). Yet at times, the group – knowingly – pushes for *bolder* agenda-items such as "people in their diversity" despite the UN's conservative views on feminist perspectives. Inspired by the academic concept of "intersectionality" (Crenshaw [1989] 2018) it appears as contentious for two reasons. First, the UN needs to be consensual to encourage 193 member states to adhere to policy suggestions. For example, the status of lesbians, gay, bisexual, transgender/transsexual, intersex, queer, asexual actors (LGBTIQA) is a salient issue. Second, there needs structural changes both at UN and state level to implement societal shifts. For example, the third feminist wave (Parini 2006) introduces the role of patriarchy which requires to be deconstructed in the public sphere and most importantly in the private sphere. According to civil society, the UN is consequently not bold *enough* to promote "women in all their

Figure 2 ECOSOC guidelines for civil society accreditation

NGO registration guide on ECOSOC website[a]

The profile registration will take about 10 minutes. Once completed, your profile will be reviewed by a substantive officer of our Branch. You will be informed by email when your registration has been accepted. It might take a few days for your profile to be approved. Please ensure that you do not submit your profile more than once.

- Copy of constitution/charter and/or statutes/by-laws and amendments to those documents (pursuant to paragraph 10 of ECOSOC resolution 1996/31.
- Copy of certificate of registration. According to resolution 1996/31 an organization "should attest that it has been in existence for at least two years as at the date of receipt of the application by the Secretariat". Please provide a copy of the registration paper or, if your country does not require registration, please provide other proof of existence.
- Copy of most recent financial statement and annual report.
- Optional: Copy of examples of your publications and recent articles or statements.
- Optional: Organization chart (if available).

[a] https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/civil-society/ecosoc.status.html

Source: https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/civil-society/ecosoc.status.html.

diversity" and seems at a loss to implement a more forward-looking understanding of women's position in societies (Kimber 2020).

Nonetheless, the leeway the team enjoys in pushing the boundaries and evaluating between safer and bolder agenda-items throughout the process, gives it hope that one day some items will become mainstream language.

5.4 Team or How to Bypass Accreditation Processes

Following strict criteria for accreditation, CSOs usually need to go through ECOSOC enabling SUN to "filter" who gets involved (Figure 2). However, bypassing ECOSOC accreditation through the Major Group structure provides the group's coordinator slack to accredit whomever they deem worthy within their group.

FS-UN hence does not necessarily know where its CSO members have their "attachments", what institutions hires them before, during or after. In the Sendai process members were professors at universities, professionals in NGOs or in UN organizations (Table 1).

Table 1 List of Individuals Constituting the Women's Major Group

Name	Age	Country of Origin	Social Science Degree	"home organization"	Multi-lingual	Consistent in person attendance
Adriana	54	Fiji	BA + MA	Femlink Pacific	Yes	No
Ashley	33	USA	PhD	USAID	Yes	Yes
Cassandra	46	USA	PhD	Professor	No	Yes
Ellen	43	USA	MA	WEDO	Yes	No
Frances	48	UK	PhD	Professor	Yes	No
Gladys	46	Kenya	Unknown	Women's Em-powerment Link	Yes	No
Katherine	62	UK	PhD	Professor	No	Yes
Leah	26	Switzerland	PhD student	University	Yes	Yes
Rosemary	46	Sri Lanka	MA	UN	Yes	Yes
Sayaka	82	Japan	Unknown	Retired	Yes	Yes
Stuti	Unknown	Pakistan	PhD	Professor	Yes	No
Vickie	39	Canada	PhD	Professor	Yes	No

Source: Author's table.

Responding in part to the gap in the literature around team formation (Burke and Morley 2016) and in part to the literature on diversely skilled people (Goodman and Goodman 1976, 494), the WMG is actually formed by similarly skilled people who not only participate, but also shape UN's civil society (Keck and Sikkink 1999). Its members have similar backgrounds, mostly trained at universities in the "Global North", with master or PhD degrees in the social sciences, and a solid command of English (Kimber 2020) (Table 1).

Yet despite the quite homogenous profiles within the temporary group and hence a seeming unified identity, its members distance themselves from SUN's imposed, pre-defined groups, which confines them to specific interests, (e.g. WMG for gender considerations). They procure themselves the latitude to think of themselves as more diverse to the extent of denouncing the obsolescence of SUN's institutional rules.

> *I think we also need to think about the identity of the WMG. Is it a singular identity? I think we are very diverse around the table. It is an artificial grouping in any way set up by the UN just to deal with all these damn women.* (Katherine, Observation notes, WMG meeting dinner, Sendai, 16 March 2015).

5.5 Transition or How to Recreate the Narrative Around Success

Temporary organizing concentrates on transitions by action-oriented strategies where changes need to be achieved before a predefined time-period (Lundin and Söderholm 1995). In the process, any temporary system alternates between idea-

generating and decision-making periods and the key determinant of its success is the manager's ability to orchestrate the two appropriately (Burke and Morley 2016). For Ellen and the WMG the transition was clear from the outstart.

> *After the initial preparatory committee (PrepCom) meeting in Geneva in July 2014, the co-chairs released a pre-Zero Draft framework on disaster risk reduction, which will be an update of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). The second PrepCom (Geneva, 17–18 November 2014) will take place to approve the Conference program of work as well as to continue to develop the post-2015 draft framework for disaster risk reduction – in particular focusing on the Zero Draft which is expected to be released in October. The WMG engages in the HFA2 process aiming to ensure that efforts toward and goals of gender equality are included in the new disaster risk reduction framework and that women actively participate. The WMG also aims to ensure that HFA2 is developed and implemented with the full recognition that women's rights, experiences, knowledge and leadership are crucial to reducing the risks from and coping with the aftermath of disasters, as well as that an effective, people-centered and rights-based HFA2 will mutually support realization of women's rights and gender equality.* (Email sent by Ellen to the Women's Major Group, 16 October 2014)

Maximizing the mention of gender concerns in the outcome text is essential. According to her email (see above) and the advocacy efforts realized in the 8-month process, the team agreed to push for 1) gender equality, 2) women's rights, 3) women's leadership, 4) people-centered and rights-based approach, alongside 5) acknowledging that women are critical to effectively managing disaster risk. Yet the outcome document neither mentioned *gender equality*, *women's rights,* nor *rights-based approach*.

Since the WMG has no say in decision-making venues (Pralle 2010) with its positions at times neglected in negotiations, it reformulates its own narrative. Instead of focusing on the items that did not make it to the ratified document, the WMG finds pride and satisfaction in measuring the gains in Disaster Risk Reduction frameworks over the past 25 years (Kimber 2020). From a broader perspective, the gains are tremendous. While the Hyogo Framework for Action, only mentions *gender* three times, it numbered a total of six in the Sendai Framework (Kimber and Steele 2021). Recreating the narrative around success – despite FS-UN's final decisions – allowed the WMG to attain "the predefined state or condition" (Bakker et al. 2009, 203), namely maximizing gender mentions in the text, and counter the fate of exclusion.

6 Discussion and Conclusion

If the UN Charter, under Chapter X in Article 71, pledged to interact with civil society, the empirical analysis through the WMG's case study in the lead up to the Sendai Framework points to the unmet potential civil society could hope for. Weaving in the dimension of inclusion in the theory of temporary organizing by including the 4Ts and *context* provides an innovative theoretical framework to better grasp the nature of civil society as an organization and hence offers a tool to analyze its inclusion in UN intergovernmental negotiations. With ethnographic fieldwork, the article sheds light on the complex relationship CSO and the FS-UN maintain in intergovernmental negotiations and the strategies civil society develops to counter UN's mechanisms of exclusion.

From a relational perspective, the temporariness of CSO as its organizational nature allows FS-UN to institutionalize five practices of exclusion; with insufficient funding opportunities for engagement, a strict calendar to comply to, siloed opportunities for agenda-item advocacy, strict rules around accreditation, and no voice in final decision-makings, FS-UN manages to reaffirm the temporariness of the major groups. Yet despite FS-UN's five practices of exclusion, the empirical data revealed how the WMG members counter their sense of exclusion. They develop strategies by holding on to their autonomy and consequently reverse the predetermined fate of exclusion (Figure 3). First, individuals participate in discussions and debates from afar using online discussions while working for their "home institution". Second, they organize themselves at the margins either under pressure or by enjoying their time freedom depending on their own calendar, needs, and goals. Third, the group pushes for bolder agenda-items despite being siloed into a channel which contends

Figure 3 Relational Dynamics Between Temporariness and Exclusion and WMG's Strategies



Source: Author's scheme.

other major interests. Fourth, the major group coordinator bypasses ECOSOC accreditation allowing a greater number of actors from different backgrounds to work together under the banner of the WMG. Fifth, with no opportunity to take the floor at decision-making venues, the WMG members take advantage of recreating FS-UN's narrative around success to their own benefit highlighting their efforts for both the group and the members' "home institution".

Despite fieldwork concentrating solely on the perspective of civil society, future work could on the one hand focus on FUN and SUN, as permanent structures to investigate for instance its inability to undergo reforms (Weiss 2003). On the other, the theoretical framework could be useful to analyze the nature and role of consultants hired by the UN. Such research would echo the literature in arguing that in times of increasing temporary organizations, temporary organizing – here consultancy – contributes to the survival of more permanent structures (Sydow and Windeler 2020) instrumentalized by the UN for its own survival.

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

Ronny König, Bettina Isengard, Klaus Haberkern, Christoph Zangger, Tamara Bosshardt, Marc Szydlik

Relations with Parents: Questions and Results

ISBN 978-3-03777-273-7
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Fr. 38.– / Euro 38.–

The book offers essential information on relations between adults and their parents. How well do the generations get along with one another? What kinds of support do adults provide to their parents, and how much do parents give to their adult children? How often does tension or conflict arise? What impact does education, finances, age, gender, migration and region have on intergenerational relationships? The study examines both current relationships with living parents and past ties to mothers and fathers who have passed away.

The empirical basis is SwissGen, a representative survey of intergenerational relations in Switzerland. The book forms a tandem with the analysis volume, which examines central generational issues in depth («Generationen zwischen Konflikt und Zusammenhalt», "Generations between Conflict and Cohesion"). The analysis volume offers key findings, whereas the volume at hand documents all questions and answers of the survey. This includes the numbers on which the figures in the analysis volume are based. Moreover, the data volume is a general reference book for all SwissGen results and provides basic information on the research project.

The study was conducted under the direction of **Marc Szydlik** at the Department of Sociology at the University of Zurich. The core research team consists of **Dr. Ronny König, PD Dr. Bettina Isengard, PD Dr. Klaus Haberkern, Dr. Christoph Zangger, Tamara Bosshardt, M.A.** and **Prof. Dr. Marc Szydlik.**

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La compétence bureaucratique, une source de pouvoir ? Une exploration du personnel des Organisations Internationales à travers la notion de compétence dans la sociologie des organisations

Emilie Dairon*

Résumé : La compétence bureaucratique naît du rapprochement entre un concept de sociologie des organisations (la compétence fonctionnelle de Crozier) et une recherche en science politique sur la compétence individuelle en organisation internationale (OI). L'article montre que les agents doivent maîtriser des zones d'incertitude inhérentes à la carrière en OI. De ce fait, ils développent une compétence bureaucratique protéiforme. L'analyse de cette compétence révèle des stratégies individuelles, loin d'une vision de la compétence comme ressource collective pour les OI.

Mots-clés : Compétence, Organisations Internationales, carrière, recrutement, sociologie des organisations

The Bureaucratic Competency: A Source of Power? An Exploration of International Organizations Staff Through the Notion of Competency in Organizational Sociology

Abstract: Bureaucratic competency arises from an approach combining a concept from organizational sociology (functional competency by Crozier) and a research in political science on individual competency in international organization (IO). The article shows that IO agents must master areas of uncertainty inherent in the career in IOs. To deal with this, they develop a multi-form bureaucratic skill. The analysis of this competency reveals individual strategies, far from a vision of competency as a collective resource for IOs.

Keywords: Competency, international organizations, career, recruitment, organizational sociology

Bürokratische Kompetenz, eine Quelle von Stärke? Eine Untersuchung des Personals internationaler Organisationen anhand des Kompetenzbegriffs in der Organisationssoziologie

Zusammenfassung: Bürokratische Kompetenz entsteht aus der Annäherung zwischen einem Konzept der Organisationssoziologie (Croziers funktionale Kompetenz) und der politikwissenschaftlichen Forschung zu individueller Kompetenz in internationalen Organisationen (IO). Der Artikel zeigt, dass Agenten die mit der Karriere in IO verbundenen Unsicherheitsbereiche meistern müssen. Dadurch entwickeln sie eine proteische bürokratische Kompetenz. Die Analyse dieser Kompetenz offenbart individuelle Strategien, weit entfernt von einer Vision von Kompetenz als kollektive Ressource für IOs.

Schlüsselwörter: Kompetenz, internationale Organisationen, Karriere, Rekrutierung, Organisationssoziologie

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1 Introduction[1]

La notion de compétence est indissociable de l'histoire du personnel des organisations internationales (OI) : vouloir recruter un personnel possédant les plus hautes qualités de compétence, de travail et d'intégrité (Nations Unies 1945) est un élément essentiel de la légitimité de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) et de sa capacité à mener à bien ses objectifs (Nations Unies 1997). La compétence individuelle a été abordée notamment dans la littérature en science politique, en tant qu'outil de légitimation collective ou sous l'angle des enjeux politiques que porte sa (re)définition (Georgakakis 2010 ; Ban 2010). Depuis une vingtaine d'années, le renouveau de l'intérêt pour les bureaucraties internationales en relations internationales (Barnett et Finnemore 2004), avec la reconnaissance d'une certaine autorité collective de ces groupes sociaux (Knill et Bauer 2016 ; Heldt et Schmidtke 2017), permet de mettre la compétence individuelle au centre de l'attention académique : elle semble porteuse d'analyses intéressantes sur la figure du bureaucrate international.

La compétence individuelle est un concept connu de la sociologie des organisations depuis les origines : Max Weber en a fait une des bases du modèle d'autorité à caractère rationnel-légal (Lafaye 2010). Cependant, la sociologie des organisations ne voit pas uniquement la compétence individuelle comme un facteur de légitimité organisationnelle. Pour Michel Crozier, elle est une des sources de pouvoir qui vont permettre à un individu de maîtriser des zones d'incertitude (Martin 2012), donc de renforcer son pouvoir (Crozier 1967).

Le dialogue entre la sociologie des organisations et la science politique sur la compétence individuelle en OI est encore peu développé, et potentiellement fécond. Dans cet article, nous cherchons à analyser les similarités entre les sources de pouvoir décrites par Crozier, et les éléments d'incertitude perçus par les bureaucraties internationales, remontés d'une recherche de terrain en science politique. C'est l'entrée par la compétence qui a permis de faire ce rapprochement : la présence d'une *compétence fonctionnelle* identifiée par Crozier a attiré l'attention car la recherche en question porte sur la compétence du personnel des OI. En cherchant à analyser les correspondances entre la compétence fonctionnelle de Crozier et le quotidien des agents des OI, la notion de compétence bureaucratique s'est révélée. Ce concept semblait un pont intéressant entre science politique, sociologie des organisations et usage pratique de la compétence individuelle en OI.

Dans cette contribution, nous cherchons donc à définir cette compétence bureaucratique en regard des définitions de la compétence déjà énoncés par ces disciplines, et des usages en OI. Puis, après une description du protocole empirique et de sa pertinence pour le sujet, nous explorons deux éléments d'incertitude du

1 Je tiens à remercier Fanny Badache et Leah Kimber pour leurs orientations et leurs conseils comme éditrices de ce numéro spécial ; ainsi que Lucile Maertens pour nos discussions sur un premier jet de cet article. Mes remerciements vont également aux évaluateurs anonymes pour leurs remarques qui ont permis d'enrichir considérablement cette contribution.

personnel international pour y repérer les manifestations concrètes de la compétence bureaucratique. L'objectif est double : du côté de la sociologie des organisations, l'article cherche à contribuer au renouvellement des réflexions sur la bureaucratie, thème fondateur de la discipline, en investissant un sujet (les OI) plutôt cultivé par les spécialistes des relations internationales, via une entrée (la compétence individuelle) à la richesse empirique certaine. Du côté de la science politique, elle permet aux études sur les OI d'utiliser des outils peu travaillés jusque-là. *In fine*, l'article confirme que les caractéristiques de ces bureaucraties sont loin d'être fixées (Littoz-Monnet 2020) et fait apparaître en creux une figure de l'agent onusien contraint d'adopter une stratégie de carrière individuelle, loin de la notion de ressource collective de l'organisation (Nations Unies 2012).

2 De la compétence individuelle à la compétence bureaucratique : bref état de l'art sur la compétence du personnel onusien

La compétence individuelle, qu'on la définisse comme technique ou comportementale, est une notion phare de la gestion de la ressource humaine dans les OI. Le dialogue entre les visions de la compétence en sociologie des organisations, en science politique et dans la réalité des OI montre des disparités dans les déclinaisons quotidiennes de la compétence. L'apparition de la compétence bureaucratique semble une réponse à ces dysfonctionnements.

2.1 La compétence, une notion pivot dans la sociologie des organisations

La sociologie des organisations cherche à étudier l'action collective à partir d'une des formes dans lesquelles elle se matérialise, l'organisation (Friedberg 1992). Elle va s'attacher au mode de fonctionnement du groupe, aux règles tacites ou explicites qui régissent les comportements des individus (Avril et al. 2010), aux modes de coopération (Lafaye 2010), aux rapports de pouvoir (Crozier 1963). La sociologie des organisations s'est rapidement intéressée à la compétence individuelle : Max Weber la considère comme une des bases du modèle d'autorité à caractère rationnel-légal (Lafaye 2010). Il définit la fonction publique moderne comme exigeant « […] un corps de travailleurs intellectuels spécialisés, hautement qualifiés, préparés à leur tâche professionnelle par une formation de plusieurs années et animés par un honneur corporatif très développé sur le chapitre de l'intégrité » (Weber 1963, 143). La compétence, individuelle et technique, devient donc un facteur de la légitimité de la bureaucratie. Pour exercer ses tâches, la bureaucratie selon Weber (appareil administratif de l'État basé sur des règles, une division du travail, des ordres et une hiérarchie) a besoin de fonctionnaires recrutés sur concours, qui mettent au service d'une fonction précise leur compétence spécialisée (Scapin 2019).

Les travaux fondateurs de Weber sur la bureaucratie vont rencontrer des critiques. Au tournant des années 1960, certains sociologues ont entamé une analyse de la bureaucratie via ses dysfonctionnements : Merton par exemple, s'interroge dès 1940 sur l'existence d'une *personnalité bureaucratique* que développeraient les fonctionnaires pour se mouvoir dans un dédale de règles et de consignes produites par la bureaucratie (Merton 1940 ; Lafaye 2010). Michel Crozier ajoute aux réflexions sur les contraintes et complications bureaucratiques en accordant une place particulière aux relations de pouvoir. Celles-ci ne sont pas réductibles aux rapports hiérarchiques : les acteurs, quelle que soit leur place dans l'organisation, peuvent avoir une capacité à se repérer et à maîtriser les sources d'incertitude (Lafaye 2010 ; Martin 2012), et donc à renforcer leur pouvoir (Crozier 1967).

Dans les analyses critiques de la bureaucratie, la place de la compétence individuelle reste centrale. Elle s'y entend comme technique : par exemple, les capacités d'adaptation du fonctionnaire dans la personnalité bureaucratique de Merton, d'ordre comportementales, ne sont pas vues comme une compétence. En revanche, chez Crozier, la compétence ou spécialisation fonctionnelle, si elle est difficilement remplaçable, devient même une source de pouvoir. Dans l'analyse stratégique développée par Crozier, chaque acteur cherche à mettre en place une stratégie qui lui permettra d'acquérir du pouvoir auprès des autres (Martin 2012). Ce pouvoir permet d'obliger les autres – comme les supérieurs – à payer davantage pour obtenir une coopération, ce qui octroie à l'acteur une liberté d'action et une meilleure marge de sécurité (Crozier 1963). Le pouvoir est lié à l'incertitude des attitudes, et non uniquement à la hiérarchie : le plus humble des employés dispose d'un peu de pouvoir si son comportement comprend assez d'imprévisibilité pour créer une incertitude, ce qui lui donne du poids dans une négociation (Crozier 1963). Pour posséder des sources de pouvoir, il faut maîtriser les zones d'incertitudes. Les principales sources de pouvoir sont (i) la possession d'une compétence ou d'une spécialisation fonctionnelle difficilement remplaçable, (ii) la maîtrise des relations avec l'environnement, (iii) la position favorable dans un circuit de communication, et (iv) la capacité à utiliser les règles organisationnelles (Lafaye 2010 ; Martin 2012).

De Weber à Crozier, la compétence technique garde donc une place essentielle dans la sociologie des organisations, jusque dans l'étude de ses distorsions. Si les appels à l'hybridation entre sociologie des organisations et études des OI sont nombreux (pour une revue de la littérature voir Badache et Kimber, introduction de ce numéro spécial), la science politique a toutefois pris un angle différent quant à la place de la compétence individuelle dans ces formes particulières d'action organisée.

2.2 Au-delà de la sociologie des organisations : la compétence comme enjeu de pouvoir

Le personnel des OI est depuis longtemps le sujet d'attention académique. Les OI sont considérées comme un champ de recherche en relations internationales depuis

les années 1910, mais le personnel est longtemps resté une donnée mineure de l'analyse, dominée par l'école réaliste (Reinalda 2013). Certaines thématiques classiques de la littérature en relations internationales portent des promesses intéressantes sur le thème. Il s'agit notamment des recherches qui étudient l'influence, l'autorité, l'autonomie, voire le pouvoir des bureaucraties internationales – des sujets largement traités en relations internationales (Fleischer et Reiners 2021).

Pendant longtemps, peu de contributions adoptent une perspective véritablement microsociologique sur ces sujets (Nair 2020). Des années 1970 aux années 1990, les appels à une connaissance plus sociologique de la fonction publique internationale (Mailick 1970), en utilisant des concepts et méthodologies de la sociologie des organisations dans l'étude des OI (Ness et Brechin 1988), vont rencontrer peu d'écho. Au début des années 2000 s'opère un tournant. Des auteurs reconnus soutiennent que pour expliquer le comportement des OI, on doit aller chercher au-delà de la théorie des organisations, et aller vers la sociologie, qui la première a étudié les bureaucraties (Barnett et Finnemore 2004). Ces travaux ouvrent la porte à une reconnaissance accrue de l'influence des administrations publiques internationales sur les politiques publiques (Knill et Bauer 2016), tout en reconnaissant que les outils manquent pour pouvoir cartographier cette influence (Knill et Bauer 2016).

Ce renouvellement des études sur les OI affecte aussi les méthodes. Depuis le milieu des années 1990, les analyses de l'action organisée internationale qui utilisent l'anthropologie ou la sociologie se sont multipliées, tout en gardant en tête que l'ONU est un « terrain jamais vraiment fermé, jamais vraiment ouvert » (Bourrier 2017, 540). Ce double mouvement d'ouverture des méthodes et d'appel à une meilleure connaissance des bureaucraties semble propice à une meilleure prise de conscience de la compétence.

On note cette tendance dans le courant de la sociologie politique de l'Europe qui prend son essor, notamment à partir du début des années 2000 (Favell et Guiraudon 2009). La compétence du personnel est abordée directement, sous l'angle de sa transformation en enjeu stratégique lors de moments de crise (Robert 2000 ; Georgakakis 2010). Deux contributions sont à noter : elles parlent des réformes de la Commission européenne dans la gestion de son personnel. L'instrument qu'est le concours de recrutement, qui passe d'un examen axé sur les connaissances à un examen basé sur les compétences où celles-ci sont définies par des consultants externes, va finir par accorder plus de place aux généralistes (Ban 2010). De même, cette orientation vers les *skills*, aptitudes personnelles ou comportementales transversales, priverait les fonctionnaires européens de leur compétence sociale, c'est-à-dire de la légitimité donnée à leur expérience, à leur connaissance technique et à leur mission de serviteur de l'Europe (Georgakakis 2010).

Du côté d'autres OI, plusieurs courants abordent les compétences techniques ou comportementales individuelles. On peut citer le courant dynamique de la sociologie de l'expertise, où les compétences de groupes distincts tels les bureaucrates

internationaux et les groupes d'experts externes sont étudiées au prisme de leur objectif final, qui est souvent d'étendre le mandat de l'organisation (Littoz-Monnet 2017). L'étude de ces tactiques d'expansion permet également de revisiter l'analyse des bureaucraties internationales, en montrant que leurs caractéristiques ne sont pas fixes, mais évoluent selon les stratégies du personnel (Littoz-Monnet 2020), qui peuvent être intimement liées à l'état du financement de ces ressources humaines (Martin-Mazé 2019).

En relations internationales, le tournant des pratiques, surtout à partir des années 2000 (Adler et Pouliot 2011), a essaimé parmi les études des OI (Bueger 2023). Il est prometteur pour l'étude des compétences individuelles. Il revient sur l'aspect social de la compétence : « les pratiques sont des performances compétentes. Plus précisément, les pratiques sont des schémas d'action avec une signification sociale, qui, s'ils sont menés de manière plus ou moins compétentes, peuvent à la fois incarner, jouer, et possiblement réifier le savoir de base et le discours dans et à propos du monde réel » (Adler et Pouliot 2011, 4). On trouve un écho avec une sociologie des OI inspirée par Bourdieu, notamment Fligstein qui introduit l'idée de *social skill* – compétence sociale – pour remettre l'acteur au centre des discussions de sociologie politique (Fligstein 2001).

Schématiquement, la science politique aborde principalement la compétence individuelle – qu'elle soit technique ou comportementale – dans sa dimension sociale, en revenant sur ses finalités ; tandis que la sociologie des organisations, des origines de l'étude des bureaucraties aux approches critiques, va partir de la compétence technique comme socle de la légitimité organisationnelle, pour aller vers son utilisation comme levier de pouvoir social. Voyons à présent comment la compétence est envisagée pratiquement dans le monde des OI.

2.3 La compétence dans les OI, un concept proche d'une vision wébérienne

La compétence individuelle est à l'origine de l'histoire du personnel des OI : l'article 101.3 de la Charte de l'ONU, qui *crée* le personnel onusien, affirme que « la considération dominante dans le recrutement et la fixation des conditions d'emploi du personnel doit être la nécessité d'assurer à l'Organisation les services de personnes possédant les plus hautes qualités de travail, de compétence et d'intégrité » (Nations Unies 1945, 41). L'idée d'un personnel qualifié, qui doit permettre à l'Organisation d'atteindre ses objectifs, est pérenne, de Dag Hammarskjöld à Kofi Annan qui affirme que « pour remplir sa mission, pour se transformer afin de faire face aux défis du siècle à venir, l'Organisation dépend de la qualité et de la compétence de son personnel » (Nations Unies 1997, 72).

Cette vision orientée vers la performance semble proche de la perspective wébérienne du modèle bureaucratique, qui, en se basant sur la compétence, la hiérarchie et la neutralité, permet précision, rapidité et efficacité (Dortier et Ruano-Borbalan 1999). Dans la pratique onusienne, cette compréhension de la compétence va se

traduire dans des politiques concrètes de gestion du personnel. En 1999 l'ONU formalise *sa grille de compétences :* à l'instar d'autres organismes publics à la fin des années 1990 (Horton et al. 2002), l'ONU adopte un modèle de compétences qui comporte huit compétences de base et qui définit les principaux aspects constitutifs de ces compétences. A cette époque, l'utilisation de la compétence est décrite comme cruciale dans quatre *moments* de la vie du personnel : perfectionnement du personnel, planification des carrières, suivi du comportement professionnel et recrutement (Nations Unies 1999). La compétence y est définie ainsi : « le terme «compétences» désigne l'ensemble des savoir-faire, qualités et types de comportement qui influent directement sur l'efficacité dans l'exécution des tâches » (Nations Unies 1999, 6). La grille de compétences de 1999 est toujours en vigueur aujourd'hui (2022).

Pourquoi cette grille de compétences a-t-elle été adoptée par les Nations Unies ? Dans la littérature en administration publique, on affirme généralement que la notion de compétence est utilisée dans le secteur privé depuis les années 1970–1980 (Hondeghem et al. 2005), puis se généralise dans le secteur public dans les années 1980–1990 avec la montée en puissance de la Nouvelle Gestion Publique – *New Public Management* (NPM) (Horton et al. 2002).

La date de l'introduction des compétences n'est pas anodine. En 1997, Kofi Annan prend les rênes de l'ONU. Premier Secrétaire général à sortir des rangs du personnel, il s'attelle à un programme rapide de réformes. D'après son rapport de juillet 1997 *Rénover l'ONU*, les premières commencent dès janvier 1997 (Nations Unies 1997). Les deux mandats de Kofi Annan seront particulièrement « chargés » en réformes (Dicke et Fröhlich 2010). Celles-ci sont clairement, et dès le départ, conçues pour rendre l'organisation plus efficace (Nations Unies 1997), et mettre en place une culture de gestion pour améliorer la performance et la responsabilité (Göthel 2010), avec un accent sur les « meilleures pratiques » (*best practices*) dès 1997 ; un vocabulaire qui deviendra courant, voire galvaudé, dans la narration onusienne (Pouliot 2020). L'introduction de la compétence répondrait donc à une volonté d'efficience :

> *L'introduction de ce concept correspondait à une approche de la gestion du personnel […], à une introduction des meilleures pratiques en matière de gestion du personnel.* (Entretien EL, mars 2019)

En 2002, puis encore en 2006 à la toute fin du deuxième mandat, des réformes importantes continuent d'essayer d'implanter une culture du management dans l'organisation (Göthel 2010). Ban Ki-moon, en poste de 2007 à 2016, continuera cet agenda de réformes.

Formalisée en 1999, la compétence individuelle onusienne n'est pas exempte de tensions, entre la vision organisationnelle de la compétence individuelle et son utilisation sociale par les acteurs. Suite à l'observation de ces tensions, au cours

d'entretiens semi-directifs, la notion de compétence bureaucratique est apparue comme pouvant éclairer ces distorsions.

3 La compétence bureaucratique ou la « capacité à comprendre le système et à durer »

L'idée de la compétence bureaucratique est venue de la lecture de Crozier et a trouvé un écho dans le matériel empirique réuni pour la recherche. La notion semble être un lien pertinent entre la compétence individuelle en OI telle qu'elle est vue par la sociologie des organisations et par la science politique. Cette deuxième partie va décrire le cheminement méthodologique et conceptuel qui a mené à la définition de la compétence bureaucratique. Puis on abordera les grandes caractéristiques de l'univers onusien, pour aller vers la définition de quatre éléments d'incertitude principaux. Deux de ces éléments d'incertitude seront disséqués : la situation contractuelle et la planification de la carrière. Nous allons voir comment la notion de compétence bureaucratique permet d'éclairer d'un jour nouveau ces deux variables.

3.1 Une approche qualitative pour une notion à la jonction entre différentes perspectives

La présente contribution se base sur une recherche doctorale qui prend comme point d'entrée la compétence individuelle et l'étudie sous différentes facettes (formation, recrutement, pratiques, carrière) pour mieux comprendre son importance dans la vie de l'organisation. Partant de la centralité de la compétence à la fois dans la conception (l'article 101 de la Charte) et dans les pratiques usuelles des Nations Unies (la grille de compétences de 1999), la recherche veut savoir si cette compétence devient une ressource collective utilisée par l'organisation comme support de son pouvoir, de son autorité ou de sa légitimité, et / ou une ressource individuelle utilisée par l'agent international comme soutien à ses motivations personnelles.

Pour mener à bien cette recherche, la posture empirico-inductive, c'est-à-dire un raisonnement sociologique qui « […] s'adosse à la connaissance des théories existantes autant qu'à l'observation de faits empiriques » (Maertens et Louis 2016, 12), a semblé la plus appropriée. Discret par vocation (Badaró 2011), le personnel des OI reste mal connu : on ignore beaucoup de ses caractéristiques socio-démographiques, de sa formation, de sa carrière, mais aussi du « […] micro-monde [de ses] interactions quotidiennes » (Nair 2020, 575). Pendant la thèse et un projet de publication parallèle, 49 entretiens ont été réalisés avec 51 personnes, dont 43 travailleurs des OI et 8 dans des fonctions en lien direct avec les OI (diplomatie, autorités locales, etc.). L'échantillon s'est construit, comme souvent en sciences sociales, en fonction de l'objectif fixé (Albaret et Deas 2023). Les entretiens se sont déroulés sur une période allant de 2015 à 2019. D'autres instruments ont été utilisés, comme des

entretiens ethnographiques (soit des interactions avec des acteurs pertinents mais non planifiées, et suscitant la réflexivité du chercheur ; Kimber et Dairon 2023) ou des notes d'observation et de participation.

Les caractéristiques socio-démographiques de l'échantillon étaient comparables à celles de la population onusienne ; à titre d'exemple, le groupe des enquêtés travaillant dans les OI, comptait 28 % de postes de milieu de carrière (P3), contre 34 % d'après les statistiques onusiennes ; et 16 % de 35–39 ans contre 15 % dans les chiffres institutionnels (Nations Unies 2020). La seule grande différence était le nombre d'enquêtés issus de la région « Europe occidentale et autres États » : 79 % parmi les enquêtés, contre 28 % dans les OI. Cette différence peut s'expliquer par le fait que tous les entretiens sauf un, se sont déroulés dans l'écosystème de Genève (Dairon et Badache 2021). Le groupe des États d'Europe occidentale et d'Amérique du Nord semble plus représenté à Genève que les autres groupes, mais cette information reste difficile à corroborer : ni l'Office des Nations Unies à Genève, ni d'autres sources sur la Genève Internationale ne semblent produire d'informations sur la ventilation par État d'origine des travailleurs de l'écosystème. Toutefois, on sait que ce groupe d'États est le deuxième plus représenté parmi les fonctionnaires (Nations Unies 2020). Au total, les enquêtés venaient de 21 pays, ce qui garantissait un éventail large de cultures et d'expériences de la compétence. Une autre divergence était dans la sur-représentation des femmes dans le panel : 51 %, contre 38 % à l'ONU.

Au cours de cette recherche, de nombreux enquêtés ont fait part de sources d'incertitude qui semblaient très proches des quatre sources de pouvoir repérées par Michel Crozier dans l'étude des organisations. La présence chez Crozier d'une source de pouvoir qui consisterait en la « capacité à comprendre le système et à en appliquer les règles » a été révélatrice : à de nombreuses reprises au cours de la recherche, la capacité à comprendre le système a été spontanément verbalisée comme l'une des compétences principales pour développer sa carrière onusienne. La même remarque vaut pour la compétence ou spécialisation fonctionnelle chez Crozier : les enquêtés abordent à de nombreuses reprises la compétence technique. À partir de ces occurrences, des ponts se sont bâtis entre les sources de pouvoir telles que définies par Crozier et les éléments d'incertitude les plus courants soulevés par les enquêtés, aboutissant à forger la notion de compétence bureaucratique, comme le montre le schéma ci-dessous (voir figure 1).

Pour définir la compétence bureaucratique, revenons à la définition de base de la compétence dans différentes disciplines. Pour l'administration publique, « les compétences sont les savoir-faire, connaissances, expériences, attributs et types de comportements dont un individu a besoin pour mener à bien son travail de manière efficace » (Hirsch et Strebler 1994, cité dans Horton et al. 2002, 4). La sociologie et la science politique vont ajouter à cette définition la possession d'une capacité à exercer légitimement ou juridiquement des effets de pouvoir (Georgakakis 2019), c'est-à-dire l'aspect de compétence sociale. Georgakakis résume la duplicité de la définition

Figure 1 Liens entre sources de pouvoir chez Crozier et éléments d'incertitude en OI



Source : Crozier 1963 ; auteur.

sociologique en définissant la compétence comme aptitude et légitimation d'une position de pouvoir (Georgakakis 2019). Fligstein quant à lui, définit la compétence sociale comme la capacité à faire coopérer d'autres acteurs (Fligstein 2001). Partant des différents piliers de la compétence, nous avons choisi de définir la compétence bureaucratique comme un ensemble protéiforme d'aptitudes comportementales, relationnelles et cognitives développées par un individu, visant à utiliser différentes facettes du système bureaucratique (règles, mandat) pour maîtriser le plus de zones d'incertitude possibles quant à son parcours dans une OI. Avec la compétence bureaucratique, on reste à l'échelle de la personne, dans une perspective micro-sociologique (Nair 2020). La répétition de certains schémas à l'échelle de l'individu permet de monter en généralité, selon les principes de la méthode par théorisation ancrée (Lejeune 2014). Ainsi, à partir d'une base empirique solide, nous pourrons repérer le développement de la compétence bureaucratique et analyser ses implications pour l'analyse des OI.

Le terme même de compétence bureaucratique n'apparaîtra pas totalement nouveau ; il entre effectivement en résonance avec plusieurs concepts issus de la sociologie des organisations ou de la sociologie politique de l'Europe. Tout d'abord, le terme de capital bureaucratique est utilisé dans les études européennes. Pour Laurens, ce capital se compose d'une dimension politique et d'une dimension technique, accumulé parfois sur des décennies par des entités ou des individus, et qui permet de retraduire des positions (comme celles du secteur privé) dans des termes compréhensibles par les agents des institutions européennes (Laurens 2015 ; Cloteau 2019). Étudier la mobilisation de ce capital bureaucratique permet d'analyser les relations de pouvoir et de concurrence dans les OI (Cloteau 2019). Tout en restant proche de cet objectif épistémologique, la présente contribution en diffère : ce que l'on cherche à repérer ici n'est pas un stock, mais plutôt un processus. Contraire-

ment à un capital au sens premier du terme, il s'agit de quelque chose qui n'est pas quantifiable et n'apporte pas automatiquement de bénéfice direct.

Les sociologues pourront également penser à la *personnalité bureaucratique* mise au jour par Merton. La structure bureaucratique tendrait à dépersonnaliser les relations et à gommer les traits de personnalité des individus ; l'organisation bureaucratique engendrerait donc de l'*impersonnalité* (Merton 1940), et une personnalité bureaucratique dont la tâche principale serait non plus de répondre aux demandes des clients mais de se repérer dans un dédale de règles et de consignes (Lafaye 2010). Ici aussi, l'angle de cette contribution diffère : il semble que Merton mette l'accent sur la réaction des employés aux dysfonctionnements et effets de la structure bureaucratique sur eux ; tandis que le concept de compétence bureaucratique se veut plus « stratégique », insistant sur la capacité de planification et de proactivité des employés. Cette capacité peut les aider à naviguer dans un environnement incertain : leur carrière.

3.2 Les éléments d'incertitude rencontrés par les agents des OI

La trajectoire des individus en OI reste mal connue. Notamment, la circulation des agents à l'intérieur d'un écosystème, d'une organisation à une autre par exemple, est peu abordée (Dairon et Badache 2021). La composition même de ces *International Public Administrations* (IPAs) qui semble souvent homogène dans la littérature, commence à être étudiée dans sa représentativité géographique (Badache 2020). Malgré cela, on en sait encore assez peu sur la distribution contractuelle : comment ces administrations se désagrègent en types de contrats et de durée, et ce que cela implique.

Il existe plusieurs sources de données sur le personnel du Secrétariat des Nations Unies. Dans cet article est utilisé le rapport du Secrétaire général à l'attention de l'Assemblée générale, qui comptabilise « toutes catégories de fonctionnaires titulaires d'un engagement permanent, d'un engagement continu, d'un engagement de durée déterminée ou d'un engagement temporaire pour le Secrétariat » (Nations Unies 2020, 15), sans que l'on puisse savoir quelle est la durée moyenne d'un engagement de durée déterminée (et la probabilité de son renouvellement) ou d'un engagement temporaire.

Le rapport du Secrétaire général et les autres sources de données ne nous renseignent pas sur l'organisation des carrières. Différents aspects de la carrière nous intéressent ici : l'aspect évolutif – la carrière comme une série composée de mouvements ascendants ou descendants entre des positions différenciées (Becker 1952) ; l'aspect social et collectif – la carrière comme « […] une construction sociale dans laquelle le parcours de l'agent est replacé dans un processus collectif lié aux modes de gestion et d'organisation [de l'institution] » (Loriol 2009, 2). La carrière dépend largement de la catégorie professionnelle. Il y a trois grandes catégories de personnel à l'ONU et dans les organisations du système commun qui suivent les mêmes

règles : les G sont les services généraux, ils sont affectés à des tâches d'exécution ; les P sont les professionnels, ils sont responsables des tâches de conception ; les D sont les directeurs. Chaque catégorie comporte plusieurs grades. Pour les G, cela va de 1 à 7 ; pour les P, de 1 à 5 ; pour les D, 1 et 2 (Nations Unies 2022).

Il existe un concours de recrutement, une *voie royale*, car il est aujourd'hui l'une des seules possibilités d'obtenir un contrat permanent aux Nations Unies (Badache 2021). Il permet de recruter des professionnels jeunes (moins de 32 ans) qualifiés, qui entrent à un niveau junior (P2), après un examen ouvert aux nationalités non représentées ou sous-représentées. Les candidats retenus bénéficieront de ce l'on appelle un contrat continu ; beaucoup pensent qu'il s'agit d'un contrat permanent (il était auparavant appelé ainsi) et le labellisent comme tel, mais en réalité le Secrétariat peut mettre fin à n'importe quel type d'engagement, y compris celui-ci. Il faut toutefois noter que ce concours ne sert à recruter qu'une partie infime des fonctionnaires : moins de 10 % des postes ouverts en 2018 (Badache 2021). On observe donc une première source d'incertitude pour le personnel onusien dès l'entrée : un seul type de recrutement mène de manière certaine à un contrat continu.

Le reste du personnel se répartit entre des professionnels qui ont reçu un engagement continu au bénéfice de l'ancienneté, les personnels en contrat à durée déterminée, ceux en engagement temporaire, et enfin le personnel fourni à titre gracieux (dont 85 % de stagiaires), les consultants et vacataires. Ces trois dernières catégories sont l'objet de rapports fréquents du Comité Consultatif sur les Questions Administratives et Budgétaires (CCQAB), organe subsidiaire de l'Assemblée générale, sur la base d'un additif au rapport annuel du Secrétaire. Le CCQAB examine et commente cet additif et note régulièrement sa préoccupation quant au "(…) recours continu à un nombre important de consultants et de vacataires pour des périodes contractuelles prolongées" (Nations Unies 2021, 4). En additionnant les chiffres du rapport du Secrétaire général et son additif (dont les chiffres portent sur deux ans), on obtient les proportions suivantes (voir tableau 1).

On note donc une autre source d'incertitude, de taille : la situation contractuelle. Avec 80 % du personnel sans engagement *à durée indéterminée*, une large partie va certainement passer du temps (de travail) à stabiliser sa situation. Cela va également avoir un impact sur la planification des carrières : envisager des mouvements ascendants – promotion – dans un contexte contractuel incertain pourra sembler plus compliqué. De même, développer ses compétences techniques dans une situation incertaine peut sembler problématique.

Au vu des caractéristiques socio-démographiques disponibles sur le personnel onusien, on identifie donc assez clairement quatre sources d'incertitude : recrutement, stabilité, carrière, formation. Nous allons examiner deux d'entre elles à l'aune du matériel empirique, et voir si la volonté individuelle de maîtriser ces sources d'incertitude aboutit au développement d'une compétence bureaucratique.

Tableau 1 Composition du secrétariat par type d'engagement en 2019

Type d'engagement		% dans le type d'engagement	% du total des engagements	% du total des engagements en pondérant les 3 dernières lignes par année
Permanent / continu	10 659	29.14 %	15.43 %	20.17 %
Durée déterminée	22 789	62.31 %	32.98 %	43.13 %
Temporaire	3 126	8.55 %	4.52 %	5.92 %
Total	36 574	100.00 %	52.93 %	69.22 %
Type d'engagement				
Agents foumis à titre gracieux (dont stagiaires)	5 146	15.82 %	7.45 %	4.87 %
Retraités	1 151	3.54 %	1.67 %	1.09 %
Consultants et vacataires	26 226	80.64 %	37.96 %	24.82 %
Total	32 523	100.00 %	47.07 %	30.78 %

Sources : Nations Unies 2020 ; Nations Unies 2021.

3.3 Compétence bureaucratique et statut contractuel : le filet de sécurité

Comme vu ci-dessus, la grande majorité des travailleurs onusiens n'ont pas de contrat *à durée indéterminée*. Ils ne bénéficient pas non plus de versements spécifiques à l'issue de leur contrat. Aucune indemnité n'est versée en cas de démission, d'abandon de poste, de fin de contrat à durée déterminée ou temporaire, de licenciement sans préavis (Nations Unies 2009). Il existe un seul cas pour lequel le Secrétariat doit verser des indemnités : c'est si le contrat fixe ou continu est interrompu en cours de contrat à l'initiative du Secrétariat. En clair, dans la très grande majorité des cas, lorsqu'un agent onusien cesse de travailler pour son organisation, il se retrouve sans rien. Les préoccupations liées à cette situation ressortent très clairement en entretien :

> *[…] les gens n'ont pas d'autres alternatives : s'ils perdent leur boulot, on n'a pas la possibilité d'être au chômage, rien. Donc il n'y a pas de* safety net, *de filet de sécurité.* (Entretien LS, décembre 2016)

Certains vont passer des années à chercher des financements pour renouveler leur projet et, par extension, leur contrat :

> *Ça s'est fait comme ça, avec une situation précaire. J'étais sur projet. Cette situation sur projet, de l'extérieur ça semble incompréhensible, mais de l'intérieur on s'y fait. Les premières années, j'ai eu 6 mois, 1 an de contrat et puis après pendant 12 ans, entre 3 et 10 contrats par an. […] Au bout de 12 ans il y a eu un poste [fixe], et donc voilà. […] Les gens se battent pour essayer d'obtenir des renouvellements de projet*s. (Entretien EX, novembre 2016)

En résumé, le statut contractuel semble constituer une zone d'incertitude majeure pour la majorité des agents onusiens qui ne bénéficient pas de contrat continu.

> *[…] je ne sais plus combien de temps je suis restée, je crois un an et demi […], ça a été des contrats de 3 mois, des fois c'était 1 mois […] comme j'ai toujours été très transparente j'ai toujours demandé à mes chefs de me le dire le plus clairement possible [quand il n'y aura plus de financement pour le contrat] […], vous me le dites, il n'y a pas de souci mais c'est bien de le savoir.* (Entretien IK, septembre 2016)

L'individualisation de cette contrainte est très intéressante : comme on le voit dans ces entretiens, les individus la connaissent et l'anticipent, par exemple en demandant aux supérieurs d'informer en amont, ou bien en prenant l'initiative pour essayer d'obtenir des financements. Ce sont ces aptitudes personnelles qui sont considérées comme une *compétence essentielle* par un autre agent onusien :

> *Le recrutement est basé sur les compétences, mais la capacité à durer dépend de la capacité à comprendre comment marche le système. Aux Nations Unies c'est une compétence essentielle.* (Entretien ZF, septembre 2016)

La contrainte de devoir chercher des financements pour ses propres contrats a déjà été mise au jour dans la littérature pour le personnel de terrain (Martin-Mazé 2019). Ici, nous définissons comme compétence bureaucratique cette capacité à naviguer entre les contrats, à savoir saisir les opportunités d'emploi ou à les créer. Elle permet de tenter de maîtriser au maximum la zone d'incertitude qu'est l'instabilité contractuelle, en anticipant et en gardant une flexibilité maximale. Elle n'est certes pas une spécialisation fonctionnelle au sens de Crozier, mais elle rejoint les autres sources de pouvoir : la maîtrise des relations avec l'environnement (savoir discuter avec ses supérieurs de sa situation) ; la position favorable dans un circuit de communication et la capacité à utiliser les règles institutionnelles (comprendre les règles de la gestion des ressources humaines : par exemple, passer de contrat court terme à consultant, ou l'inverse).

Elle permet aussi dans une certaine mesure de créer une imprévisibilité de comportement de l'agent, qui va lui rendre une part de pouvoir par rapport à son chef : un superviseur qui compterait mettre une pression professionnelle indue à un subordonné, en mettant en avant le renouvellement de contrats précaires, se verrait dépassé si ce même subordonné, ayant développé une compétence bureaucratique pour trouver de nouveaux contrats, pouvait quitter son poste du jour au lendemain.

Au vu des données de terrain, la compétence bureaucratique développée comme réponse à la source d'incertitude contractuelle semble objectivée. Il s'agit d'une compétence développée par l'individu pour naviguer dans des eaux contractuelles incertaines. Mais elle va également se retrouver dans un autre environnement instable, celui de l'organisation de la carrière.

3.4 Compétence bureaucratique et planification des carrières : un mécanisme compensatoire

Si la carrière de 80 % d'agents internationaux est marquée par l'incertitude contractuelle, on pourrait penser que celle des agents qui n'ont pas cette zone d'incertitude soit plus fluide. En termes d'analyse stratégique, les personnes ayant le bénéfice d'un contrat permanent, libérées de la préoccupation régulière d'assurer leur futur proche, pourraient reporter leur énergie vers d'autres sources de pouvoir, comme développer une compétence plus technique – au sens de la spécialisation fonctionnelle de Crozier.

Or, on se rend compte à partir des retours de terrain, que ce n'est pas parce qu'une zone d'incertitude est éliminée, que toutes les zones d'incertitude le sont. En réalité, les possesseurs d'un contrat permanent se voient imposer une autre source d'incertitude : celle de la carrière. Les individus qui commencent leur carrière par réussir le concours de recrutement entrent à niveau P2 et n'ont aucune garantie d'avoir des promotions. Certes, l'entrée par concours garantit un certain capital symbolique à ses détenteurs :

> *Auparavant j'aurais dit que [les personnes qui réussissent le concours] se voient donner la priorité, parce que l'institution a investi tellement de temps et d'argent pour les choisir […]. Donc oui, au début de ma carrière, c'était un atout, parce que je pense [qu'en ayant réussi le concours] on avait été plus testés que les autres*. (Entretien KK, décembre 2016)

Ce groupe peut se voir comme une sorte d'élite par la possession du précieux contrat continu, le « Saint Graal » (Badache 2021). En revanche, certains manifestent leur amertume du fait que la stabilité contractuelle – et l'investissement de l'organisation en eux – ne se traduise pas par une carrière plus fluide :

> *Le concours national de recrutement est la voie la plus lente qu'on puisse avoir pour sa carrière […] parce qu'il faut attendre des postes très spécifiques pour être promus.* (Entretien KK, décembre 2016)

> *[…] je voyais des gens qui étaient P2 P3 P4 […] enfin L2 L3 L4 [postes de P financés sur projet] et qui étaient toujours plus gradés que moi, alors que je faisais le même boulot qu'eux, et on me disait, mais non, toi tu as un contrat permanent, L4 ça correspond à P3. Moi je disais oui mais L4 ça correspond pas au salaire de P3, je suis désolé.* (Entretien QJ, mai 2015)

D'autres enquêtés ne rapportent pas de difficulté particulière : il n'y a pas de certitude à avoir une carrière plus rapide ou plus lente avec le concours. Il existe donc une zone d'incertitude forte sur la carrière. En revanche, les détenteurs du contrat continu semblent essayer de développer une marge de manœuvre plus grande quant aux sujets qu'ils traitent : en résumé, puisqu'ils ne peuvent pas (ou difficilement)

perdre leur emploi mais qu'ils ont une carrière qui n'est pas forcément fluide, ils veulent choisir sur quoi, et avec qui ils travaillent :

> *[…] ce n'était pas clair ce que j'allais faire, j'ai exprimé mon intérêt pour un sujet qui était la privatisation parce que j'avais fait un papier pour une conférence dessus […].* (Entretien UV, janvier 2017)

> *C'est ma volonté de garder un pied dans le monde académique […]. Ca me permet moi aussi d'évoluer. (*Entretien AM, novembre 2016)

Vouloir garder une marge de manœuvre au quotidien, ou maîtriser une zone d'incertitude qui serait liée aux sujets qui sont traités par l'agent au quotidien, peut s'interpréter également comme la manifestation d'une compétence bureaucratique. Il s'agit de tourner les règles du jeu (ici, la stabilité contractuelle) à son avantage personnel ; on cherche à maintenir sa liberté d'action, à devenir maître de son travail, objectif auquel aspirent nombre de travailleurs (Crozier 1963). En revanche, ce n'est pas parce que l'on développe la compétence bureaucratique que l'on va pouvoir assurer une carrière où qu'elle soit : elle n'est pas transférable, ce qui est souligné par de plusieurs enquêtés :

> *[…] en fait, l'expérience que vous gagnez aux Nations Unies n'est pas utile pour d'autres employeurs.* (Entretien YJ, septembre 2016)

> *C'est une compétence très chronophage à acquérir et pas revendable. L'énergie ne va pas vers le métier.* (Entretien ZF, septembre 2016)

La compétence bureaucratique est donc aussi un mécanisme de défense par rapport à l'incertitude de la situation contractuelle et de l'organisation de la carrière. Mais, ce faisant, elle renforce également cette incertitude : ne pouvant pas être valorisée à l'extérieur, elle oblige l'individu à rester dans le système onusien. Elle met en lumière une sorte de double contrainte : l'agent est amené à la développer s'il veut des contrats ; et l'énergie utilisée pour l'acquérir sera difficile à revendre à l'extérieur, forçant quasiment l'individu à rester. La compétence bureaucratique est une capacité et une contrainte.

4 Conclusion

Les agents qui intègrent les OI onusiennes se trouvent rapidement confrontés à différentes zones d'incertitude. En réponse, certains d'entre eux, proactifs et stratégiques, développent ce que l'on pourrait appeler une compétence bureaucratique. Ce faisant, ils peuvent naviguer à travers les écueils de la carrière onusienne avec peut-être plus de facilités ; mais ils passent aussi du temps à développer cette facette, qui ne leur sera utile qu'en interne, les amenant donc à rester dans le système.

La compétence bureaucratique nous semble être un outil d'analyse pertinent, qui fait revenir l'acteur au centre de l'attention avec pour but d'en tirer les implications pour l'organisation. Elle permet d'évacuer une perspective déterministe et homogénéisante de l'étude des administrations internationales ; en clair, d'étudier les secrétariats selon des perspectives plus sociologiques. À l'instar d'autres recherches récentes, elle veut s'interroger sur les manières dont les expériences individuelles et sociales modèlent le fonctionnement quotidien des OI (Kimber et Maertens 2021). Certes, les limites d'une vision fixe et idéalisée de la bureaucratie internationale avaient déjà été abordées par certains analystes à la croisée de la sociologie et de la science politique, en analysant des distorsions dans l'application du mandat de l'organisation (Littoz-Monnet 2020) ou dans le travail de terrain (Martin-Mazé 2019). Cependant, l'individualisation à l'extrême de la gestion des carrières internationales n'a été que peu abordée dans la littérature.

La contribution décrit une figure du bureaucrate qui lutte pour développer ses sources de pouvoir, tout en étant conscient que cette lutte maintient dans un système où la stabilité contractuelle est l'exception et non la norme. Elle apporte à la sociologie des organisations en portant l'attention sur des bureaucraties peu investies jusqu'ici par la discipline. Elle permet également de renouveler les analyses des dysfonctionnements de la bureaucratie, avec l'apparition de cette nouvelle compétence, à la fois capacité et contrainte. L'article apporte également aux études sur les OI avec ces nouvelles facettes de la vie quotidienne du bureaucrate international et de l'organisation individuelle de sa carrière.

De nouvelles pistes de recherche pourraient s'ouvrir : vers l'extérieur, pour savoir si d'autres bureaucraties internationales – par exemple les grandes ONG – sont aussi concernées par le développement de cette compétence ; vers l'intérieur, pour examiner plus avant les déviations entre stratégie individuelle de carrière et objectifs collectifs ; pour analyser l'existence de frontières sectorielles internes entre détenteurs de différentes compétences (Guilbaud, dans ce numéro) ; ou encore pour étudier, dans le cadre de la reconstruction de compétences techniques d'une OI (Hošman, dans ce numéro), quelle place tient la compétences bureaucratique. On pourrait également voir si l'institution reconnaît cette distorsion bureaucratique, et y répond : par exemple, si les OI voient qu'un certain nombre de personnes développent une compétence bureaucratique, ou combien d'autres préfèrent jeter l'éponge et quitter le système. En bref, la compétence bureaucratique semble une notion avec un potentiel heuristique certain pour avancer sur la connaissance d'un groupe social toujours peu connu.

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Le travail des frontières sociales au sein des organisations internationales : taxonomie et résistances

Auriane Guilbaud*

Résumé : Cet article, qui s'appuie sur les cas d'étude de l'OMS et de la FAO, montre que l'expansion de la coopération des Organisations Internationales (OI) avec les acteurs non-étatiques (ANE) entraîne un important réagencement des frontières organisationnelles des OI. En effet, celles-ci mettent en place des procédures bureaucratiques conduisant des employés des OI à être chargés d'un travail de taxonomie, c'est-à-dire de classification et de hiérarchisation des ANE. Ce travail redessine les frontières des OI et engendre résistances et contestation tant à l'interne qu'à l'externe des OI.

Mots-clés : Organisations internationales, frontière, Nations Unies, nouveau management public, acteurs non-étatiques

Social Boundary Work in International Organizations: Taxonomy and Resistance

Abstract: This article – based on the case studies of the WHO and the FAO – shows that the expansion of cooperation between international organizations (IOs) and non-state actors (NSAs) leads to a significant rearrangement of IOs organizational boundaries. IOs develop bureaucratic procedures (e. g. due diligence, risk management) that lead IO employees to be in charge of "taxonomy work", i. e. the classification and hierarchization of NSAs. This work redraws the boundaries of IOs and generates resistance and contestation, both inside and outside IOs.

Keywords: International organizations, boundary, United Nations, new public management, non-state actors

Soziale Grenzarbeit in Internationalen Organisationen: Taxonomie und Widerstände

Zusammenfassung: Dieser Artikel zeigt anhand von Fallstudien der WHO und der FAO, dass die Ausweitung der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Internationalen Organisationen (IO) und nichtstaatlichen Akteuren (NSA) zu einer erheblichen Neuanordnung der Organisationsgrenzen der IO führt. IO entwickeln bürokratische Verfahren, die dazu führen, dass IO-Mitarbeiter mit einer «Taxonomiearbeit» betraut werden, d. h. mit der Klassifizierung und Hierarchisierung von NSA. Diese Arbeit zieht die Grenzen der IO neu und führt zu Widerstand und Konflikten, sowohl innerhalb als auch ausserhalb der IOs.

Schlüsselwörter: Internationale Organisationen, Grenze, Vereinte Nationen, New Public Management, nichtstaatliche Akteure

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1 Introduction

Une part importante de la sociologie des organisations s'intéresse à la question des frontières entre champs organisationnels, entre organisations et au sein même des organisations (entre départements, bureaux, unités, etc. [Crozier et Friedberg 1977 ; Scott 1994 ; Santos et Eisenhardt 2005]). Ces travaux visent principalement à analyser les processus de délimitation, de construction de frontières (Lamont et Molnár 2002), et leurs effets (de concurrence, de circulations de dispositifs ou de "boundary objects" qui traversent les frontières (Star et Griesemer 1989), de création d'organisations frontières ou "boundary organizations" (Guston 2001). Certains travaux ont également mis l'accent sur le travail des frontières ("boundary work") impliqué dans ces jeux de frontières (Gieryn 1983 ; Zietsma et Lawrence 2010). Dans le domaine de l'étude des organisations internationales (OI), ces lignes de recherche issues de la sociologie des organisations permettent notamment d'analyser la manière dont les OI fonctionnent et évoluent en tant qu'institutions bureaucratiques, mais aussi la manière dont elles interagissent avec, et s'adaptent à, leur environnement extérieur (en particulier d'autres OI, des acteurs non-étatiques (ANE), des États, etc. [Trondal et al. 2010 ; Abbott et al. 2015 ; Orsini et al. 2017])[1].

Depuis les années 1990, l'ouverture des OI à la coopération avec différents types d'ANE comme des firmes, des ONG, des fondations philanthropiques ou des groupes d'experts, s'est accélérée (Tallberg et al. 2013). Cette évolution a conduit nombre d'OI à instituer des procédures spécifiques pour encadrer cette coopération, évaluer sa désirabilité et les risques éventuels qu'elle représente pour l'OI. Ainsi, lorsqu'une OI accepte de collaborer avec une entreprise (par exemple pour obtenir des ressources – financements, dons en nature –), il peut y avoir un risque de conflits d'intérêt et/ou d'atteinte à l'image, à la réputation de l'OI, qui amoindrirait sa légitimité. Cet article s'intéresse plus particulièrement à deux types de procédures, dites de *due diligence* (ou diligence raisonnable, ou vérification diligente) et de *risk evaluation* (ou évaluation du risque), qui qui vont de pair et sont désormais utilisées par un grand nombre d'OI (UN JIU 2017) pour limiter ces dommages potentiels (par exemple en exigeant que l'entreprise avec laquelle une collaboration est envisagée réponde à un certain nombre de critères sociaux et environnementaux, en fixant des limites précises à la collaboration, etc. – cf. point 3 ci-dessous pour une présentation détaillée). Ces deux dispositifs bureaucratiques sont donc mobilisés par les OI pour organiser leurs relations avec les ANE et ont pour effet de modifier les frontières organisationnelles des OI. Ces procédures sont mises en œuvre par des agents employés des OI, qui sont ainsi amenés à effectuer dans leur travail quotidien des opérations de taxonomie, c'est-à-dire des opérations de classification et de hiérarchisation, traçant des frontières entre différentes catégories d'acteurs (ONG, entreprises , etc.) avec lesquels ils interagissent. Au-delà de la caractérisation de ces procédures, l'objectif de cet article

1 Sur ce point, voir également l'article introductif du numéro spécial (Badache et Kimber 2023).

est donc aussi de montrer que l'étude des frontières organisationnelles peut être utile pour comprendre et conceptualiser de nouvelles évolutions dans le travail administratif des Secrétariats des OI, qui participent à la redéfinition des frontières des OI. Cela nous conduit à conceptualiser le fait que les OI jouent un rôle de classificateur au sein de la gouvernance mondiale par l'intermédiaire de procédures administratives qui sont un type de norme spécifique (sur le travail de production de normes par les OI, voir Barnett et Finnemore 2004). En outre, ces outils de classification sont ici appliqués à des acteurs non-étatiques, et non à des États ou aux diplomates les représentant (Pouliot 2017). Cet article contribue ainsi à la sociologie des organisations en approfondissant la compréhension de la nature « composite » des bureaucraties internationales (Trondal et al. 2010, 11) et ses effets.

La partie empirique de notre recherche s'appuie plus particulièrement sur deux cas d'études d'institutions spécialisées du système des Nations Unies, celui de l'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) et de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO selon l'acronyme anglais, Food and Agriculture Organization). Ces deux OI sont actives dans la fourniture de biens collectifs mondiaux de nature sociale, respectivement sanitaire – i. e. permettre une vie en bonne santé et promouvoir le bien-être – et agricole – éliminer la faim, l'insécurité alimentaire, et permettre une alimentation de bonne qualité. Elles mènent des actions avant tout normatives (élaboration de normes, apport d'expertise et de soutien technique pour renforcer les capacités des pays). Elles sont également parmi les rares OI du système des Nations Unies à avoir mis en place des procédures de *due diligence* et de *risk evaluation* détaillées et rendues publiques.

Cet article présente des réflexions issues d'enquêtes de terrain réalisées aux sièges de la FAO à Rome, de l'OMS à Genève, et aux Nations Unies à New York entre 2016 et 2019. Dans ce cadre, nous avons notamment conduit une cinquantaine d'entretiens semi-directifs[2], complétés par des observations directes participantes et non participantes de sessions des organes de gouvernance des OI, et de différents *side-events* et de rencontres de la société civile se tenant au moment de ces réunions[3]. Lors de ces terrains de recherche, nous avons trouvé remarquable l'importance prise par les procédures visant à gérer la relation entre les OI et les ANE, et les modifications que cela entraîne sur le travail des employés des OI (sans que cela ne présage en rien de l'effectivité et de l'efficacité de ces procédures). Cet article se propose donc de comprendre le développement de ces procédures et d'en analyser les effets, proposant des pistes qui amènent à être explorées par d'autres projets de recherche. En effet, dans l'espace limité de cet article, nous ne pourrons pas toujours détailler la mise en œuvre concrète des procédures et effectuer une véritable « sociologie du

2 Avec des diplomates des délégations des États membres, des membres du Secrétariat des OI, d'ONG et d'entreprises. Lorsque nous citons des entretiens dans cet article, ils ont été anonymisés, et nous mentionnons seulement la position/l'organisation de l'interviewé, la date et le lieu de l'entretien.

3 Certains de ces terrains ont été réalisés grâce à une bourse CNRS-INSHS-SMI 2017.

travail en acte » (Bidet 2006 ; Avril et al. 2010), et nous proposons ici une analyse avec une dimension programmatique.

Dans une première partie de l'article, nous reviendrons sur le réagencement des frontières organisationnelles des OI suite au développement de la coopération avec les ANE. Dans un second temps, nous retraçons l'origine et les effets des procédures de *due diligence et risk evaluation,* que nous définissons comme des outils bureaucratiques de classification. Dans un troisième temps, nous montrerons le travail de taxonomie des agents des OI engendré par ces procédures, qui est constructeur de frontières sociales contestées. Dans un quatrième temps conclusif, nous nous intéressons au rôle de classificateur des OI qui est impliqué par ce travail de taxonomie et dont celles-ci se servent pour réintroduire un certain contrôle hiérarchique au sein de la gouvernance mondiale. Cet article montre ainsi le travail de construction de frontières effectués par des employés OI, mais aussi les résistances et contestation, les luttes autour des frontières engendrées par ces opérations de taxonomie, et ce que cela implique concernant la manière de conceptualiser le rôle des OI au sein de la gouvernance mondiale.

2 Les relations entre OI et ANE, facteurs de réagencement des frontières organisationnelles des OI

2.1 Les frontières organisationnelles des OI comme frontières sociales multiples, interdépendantes et évolutives

Comme pour toute organisation bureaucratique s'inscrivant dans un ou plusieurs champs organisationnels (défini comme « une communauté d'organisations qui participe d'un système de signification commun et dont les participants interagissent plus fréquemment et de manière plus importante les uns avec les autres qu'avec des acteurs extérieurs au domaine » (Scott 1994, 207–208), les frontières d'une OI établissent des distinctions entre des catégories d'objets, de personnes, ou d'activités. Elles peuvent être matérielles ou symboliques (Lamont et Molnár 2002). Ce sont des processus de démarcation et de regroupement qui expriment et objectivent des hiérarchies sociales en instituant des catégories d'insiders et d'outsiders (Mathieu et Roussel 2019). Ces processus sont multiples, interdépendants, et évolutifs.

Nous proposons de commencer par définir les frontières organisationnelles externes des OI comme la combinaison de deux types de frontières : l'une marquant un périmètre institutionnel, défini par un statut juridique, qui comprend typiquement le Secrétariat de l'OI et les États membres ; l'autre marquant un périmètre sectoriel, défini par le mandat spécifique de l'OI dans un ou plusieurs domaine(s) d'activités. Les frontières organisationnelles sont donc à la fois institutionnelles et sectorielles et permettent de définir l'OI par rapport à son environnement extérieur, i. e. autres acteurs et autres domaines d'activités. Ces frontières externes, en

particulier dans leur dimension sectorielle, sont loin d'être univoques, comme le montre l'exemple des organisations frontières *(boundary organizations)*, qui opèrent sur la frontière entre science et politique, comme par exemple le GIEC (Groupe d'experts intergouvernemental sur l'évolution du climat), la Convention Cadre des Nations Unies contre le Changement Climatique (Miller 2001), ou encore l'OMS (Holzscheiter 2017, 769).

En outre, les frontières externes des OI ne peuvent pas être définies de manière indépendante des frontières internes aux OI. Les OI sont des organisations administratives complexes qui sont traversées par des frontières institutionnelles internes, entre bureaux, unités, départements, dont les relations sont caractérisées par des chaînes hiérarchiques (Trondal et al. 2010). Les OI sont également traversées par des frontières sectorielles, qui peuvent par exemple être de nature professionnelle (ainsi à l'OMS, on peut observer des frontières sectorielles selon la formation professionnelle des agents : en santé publique, en économie, en droit ; etc.). Ces frontières internes sont régulièrement redessinées, par exemple par des dynamiques de fragmentations des bureaucraties verticales, qui contribuent à la création d'agences autonomes – suivant les principes du Nouveau Management Public (NMP) – ou par des dynamiques d'homogénéisation par fusion, dans une logique « post-NMP » de « gouvernement intégré » (Bezès et Le Lidec 2016). Par ailleurs, comme le notent M. Crozier et E. Friedberg cette « différenciation interne des organisations » s'effectue « selon les nécessités des rapports à l'environnement » (1977, 165). Autrement dit, les frontières externes des OI ont des répercussions sur le tracé des frontières internes aux OI. Mais inversement, chacune de ces parties internes aux OI va former ses propres relations, développer un rapport spécifique à la frontière externe de l'OI, et peut en influencer les contours, par exemple en nouant des relations avec des acteurs extérieurs. C'est pourquoi certains auteurs préfèrent souligner la dimension sociale des frontières des OI. Par exemple, Yves Buchet de Neuilly (2019) définit la frontière d'une OI par la participation au processus décisionnel d'une OI : la frontière, sociale plus qu'organisationnelle, marque un « périmètre d'emprise décisionnelle ». En suivant cette définition, des membres d'organisations et institutions aux statuts distincts peuvent ainsi se retrouver inclus dans le périmètre d'une OI. Les frontières internes et externes des OI sont donc non seulement interdépendantes, mais il peut aussi se produire un brouillage entre frontières internes et externes des OI.

En plus d'être multiples et interdépendantes, les frontières des OI sont également évolutives : quelle que soit la manière (matérielle ou symbolique) dont sont définies les frontières, elles ont des conséquences matérielles importantes car les frontières déterminent l'accès à des ressources et sont des objets d'intérêt stratégiques. Il y a donc en permanence un travail de construction ou perturbation des frontières des OI, dont le tracé dépend de rapports de forces, des actions pour ouvrir ou fermer les frontières, les déplacer, etc. S'inscrivant dans la lignée de nombreux travaux sur les « objets-frontières » et le travail des frontières initiés dans les années 1980

(Star et Griesemer 1989), Zietsma et Lawrence (2010) identifient trois types de travail de frontière : 1. la fermeture des frontières *(boundary closure)* : établir des frontières pour protéger l'autonomie, le prestige et le contrôle des ressources ; 2. la connexion de frontières *(boundary connecting)* : établir des stratégies pour gérer les connexions transfrontalières (par l'intermédiaire d'acteurs courtiers, d'objets frontières, etc.) 3. le dépassement des frontières *(boundary breaching)* : établir des stratégies pour perturber des frontières et les contourner.

Les frontières organisationnelles des OI, dans leurs dimensions institutionnelles et sectorielles, sont donc des frontières sociales, car elles sont multiples, interdépendantes, et évolutives. Elles sont ainsi l'objet d'un véritable travail des frontières, qui permet notamment d'organiser l'environnement et les relations extérieures des OI.

2.2 Les relations avec les ANE, facteurs de réagencement des frontières sociales des OI

Parmi les relations que les OI entretiennent avec des acteurs situés au-delà de leurs frontières organisationnelles externes, pour reprendre les termes que nous avons utilisés ci-dessus, se trouvent des acteurs non-étatiques (ANE) : firmes, ONG, fondations philanthropiques, institutions académiques, etc. Ces relations, qui existent depuis la création des OI (par exemple, la Constitution de l'OMS de 1948 prévoit la coopération avec des ONG), ont connu un développement important depuis la fin de la guerre froide, en raison d'un besoin en ressources, en légitimation, et de la diffusion d'une norme de démocratie à l'échelle mondiale (Ermand et Uhlin 2010 ; Kimber 2023). Cette dynamique de renouvellement du multilatéralisme inclut la société civile et le secteur privé à but lucratif (Devin 2022, 163–184). Par exemple, le Comité de la sécurité alimentaire mondiale, comité mixte FAO-Nations Unies, n'est plus depuis une réforme de 2009 uniquement un comité intergouvernemental, mais voit différents types d'ANE siéger en son sein (Duncan 2015).

Ces évolutions ont contribué à un certain brouillage des frontières entre OI et ANE. La délimitation de la catégorie « acteurs non-étatiques » (qui reste hétérogène) comme extérieure aux OI n'a d'ailleurs jamais été aussi évidente que la distinction juridique sur laquelle elle repose le laisse supposer (des ONG peuvent être pilotées par des États ; des États peuvent détenir des parts du capital d'entreprises, etc. [Nay 2021, 18]). A ceci s'est ajouté, dans le cadre d'une « bureaucratisation néolibérale » reposant sur un principe d'homothétie entre public et privé (Hibou 2012), un brouillage des frontières entre secteurs public et privé, à but lucratif et à but non-lucratif et à des dynamiques d'hybridation (Guilbaud 2015, 145–146 ; Graz 2006).

Le développement des relations entre OI et ANE a donc un effet important sur le tracé des frontières des OI, renforçant les caractères de multiplicité, d'interdépendance et d'évolution définis ci-dessus. Non seulement les OI entretiennent des relations toujours plus nombreuses avec des ANE dont le statut d'acteurs situés au-delà des frontières organisationnelles externes de l'OI peut être questionné, mais

les frontières organisationnelles internes des OI évoluent également. Il en résulte une interdépendance accrue entre frontières internes et externes aux OI, et de nouvelles manières de « travailler » les frontières des OI.

3 Les procédures de vérification diligente et d'évaluation du risque, instruments bureaucratiques de délimitation des frontières des OI

3.1 Définition et cadre d'émergence de deux procédures issues du secteur privé

Confrontées à cette dynamique de coopération accrue avec les ANE, les OI sont amenées à créer ou consolider des bureaux dédiés, chargés de piloter la mise en œuvre de partenariats et qui s'appuient sur des procédures spécifiques : la « due diligence » (ou diligence raisonnable, ou vérification diligente) et le « risk assessment and management » ou « risk evaluation » (l'évaluation et la gestion du risque). Ce sont des termes et des procédures qui viennent du monde de l'entreprise, et en particulier de la finance. Il s'agit au départ de l'ensemble des vérifications qu'un éventuel acquéreur ou investisseur « raisonnable » est censé réaliser avant une transaction ou la signature d'un contrat, l'exemple typique étant celui de l'évaluation précise de la situation d'une entreprise avant une acquisition. Depuis les années 1990, les entreprises ont étendu l'emploi de ces procédures, en particulier dans le domaine de la Responsabilité Sociale d'Entreprise (RSE), qui renvoie notamment aux initiatives volontaires de la part des entreprises pour améliorer le respect des droits de l'homme, la protection de l'environnement, etc., que les entreprises utilisent également de manière stratégique (Kell et Ruggie 1999). La diffusion de ces procédures au sein des OI résulte de plusieurs facteurs : des évolutions dues au Nouveau Management Public (NMP), à la financiarisation des politiques publiques, et au modèle développé par le Pacte Mondial des Nations Unies (UN Global Compact) à partir des années 2000.

La mise en place de procédures pour évaluer la désirabilité de la coopération avec les ANE (et au départ plus particulièrement avec le secteur privé à but lucratif) et gérer les risques identifiés est caractéristique de la transformation du fonctionnement des administrations publiques par l'intermédiaire d'un « nouveau management public » (NMP) [Geri, 2001]). Celui-ci vise à les rendre plus efficaces en préconisant le recours à des méthodes importées du secteur privé et s'est largement diffusé à l'échelle mondiale (Common 1998). Les entreprises du secteur privé sont donc familières de ces pratiques de vérification diligente et d'évaluation des risques – ce qui conduit une de de nos interlocutrices à la FAO à nous déclarer "How did the private sector react to the 2013 FAO Strategy? They were delighted! Because for the first time there were clear guidelines and risk management procedures"[4]. Même si cette position appelle à être nuancée, tous les acteurs ne percevant pas cette évolution

4 Entretien, Partnerships, Advocacy and Capacity Development Division (OPC), FAO, Rome, avril 2017.

de la même manière, elle exprime une familiarité partagée. Ces procédures relèvent également d'autres processus caractéristiques du NMP (Bezès 2007), en particulier la transformation de la structure hiérarchique de l'administration par un renforcement des responsabilités et de l'autonomie des échelons intermédiaires (le détail des procédures à suivre vise à renforcer la responsabilité des unités techniques et des unités responsables des partenariats) et la mise en place d'une gestion par les résultats (réalisation d'objectifs, mesure et évaluation des performances : les coopérations créées ont vocation à être évaluées).

Le développement de procédures de *due diligence* et *risk evaluation,* courantes dans de domaine de la finance, est également caractéristique de la financiarisation des politiques publiques internationales, à la fois dans sa dimension « externaliste » (transformations du système économique depuis les années 1970) et « internaliste » (importation de pratiques, théories, instruments, modes de raisonnements nés dans le secteur financier [Chiapello 2017]). C'est ainsi que le « raisonnement capitaliste » qui consiste à analyser « tout débours comme un investissement associé à un rendement espéré et à un risque » (Chiapello 2017, 26) et qui est reflété par les procédures de vérification diligente et d'évaluation du risque, se retrouve intégré dans le langage et la pratique des OI. Par l'intermédiaire de ces procédures, il y a une requalification de la relation établie avec un ANE en termes d'investissement, de capital, de rendements et de risques.

Au sein des OI, la vérification diligente et l'évaluation du risque visent également à répondre à une remise en cause de la légitimité et de l'intégrité des organisations du système des Nations Unies en raison du développement de relations avec le secteur privé à but lucratif mal maîtrisées. Ces critiques gagnent en visibilité suite à la mise en place en 2000 du Pacte mondial des Nations Unies (UN Global Compact), dont le but est d'établir un partenariat entre l'ONU et les entreprises. Suite à des accusations de "bluewashing" visant des firmes qui utilisent leur participation au Pacte à des fins de pure communication et en tirent des bénéfices à peu de frais, le Pacte commence en 2004 à mettre en place de premières « mesures d'intégrité » d'ampleur limitée. À partir de là, la question des procédures encadrant les partenariats des OI, commence à être posée. Toutes les procédures développées sont toutefois loin d'avoir la même ampleur, et, comme le notent K. Seitz et J. Martens, des descriptions détaillées des processus de *due diligence* et *risk evaluation* sont rares (Martens et Seitz 2019). L'Unité d'inspection conjointe (Joint Inspection Unit) des Nations Unies préconise d'ailleurs dans un rapport de 2017 de mettre en place une base de données et des procédures communes aux agences des Nations Unies pour la vérification diligente, tant les variations sont importantes pour l'instant (UN JIU et Dumitriu 2017).

3.2 Le renforcement des procédures de vérification et d'évaluation du risque à l'OMS et à la FAO

L'OMS et la FAO sont parmi les premières OI à avoir mis en œuvre et à rendre publiques des procédures de vérification diligente, d'évaluation et de gestion du risque au début des années 2000. À l'OMS, on peut déceler des références à ces mécanismes dans les « Principes directeurs applicables à la collaboration avec le secteur privé en matière de santé » adoptés sous la direction de la DG de l'OMS le Dr. Gro Harlem en 2000. Les termes restent néanmoins vagues et peu explicites (à l'époque on parle de "screening" et de "reputational risk"). Les « Procédures de mise en œuvre » de ces Principes directeurs proposent tout de même une série d'étapes à suivre, de l'avis du département technique, à la consultation du département juridique, et à l'évaluation sur la base de critères politiques et éthiques par le service des relations extérieures en charge du secteur privé et de la société civile (et plus précisément un bureau spécialisé créé en 2000). Les collaborations appropriées sont celles qui ne présentent pas de risques pour l'OMS, autrement dit, qui ne porteront pas atteinte à l'image de l'OMS, à ses relations avec d'autres acteurs – ONG et gouvernements – ni à sa légitimité en tant qu'organisation normative. Mais en pratique, toutes les étapes de la procédure sont loin d'être systématiquement respectées[5]. Les Directives de la FAO pour la coopération avec le secteur privé sont aussi publiées en 2000. Lancées suite au développement de partenariats avec le secteur privé après le Sommet mondial pour l'alimentation de 1996 (McKeon 2009, 25), elles sont encore plus imprécises. Il y est simplement rappelé que les partenariats de la FAO avec le secteur privé doivent respecter les principes juridiques, éthiques et opérationnels auxquels les ONG sont soumis dans le cadre des relations officielles avec la FAO, que l'organisation doit éviter les situations qui pourraient « la mettre dans l'embarras », et que les contributions (financières) de la part du secteur privé doivent être autorisées par le directeur général adjoint après avis du bureau du directeur général et du bureau juridique (FAO 2000, 17, 34, 38).

À partir des années 2010, de nouvelles procédures sont développées. Envisagées au départ pour gérer la coopération avec les entreprises, elles s'appliquent désormais (avec parfois quelques différences) à tout type d'ANE. A l'OMS comme à la FAO, l'évolution non seulement du langage (avec la multiplication de l'emploi du mot « risque »), mais également du détail des procédures à mettre en œuvre est remarquable. En 2011, l'OMS lance un long processus de négociation qui aboutit en 2016 à l'adoption d'un « Cadre de collaboration avec les acteurs non étatiques » (connu sous le nom de son acronyme anglais FENSA, Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors), un document au « niveau de détail très poussé »[6]. Pour l'OMS, la vérification diligente consiste en des « mesures prises […] pour obtenir et vérifier les informations utiles relatives à un acteur non étatique afin de se faire une idée

5 Entretien, Partnership Department, OMS, Genève, Mai 2017.
6 Entretien, Partnership Department, OMS, Genève, Mai 2017.

claire de son profil. ». Elle se base, outre sur des informations fournies par l'ANE, sur « d'autres sources […] notamment : les médias ; les rapports d'analystes, répertoires et profils de sociétés que l'on trouve sur le site Web de l'entité ; et les sources publiques, juridiques et gouvernementales » (FENSA, points 29 et 30, p. 11). L'évaluation des risques quant à elle relève « de l'évaluation de la collaboration proposée avec cet acteur non-étatique. […] Les risques sont l'expression de la probabilité et de l'effet potentiel d'un évènement qui affecterait la capacité de l'Organisation d'atteindre ses objectifs » (FENSA, point 33, p. 12). Enfin, « la gestion des risques concerne le processus aboutissant à une décision de gestion expresse et justifiée du Secrétariat d'engager une collaboration, de la poursuivre, de l'assortir de mesures d'atténuation des risques, de ne pas collaborer ou de se retirer d'une collaboration existante ou prévue avec des acteurs non étatiques » (FENSA, point 34, p. 12).

Parmi les OI suivant de près les procédures de l'OMS et notamment l'adoption de FENSA se trouve la FAO – on nous déclarera d'ailleurs lors d'un entretien à l'OMS que « la FAO nous a copié »[7]. Si cette formule apparaît excessive, la FAO n'adoptant pas un cadre aussi détaillé, à partir de 2013, la FAO publie des stratégies pour la coopération avec chaque type d'ANE, dont le secteur privé. Chacune contient une partie sur la gestion du risque. La stratégie pour la coopération avec le secteur privé de 2013 prévoit ainsi trois étapes : d'abord une vérification préliminaire (*preliminary screening*) de l'ANE selon le respect des principes du Global Compact des Nations Unies, des pratiques de RSE (responsabilité sociale d'entreprise) et de certains facteurs de risques identifiés par la FAO (conflit d'intérêt, crédibilité scientifique, avantage compétitif indu, risque financier) [FAO 2013]). À l'issu de ce processus, réalisé par une personne au sein de l'unité des partenariats de la Partnerships, Advocacy and Capacity Development Division (OPC) en utilisant différentes agences de presse, bases de données des Nations Unies, etc., un code couleur est attribué : vert si aucun problème n'est détecté ; jaune si certaines questions sont soulevées (par exemple un article trouvé mentionnant de l'évasion fiscale) ; rouge si il y a de fortes preuves d'un comportement non adéquat (par exemple une amende a été payée pour évasion fiscale)[8]. Cette évaluation est ensuite transmise à un sous-comité (Sub-Committee for Review of Financial and other Agreements ou SubCom-RFA) composé de membres *senior* de la FAO (directeur du bureau juridique, du département OPC, etc.), qui donne son avis final. Cet avis est ensuite confirmé (ou non, dans de rares cas) par le comité des partenariats, présidé par le Directeur Général de la FAO.

Outre de par leur niveau de détail et les mécanismes qui les accompagnent (par exemple à l'OMS FENSA prévoit la création d'un « registre des acteurs non-étatiques » à des fins de transparence), les procédures de l'OMS et de la FAO diffèrent également dans leur rapport avec le modèle proposé par le Global Compact/Pacte Mondial des Nations Unies (cf. *supra*) : si la FAO s'y réfère, l'OMS en revanche s'en

7 Entretien, Partnerships Unit (OPCP), Rome, avril 2017.
8 Entretien, Partnerships Unit (OPCP), Rome, avril 2017.

tient à distance[9], ce qui s'explique par le fait que, contrairement à l'OMS, le Global Compact n'interdit pas toute coopération avec l'industrie du tabac. De manière réciproque, nous avons pu noter dans nos entretiens une différence d'appréciation entre l'OMS et la FAO de la part du UN Global Compact. Un employé du UN Global Compact nous déclare ainsi: "We've been following FENSA from afar, FENSA is quite restrictive. We hear from companies that the WHO is difficult to engage with, to find entry, and we hear a lot of frustration from them. […] The FAO is building capacities to cooperate with the private sector. The UNSG reports on partnerships will highlight FAO as a good practice case. FAO also has developed a good and sound approach to due diligence. […] We'll see if it can open cooperation with WHO, but then we fear they will bring on the issue of alcohol"[10].

Les procédures de vérification diligente, d'évaluation et de gestion du risque sont donc loin de faire l'objet d'une définition, d'une mise en œuvre et d'une appréciation homogène au sein du système des Nations Unies. Mais à l'OMS et à la FAO, elles servent à tracer des frontières autour de l'OI qui sont à la fois symboliques (excluant par exemple les acteurs qui posent un risque en termes de réputation) et matérielles (ainsi la coopération avec les acteurs qui sont jugés aptes à entrer en collaboration avec l'OI se traduit de manière concrète par des échanges de ressources et peuvent être codifiées dans des programmes de travail commun). Ces procédures ont également pour effet de contribuer à classifier les acteurs extérieurs à l'OI en créant des catégories entre eux (entreprises, ONG, fondations, etc.,) et de créer une hiérarchie parmi ces acteurs extérieurs de l'OI, en fonction du degré d'accès à l'OI qui est autorisé. La délimitation de ces frontières s'effectue depuis l'intérieur de l'OI, par un travail d'agents des OI employés dans des unités dédiées à la mise en œuvre de ces procédures bureaucratiques.

4 Le travail de taxonomie des agents des OI, constructeurs de frontières sociales contestées

4.1 Un travail de taxonomie organisé autour de trois types d'opérations de classification et de hiérarchisation

Ce travail d'évaluation de la désirabilité de la coopération avec les ANE et d'évaluation et de gestion des risques est effectué par des employés d'unités dédiées au sein des départements consacrés aux partenariats à l'OMS comme à la FAO. Comme le prévoient les directives adoptées par les deux OI, ce travail débute par une phase de collecte d'informations (sur la nature de l'ANE et de ses activités, sur la collaboration

9 Entretien, OMS, Partnership Department, Genève, Mai 2017 ; Entretien, Consultant et professeur en santé public, Ancien employé de l'OMS, Genève, mai 2017.

10 Entretien, Partnerships and UN Relations, United Nations Global Compact, New York, juillet 2017.

proposée), puis de classification (par type d'acteur) et enfin se termine par une phase d'évaluation (la coopération est-elle recommandée ou non). Les agents des OI en charge de ces tâches effectuent ainsi un travail de taxonomie – à l'origine une branche de la biologie qui se veut la « science de la classification » des organismes vivants (Sartori 1970). Si l'opération de classification est au cœur de la taxonomie, celle-ci contient également l'idée d'une certaine hiérarchie (un certain ordre) entre classes.

Les procédures de *due diligence* et *risk evaluation and management,* confrontent donc les OI à un problème de taxonomie, c'est-à-dire de classification et de hiérarchisation. Ainsi, à l'OMS, la catégorie originelle d'« ONG » était trop vaste, et inopérante pour évaluer la désirabilité de la coopération avec des ANE. En effet, dans la Constitution de l'OMS de 1948, seule la coopération avec les ONG est formellement prévue. Sur cette base est défini un statut d'« ONG en relations officielles avec l'OMS » (avec une procédure et un comité d'examen des candidatures) donnant le droit d'assister aux réunions des organes de gouvernance de l'OMS, de faire des déclarations, de recevoir des documents. Les associations internationales d'entreprises y sont éligibles, au motif que, si elles représentent les intérêts corporatifs de leurs membres (entreprises individuelles ou associations professionnelles nationales), elles sont elles-mêmes à but non lucratif. Cette inclusion dans la catégorie d'ONG est régulièrement dénoncée par des ONG dites « d'intérêt public », et jugée problématique par des membres du Secrétariat de l'OI. Le cadre FENSA adopté en 2016 vient redéfinir cette catégorie. Il distingue notamment quatre types d'acteurs avec lesquels l'OMS peut entretenir des relations (les organisations non gouvernementales, le secteur privé, les fondations philanthropiques et les institutions académiques) et les associations d'entreprises sont désormais reconnues comme faisant partie du secteur privé à but lucratif et exclues de la catégorie ONG.

On peut *in fine* distinguer trois types d'opérations de taxonomie. D'abord une classification par type d'acteur. Sur la base des informations récoltées lors de la phase de vérification diligente, les agents des OI vont classifier tel ANE comme ONG, entreprise ou comme fondation philanthropique par exemple. Ce classement est un sujet de préoccupation pour de nombreux ANE, comme nous avons pu notamment le constater lors d'une observation participante lors d'une réunion informelle à l'OMS[11]. Plusieurs ANE se sont inquiétés de savoir quelle est la limite de financement du secteur privé que l'on peut recevoir sans pour autant être classé comme entité du secteur privé, en restant catégorisé comme ONG (la réponse étant qu'il n'y a pas de limite fixée, c'est une évaluation faite par le Secrétariat de l'OI, de manière discrétionnaire). La même question se pose à la FAO, et pas seulement du côté des ANE, mais également du côté du Secrétariat : nos interlocuteurs en charge de l'évaluation des ANE questionnent non seulement les financements du secteur privé, mais aussi les financements étatiques, et notamment des grandes entreprises

11 Observations de terrain, Informal Consultation on the Handbook to Guide Non-State Actors in their interaction with WHO, OMS, Genève, 5 Mai 2017.

dont les États détiennent des parts de capitaux[12]. Deuxièmement, au-delà de cette classification par type d'acteur qui vise à évaluer la nature de l'ANE, une autre opération de taxonomie est effectuée en fonction du respect des principes de l'OI et/ou des normes internationales par l'ANE (qui à la FAO donne lieu au classement selon le « code couleur » allant de aucun problème détecté, à problème soulevé puis problème avéré présenté ci-dessus). Enfin, un troisième type d'opération de taxonomie (qui dépend en partie du résultat des deux premières) est effectué selon le statut de coopération autorisé : l'ANE peut avoir un accès plus ou moins étendu à l'OI. Par exemple à l'OMS, d'après le cadre FENSA, si vous êtes classés comme « secteur privé » (entreprise ou association d'entreprises), vous ne pouvez pas effectuer de détachement de personnel *(secondment)* auprès de l'OI. Une proposition de coopération peut aussi être refusée.

Ces opérations de taxonomie sont caractéristiques de l'activité bureaucratique d'une administration. Les opérations de taxonomie ont une valeur pratique, elles ont pour but de rendre gérable *(manageable)* la coopération avec les ANE. Dans le cas des administrations étatiques, James C. Scott (1998) a ainsi bien mis en évidence que l'État moderne repose sur la production de ce qu'il appelle des « simplifications étatiques » ou des « cartes de lisibilité », (catégories, statistiques, etc.), qui sont non pas destinées à représenter la société telle qu'elle est, mais représentent seulement ce qui intéresse l'observateur officiel. Pour effectuer ces opérations de classification, il est mis en œuvre un processus de construction de faits standardisés : les faits de départs perdent leur singularité et réapparaissent de manière simplifiée comme membre/partie d'une classe de faits, des distinctions qui pourraient être pertinentes sont donc ignorées (Scott 1998, 80). Classer les ANE revient pour les OI à créer de la lisibilité, à simplifier leur environnement, et à faciliter leurs interventions. Mais ce travail de taxonomie est un travail politique, objet de conflits. Cela a pour conséquence d'entraîner une résistance de la part des acteurs objets de simplification, et des tensions du côté des acteurs effectuant ces opérations taxonomiques.

4.2 Un travail contesté à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur de l'organisation

Comme l'a noté Marion Fresia (2009, 184) dans une étude portant sur les employés du HCR, la bureaucratisation qui résulte de l'imposition de nouveaux principes issu du NMP contribue à alourdir les contraintes pesant sur les employés des OI et peut être source de frustration, de démotivation, voire de résistance. La mise en œuvre des mesures de vérification diligente et d'évaluation et gestion du risque s'inscrit dans ces mêmes dynamiques. Il s'agit d'un travail supplémentaire qui repose à la fois sur le département dédié aux partenariats et sur les unités techniques des Secrétariats des OI, et dont le financement n'est pas toujours assuré. Il y a en effet besoin de nouvelles ressources, d'abord pour recruter (pour étoffer les équipes chargées de la vérification et de l'évaluation) et également pour former le personnel déjà en

12 Entretien, Partnerships Unit (OPCP), Rome, avril 2017.

place aux nouvelles procédures. A l'OMS, lors des négociations du Cadre FENSA, le Secrétariat s'est ainsi inquiété de la « surcharge systématique » de travail pour le Secrétariat (WHO Secretariat 2015, 2) et a insisté pour qu'un budget jugé soutenable soit adopté (WHO Secretariat 2016). Le Secrétariat de l'OMS a ainsi pu recruter de nouvelles personnes au sein du département des partenariats et publie l'année suivante un manuel à destination de ses employés (« Guide for staff on the implementation of FENSA »). Cela ne suffit pas à mettre fin à une inquiétude répandue parmi les employés du Secrétariat, comme le formule une de nos interlocutrices : « Dès qu'il y a un problème, on va encore taper sur le Secrétariat – on a l'impression d'être pris en étau entre les États membres et les acteurs non-étatiques, et ce qui ne marche pas retombe sur le Secrétariat »[13]. Cette inquiétude est partagée à la FAO[14]. En outre, au sein même du Secrétariat, ces procédures entraînent une fragmentation et un réagencement des chaînes hiérarchiques en divisant le travail taxonomique entre les unités dédiées aux partenariats et les unités techniques. En effet, les premières sont en charge des fonctions de contrôle, et peuvent être associées aux fonctions de pilotage stratégique, tandis que les fonctions opérationnelles de mise en œuvre et d'exécution restent l'apanage des unités techniques des Secrétariats des OI. Cette division des tâches, caractéristique du NMP, est susceptible de créer des tensions internes, par exemple quand le travail du bureau en charge de l'évaluation des risques n'est pas connu des unités techniques[15]. Ces tensions internes peuvent être renforcées par le fait que les justifications invoquées pour la mise en place des procédures de due diligence et risk evaluation (augmentation des partenariats extérieurs s'accompagnant de mesures de protection des OI) ne sont pas toujours vues comme suffisantes pour légitimer leur existence et leur mise en œuvre du point de vue des employés des OI. C'est le cas en particulier de ceux des unités techniques qui peuvent avoir l'impression à certains moments d'être confrontés à des injonctions contradictoires (devoir former des partenariats avec des acteurs extérieurs mais sous le sceau de la suspicion), voire d'être empêchés de faire leur travail.

Ces tensions ressenties au sein des Secrétariats des OI sont accentuées par les contestations extérieures de leur travail de taxonomie, de la part des acteurs mêmes qui sont l'objet des opérations de classification et de hiérarchisation. Ces contestations peuvent par exemple intervenir au moment même de la définition des catégories d'acteurs et/ou au moment de leur mise en œuvre effective (i.e. du classement des acteurs selon les catégories définies). Ainsi, à l'OMS, certaines ONG vont contester la définition d'une ONG prévue par le cadre FENSA comme une entité n'ayant « pas

13 Entretien, Partnership Department, OMS, Genève, Mai 2017.

14 Par leur familiarisation avec les procédures de *due diligence* et *risk management,* les employés des OI développent de nouvelles compétences techniques qui enrichissent leur « compétence bureaucratique » générale (Dairon 2023). Mais l'accroissement de la charge procédurale peut également contribuer à entretenir le cercle vicieux du cynisme (le « cynicism trap ») mis en évidence par Christian (2023) dans son article pour ce numéro spécial.

15 Entretien, Partnerships Unit (OPCP), Rome, avril 2017.

d'intérêts de nature *principalement* privée, commerciale ou lucrative » (nous soulignons), qui laisse entendre qu'il s'agit d'une question de degré plus que de nature. IBFAN (International Baby Food Action Network), ONG très attentive aux sources de financement, critique le fait que certaines ONG, qui reçoivent des financements de la part du secteur privé (par exemple : Save the Children), appartiennent à la même catégorie que les autres[16]. Certaines ONG (IBFAN, mais aussi Third World Network (TWN), Medicus Mundi International (MMI) …) contestent également la caractérisation de la fondation Gates en tant que fondation philanthropique, qui d'après la définition du cadre FENSA, doit être « clairement indépendante de toute entité du secteur privé », en raison de l'investissements des fonds dont elle tire ses revenus dans des sociétés dont les produits sont nuisibles à la santé, telles que Coca-Cola ou Walmart. Elles essayent au moins d'obtenir que soit interdit le détachement de personnel (*secondment*) d'une fondation philanthropique auprès de l'OMS (comme c'est le cas pour les entités du secteur privé), sans succès[17]. Au sein du Comité de la sécurité alimentaire mondiale (CSA) hébergé par la FAO, des organisations de la société civile s'opposent en 2017 à ce que la World Farmers' Organization (WFO – Organisation Mondiale des Agriculteurs), une association qui représente des organisations de producteurs agricoles, obtienne son propre siège au CSA (alors qu'auparavant elle était reconnue comme une organisation du secteur privé et appartenait au Mécanisme du secteur privé du CSA). Le tracé des frontières entre catégories reflète en effet les rapports de force entre acteurs lors des négociations, et certaines fondations, comme par exemple la fondation Gates, disposent d'un poids important au sein des OI. Ces contestations peuvent créer des tensions dans la collaboration plus générale qui existe entre ces ANE et le Secrétariat des OI. Comme nous avons pu le constater lors de notre enquête de terrain, les employés chargés des opérations de taxonomie ont parfois l'impression d'être mal compris, de faire l'objet de critiques qu'ils considèrent comme injustifiées, alors que leur autonomie dans l'application des procédures de vérification diligente et d'évaluation du risque est limitée (tout comme de manière plus générale, l'autonomie du Secrétariat est limitée vis-à-vis des États membres de l'OI) et qu'ils sont finalement soumis à une pression conséquente, puisque ce travail qui ordonne les frontières, les marges de l'OI, est présenté comme visant à « protéger » l'OI, et donc comme une tâche cruciale pour le maintien de la légitimité de l'organisation.

16 Observations de terrain, Genève, Mai 2016.
17 Entretien, Représentation permanente de la France auprès des Nations Unies à Genève, Genève, Mai 2017.

5 Conclusion. Le rôle de classificateur des OI dans la gouvernance mondiale

Dans cet article, nous avons montré que l'expansion de la coopération des OI avec les ANE entraîne un important réagencement des frontières organisationnelles des OI. En effet, les procédures de *due diligence* et de *risk evaluation,* outils bureaucratiques mobilisés par les OI pour organiser leurs relations avec les ANE, conduisent des employés des OI à être chargés d'un travail de taxonomie, c'est-à-dire de classification et de hiérarchisation des ANE et de leurs relations avec l'OI. Ce travail redessine les frontières des OI et engendre des résistances et contestation, à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur des OI.

Ce travail taxonomique revêt une double importance pour les OI. D'abord parce qu'il vise à les protéger de collaborations avec des ANE qui viendraient amoindrir leur légitimité, par exemple en cas de conflits d'intérêt. Les directives et procédures adoptées cherchent ainsi à maintenir une certaine unité de l'OI, en mettant toute coopération en conformité avec ses principes fondateurs et en garantissant une participation des ANE intégrée au jeu politique institutionnel des OI. Ensuite, parce que ce travail de taxonomie vise à leur redonner du contrôle sur leur environnement en leur permettant davantage de lisibilité grâce à des opérations de classification simplificatrices (pour reprendre les termes de James C. Scott utilisés ci-dessus). En effet, il est possible d'interpréter la mise en place de ces procédures de vérification diligente et d'évaluation du risque comme une tentative pour les OI de réaffirmer leur autorité au sein d'un système de gouvernance mondiale qui compte désormais une multitude d'acteurs leur faisant concurrence et qui s'est développé davantage sur la forme du réseau et du marché (par exemple sous la forme du partenariats public-privé [Meuleman 2008]).

Finalement, l'analyse des procédures de *due diligence* et *risk evaluation,* permet de mettre en évidence le rôle de classificateur joué par les OI au sein de la gouvernance mondiale. Celui-ci peut se comprendre comme une nouvelle dimension du rôle des organisations internationales comme « chefs d'orchestre » *(orchestrators)* au sein de la gouvernance mondiale. Ce rôle de « chef d'orchestre » a par exemple été défini par comme la capacité des OI à orchestrer des relations avec « acteurs intermédiaires » pour atteindre leurs objectifs (Abbott et al. 2015). L'orchestration par la classification s'effectue ici par l'intermédiaire d'un processus de bureaucratisation managériale qui conduit les OI à effectuer des opérations de taxonomie de leur environnement, et non simplement par des opérations de délégation à des acteurs extérieurs (Hawkins et al. 2006 ; Tallberg et al. 2013). C'est une piste de recherche qui amène à être davantage explorée dans d'autres travaux, afin de mieux comprendre et conceptualiser le rôle des OI au sein de la gouvernance mondiale.

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Varia

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Die Grünen in der Schweiz
Entwicklung – Wirken – Perspektiven

Reihe
ds demokratie.schweiz

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Die Grüne Partei der Schweiz (GPS) ist heute, nach vierzig Jahren Bestehen, in der Schweizer Parteienlandschaft eine feste Grösse. Sie erreichte bei den letzten nationalen Wahlen 2019 13 Prozent Stimmenanteil, ist in allen Sprachregionen präsent, regiert in zahlreichen Städten und Kantonen mit und vertritt fünf Kantone im Ständerat.

Als sich im Mai 1983 fünf ökologische Gruppierungen zur «Föderation der grünen Parteien der Schweiz» zusammenschlossen, war dies der erste Schritt zur heutigen GPS. Für die Weiterentwicklung war der Beitritt der linksalternativen Grünen Anfang der Neunzigerjahre wichtig, da dadurch ihr soziales, pazifistisches und feministisches Profil verstärkt wurde. Während die Grüne Partei Schweiz zunehmend in Konkurrenz zur Sozialdemokratischen Partei (SP) trat, erwuchs ihr und der SP in der zweiten Hälfte der Nullerjahre Konkurrenz durch die eher bürgerlich positionierten Grünliberalen (GLP).

Im vorliegenden Sammelband beleuchten 18 Autor:innen die GPS in all ihren Facetten. Untersucht werden ihre Geschichte und das Profil ihrer Wähler:innen, ihr intensiver Gebrauch der direktdemokratischen Instrumente oder das Stimmverhalten der Grünen im Nationalrat. Ein Vergleich mit den anderen Grünen in Europa zeigt, dass die GPS besonders wählerstark ist und sich ausgesprochen links positioniert.

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Seismo
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Social Support, Gender and the Roots of Political Efficacy: Evidence from the Swiss Household Panel

Annika Lindholm*

Abstract: This study explores how social support, defined as the number and quality of close relationships, affects feelings of political influence. Using Swiss Household Panel data (1999–2018), it reveals that the quality of relationships (emotional support) enjoyed from weak ties drives women's political efficacy, while having no significant effect for men. In addition to extending on the socially oriented drivers of political engagement, social support has the potential to reduce female disadvantage in political efficacy and eventually alleviate gender inequality in politics.

Keywords: political efficacy, gender, social support, panel data, Switzerland

Soutien social, genre et efficacité politique : résultats tirés du Panel suisse de ménages

Résumé : Cette étude examine l'effet du soutien social, défini comme le nombre et la qualité des relations personnelles étroites, sur le sentiment d'influence politique. À travers le Panel suisse des ménages (1999–2018), nous révélons que la qualité des relations (le soutien émotionnel) entretenues dans les liens faibles augmente l'efficacité politique chez les femmes, sans avoir d'effet chez les hommes. Le soutien social peut ainsi réduire le désavantage féminin pour le développement de l'efficacité politique, et à terme réduire l'inégalité de genre dans la politique.

Mots-clés : efficacité politique, genre, soutien social, données de panel, Suisse

Soziale Unterstützung, Geschlecht und die politische Wirksamkeit: Ergebnisse aus dem Schweizer Haushalt-Panel

Zusammenfassung: Diese Studie untersucht den Effekt der sozialen Unterstützung, definiert als Anzahl und Qualität enger persönlicher Beziehungen, auf das Gefühl politischer Einflussnahme auswirkt. Anhand von Daten des Schweizer Haushaltspanels (1999–2018) zeigen wir, dass die Qualität der Beziehungen (emotionale Unterstützung), die in schwachen Bindungen gepflegt werden, die politische Wirksamkeit von Frauen antreibt, während sie keinen signifikanten Einfluss auf Männer hat. Soziale Unterstützung kann somit die Geschlechterungleichheit in der Politik reduzieren.

Schlüsselwörter: politische Wirksamkeit, Geschlecht, soziale Unterstützung, Paneldaten, die Schweiz

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1 Introduction

I examine how social support influences the perception of political influence, a key indicator of political efficacy that shapes a politically engaged citizen. The socially-oriented predictors of political engagement are not novel to political research, but the discipline has for long been dominated by a strong focus on recruitment and mobilizing networks (Armingeon 2007; Lin 2008), civic norms (Putnam 1995; 2000) and skills (Verba et al. 1995; Teorell 2003) that are developed within these networks, as well as on other factors stemming from the broader socio-political environment that individuals are surrounded by (Campbell 2013). These explanations find their theoretical core in the social capital literature (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1995; Portes 1998; 2000; Hays 2015; Morales and Giugni 2016) that has become immensely popular for explaining how social structures and mores favour political activity.

Building on this scholarship, this article re-focuses the debate to the individual's experience of support in their social relationships. I argue that social support favours individual feelings of political efficacy, irrespective of the influence of formalized social networks, social trust, or other conventional indicators of social capital. Political efficacy is widely viewed as a cornerstone of participation in political activities (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et al. 1997; Karp and Banducci 2007), making the drivers of efficacy a key concern for the social sciences. Yet the wider range of the socially oriented predictors of political efficacy, such as social support, have not received much consideration in previous research. This study shows that the mechanism that links social support to political efficacy is very different between women and men. It drives women's within-individual efficacy development, while being less influential for men. Therefore, this study builds on an important and underexplored aspect of the discipline, that is, explaining where political efficacy comes from, and also sheds light on how the intra-individual development of political efficacy is driven by very different factors for men and women. The conventional belief is that gender disparities exist in terms of efficacy (Solhaug 2006; Paxton et al. 2007; Vecchione and Caprara 2009; Cicognani et al. 2012; Arens and Watermann 2017). Social support should thus be brought to the forefront in initiatives that combat gender inequality in politics. Considering how strongly political efficacy is correlated with actual participation, paying more policy attention to social support may have profound consequences on patterns of political behaviour.

While at present time, the majority of research on political efficacy is cross-sectional, this study examines trajectories of political efficacy over time using Swiss Household Panel (SHP) data (20 waves, 1999-2018). The Swiss context is suitable for studying gender differences in politics due to a particularly persistent gender gap in Swiss politics compared to many other Western democracies (Engeli et al. 2006; Stadelmann-Steffen and Koller 2014). Moreover, access to high-quality longitudi-

nal data brings a clear advantage to the present study in examining causal effects compared to previous cross-sectional research in the domain.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Political Efficacy

The ability to influence politics is a key indicator of political efficacy, which is one of the strongest predictors of political participation (Almond and Verba 1963; Karp and Banducci 2008; Wolak 2018). Political efficacy has been defined as "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have an impact on the political process" (Campbell et al. 1954, 187). It is developed over the life course, and particularly in adolescence and early adulthood (Caprara et al. 2009; Zaff et al. 2011; Arens and Watermann 2017). A conventional distinction is made between internal and external efficacy: while the internal component relates to the broader feeling of self-efficacy and is described as the individual's belief in her own abilities to influence political processes (Craig et al. 1990; Rasmussen and Nørgaard 2018), external efficacy is the individual's perception of the responsiveness of the political system, or the "feeling of having a voice in politics" (Wolak 2018, 764). Internal and external political efficacy are correlated but conceptually separate concepts, and it is possible for individuals to experience simultaneously different levels of external and internal efficacy. For instance, one can feel confident in their own ability to participate (high internal efficacy), but believe they are not heard by decision-makers (low external efficacy). Or to the contrary, one can have faith in the political system (high external efficacy), while feeling that politics is hard to understand or personally difficult to engage in (low internal efficacy). However, some measures of political efficacy, such as the personal feeling of political influence (the key dependent variable of this study), combine elements from both dimensions of efficacy, thus blurring out any sharp empirical distinctions between the two dimensions (see e. g. Acock and Clarke 1990; Niemi et al. 1991).

While past research has mainly used political efficacy as an independent variable, it is conceptually relevant to consider efficacy as a dependent variable and examine the antecedents of political efficacy. There is widespread agreement that resources related to socio-economic status (Verba et al. 1995), associational involvement (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Putnam 2000), political knowledge (Pasek et al. 2008), or political participation itself (Quintelier and Van Deth 2014) positively relate to political efficacy. Among the psychological predictors of efficacy, personality factors (Mondak 2010; Gerber et al. 2011) and good physical and mental health (Denny and Doyle 2007; Mattila et al. 2013; Ojeda 2015) have been mentioned. Still, most former research has settled for recognizing that politically efficacious individuals engage more in politics without fully understanding how efficacy develops in the

individual's mind. I argue that is essential to extend on this literature and consider the other psychological predictors of efficacy that are cultivated interpersonally – such as social support.

2.2 Social Support

The importance of social support for physical and mental wellbeing has widely been recognized in psychology as well as by health practitioners (Vaux 1988; Krause 2001; Harandi et al. 2017; Lee et al. 2018; Uchino et al. 2018). Social support is defined as the availability (the quantity) and the quality of close, trustful, and reliable relationships with surrounding persons (Larson 1993). How much is enough social support is highly personal; some people prefer to have several people to rely on for support, others are satisfied with just one close relationship (Cohen et al. 2000). Satisfaction with the available support is also strongly individual, and partly influenced by self-esteem and the level of control one has over their surroundings (Silverstein et al. 1996). These circumstances highlight the need to examine intra-individual trajectories in social support, instead of relying on between-person comparisons only.

Social support can either be practical, entailing help and support in concrete tasks, or psychological, which involves caring, empathy, love, and trust in one's social relationships, as well as a feeling of belonging, being accepted and needed in these relationships (Langford et al. 1997; Krause 2001). Despite that scholars have gradually started to explore how the act of giving (practical or psychological) support influences individual wellbeing (e. g. Inagaki and Orehek 2017), or on the transactional process of giving and receiving support (Liu et al. 2020), traditionally the domain focuses on the subjective experiences of perceived support (Sarason et al. 1983; Krause 2001; Utz and Breuer 2017). Accordingly, this study focuses on explaining how the *psychological* dimension of *perceived* social support (hereafter "social support") relates to political efficacy.

Participation in social activities (associations, clubs, or other organizations) and enjoying social support are likely positively correlated. Social participation has been described as vehicular to social support, rather than an indicator of support itself (Langford et al. 1997), and the structure through which social support may be provided (or not) (Ryan et al. 2008). A person may be integrated in social relationships without receiving sufficient social support, but one cannot receive social support without having any social contacts (Larson 1993). Moreover, the quality of support in personal relationships, or emotional support, should be more important for wellbeing than the mere number of relationships, that is, the weak and strong ties[1] individuals maintain (Ishii-Kuntz 1990; Krause 2001). Figure 1 illustrates the conceptualization of social support that is used in this study.

1 The terminology of weak and strong ties stems from social network theory that investigates structures of interpersonal relationships and their influence on individual and group social capital (Granovetter 1977).

Figure 1 Conceptualizing social support



Note: Author's own illustration. The shaded boxes indicate the dimensions of social support considered in this article.

2.3 Social Support and Social Capital

Studying efficacy through the social support framework has many potential merits, similarly to the more traditional indicators of social capital. Social capital has broadly been defined as the level of involvement in more or less formalized social networks and the extent of interpersonal trust which may or may not extend to strangers (Coleman 1988; Brehm and Rahn 1997), as well as the civic norms that "facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam 1995, 67). Social capital is thought to favour political activity and civic engagement on the individual and group level, by teaching skills, transmitting norms of civic duty, and increasing social trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Portes 1998; Putnam 2000; Stolle and Hooghe 2005; Armingeon 2007; Hays 2015).

Notwithstanding the great contribution social capital theory has made to our understanding of the social processes that favour political engagement, there are good reasons to call for more attention to social support as a distinct source of social capital and a driver of efficacy beliefs. Social support has been described in research as a source of the social capital that is cultivated in close social networks (Coleman 1988; Ryan et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2018). Still, social capital scholarship traditionally focuses on explaining the influence of the "bridging" ties persons cultivate, which extend to the wider circle of social contacts through involvement in associations or other (more or less) formalized social networks. By contrast, social support is mostly cultivated in "thick" social relationships, or "bonding" ties, meaning our

close, personal relationships (Lee et al. 2018). The specificity of social support is illustrated by how persons could have small social networks, e. g. because they do not belong to any clubs or associations, yet these individuals could cultivate one or a few strong personal relationships and be fully satisfied with the support they receive in these relationships. Simply put, social support *per se* could be beneficial for intra-individual efficacy development, irrespective of the bridging ties persons maintain.

2.4 Social support and political efficacy

In addition to traditional sources of social capital, social support provides an additional pathway to political efficacy. Social support is an established source of personal efficacy (Sarason et al. 1983; Langford et al. 1997; Krause 2001; Molino et al. 2018). It also likely strengthens feelings of political influence, since feeling supported favours personal competence (Krause 2001) and enhances a sense of control (Langford et al. 1997; Thoits 2011), capabilities of problem-solving (Whitfield and Wiggins 2003), and a sense of self-worth (Cohen et al. 2000; Karademas 2006). Social support thus strengthens the awareness of one's own capabilities as a political actor. By contrast, a lack of social support is associated with external locus of control and difficulty of persisting with a task that does not deliver an immediate and ready solution (Sarason et al. 1983), which characterize many activities that seek to exert political influence. Finally, social support reinforces a sense of belonging to a group or a collective, which is particularly favourable to the development of political efficacy (Moscardino et al. 2010; Talò et al. 2014; McDonnell 2020). On this note, Anderson (2010) showed that the prevalence and quality of social relationships positively relates to personal political efficacy in a community. It is therefore expected that social support favours the intra-individual development of political efficacy (Hypothesis 1, H_1).

2.5 Gender Differences in Social Support and Political Efficacy

Considering gender differences in political efficacy development sheds light on how socialization and societal norms influence individual attitude-formation. The debate is on-going whether a gender gap (still) exists in political engagement. Although some studies have relativized the persistence of a gender gap, at least in electoral participation (Norris 2002; Burns et al. 2018), many others have shown that women continue to be less engaged in politics due to their lower involvement in associations and social norms that discourage women's political participation, resulting in lower levels of political interest, knowledge, and political efficacy among women (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Beauregard 2014; Fraile 2014; Dassonneville and McAllister 2018). Moreover, the politico-institutional context provides cognitive cues, facilitates the organization, and provides more opportunities for men over women in politics (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012; Beauregard 2014). Gender differences in political efficacy and related attitudes stem from political socialization in adolescence

and early adulthood. Boys and men typically display higher levels of political efficacy than girls and women (Solhaug 2006; Paxton et al. 2007; Vecchione and Caprara 2009; Cicognani et al. 2012), and gender-specific trajectories are likely to continue into adulthood (Hill and Lynch 1983; Arens and Watermann 2017).

Gender differences also extend to social support practices. It influences the type of social relationships individuals are embedded in; some studies even suggest that, generally speaking, women have more "thick" relationships where social support is given and received, whereas men maintain more extended social networks ("thin" relationships) (Fuhrer et al. 1999; Perrewé and Carlson 2002). Importantly, social support has been found to be more significant as a resource for women than men in efficacy development, particularly in fields that are traditionally male-dominant (Vekiri and Chronaki 2008; Arens and Watermann 2017; Guan et al. 2017; Molino et al. 2018). Politics is arguably still a male-dominant field, due to the deep-rooted influence of socialization and social norms on gender roles. It is therefore likely that women benefit more than men from social support in terms of within-individual development of political efficacy (Hypothesis 2, H_2).

2.6 Political Efficacy in Switzerland

The Swiss context is interesting for studying political engagement, considering the particular politico-institutional context of direct democracy in which Swiss citizens participate in politics (Lutz 2006). From a normative perspective, direct democracy should increase political competence and system responsiveness to citizens' demands, both being favourable to individual political efficacy (Pateman 1970). In this rationale, average levels of political efficacy (internal and external) should be comparatively higher in Switzerland (Bowler and Donovan 2002), although empirical evidence is inconclusive in this regard (Blais 2014). On the other hand, direct democracy presupposes a high level of political sophistication from citizens. It may make uninformed citizens believe that participation is too hard, and dampen political efficacy (Dyck and Lascher 2009; Schlozman and Yohai 2008). As for gender differences, studies show that they are more persistent in Swiss society than in many other Western democracies (Engeli et al. 2006). Swiss women continue to have lower levels of political knowledge, skills, and interest compared to men (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010), and likely also lower political efficacy. While some claim that direct democracy mitigates gender differences in political efficacy (Kim 2015), the gender gap in Swiss politics tends to suggest otherwise. Despite the mixed evidence of political efficacy in a direct democracy setting, it entails that the results of this study cannot be guaranteed to hold in other contexts. But this study provides valuable information on how political efficacy develops intra-individually in a direct democracy, and possibly also in other political systems.

3 Data and Methods

3.1 The Sample and Measures

The hypotheses will be tested on SHP data. Since 1999, the SHP is an annual panel study based on a stratified random sample of private households and individuals living in Switzerland (SHP 2020). Respondents who participated in 1999 and in any of the subsequent waves until 2018 are included in the analysis, thus amounting to twenty waves (waves 1–20) and 1724 respondents. The interviews were mainly done by telephone.

Table 1 recapitulates the measurements used in the analyses. Political efficacy is a single item expressing belief in one's own ability to influence political decision-making, thereby combining elements from the external (Niemi et al. 1991) and internal (Acock and Clarke 1990) dimensions of efficacy . Respondents in the sample score on average 4 out of 10 in political efficacy across time, with intra-individual variation ($\sigma = 1.7$) in the panel being slightly, but not substantively, lower than between-individual differences ($\sigma = 1.8$). Feelings of political influence are thus not static but develop for individuals over time.

Social support is measured through quantity of close relationships and the quality, i. e. the emotional support, enjoyed from those relationships. The number of close relationships with relatives or friends are combined into an indicator of strong informal ties ("strong ties"), whereas close relationships with neighbors or colleagues indicate weak informal ties ("weak ties"). The extreme values of the number of relationships were truncated at the top due to low occurrence of these high values (between 1–4 % of all observations).[2] Emotional support is measured through personal satisfaction with the support enjoyed in those relationships.[3] To differentiate between the sources of that support, I distinguish between support received from strong ties (friends and relatives) and weak ties (neighbours and colleagues). The items are combined into two cumulative indices: emotional support from strong ties and from weak ties.[4] Details on the construction of the social support measures are available in Appendix A1.

To compare the influence of social support with some of the traditional indicators of social capital, I control for social participation, associational involvement, and

2 Measurement scale of the indicators of strong and weak ties was changed in waves 15 and 18 from continuous to categorical. To preserve equivalence of measurement, these variables were excluded from analysis for waves 15 and 18.

3 These questions were not asked whenever respondents reported not having any contact with a relative, friend, colleague, or neighbor in a particular wave. This occurred at least once for a number of respondents (relatives: 21 %, friends: 20 %, colleagues: 81 %, neighbors: 70 %). However, only between 20–35 % of those respondents never changed their answer in the panel (see Appendix A5 for details). The responses that never change are excluded by default from the fixed-effects analysis, which requires that individual change takes place in order to estimate causal effects.

4 The correlations between emotional support from weak ties ($r = .44$) and strong ties ($r = .39$) are sufficient for index creation (Clark and Watson 2016).

social trust in the models. Social participation is measured by overall engagement in social activities as well as by active membership in social and political associations. Since civic skills are likely to be better learnt through actual participation in associational activities, active members are isolated from passive members in the associations. Active political party membership is considered separately from other political associations due to its presumed strong influence on political efficacy.

The models additionally control for the influence of sociodemographic characteristics and core political attitudes. Structural and social aspects of life (such as age, education, and income) influence one's social relationships, since "people do not begin or maintain their quest for social well-being with the same assets" (Keyes 1998, 123), in addition to being correlated with political efficacy (Finkel 1985; Brady et al. 1995). Income is measured through satisfaction with one's financial situation. Subjective income measures are less sensitive to item non-response and can be considered a better proxy of the quality of life than objective indicators (Ackerman and Paolucci 1983). Finally, political interest is controlled for as one of the strongest predictors of political engagement (Prior 2010).

3.2 The Method

Fixed-effects OLS regressions were estimated in the data to encounter for within-individual change in social support and political efficacy and to identify potential causal effects. The fixed-effects model is similar to a multilevel regression model where observations are nested within individuals, and where the fixed-effects coefficient expresses variation over time in the individual-specific mean of a construct. An advantage of the fixed-effects model is that it controls for time-constant heterogeneity between individuals that may be correlated with the outcome, thereby making self-selection into treatment no longer a problem (Allison 2009). In this way, fixed-effects estimation provides a significant advantage over other methods for inferring causal effects of a predictor on an outcome. When estimating individual change in statistical models, the individual error terms are likely to correlate across waves. Therefore the standard errors are clustered by respondents in the analysis. Since fixed-effects models only use within-individual variation to estimate effects, the influence of time-constant characteristics cannot be directly estimated by these models; on the other hand, the models implicitly control for the influence of time-constant traits (Allison 2009). To test gender differences (H_2), the models are estimated separately for men and women.

Table 1 Variable Descriptions

Item	Measurement	Wording
Political efficacy	0–10	"How much influence do you think someone like you can have on government policy, if 0 means 'no influence', and 10 'a very strong of influence?'"
Emotional support, weak ties	0–10	"To what extent can your (neighbours/colleagues) be available in case of need and show understanding, by talking with you for example, if 0 means 'not at all' and 10 'a great deal'?"
Emotional support, strong ties	0–10	"To what extent can your (friends/relative) be available in case of need and show understanding, by talking with you for example, if 0 means 'not at all' and 10 'a great deal'?"
Strong ties	0–10	"With how many relatives living outside of your household do you have a good and close relationship?" "How many good and close friends do you have?"
Weak ties	0–10	"With how many of your neighbors are you on good terms and enjoy a close relationship?" "With how many work colleagues or acquaintances met during the course of leisure, political, religious or other activities, are you on good terms?"
Social participation	yes = 1, no = 0	"Do you take part in clubs' or other groups' activities (religious groups included)?"
Active in a political party	active member = 1, passive member or not a member = 0	"I will now read out a list of associations and organisations. Could you tell me for each of them whether you are an active member, a passive member, or not a member?" (political party)
Active in political organization	active member = 1, passive member or not a member = 0	"I will now read out a list of associations and organisations. Could you tell me for each of them whether you are an active member, a passive member, or not a member?" (union/environmental/tenants)
Active in social organization	active member = 1, passive member or not a member = 0	"I will now read out a list of associations and organisations. Could you tell me for each of them whether you are an active member, a passive member, or not a member?" (local or parents/charity/cultural or education/women/sports association)
Social trust	0–10	"Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people, if 0 means 'Can't be too careful' and 10 means 'Most people can be trusted'?"
Education, highest attained	secondary level or less = 1 completed secondary = 2 tertiary-level or advanced vocational degree = 3	
Satisfaction with financial situation	0–10	"Overall how satisfied are you with your financial situation, if 0 means 'not at all satisfied' and 10 'completely satisfied'?"
Political interest	0–10	"Generally, how interested are you in politics?"
Age	in years, numeric	
Gender	female = 1, male = 0	

4 Results and Discussion

4.1 Descriptive Analysis

Through a cross-sectional lens, significant gender differences can be observed in the mean levels of social support across time in the sample (Figures 2a–e). Men maintain on average more weak ties than women (2d), while women report more emotional support in their relationships (2b and c). These findings reflect past research on gendered patterns of social relationships (Fuhrer et al. 1999; Perrewé and Carlson 2002). By contrast, and perhaps surprisingly, men and women are not significantly different in the panel in terms of average levels of political efficacy (2a). At least one explanation could relate to the specific attributes of panel participants, i. e. that they tend to be more politically and socially active than the general population (Voorpostel 2010). While the descriptive results align with some studies that do not find gender differences in efficacy (e. g. Anderson 2010), it should be recalled that Figures 2a–e express differences *between* individuals in the panel, thereby effectively ignoring individual trajectories in political efficacy. In other words, while men and women in the panel do not significantly differ in terms of average political efficacy, the drivers of their political attitudes may very well be different.

4.2 Fixed-Effects Estimation

Table 2 shows the fixed-effects estimators (FE) for the entire sample and separately for men and women. The standardized coefficients facilitate the comparison of the predictors across models. Firstly, we observe that social support does not attain statistical significance in the global sample. While an intra-individual increase in emotional support from neighbours or colleagues (weak ties) to a certain extent fosters political efficacy, this effect only attains statistical significance at the 0.08 level, which is below the conventional threshold. The number of close ties individuals have are not significant in predicting political efficacy either. In summary, I do not find very strong evidence of social support being a significant predictor of political efficacy across groups in the sample.

Meanwhile, examining gender differences reveal that emotional support received from weak ties is statistically significant for women in the sample ($\beta = .046$; $p < 0.05$), but not for men ($\beta = .006$; ns). Strikingly, the positive influence of emotional support among women overrides the effect of the traditional indicators of social capital. Social participation, associational involvement, or social trust do not emerge as significant within-individual predictors of efficacy. The fact that emotional support cultivated in weak ties is more influential than support from strong ties underscores, however, the relevance of the wider social networks for the intra-individual development of efficacy and in this way speaks to the social capital literature. The magnitude of the effect of emotional support from weak ties may appear as modest, being responsible on average for a 5-percentage point increase in within-individual political efficacy

Figure 2A–E Mean Levels of Political Efficacy And Social Support Across Time, By Gender, 1999–2018



Note: gray line = women; black line = men. Spikes show 95 % confidence intervals. The gaps in the graphs is due to data unavailability for certain years.

development among women, yet its effect exceeds some other conventional predictors of efficacy, such as age, or indicators of social participation. These results suggest that from a within-individual perspective, increases in formal social participation or trust do not have as much influence on women's feelings of political influence as emotional support has. While women who participate actively in associations and other social activities likely feel, on average, more efficacious and are more involved politically, having access to broad social networks does not fully explain the mecha-

nism that makes individuals feel more politically efficacious. Equally interesting is the finding that the positive effect of emotional support from weak ties remains for women even when controlling for political party membership or political interest, despite that these are conventionally viewed as some of the most powerful predictors of political engagement.

Figure 3 further illustrates the salience of emotional support from weak ties for women's political efficacy by displaying the average predicted probabilities (AME:s) of efficacy along increases in emotional support. The AME:s are calculated for each observation in the data, separately for men and women, and then averaged to get the predicted values. Figure 3 shows that while women in the panel tend to have lower political efficacy than men without emotional support (albeit confidence intervals overlap in the lowest levels of support), this gap is progressively narrowed when women enjoy more emotional support from their weak ties, and finally the gender gap in efficacy closes when women and men are fully satisfied with the emotional support they receive. In other words, a lack of emotional support in their weak ties "penalizes" women in terms of within-individual political efficacy development, but as women receive more emotional support they tend to "catch up" to men in this regard. Figure 3 illustrates how emotional support could become a meaningful resource for women in overcoming their initial disadvantage in political efficacy. This echoes previous research on the important gender differences in giving and receiving social support (Fuhrer et al. 1999; Perrewé and Carlson 2002), as well as feelings of political efficacy (e. g. Verba et al. 1997; Paxton et al. 2007; Cicognani et al. 2012; Arens and Watermann 2017). Emotional support emerges in the analyses as an *underexplored pathway* for the shaping of politically efficacious and engaged women.

4.3 Robustness Checks

The stepwise built models are available in Appendices A2 a–c. They show that there is a base effect of emotional support (from weak ties) for the global sample and for women in the data, which holds with the inclusion of sociodemographic controls. The main models were also estimated without the emotional support variables (Appendix A3) to verify whether the effect of the other socially oriented predictors will change. The influence of weak and strong ties did not change in the models, however, involvement in political associations and social trust became significant. This underlines how some of the influence of these traditional social capital indicators actually stem through the emotional support enjoyed in relationships, instead of mere network participation and size, or generalized trust.

Some of the control variables could also be considered as potential colliders in the model. For instance, high political efficacy could also cultivate political interest, and not only result from it (Brussino et al. 2011; Pedersen 2012). Therefore, we also estimate the main model without political interest (see Appendix A4). The exclusion of political interest does not substantively change the influence of emotional support

Table 2 Fixed-Effects Estimation of Political Efficacy, 1999–2018

Predictors of political efficacy	All		Women		Men	
	FE	SE	FE	SE	FE	SE
Social support						
Emotional support from weak ties	0.0289 †	0.01574	0.0464 *	0.02093	0.0058	0.02364
Emotional support from strong ties	0.0282	0.01782	0.0295	0.02274	0.0262	0.02815
Number of weak ties	0.0070	0.01187	0.0218	0.01624	–0.0096	0.01739
Number of strong ties	–0.0013	0.01345	0.0073	0.01779	–0.0096	0.02061
Covariates						
Age in years	0.0452 **	0.01641	0.0368 †	0.02214	0.0539*	0.02432
Age-squared	–0.0004 *	0.00016	–0.0002	0.00022	–0.0005 †	0.00024
Education, completed (ref. secondary-level)						
Compulsory school	–0.0610	0.18674	–0.0932	0.28374	0.0169	0.13670
Tertiary level	–0.0813	0.07549	–0.0793	0.10516	–0.0902	0.10593
Satisfaction with income	0.0048	0.01420	–0.0105	0.01826	0.0329	0.02258
Social participation (clubs/ groups) (y/n)	–0.0087	0.02908	–0.0113	0.03544	–0.0036	0.05002
Active in political association (y/n)	0.0646 †	0.03559	0.0692	0.04553	0.0604	0.05345
Active in political party (y/n)	0.2053 **	0.06009	0.1315	0.08783	0.2501**	0.08028
Active in social association (y/n)	0.0168	0.02518	0.0127	0.03306	0.0273	0.03824
Social trust	0.0169	0.01469	0.0200	0.02038	0.0143	0.02063
Political interest	0.1655 ***	0.02199	0.1754 ***	0.02889	0.1483***	0.03323
Constant	1.1456 *	0.48055	0.8455	0.64052	1.4844*	0.72692
Model diagnostics						
Std. dev of residuals (within-person)	0.82		0.81		0.84	
Std. dev of residuals (between-person)	0.62		0.63		0.62	
Correlation within-person errors/regressors	–0.11		–0.14		–0.10	
rho	0.63		0.62		0.65	
R^2 (within-person)	0.02		0.03		0.02	
n (persons)	1538		895		643	
N (observations)	7332		4192		3140	

Note: FE = standardized fixed-effects estimators. Standard errors (SE) are panel robust. Significance: † = $p < 0.08$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure 3 Predicted Values of Political Efficacy Across Emotional Support Scale, By Gender, 1999–2018



Note: Probabilities calculated from models in Table 2. The average marginal effects are reported; other covariates in the model are at their actual values. Spikes indicate 95 % confidence intervals.

main analyses. Finally, a first difference (FD) model was also estimated in the data (results available upon request). The results were robust to the main models.

4.4 Discussion

The results do not provide strong support for H_1 regarding a generalized positive influence of social support on political efficacy. Meanwhile, I find support for H_2 about gender differences in benefiting from emotional support for intra-individual political efficacy development. This echoes previous research on the salience of social support for women's efficacy in traditionally male-dominant fields (Vekiri and Chronaki 2008; Arens and Watermann 2017; Guan et al. 2017; Molino et al. 2018), and on how it is the quality, and not the quantity, of social support that influences individual perceptions and beliefs (Ishii-Kuntz 1990; Krause 2001; Utz and Breuer 2017).

In all three samples (full and split by gender), the surprisingly weak influence of social participation, most forms of associational activity, and social trust stand out in the analyses. There is limited within-person variation in the social participation and association activity variables in the sample (see Appendix A5), which is one possible explanation to their non-significance in the model. On a related note, the

differences in political efficacy between individuals are moderately high, explaining up to 63 % of the variance in the full model (rho=0.63), 62 % for women and 65 % for men. The results should therefore not be understood as contradicting the widespread recognition that persons having large social networks and who participate more in social activities feel generally more politically efficacious, but instead it sheds light on how *changes* in social support relate to political efficacy development *within* individuals, and women particularly, over the life course. Understanding these gender differences in efficacy development are extremely useful in view of building on the social capital literature and by bringing social support to the forefront among the more established, socially-anchored drivers of a politically-engaged citizenry.

Some limitations to this study should be acknowledged. Despite the many merits of panel data, a drawback is its sensitivity to self-selection, thus attracting respondents with stronger patterns of political involvement and pro-social behaviour (Voorpostel 2010), and likely also higher levels of political efficacy. The distinct profile of panel participants should therefore be kept in mind when interpreting the results of this study. In addition, considering that the analyses were conducted on Swiss data, a country with a distinct politico-institutional setting and pronounced gender differences in political involvement, the results should not be generalized across political contexts, but instead serve as an illustration of how the relationship between social support and efficacy could look like in similar settings. Future longitudinal, cross-national research would be desirable in order to test the relationship in other country contexts. Finally, data availability in the SHP constrained this study to examine political efficacy through a single item that combines elements of internal and external political efficacy. This is admittedly a drawback, since internal and external efficacy are conceptually distinct and correlate differently with other indicators of the political individual, such as political trust or participation (Anderson 2010; Wolak 2018). While it was shown that emotional support fosters intra-individual changes in political influence, we cannot differentiate whether this effect taps on external or internal efficacy, or both, with the data. Future data collection endeavours should aim to target social support and both dimensions of political efficacy so that we could more carefully disentangle between the effects of social support on the different aspects of the political individual.

5 Conclusions

This study has revisited the mechanism that makes socially well-connected individuals more likely to feel influential in politics. I showed that the emotional support that is cultivated in weak ties is more influential on women's intra-individual political efficacy development than the number of social ties, the extent of social participation and associational activity, or the level of social trust. By showing that

emotional support fosters women's political efficacy development, this study challenges the conventional wisdoms on the main socially-rooted predictors of political engagement. These findings have important implications on how scholars should think about the social resources that shape individual perceptions of political influence, and how gender interacts in this relationship. It highlights the need to look into how interactions in close personal relationships shape how women feel about politics – thus unveiling just how important these are for getting women more involved politically. This study therefore calls for more systematic consideration to social support, and its quality in particular, in future research that aims to shed light on the development of politically efficacious female citizens.

Could social support become a remedy for gender disparities in politics? It is certainly possible. Promoting social support practices in female education, by preference already during formative years (Arens and Watermann 2017), as well as strengthening existing initiatives that combat social isolation among politically disengaged female populations have the potential to reduce women's disadvantage in political efficacy over the life course. Actions such as these may alleviate gender inequalities and combat stereotypes about women's political involvement, and ultimately increase women's participation in politics. If we acknowledge that the extent of citizen's political engagement is an indicator of a well-functioning democratic societies, paying attention to social support becomes paramount for the purpose of democratic inclusion. Considering social support more systematically in research on women's political involvement thereby emerges as a promising new research agenda in the political and social sciences.

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Appendices

A1. Social Support-Measures

"Weak ties": number of colleagues (C) or neighbors (N) the respondent reports having close contact with (if any) in a particular wave. Combined additive index, rescaled to 0–10.
"Strong ties": number of friends (F) or relatives (R) the respondent reports having close contact with (if any) in a particular wave. Combined additive index, rescaled to 0–10.
"Emotional support, weak ties": The level of satisfaction a respondent reports enjoying from their relationships with colleagues (C) or neighbours (N) in a particular wave. Combined additive index, rescaled to 0–10.
"Emotional support, strong ties": The level of satisfaction a respondent reports enjoying from their relationships with friends (F) or relatives (R) in a particular wave. Combined additive index, rescaled to 0–10.

The emotional support indices do not differentiate from the number of social ties persons receive satisfaction from. Consider the following examples:

- *Respondent A* has a close relationship with 11 colleagues (C), 3 neighbors (N), 13 friends (F) and 5 relatives (5).
- They report low satisfaction (2/10) for C and medium satisfaction (5/10) for N,
- and high satisfaction (8/10) for friends (F) and relatives (F) (7/10).
- Respondent A's overall emotional support index for *weak* ties is (2 + 5)/2 = 3,5. Respondent A's overall emotional support index for *strong* ties is (8 + 7)/2 = 7,5.

- *Respondent B* has a close relationship with 4 friends (F), 1 relative (R), 4 colleagues (C), and no neighbors (N).
- They report medium satisfaction (6/10) for F, low satisfaction (1/10) for R, and high satisfaction (9/10) for colleagues (C).
- Respondent B's overall emotional support index for *weak* ties is (0 + 9)/2 = 4,5.
- Respondent B's overall emotional support index for *strong* ties is (6 + 1)/2 = 3,5.

Respondent A maintains more strong ties than Respondent B and also report being more satisfied from in these relationships, thus having a higher score on the

emotional support index for strong ties. By contrast, although Respondent A has a larger network of weak ties, their overall satisfaction in these relationships is lower than Respondent B's satisfaction of weak ties, and thus A scores lower in emotional support from weak ties than B.

Table A2a Fixed-Effects Estimation: Base Model (Emotional Support Only)

Predictors of political efficacy	All		Women		Men	
	FE	SE	FE	SE	FE	SE
Social support						
Emotional support from weak ties	0.0381 **	0.01289	0.0519 **	0.01703	0.0196	0.01966
Emotional support from strong ties	0.0105	0.01383	0.0136	0.01711	0.0063	0.02273
Constant	0.0672 ***	0.00038	0.0318 ***	0.00281	0.1060 ***	0.00427
Model diagnostics						
Std. dev of residuals (within-person)	0.80		0.78		0.81	
Std. dev of residuals (between-person)	0.67		0.66		0.67	
Correlation within-person errors/ regressors	0.02		0.03		0.03	
rho	0.59		0.58		0.59	
R^2 (within-person)	0.00		0.00		0.00	
n (persons)	1602		926		676	
N (observations)	9622		5495		4127	

Table A2b Fixed-Effects Estimation: Emotional Support And Strong And Weak Ties

Predictors of political efficacy	All		Women		Men	
	FE	SE	FE	SE	FE	SE
Social support						
Emotional support from weak ties	0.0381**	0.01289	0.0524**	0.01716	0.0191	0.01946
Emotional support from strong ties	0.0090	0.01388	0.0113	0.01712	0.0062	0.02285
Number of weak ties	0.0092	0.01011	0.0224	0.01368	–0.0050	0.01493
Number of strong ties	–0.0107	0.01118	–0.0057	0.01456	–0.0164	0.01737
Constant	0.0644***	0.00553	0.0232**	0.00696	0.1132***	0.01092
Model diagnostics						
Std. dev of residuals (within-person)	0.80		0.78		0.81	
Std. dev of residuals (between-person)	0.67		0.66		0.67	
Correlation within-person errors/ regressors	0.02		0.03		0.03	
rho	0.59		0.58		0.60	
R^2 (within-person)	0.00		0.00		0.00	
n (persons)	1602		926		676	
N (observations)	9594		5479		4115	

Table A2c Fixed-Effects Estimation: Sociodemographics Added

Predictors of political efficacy	All		Women		Men	
	FE	SE	FE	SE	FE	SE
Social support						
Emotional support from weak ties	0.0385 **	0.01277	0.0526 **	0.01710	0.0191	0.01919
Emotional support from strong ties	0.0108	0.01392	0.0131	0.01713	0.0082	0.02289
Number of weak ties	0.0136	0.01003	0.0257 †	0.01368	–0.0001	0.01475
Number of strong ties	0.0027	0.01123	0.0090	0.01491	–0.0044	0.01705
Covariates						
Age in years	0.0674 ***	0.01245	0.0528**	0.01587	0.0861***	0.01987
Age-squared	–0.0005 ***	0.00012	–0.0003*	0.00016	–0.0007 ***	0.00019
Education, completed (ref. secondary-level)						
Compulsory school	–0.1573	0.09110	–0.1770	0.13079	–0.1148	0.12429
Tertiary level	–0.0931	0.06669	–0.1209	0.08201	–0.0651	0.11080
Satisfaction with income	–0.0082	0.01276	–0.0178	0.01599	0.0079	0.02096
Constant	1.6530 ***	0.36351	1.1703*	0.46127	2.2707 ***	0.58238
Model diagnostics						
Std. dev of residuals (within-person)	0.85		0.84		0.86	
Std. dev of residuals (between-person)	0.66		0.66		0.66	
Correlation within-person errors/ regressors	–0.31		–0.31		–0.32	
rho	0.62		0.62		0.63	
R^2 (within-person)	0.02		0.02		0.02	
n (persons)	1602		926		676	
N (observations)	9578		5465		4113	

Note: SHP 1999–2018 data. FE = standardized fixed-effects estimators. Standard errors (SE) are panel robust. Significance: † = $p < 0.08$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A3 Fixed-Effects Estimation Without Emotional Support

Predictors of political efficacy	All		Women		Men	
	FE	SE	FE	SE	FE	SE
Social support						
Number of strong ties	0.0076	0.01088	0.0116	0.01467	0.0029	0.01610
Number of weak ties	0.0070	0.00847	0.0208	0.01104	–0.0088	0.01303
Covariates						
Age in years	0.0418 **	0.01254	0.0321	0.01670	0.0548 **	0.01892
Age-squared	–0.0004 **	0.00012	–0.0003	0.00016	–0.0005 *	0.00019
Education, completed (ref. secondary-level)						
Compulsory school	–0.0170	0.14788	0.0633	0.19492	–0.1505	0.18316
Tertiary level	–0.0414	0.05812	0.0368	0.07674	–0.1715*	0.08684
Satisfaction with income	0.0138	0.01047	0.0100	0.01285	0.0215	0.01779
Social participation (clubs/groups) (y/n)	0.0297	0.02187	0.0132	0.02743	0.0523	0.03640
Active in political association (y/n)	0.0730 **	0.02787	0.0790 *	0.03619	0.0649	0.04168
Active in political party (y/n)	0.1831 ***	0.04741	0.0648	0.07434	0.2550 ***	0.06083
Active in social association (y/n)	0.0372	0.01950	0.0595 *	0.02519	0.0047	0.03059
Social trust	0.0430 ***	0.01105	0.0550 ***	0.01390	0.0248	0.01795
Political trust	0.1700 ***	0.01603	0.1737 ***	0.02057	0.1653 ***	0.02560
Constant	1.0461 **	0.36300	0.7698 **	0.47816	1.4624 **	0.55593
Model diagnostics						
Std. dev of residuals (within-person)	0.76		0.74		0.81	
Std. dev of residuals (between-person)	0.65		0.65		0.65	
Correlation within-person errors/ regressors	–0.04		0.02		–0.16	
rho	0.58		0.56		0.61	
R^2 (within-person)	0.02		0.02		0.02	
n (persons)	1705		989		716	
N (observations)	12 482		7298		5184	

Note: SHP 1999–2018 data. FE = standardized fixed-effects estimators. Standard errors (SE) are panel robust. Significance: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A4 Fixed-Effects Estimation Without Political Interest

Predictors of political efficacy	All		Women		Men	
	FE	SE	FE	SE	FE	SE
Social support						
Emotional support, weak ties	0.0318 *	0.01563	0.0478 *	0.02072	0.0101	0.02359
Emotional support, strong ties	0.0330 †	0.01790	0.0382	0.02276	0.0266	0.02829
Number of strong ties	0.0096	0.01196	0.0269	0.01634	–0.0094	0.01752
Number of weak ties	0.0001	0.01362	0.0078	0.01808	–0.0075	0.02080
Covariates						
Age in years	0.0474 **	0.01666	0.0397 †	0.02257	0.0549 *	0.02454
Age-squared	–0.0004 *	0.00016	-0.0003	0.00022	–0.0005 †	0.00024
Education, completed (ref. secondary-level)						
Compulsory school	–0.0862	0.19826	–0.1456	0.30206	0.0313	0.13992
Tertiary level	–0.0745	0.07352	–0.0780	0.09987	-0.0746	0.10712
Satisfaction with income	0.0047	0.01436	–0.0109	0.01845	0.0331	0.02289
Social participation (clubs/groups) (y/n)	–0.0087	0.02949	–0.0096	0.03599	-0.0064	0.05054
Active in political association (y/n)	0.0712 *	0.03587	0.0719	0.04578	0.0693 **	0.05396
Active in political party (y/n)	0.2309 ***	0.06106	0.1654	0.08858	0.2693	0.08159
Active in social association (y/n)	0.0177	0.02546	0.0137	0.03343	0.0281	0.03857
Social trust	0.0229	0.01482	0.0257	0.02050	0.0204	0.02098
Constant	1.2116 *	0.48784	0.8998	0.65336	1.5520 *	0.73249
Model diagnostics						
Std. dev of residuals (within-person)	0.84		0.83		0.85	
Std. dev of residuals (between-person)	0.63		0.63		0.62	
Correlation within-person errors/ regressors	–0.15		–0.19		–0.13	
rho	0.64		0.63		0.65	
R^2 (within-person)	0.01		0.01		0.01	
n (persons)	1538		895		643	
N (observations)	7332		4192		3140	

Note: SHP 1999–2018 data. FE = standardized fixed-effects estimators. Standard errors (SE) are panel robust. Significance: † = $p < 0.08$.; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A5 Within-Person Variation in Predictors, SHP 1999–2018, in %

	Ever	Always		Ever	Always		Ever	Always		Ever	Always
Emotional support, friends			Emotional support, relatives			Emotional support, colleagues			Emotional support, neighbors		
0	2.9	13.5	0	8.8	15.0	0	9.4	19.3	0	11.1	23.3
1	1.6	9.2	1	4.0	11.7	1	5.5	13.3	1	5.7	18.6
2	7.3	10.8	2	10.1	12.8	2	20.2	16.9	2	18.9	19.0
3	11.4	12.0	3	15.4	12.6	3	31.5	17.0	3	26.5	18.1
4	17.2	12.9	4	19.0	12.4	4	43.8	17.6	4	34.7	17.7
5	44.5	19.4	5	48.4	17.3	5	76.4	27.3	5	70.1	26.0
6	49.7	16.5	6	47.7	16.0	6	68.3	22.1	6	62.4	21.7
7	74.7	23.4	7	72.0	22.2	7	71.7	24.9	7	69.1	24.8
8	90.1	32.9	8	88.9	30.9	8	66.7	25.9	8	69.2	28.4
9	59.0	20.1	9	55.4	18.5	9	20.9	14.9	9	25.5	17.3
10	61.7	31.5	10	67.0	34.2	10	28.5	23.7	10	33.7	26.4
Nr. of close relationships; friends			Nr. of close relationships; relatives			Nr. of close relationships; colleagues			Nr. of close relationships; neighbors		
0	19.7	25.3	0	21.2	20.0	0	81.0	29.1	0	70.2	35.3
1	20.4	20.6	1	22.1	19.4	1	25.1	13.9	1	43.1	20.2
2	50.4	26.1	2	45.0	20.9	2	49.9	18.0	2	71.5	25.9
3	64.2	23.7	3	54.5	20.1	3	53.0	15.7	3	58.8	18.9
4	66.7	21.6	4	61.8	18.9	4	49.5	14.4	4	61.0	18.4
5	64.4	21.6	5	65.2	18.7	5	59.3	16.2	5	41.8	15.0
6	53.7	17.5	6	55.9	16.3	6	37.1	13.0	6	39.0	16.2
7	17.8	11.9	7	30.0	11.9	7	13.2	10.7	7	12.7	10.6
8	29.1	14.2	8	39.5	13.6	8	21.5	10.8	8	21.6	13.0
9	1.7	9.9	9	6.9	9.9	9	1.5	9.6	9	2.9	10.1
10	46.5	24.7	10	63.7	22.6	10	66.1	20.5	10	28.4	18.9
11	0.6	8.5	11	2.8	10.3	11	0.8	9.4	11	0.8	8.5
12	12.7	14.1	12	21.2	13.4	12	13.7	13.2	12	8.1	12.7
13	0.8	8.4	13	2.1	10.8	13	0.9	9.4	13	0.4	10.8
14	1.0	10.4	14	4.1	9.7	14	1.2	8.9	14	1.5	10.8
15	12.4	14.3	15	25.5	13.6	15	25.5	12.5	15	6.7	12.5
16	1.5	10.3	16	2.7	10.2	16	1.0	9.4	16	1.0	9.8
17	0.1	33.3	17	0.8	11.0	17	0.6	8.6	17	0.4	8.3
18	0.5	9.3	18	1.9	9.7	18	0.7	8.8	18	0.1	8.3
20	14.4	20.0	20	30.7	20.8	20	45.7	24.7	20	8.0	13.8
Satisfaction with income			Social trust			Political interest					
0	6.3	11.1	0	14.2	17.6	0	18.7	27.9			
1	2.9	7.9	1	5.9	10.2	1	13.9	13.5			
2	9.5	8.5	2	15.7	12.4	2	26.3	16.3			
3	17.4	9.8	3	22.4	12.9	3	31.9	15.5			
4	28.3	10.9	4	31.2	14.0	4	36.7	15.2			
5	50.2	16.0	5	64.1	26.0	5	61.5	25.2			
6	51.4	14.9	6	63.3	18.2	6	60.1	18.5			
7	77.8	24.1	7	80.3	28.7	7	67.7	26.1			
8	89.3	36.4	8	75.7	32.1	8	63.3	31.6			
9	57.8	21.0	9	36.6	18.8	9	31.8	19.4			
10	49.5	29.1	10	27.0	19.7	10	26.9	28.6			

Continuation of Table A5 on the following page.

Continuation of Table A5.

	Ever	Always
Social participation		
No	81.0	52.6
Yes	89.1	64.4
Active in political association		
No	99.3	90.0
Yes	40.9	26.1
Active in social association		
No	82.3	55.8
Yes	89.4	60.5
Active in political party		
No	98.3	94.3
Yes	17.4	42.2
Education		
Compulsory	15.5	79.2
Secondary	65.4	90.9
Tertiary	31.7	89.4

Note: SHP 1999–2018 data. "Ever" = respondents having ever reported a given response category during the panel; "Always" = the respondents in the "Ever" column that never changed their response in the panel.

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Die Sozialstruktur der Bildungsvorstellungen in der Schweiz

Barbara Zimmermann* und Rolf Becker**

Zusammenfassung: In der vorliegenden Studie werden Bildungsvorstellungen in der Schweizer Bevölkerung empirisch untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Bildung als sehr wichtig eingestuft wird. Während zweck- und wertrationale Bildungsvorstellungen sozialstrukturell differenziert sind, liegen für traditionale Bildungsvorstellungen keine herkunfts- und bildungsbezogene Unterschiede vor. Ungeachtet der tatsächlichen Bildungschancen ist abgesehen von Geschlechter- und Kohortenunterschiede die Zustimmung zur Chancengleichheit im Bildungssystem in allen sozialen Gruppen hoch.

Schlüsselwörter: Bildungsvorstellungen, Chancenungleichheit, Schweiz, Bildungsexpansion, Meritokratie

The Social Structure on Perception and Attitudes on Education in Switzerland

Abstract: The present study investigates the Swiss population's perceptions of education. The results show that education is rated as very important. While functional and value-rational ideas about education are differentiated in terms of social structure, there are no differences related to origin and education for traditional ideas about education. Regardless of actual educational opportunities, disregarding gender and cohort differences, approval of equal opportunities in the education system is high in all social groups.

Keywords: Educational attitudes, inequality of opportunities, Switzerland, educational expansion, meritocracy

La structure sociale des idées éducatives en Suisse

Résumé : La présente étude a porté sur la perception de l'éducation par la population suisse. Les résultats montrent que l'éducation est considérée comme très importante. Alors que les idées fonctionnelles et rationnelles sur l'éducation sont différenciées en termes de structure sociale, il n'y a pas de différences liées à l'origine et à l'éducation pour les idées traditionnelles sur l'éducation. Indépendamment des opportunités éducatives réelles, sans tenir compte des différences entre les sexes et les cohortes, l'approbation de l'égalité des chances dans le système éducatif est élevée dans tous les groupes sociaux.

Mots-clés : Attitudes éducatives, inégalité des chances, Suisse, extension pédagogique, méritocratie

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1 Einleitung

Bildung ist in vielerlei Hinsicht bedeutsam, sowohl individuell als auch gesellschaftlich (Müller und Kogan 2010; Becker 2013; Becker und Schoch 2018). Individuell eröffnet Bildung verschiedene Lebenschancen – sei es beruflich, in Form von Aufstiegschancen oder angemessener Entlohnung, oder auch ideell, für die Gestaltung des Lebensverlaufs und das Verfolgen persönlicher Ziele (Meulemann 1985; Mayer und Müller 1986; Mayer und Blossfeld 1990; Müller und Jacob 2008; Solga und Becker 2012). Bildung fördert weiterhin das politische Interesse und die politische Partizipation (Hadjar und Becker 2006; 2007). Des Weiteren ist sie eine Determinante für die Gesundheit (Kuntz 2011) und Lebenserwartung (Klein et al. 2006). In Bezug auf die Sozial- und Systemintegration ist eine demokratische und marktwirtschaftlich organisierte Gesellschaft wie etwa die Schweiz auf Bildung, d.h. ein funktionstüchtiges Bildungssystem und eine gebildete Bevölkerung, angewiesen (Dahrendorf 1965; Müller 1998; Hanushek und Wössmann 2019; Gebel und Heineck 2019). Diese *Bedeutsamkeit von Bildung* dürfte inzwischen zum Allgemeinwissen in der Bevölkerung moderner Gesellschaften gehören.

Allerdings sind die Bildungschancen – wie in westlichen Demokratien – auch in der Schweiz weiterhin sehr ungleich verteilt (Blossfeld und Shavit 1993; Müller und Shavit 1998; Buchmann et al. 2007; Hadjar und Berger 2010; Breen et al. 2012; Buchmann 2013; Zangger und Becker 2016). Trotz der Bildungsexpansion, die in der Nachkriegszeit begann und die eine zunehmende Bildungsbeteiligung von Menschen aus unterschiedlichen sozialen Schichten bewirkte, konnten, über einen langen Zeitraum betrachtet, *Chancenungleichheiten im Schweizer Bildungssystem* zwar verringert werden (Buchmann und Charles 1993; Hadjar und Berger 2010; Becker und Zangger 2013). Aber im internationalen Vergleich gehört die Schweiz immer noch zu den europäischen Ländern mit den höchsten sozial bedingten Bildungsungleichheiten. So haben beispielsweise Kinder aus tieferen sozialen Schichten oder von Eltern mit vergleichsweise geringerem Bildungsniveau eine deutlich geringere Wahrscheinlichkeit, eine weiterführende Schule zu besuchen (Glauser 2015; Buchmann et al. 2016; Glauser und Becker 2016; Becker und Glauser 2018; Becker und Schoch 2018; Kriesi und Imdorf 2019). Sie haben oftmals auch geringere Chancen, an einer Hochschule zu studieren (Buchmann et al. 2007; Griga et al. 2013). Gleiches gilt für den Erwerb von zertifizierten Bildungsabschlüssen (Becker und Schoch 2018). Gegenwärtige Ungleichheiten im Bildungssystem lassen sich in den Augen einer Bevölkerung allerdings nur dann legitimieren, wenn sie gemäss meritokratischen Prinzipien zustande gekommen sind (Solga 2005; Müller 2013). In anderen Worten: Sowohl beim Bildungserwerb als auch durch Bildung ermöglichte gesellschaftliche Vorteile sollten einzig aufgrund der individuellen Begabung und Leistung erzielt werden und nicht dank einem hohen sozialen Status der Eltern oder wegen anderer zugeschriebener Merkmale (zur Kritik an dieser Leistungsideologie: Solga 2005; Had-

jar und Becker 2016; Bills 2019). Allerdings ist diese Legitimation daran geknüpft, dass in der Bevölkerung mehrheitlich die Sichtweise vertreten wird, Bildungschancen seien gleich verteilt und dass der Zugang und Erwerb von Bildung an individuelle Leistung geknüpft sei (Weber 1922a; 1922b; Mayer 1975; von Friedeburg 1989; Kraus und Müller 1990; von Friedeburg 1997; Solga 2005; Becker et al. 2022). Gemäss dem meritokratischen Prinzip wird Ungleichheit im Bildungssystem in der Bevölkerung dann akzeptiert, wenn jede Person eine *faire* Chance hat, sich gemäss ihren Fähigkeiten und Motivationen auszubilden (Müller 2013). Allerdings hat Friedeburg (1997, 45) für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland verdeutlicht, dass in der Bevölkerung die Bildungsexpansion mit gestiegener Chancengleichheit gleichgesetzt wird, aber die für soziale Gruppen unterschiedlichen Bildungschancen und daran geknüpften Bildungserträge nicht realistisch eingeschätzt werden.

Ein ebenso wichtiger Aspekt von Bildung, der aber bislang in der soziologischen Forschung vergleichsweise wenig Aufmerksamkeit erhalten hat, sind die *Bildungsvorstellungen der Bevölkerung* (Mayer 1975; Strzelewicz 1980; Meulemann 1982; von Friedeburg 1997; Becker et al. 2022). Hier steht im Zentrum, wie Menschen oder soziale Gruppen über Bildung denken und sie bewerten. Dies ist, wie bereits gesehen, insbesondere im Zusammenhang mit der *Chancenungleichheit im Bildungssystem* relevant. Darüber hinaus ist es ebenfalls von soziologischem Interesse, welchen Sinn und Zweck die Menschen der Bildung zuschreiben (Raapke 1998). Ist Bildung, so eine seit langem sowohl in der Bildungssoziologie (Weber 1922b ; Edding 1963; Dahrendorf 1965; Boudon 1974; Erikson und Jonsson 1996; Breen und Goldthorpe 1997; Stocké 2019) als auch in der Bildungsökonomie (Schultz 1961; Mincer 1974; Becker und Tomes 1986; Hanushek und Wössmann 2019) verfolgte Fragestellung, eher ein Zweck an sich oder ein Mittel zum Zweck? Sind mit Bildung immer noch *wertrationale* oder nur noch *rein zweckrationale Sinnhaftigkeiten* verbunden? Zudem ist es bedeutsam, zu eruieren, ob diese Vorstellungen von allen Bevölkerungsgruppen gleichermassen geteilt werden oder ob es Unterschiede, etwa nach eigener Bildung und anderen sozialstrukturellen Merkmalen wie etwa soziale Herkunft oder Geschlecht, gibt.

Während für Deutschland nur vereinzelte ältere Studien und nur eine einzige aktuelle Analyse über den sozialen Wandel von Bildungsvorstellungen in der Bevölkerung zugänglich sind (Schulenberg 1957; Strzelewicz et al. 1966; Mayer 1975; Meulemann 1982; Müller 1998; Raapke 1998; Becker et al. 2022), fehlen für die Schweiz solche soziologischen Analysen vollständig (vgl. Becker und Schoch 2018). Diese Studie soll deswegen dazu beitragen, diese Forschungslücke zu schliessen. Im weiteren Verlauf des vorliegenden Beitrags werden wir im zweiten Abschnitt zuerst einige theoretische Überlegungen zu Bildungsvorstellungen in der Bevölkerung aus sozialstruktureller Sicht angestellt sowie knapp der aktuelle Forschungsstand dargestellt. Im dritten Abschnitt erläutern wir unsere Fragestellung und das empirische Vorgehen. Im darauffolgenden vierten Abschnitt werden die Ergebnisse der Unter-

suchungen dargestellt. Im abschliessenden fünften Abschnitt werden die Ergebnisse nochmals reflektiert und mit der bisherigen Forschung verbunden.

2 Theorie und Forschungsstand

In diesem Kapitel stellen wir vor dem Hintergrund des bisherigen Forschungsstandes die wichtigsten theoretischen Überlegungen kurz vor. Dabei fokussieren wir auf den Aspekt der subjektiven Bildungsvorstellungen, also darauf, welche Meinungen und Einstellungen in der Schweizer Bevölkerung zum Thema Bildung geteilt werden. Dabei geht es darum, wie wichtig Bildung in den Augen der Bevölkerung ist und welchen Zweck sie zu erfüllen hat. Danach befassen wir uns mit der Beurteilung von Chancengleichheit im Bildungssystem.

2.1 Bedeutsamkeit von Bildung aus Sicht der Bevölkerung

Dass Bildung wichtig für das Leben und die Gesellschaft ist, scheint weitgehend unbestritten. Ob und inwiefern die Bedeutsamkeit von Bildung tatsächlich von der Schweizer Bevölkerung geteilt wird, ist eine empirisch zu eruierende Frage. Es gibt «gute» Gründe jenseits der gesetzlich gebotenen Schulpflicht und Mindestverweildauer in der Schul- und Berufsausbildung dafür, anzunehmen, dass Bildung generell als wichtig erachtet wird. Diese Beurteilung wird auch unabhängig davon sein, was in der Bevölkerung unter Bildung verstanden wird (Müller und Mayer 1976; von Friedeburg 1997; Gordt und Becker 2016). Darunter fallen Verständnisse wie etwa die akademische Ausbildung, die Wissen und Kenntnisse in verschiedenen Gebieten beinhaltet (Strzelewicz et al. 1966), das «Gebildet sein als eine hochbewertete Auszeichnung» (Schulenberg 1957, 71) oder die Verfügung über Sekundärtugenden wie etwa Ordnung und Disziplin oder über gute Umgangsformen und Manieren (Meulemann 1982). Es umfasst die Spannbreite von «Schulzeugnis bis zur Herzensbildung» (Strzelewicz et al. 1966, 96) oder die auf dem Arbeitsmarkt verwertbaren Zertifikate und Qualifikationen (Müller und Jacob 2008; Müller und Kogan 2010). Seit der Publikation der Ergebnisse von PISA 2000 wird in der politisch interessierten Öffentlichkeit nicht nur die essentielle Bedeutung von Bildung medial hervorgehoben, sondern darunter werden auch die Kompetenzen subsumiert, welche laut der OECD heute und zukünftig wichtig sind und sein werden, um für das Leben gerüstet zu sein (Becker 2007; Moser 2001).

Auch die Arbeitsmärkte in der Schweiz signalisieren, wie wichtig Bildung ist (Buchmann 2013). So wird aus dem Stellenmarkt-Monitor Schweiz anhand der Stelleninserate ersichtlich, dass nicht nur die Qualifikationsanforderungen für die vakanten Arbeitsstellen in den letzten Jahrzehnten gestiegen sind, sondern auch die Bildungsjahre, die Arbeitgeber von den Bewerberinnen und Bewerbern erwarten (Buchmann et al. 2022). Ferner dürfte sich auch über die bildungspolitischen De-

batten und sozialwissenschaftlichen Bildungsstudien die Bedeutung von Bildung in der Bevölkerung verbreitet haben (Meulemann 1982; Solga und Becker 2012; Becker et al. 2022). Und schliesslich sollte sich in individuellen Lebenserfahrungen, auch abseits des Bildungs- und Beschäftigungssystems, widerspiegeln, dass es im heutigen Leben keine Bereiche in der Schweiz gibt, in denen nicht zumindest grundständige Bildung notwendig ist (Becker und Schoch 2018).

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Darstellung wären geringfügige Unterschiede für die subjektiv beurteilte Wichtigkeit von Bildung in der Schweizer Bevölkerung zu erwarten. Für bestimmte sozialstrukturelle Merkmale wie etwa Bildungsniveau und Geschlecht hingegen sollten systematische Variationen in der wahrgenommenen Bedeutung von Bildung aufzudecken sein. So dürfte die in den 1950er Jahren zögerlich einsetzende Bildungsexpansion im Berufsbildungssystem, der Ausbau des allgemeinbildenden Schulwesens seit den 1960er Jahren und die verhaltene Ausdehnung des Hochschulwesens bei einer forcierten Ausdifferenzierung seit den 1990er Jahren durch die Einführung von Fachhochschulen und Pädagogischen Hochschulen die Wichtigkeit von Bildung verdeutlicht haben (Buchmann und Charles 1993; Buchmann et al. 2007; Buchmann 2013). Vor allem den jüngeren Geburtskohorten der ab 1960 Geborenen, welche von den verbesserten Bildungsgelegenheiten im Gymnasium und im Hochschulbereich profitiert hatten, haben mit diesem strukturellen Wandel die zunehmende Wichtigkeit von Bildung selbst erfahren (Hadjar und Berger 2010; Roth und Salikutluk 2012). Jüngere Geburtsjahrgänge müssten dann daher die Bildung als wichtiger erachten als ältere Kohorten (vgl. Becker und Zangger 2013). Diese vermutete Kohortendifferenzierung könnte sich in der Kohortenabfolge über die soziokulturelle Reproduktion von Bildungsvorstellungen durch Sozialisation und Erziehung im Elternhaus und im familialen Netzwerk zudem durch die (intergenerationale) Transmission der Einstellung zu Bildung verstärkt haben (vgl. Smyth et al. 2010; Roth und Salikutluk 2012; Lorenz et al. 2020). Daher sind angesichts der durch die Kohortenabfolge getragenen Bildungsexpansion und dabei weiterhin bestehende herkunftsbedingte Bildungsungleichheiten zu vermuten, dass Kinder aus höheren Sozialschichten Bildung als wichtiger erachten als Kinder von Eltern mit manuellen Berufen (Arbeiter oder «kleine» Gewerbetreibende).

Von der Bildungsexpansion in der Schweiz haben vor allem Frauen profitiert, die bei der Beteiligung an weiterführender und höherer Bildung nicht nur mit den Männern gleichgezogen, sondern diese beim Erwerb der Maturität und Hochschulabschluss überholt haben (Becker und Zangger 2013; Becker und Schoch 2018; Glauser et al. 2019a; 2019b). Die zugleich gestiegene Frauenerwerbstätigkeit in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten dürfte ebenso dazu beigetragen haben, dass Frauen als die «Gewinnerinnen der Bildungsexpansion» die Bildung als wichtiger erachten als Männer (vgl. Zimmermann 2020).

2.2 Idealtypische Kategorien von Bildungsvorstellungen

Wie bereits zuvor angedeutet, ist das Spektrum, was in der Bevölkerung unter Bildung verstanden wird, relativ breit, und es gibt verschiedene Gründe dafür, warum heutzutage Bildung als wichtig erachtet werden könnte. Auch der *Sinn von Bildung* dürfte in unterschiedlicher Weise wahrgenommen werden. Anlehnend an die Kategorisierung der Sinnhaftigkeit des sozialen Handelns nach Weber (1922a, 12) kann danach unterschieden werden, ob Bildung eher als rein instrumentell oder als ideell oder als traditional angesehen wird (siehe auch: Strzelewicz et al. 1966; Schulenberg et al. 1978; Meulemann 1982). Es stellt sich daher die Frage, ob Bildung in ihrem *«subjektiv gemeinten Sinn»* (Weber 1922a, 1) eher als Mittel zum Zweck (rein zweckrational) oder eher als ein ethischer, ästhetischer oder religiöser Selbstzweck (wertrational) angesehen wird. Als eine eher eingeschränkte Sinnhaftigkeit könnte eine Bildungsvorstellung eher mit einer bewusst aufrechterhaltenen Bindung mit Gewohnheiten (z. B. Ordnung, Disziplin, Manieren, Umgangsformen) verbunden sein, die in der Erziehung und Sozialisation eingeübt wurden, und daher mit dem Festhalten an bestimmten Regeln der Erziehung (traditional) einhergehen (Weber 1922a, 12–13).

Bei *zweckrationalen Bildungsvorstellungen* wird – wie etwa bei der Humankapitaltheorie (Schultz 1961; Mincer 1974; Becker 1975) oder bei soziologischen Ansätzen rationaler Bildungsentscheidungen (Boudon 1974; Erikson und Jonsson 1996) – ausgegangen, dass in Bildung investiert wird, um eine vorteilhafte berufliche Stellung zu erreichen oder ein hohes Einkommen zu generieren. Aufgrund erwarteter beruflicher Erfolge und Mehreinkommen wird rein zweckrational in Bildung investiert. Vorliegende Studien zeigen, dass die Bevölkerung mehrheitlich Bildung als Weg zum Erfolg einstuft und damit der Meinung ist, dass sich eine «gute» Ausbildung lohnt, um im Leben etwas zu erreichen (Hadjar 2008, 212; siehe auch Becker et al. 2022). Aus diesem Grund wurde in früheren Studien hierbei auch von «sozial differenzierenden» Bildungsvorstellungen gesprochen (Strzelewicz et al. 1966). Gemäss den sozial differenzierenden Bildungsvorstellungen weist die Bildung, z. B. mittels Abschlusszeugnissen, den sozialen Status zu (Müller 1975; Müller und Mayer 1976; Müller und Shavit 1998; Müller und Jacob 2008; Müller und Kogan 2010). Dem gegenüber stehen *wertrationale* oder «personal differenzierende» *Bildungsvorstellungen* (Strzelewicz et al. 1966). Bildung ist demnach nicht Mittel zum Zweck, sondern Zweck an sich. Bei personal differenzierenden Bildungsvorstellungen wird der Bildung keine statusdistribuierende Funktion zugeschrieben. Gemäss der Humankapitaltheorie von Schultz (1961) ist damit eher ein konsumtiver Nutzen mit Bildung verbunden, der gratis als ein Nebenprodukt von zweckrationalen Bildungsinvestitionen anfällt. Hierbei handelt es sich eher um ideelle und ästhetische Momente der Bildung wie etwa Freude am Lernen, Befriedigung über Lernerfolge, intellektueller Genuss von Kulturgütern oder schöpferische Auseinandersetzung mit den Ideen (Hegelheimer 2019, 305). Somit geht es bei wertrationalen Bildungsvor-

stellungen auch um eine ganzheitliche Ausbildung und eine starke Allgemeinbildung (Humboldt 2017) dank dieser sich der Mensch, auch im Sinne der Aufklärung (Kant 1784), frei entfalten und «wesentliche Würde» erreichen kann (Strzelewicz 1980: 9). Diese Art von Bildungsvorstellung ist somit eng mit individuellen Kompetenzen wie etwa eigene Urteilskraft (Human Agency) sowie Autonomie – sprich: persönliche Selbständigkeit und sicheres Selbstbewusstsein – verbunden (Meulemann 1982; Becker et al. 2022). Die *traditionale Bildungsvorstellung* schliesst als eine Residualkategorie subjektive Elemente ein, die mit der Erziehung zum gesellschaftsfähigen Individuum verbunden sind wie etwa Ordnung und Disziplin oder Manieren und gute Umgangsformen. Diese Form der Bildungsvorstellung ist von eingelebter Gewohnheit geprägt. Sie umfasst im Unterschied zu den beiden anderen Formen der Bildungsvorstellungen weniger sinnhafte als alltägliche Orientierungen, die nützlich sind für reaktives Verhalten in alltäglichen Situationen und daher von Generation zu Generation tradiert werden.

Bei der Sinnhaftigkeit der Bildungsvorstellung sind – wie andere Studien in Deutschland zeigen (z. B. Meulemann 1982; Becker et al. 2022) – in sozialstruktureller Hinsicht systematische Unterschiede nach dem Bildungsniveau zu erwarten. Weil Frauen, wie bereits gesehen (Becker und Jann 2017; Zangger und Becker 2016; Hadjar und Berger 2010; Buchmann und Charles 1993), eher von der moderaten Bildungsexpansion in der Schweiz profitierten als Männer, werden sie vermutlich eher als Männer die zweckrationalen, wertrationalen und traditionalen Bildungsvorstellungen teilen.

Während tiefer gebildete und aus tieferen Sozialschichten stammende Personen (etwa Kinder von Eltern mit manuellen Berufen) eher zweckrationale Bildungsvorstellungen teilen, dominieren bei Akademikerinnen und Akademikern sowie aus höheren Sozialschichten stammende Personen eher personal differenzierende bzw. wertrationale Bildungsvorstellungen. Dieser Umstand wird von Schulenberg et al. (1978, 72) folgendermassen zusammengefasst: «Höhere Schulbildung ist für die, die sie nicht haben, Kennzeichen von Bildung; diejenigen, die sie haben, erkennen sie nicht als solches an». Personen aus unteren Schichten erkennen möglicherweise, dass andere Menschen höhere Ausbildungsabschlüsse haben als sie selbst und dass diese Patente für das berufliche Fortkommen und den sozialen Status notwendig sind. Dies wiederum führt dazu, dass sie eher zweckrationale und traditionale Bildungsvorstellungen vertreten (Raapke 1998).

Eine andere Argumentation stellt in Bezug auf die Einstellungen zu Bildung und folglich auf den Sinn und Zweck von Bildung auf die sozialen Einflüsse signifikant Anderer ab (Roth und Salikutluk 2012; siehe auch: Stocké 2013). Weil untere Sozialschichten und Bildungsgruppen den Zweck von Bildung darin sehen, dass ihre Kinder die ökonomische Unabhängigkeit erhalten, dominiert bei ihnen die zweckrationale und traditionale Sicht auf Bildung. Höhere Sozialschichten hingegen folgen den Erwartungen der ebenfalls höher gebildeten Referenzgruppen, in der

Bildung ein Mittel für den intergenerationalen Statuserhalt zu sehen, das geeignet ist, um die soziale Missbilligung wegen Nichterreichen dieses Zieles zu vermeiden (siehe auch: Breen und Goldthorpe 1997). Ein soziales Netzwerk von Personen mit hoher Bildung, die zudem zumeist höheren Sozialschichten angehören, fungiert somit als normative Referenzgruppe. Dieses Netzwerk hat nicht nur Einfluss auf die subjektiv geteilte Wichtigkeit von Bildung, sondern trägt auch zu positiven Einstellungen zu Bildung und ihrer wertrationalen Sinnhaftigkeit bei. Rein zweckrationale Investitionen in statuserhaltende Bildung haben die soziale Anerkennung über den erfolgreichen Bildungserfolg und den daran geknüpften Eintritt in die avisierte Markt- und Klassenlage (Einkommen und Beruf) als Wert an sich zum Ziel (siehe auch: Becker 2003, 5–6; Becker 2022). Deswegen sollten höher gebildete und aus privilegierten Sozialschichten stammende Personen eher wertrationale Bildungsvorstellungen als zweckrationale oder traditionale Bildungsvorstellungen teilen (Roth und Salikutluk 2012; Stocké 2013; Lorenz et al. 2020).

2.3 Subjektive Beurteilung von Chancen(un)gleichheit

Besonders hervorheben möchten wir abschliessend mit der subjektiv wahrgenommenen Chancengleichheit einen funktionalen und legitimatorischen Aspekt der Bildung. Nach dem wissenschaftlichen Diskurs in den 1960er Jahren, der seit dem «PISA-Schock» neu entflammt ist (Becker 2007), spielt dieser Aspekt seitdem auch in der breiten Öffentlichkeit eine wichtige Rolle (Solga und Becker 2012; Becker und Schoch 2018). Dass die Menschen formale Chancengleichheit als realisiert betrachten, ist eine Voraussetzung, um ungleiche Positionen in der Gesellschaft, die aufgrund der schulischen Leistung zustande kommen, zu legitimieren (Mayer 1975; Meulemann 1982; von Friedeburg 1989; 1997; Müller 1998). Damit Bildungsungleichheiten akzeptiert und als legitim betrachtet werden, müssen sie als gerecht oder zumindest gerechtfertigt beurteilt werden (Solga 2005; Hadjar 2008; Müller 2013; Bills 2019).

Für den Westen Deutschlands liegen empirische Befunde vor, wonach in der Bevölkerung der Glaube an die Chancengleichheit – trotz und vor allem im Zuge der Bildungsexpansion – seit den 1960er Jahre systematisch abgenommen hat (vgl. Meulemann 1982; Kraus und Müller 1990; von Friedeburg 1997; Becker et al. 2022; Hadjar 2008). Obwohl deutlich mehr Menschen eine höhere Bildung erlangen, hat die Meinung, dass «heute jeder die Möglichkeit habe, sich ganz nach seiner Begabung und seinen Fähigkeiten auszubilden» (Meulemann 1982, 235) über die Zeit der frühen Bildungsexpansion bis in die jüngste Gegenwart an Zustimmung verloren (Becker et al. 2022).

In Anlehnung an diese vorliegenden Befunde wird auch für die Schweizer Bevölkerung angenommen, dass sich im Zuge der Bildungsexpansion der Glaube an Chancengleichheit im Bildungssystem verändert hat. Aufgrund der subjektiv wahrgenommenen Gleichzeitigkeit von gestiegener Bildungsbeteiligung und weiterhin

hoher sozialer Ungleichheit von Bildungschancen dürften vor allem die jüngeren und besser gebildeten Geburtsjahrgänge in geringerem Masse an Chancengleichheit im Schweizer Bildungssystem glauben als ältere Geburtsjahrgänge. Hingegen sind die älteren Kohorten, die vor Einsetzen der Bildungsexpansion in der Schweiz geboren wurden, eher davon überzeugt, dass formale Chancengleichheit im Bildungszugang und beim Bildungserwerb garantiert sei. Zugleich müssten jedoch, den Schlussfolgerungen von Friedeburg (1989; 1997) zur Interpretation der Bildungsexpansion aus Sicht der Bevölkerung folgend, die Kinder von Eltern mit manuellen Berufen eher als die aus höheren Sozialschichten stammenden Personen davon überzeugt sein, dass im Schweizer Bildungssystem die Chancengleichheit garantiert sei.

3 Fragestellung und empirisches Vorgehen

3.1 Fragestellung und Hypothesen

Aufbauend auf die im vorhergehenden Kapitel vorgestellten Arbeiten, untersuchen wir im Folgenden die Bildungsvorstellungen der Bevölkerung in der Schweiz. Obwohl dieses Phänomen im deutschsprachigen Raum bereits seit Ende der 1950er Jahren mit wechselhafter Intensität erforscht wird, liegt für die Schweiz bisher keine solche empirische Evidenz vor. Mit unserer Befragung in der gegenwärtigen Schweizer Bevölkerung schliessen wir nun diese Lücke. Wir untersuchen folgende drei Forschungsfragen:

- Welche Bildungsvorstellungen haben die Menschen in der Schweiz?
- Wie wird die Chancenungleichheit in der Bildung eingeschätzt?
- Gibt es bei den Bildungsvorstellungen und wahrgenommenen Bildungschancen systematische Unterschiede nach sozialstrukturellen Merkmalen?

Angesichts der Tatsache, dass Chancenungleichheit in der Bildung in einem deutlich messbaren Masse weiterhin besteht, und auch in der Schweiz kontrovers debattiert wird (Müller 2013; Buchmann 2013; Becker und Schoch 2018), ist es aus soziologischer Sicht interessant, zu sehen, wie sich dieser Umstand in der subjektiven Wahrnehmung in der Bevölkerung widerspiegelt. Von besonderem Interesse ist vor dem Hintergrund einer vergleichsweise zögerlichen Bildungsexpansion in der Schweiz (Buchmann und Charles 1993) die sozialstrukturelle Variation der Bildungsvorstellungen in der Bevölkerung.

Vom theoretischen Hintergrund ausgehend, werden *vier Hypothesen* abgeleitet. Erstens wird eine Kohortendifferenzierung infolge der Prägung durch die Bildungsexpansion angenommen. Die jüngeren und in der Regel höher gebildeten Geburtsjahrgänge dürften kritischer gegenüber den Bildungsvorstellungen und den gewährten Bildungschancen eingestellt sein als vor 1960 Geborene (Kohortendifferenzierungsthese). Weil vor allem Frauen unmittelbar von der Bildungsexpansion

profitierten, wird zweitens angenommen, dass sie die Bildungsvorstellungen und die Chancengleichheit in der Bildung in einem höheren Masse teilen als Männer (Geschlechterdifferenzenthese). Drittens wird angenommen, dass höher gebildete Personen die Bildungsvorstellungen und Bildungschancen kritischer beurteilen als Personen mit tieferem Bildungsniveau. Insbesondere akademisch gebildete Personen sollten eher wertrationale als rein zweckrationale Bildungsvorstellungen teilen (Bildungsniveauthese). Viertens wird aufgrund der Sozialisation im Elternhaus, insbesondere wegen der Prägung durch elterliche Bildungsvorstellungen, angenommen, dass sich bei den Bildungsvorstellungen die Kinder von Eltern aus unteren Sozialschichten systematisch von den aus höheren Sozialschichten stammenden Personen unterscheiden (Herkunftsthese).

3.2 Daten und Methode

Zur Beantwortung unserer Fragestellungen wurde im Kontext des vom Schweizerischen Nationalfonds geförderten Projektes «Bildungsverständnisse im sozialen Wandel» (Projekt-Nr.: 169748) eine Umfrage in der Schweizer Bevölkerung durchgeführt. Die Online-Befragung fand im März und April 2019 statt und wurde im Auftrag der Abteilung Bildungssoziologie an der Universität Bern von einem Sozialforschungsinstitut im Kontext ihres Panels mittels eines Random-Quota-Verfahrens durchgeführt. Die Stichprobe umfasste erwachsene Personen im Alter zwischen 18 und 79 Jahren, die in der deutschsprachigen Schweiz wohnhaft sind. Insgesamt wurden 2.056 Interviews realisiert. Dabei ist eine Standardgewichtung nach Alter, Geschlecht und Region sowie eine Randsummengewichtung nach Erwerbstätigkeit und Haushaltsgrösse vorgenommen worden.

Anknüpfend an die Studien von Meulemann (1982), Schulenberg (1957), Strzelewicz et al. (1966) und an den ALLBUS 1980–2018, der Allgemeinen Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften in Deutschland (Koch und Wasmer 2004), wurden die Forschungsfragen folgendermassen operationalisiert (siehe detaillierte Darstellung der gestellten Fragen im Anhang). Erstens wurde die Frage gestellt, «Wie wichtig ist Bildung heutzutage?». Die Bedeutung von Bildung konnte auf einer Skala von 1 (sehr unwichtig) bis 10 (sehr wichtig) bewertet werden. Aufgrund der sehr schiefen Verteilung dieser Bewertung haben wir diese Variable zusätzlich binär codiert verwendet. In der ersten Kategorie sind alle Personen eingeschlossen, die Bildung als sehr wichtig erachten (Anteil von 65 %), in der zweiten Kategorie alle anderen Antworten (35 %). Um die Reliabilität dieses Items aufzudecken, wurde den Befragten ein Zitat aus dem Jahre 1961 vorlegt, das dem ehemaligen amerikanischen Präsidenten John F. Kennedy zugeschrieben wird: «Es gibt nur eines, was auf Dauer teurer ist als Bildung: keine Bildung». Rund 60 Prozent der Befragten sind der Meinung, dass dieser Satz heute noch uneingeschränkt gilt. Diese Variable wurde aufgrund der sehr schiefen Verteilung dieser Bewertung auf der 10er-Skala ebenfalls in gleicher Weise wie die Wichtigkeit von Bildung binär codiert.

Um die unterschiedlichen Aspekte von Bildungsvorstellungen zu erfassen, wurde eine Reihe von Fragen gestellt. Diese den Befragten in randomisierter Reihenfolge vorgelegten Fragen konnten wiederum anhand einer Skala von 1 (stimme überhaupt nicht zu) bis 10 (stimme voll und ganz zu) beurteilt werden. Der Fragenkomplex zu den Bildungsvorstellungen umfasst 12 Items, die in Tabelle 1 dargestellt werden. Die Items lassen sich zu drei Skalen zusammenfassen: *Zweckrationale Bildungsvorstellungen*, (enthält Items wie etwa «Bildung ist notwendig, um einen Beruf zu finden, der gut entlohnt ist»), *wertrationale Bildungsvorstellungen* (z. B. «Durch Bildung kann das selbständige Denken und Handeln gefördert werden») und *traditionale Bildungsvorstellungen* (z. B. « Durch Bildung können gute Umgangsformen erworben werden»). Die Skalen werden theoriegeleitet abgeleitet (Weber 1922a; Meulemann 1982) und mittels einer explorativen Faktorenanalyse gebildet. Das extrahierte Ergebnis ergibt eine statistisch akzeptable Passung mit drei Skalen (Varimax-Rotation, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Mass 0.91 und Cronbach's Alpha 0.81 für wertrationale Bildungsvorstellungen, 0.74 für zweckrationale Bildungsvorstellungen und 0.80 für traditionale Bildungsvorstellungen). Um die Skalen zu bilden, wurden die Werte der Items gemittelt und so standardisiert, dass alle Werte zwischen 0 und 1 liegen.

Tabelle 1 Items zu den Bildungsvorstellungen

Zweckrationale Bildungsvorstellungen
Bildung ist ein Mittel, um einen Berufswunsch zu erfüllen.
Bildung ist notwendig, um einen Beruf / eine Anstellung zu finden.
Bildung ist notwendig, um einen Beruf zu finden, der gut entlohnt ist.
Bildung ist notwendig, um einen Beruf zu finden, der mich erfüllt.
Wertrationale Bildungsvorstellungen
Durch Bildung kann vielseitiges Wissen erworben werden.
Durch Bildung kann spezifisches Wissen erworben werden.
Durch Bildung kann die eigene Urteilskraft gestärkt werden.
Durch Bildung kann das selbständige Denken und Handeln gefördert werden.
Durch Bildung kann das Selbstbewusstsein gefördert werden.
Traditionale Bildungsvorstellungen
Durch Bildung können Ordnung und Disziplin vermittelt werden.
Durch Bildung können gute Umgangsformen erworben werden.
Durch Bildung kann Achtung vor Mitmenschen vermittelt werden.

Quelle: Bildungsverständnisse im sozialen Wandel (SNF-Projekt-Nr.: 169748; SWISSUbase Ref. 13031).

Wie die Befragten die Realisierung der Chancengleichheit im Schweizer Bidungssystem einschätzen, wurde über folgende Frage erfasst: «Dann würden wir auch gerne von Ihnen wissen, inwieweit Sie zustimmen, dass bei uns in der Schweiz jede Person die Möglichkeit hat, seine Begabungen zu entfalten und sich seinen Fähig-

keiten entsprechend auszubilden». Die Antwortskala dieser Frage umfasst 4 Kategorien, «Ich stimme voll und ganz zu» (mit dem Wert 4), «Ich stimme eher zu», «Ich stimme eher nicht zu» und «Ich stimme überhaupt nicht zu» (mit dem Wert 1). Ein Viertel der Befragten stimmt uneingeschränkt zu, dass die Chancengleichheit im Bildungssystem garantiert sei.

Eine wichtige erklärende Variable ist die Kohortenzugehörigkeit der Befragten. Hierbei unterscheiden wir zwischen den vor 1960 und ab 1960 geborenen Befragten. Auf diese Weise soll die Kohortendifferenzierung der Bildungsvorstellungen durch die Bildungsexpansion in der Schweiz abgebildet werden (Buchmann und Charles 1993; Becker und Zangger 2013; Zangger und Becker 2016). Weitere erklärende Variablen sind das Geschlecht der Befragten (Mann oder Frau), ihre höchste abgeschlossene Ausbildung mit drei Ausprägungen (Berufsausbildung, höhere Berufsbildung und akademische Ausbildung), sowie – als Indikator für soziale Herkunft – der Beruf ihres Vaters und ihrer Mutter mit zwei Ausprägungen (manuell vs. nicht manuell). Bezogen auf die Bildungsvorstellungen zielt diese Dichotomie neben den Bildungsanforderungen der Berufstätigkeit auch die Unterscheidung nach Hand- und Kopfarbeit ab. Die deskriptive Statistik der verwendeten Variablen ist in den Tabellen A1und A2 im Anhang aufgeführt.

Zur Beantwortung unserer Fragestellungen schätzen wir multivariate Regressionsmodelle, um den Zusammenhang zwischen den verschiedenen Aspekten von Bildungsvorstellungen und den soziodemografischen Merkmalen darzustellen. Je nach Skalenniveau der abhängigen Variablen werden lineare oder logistische Regressionen angewendet. Die Koeffizienten der linearen Regression zeigen, um wie viel sich die metrisch skalierte, abhängige Variable verändert, wenn sich die unabhängige Variable um eine Einheit ändert (Cameron und Trivedi 2009). Bei binär kodierten abhängigen Variablen kommt die logistische Regression zur Anwendung (Long und Freese 2006). Da Logit-Koeffizienten oder relative Chancenverhältnisse (odds ratios) nicht ganz einfach zu interpretieren und zwischen unterschiedlichen Modellen nur bedingt miteinander vergleichbar sind, werden die Resultate in Form von durchschnittlichen Marginaleffekten dargestellt. Diese sogenannten “Average Marginal Effects” (AME) können als Veränderung in Prozentpunkten interpretiert werden, wenn sich die unabhängigen Variablen jeweils um eine Einheit verändern (Mood 2010).

4 Ergebnisse

4.1 Bildungsvorstellungen – die Wichtigkeit von Bildung

Insgesamt ist ein Grossteil der Befragten d.h. fast zwei Drittel von ihnen, der Meinung, dass Bildung heutzutage sehr wichtig sei (im Mittel 9.3 auf einer Skala von 1 bis 10; siehe Tabelle A1 im Anhang). Und rund 60 Prozent der Befragten

sind uneingeschränkt der Ansicht, dass auf Dauer keine Bildung teurer wäre als Bildung. Insgesamt ist die Mehrheit der Befragten davon überzeugt, dass Bildung heutzutage wichtig ist.

Unterschiede in der Bewertung der Bildung nach soziodemografischen Merkmalen sind in Abbildung 1 dargestellt (siehe auch Tabelle A3 im Anhang). Die Ergebnisse können als prozentuale Veränderung gelesen werden. Den deutlichsten Unterschied finden wir zwischen den Geburtskohorten: Vor 1960 Geborene stufen Bildung als deutlich wichtiger ein als die ab 1960 Geborenen. Die Differenz beträgt unter Kontrolle anderer sozialstruktureller Merkmale rund 18 Prozentpunkte und ist statistisch signifikant ($p < 0.001$). Die gleiche Kohortendifferenzierung ist für Nachteile fehlender Bildung festzustellen.

Ebenfalls signifikant ist die Geschlechterdifferenz für die Wichtigkeit von Bildung, welche rund 7 Prozentpunkte beträgt ($p < 0.01$). Männer stufen Bildung somit als deutlich weniger wichtig ein als Frauen. Ebenso gewichtig sind die Geschlechterdifferenzen für die Bedeutung von Bildung gegenüber fehlender Bildung.

Abbildung 1 Bedeutsamkeit von Bildung



Quelle: Bildungsverständnisse im sozialen Wandel (SNF-Projekt-Nr.: 169748; SWISSUbase Ref. 13031), eigene Berechnungen.

Im Vergleich zur Referenzkategorie, die Personen mit höchstens einer abgeschlossenen Berufsausbildung umfasst, sind Personen mit einer akademischen Ausbildung

häufiger der Ansicht, Bildung sei sehr wichtig. Für Personen mit einer höheren Berufsausbildung ist der Unterschied Personen mit höchstens einer abgeschlossenen Berufsausbildung allerdings nicht signifikant. Dies ist daran erkennbar, dass für Personen mit höherer Berufsausbildung das 95-%-Konfidenzintervall die vertikale Null-Linie überschneidet. Es handelt sich hier also eher um einen Zufallsbefund. Bei der subjektiven Einschätzung, dass fehlende Bildung mehr Nachteile nach sich zieht als Investitionen in die Bildung, unterscheiden sich die Personen mit höherer Berufsausbildung und akademischer Ausbildung signifikant von Personen mit einem niedrigeren Bildungsniveau. Insgesamt werden sowohl die Bildungsniveauthese als auch die Geschlechterdifferenzenthese bestätigt. Für die Kohortendifferenzierungsthese zeigt es sich, dass entgegen unserer theoretischen Annahme, eher die älteren Geburtsjahrgänge die Bildung als wichtig erachten als die durch die Bildungsexpansion geprägten Kohorten.

Keinen Unterschied in der Bewertung der Wichtigkeit und Bedeutung der Bildung finden wir, wenn wir Personen nach ihrer sozialen Herkunft vergleichen. Gemessen an der Berufsposition ihrer Eltern gibt es keine signifikante Variation in der Beurteilung der Wichtigkeit von Bildung. Damit ist die Herkunftsthese empirisch widerlegt.

4.2 Traditionale sowie zweck- und wertrationale Bildungsvorstellungen

Des Weiteren werden nach der Bedeutung von Bildung die sozialen Disparitäten in den anderen Dimensionen von Bildungsvorstellungen untersucht (siehe Abbildung 2 und Tabelle A4 im Anhang). So finden wir einen starken Zusammenhang zwischen der Kohortenzugehörigkeit und den drei Kategorien von zweckrationalen, wertrationalen und traditionalen Bildungsvorstellungen. Ab 1960 Geborene zeigen eine deutlich tiefere Zustimmung zu diesen drei Kategorien von Bildungsvorstellungen als vor 1960 Geborene. Besonders ausgeprägt ist der Kohortenunterschied bei den zweckrationalen und den traditionalen Bildungsvorstellungen, etwas weniger stark ist er hingegen bei den wertrationalen Bildungsvorstellungen. Entsprechend der Kohortendifferenzierungsthese werden diese Dimensionen von Bildungsvorstellungen von den jüngeren Geburtskohorten in geringerem Masse geteilt als von den älteren Kohorten, die vor Einsetzen der Bildungsexpansion geboren wurden.

Des Weiteren wird die Geschlechterdifferenzthese empirisch gestützt. So teilen Männer zweckrationale, wertrationale und traditionale Bildungsvorstellungen in einem signifikant geringeren Masse als Frauen. Zudem ist die Geschlechterdifferenz bei den zweckrationalen und den traditionalen Bildungsvorstellungen deutlich stärker ausgeprägt als bei den wertrationalen Bildungsvorstellungen.

Wie es aufgrund der Bildungsniveauthese zu erwarten war, sehen wir deutliche Unterschiede in den Bildungsvorstellungen nach den Bildungsabschlüssen. Je höher die Ausbildung, desto geringer ist die Zustimmung zu zweckrationalen Bildungsvorstellungen. Personen mit akademischem Abschluss sind demnach deutlich

Abbildung 2 Zweckrationale, wertrationale und traditionale Bildungsvorstellungen



Quelle: Bildungsverständnisse im sozialen Wandel (SNF-Projekt-Nr.: 169748; SWISSUbase Ref. 13031), eigene Berechnungen.

seltener als Personen mit Berufsausbildung der Ansicht, dass Bildung in erster Linie Mittel zum Zweck sei und dazu dienen soll, eine vorteilhafte berufliche Stellung zu erreichen. Gerade umgekehrt verhält es sich bei den wertrationalen Bildungsvorstellungen. Personen mit akademischer Ausbildung messen diesen Aspekten deutlich mehr Bedeutung zu als Personen mit einer Berufsausbildung. Personen mit einer höheren Berufsausbildung liegen mit ihren Werten zwischen den beiden Gruppen, unterscheiden sich jedoch nicht signifikant von der Referenzkategorie (Personen mit Berufsausbildung). Bei den traditionalen Bildungsvorstellungen finden wir keine Unterschiede nach dem Bildungsniveau der Befragten.

Differieren die Bildungsvorstellungen auch nach der sozialen Herkunft der Befragten? Im Unterschied zu den wertrationalen und den traditionalen Bildungsvorstellungen finden wir zunächst bei den zweckrationalen Bildungsvorstellungen einen signifikanten Herkunftseffekt. Personen, deren Väter einen manuellen Beruf ausüben oder ausgeübt haben, neigen eher zu zweckrationalen Bildungsvorstellungen. Wie theoretisch erwartet, verbinden Personen aus den tieferen Sozialschichten mit Bildung eher eine zweckrationale Sinnhaftigkeit als Personen aus den höheren Sozialschichten. Für wertrationale und traditionale Bildungsvorstellungen gibt es keine bedeutsamen Herkunftseffekte.

4.3 Subjektive Beurteilung der Chancengleichheit im Bildungssystem

Im letzten Schritt untersuchen wir die in der Bevölkerung wahrgenommene Chancengleichheit im Schweizer Bildungssystem. Sie wurden anhand der Frage erfasst, bei der die Befragten angegeben konnten, wie sehr sie zustimmen, «dass bei uns in der Schweiz jede Person die Möglichkeit hat, ihre Begabungen zu entfalten und sich ihren Fähigkeiten entsprechend auszubilden». Insgesamt ist die Zustimmung einer wahrgenommen Gleichheit von Bildungschancen hoch (im Mittel 3 auf einer Skala von 1 für volle Ablehnung bis 4 für volle Zustimmung, siehe Tabelle A1 im Anhang). Rund ein Viertel der Befragten ist uneingeschränkt der Auffassung, dass Chancengleichheit im Bildungssystem garantiert sei. Insgesamt 86 Prozent der Befragten stimmt eher oder gänzlich zu, dass jede Person gleiche Chancen auf eine Ausbildung habe. In der subjektiven Wahrnehmung der Schweizer Bevölkerung ist somit die Chancenungleichheit im Bildungssystem gering. Zumindest wird die formale Chancengleichheit als garantiert angesehen, während die relative Chancenungleichheit, d.h. tatsächliche soziale Ungleichheit von Bildungschancen, wie von Friedeburg (1997) für Deutschland feststellte, zumeist verkannt wird.

Den mit Abstand deutlichsten und einzigen signifikanten Unterschied zwischen verschiedenen Bevölkerungsgruppen sehen wir, wie theoretisch erwartet, bei den Geburtskohorten: Vor 1960 Geborene sind deutlich häufiger der Ansicht, dass bei Bildung die Chancengleichheit realisiert sei. Die jüngeren, ab 1960 Geborenen hingegen bezweifeln, dass gleiche Chancen im Bildungssystem gewährt werden. Dieser Befund stützt die Kohortendifferenzierungsthese (siehe dazu auch Abbildung 3 sowie Tabelle A5 im Anhang). Demnach beurteilen die Jahrgänge, welche die Bildungsexpansion in der Schweiz erleben und erlebt haben, die Garantie gleicher Bildungschancen weitaus kritischer als die älteren Geburtsjahrgänge. Ob diese kohortenspezifische Sichtweise davon rührt, dass im Zuge der Bildungsexpansion die Beteiligung an weiterführender und höherer Bildung zwar gestiegen, die Chancenungleichheit aber kaum zurückgegangen ist, kann anhand fehlender Daten nicht untersucht werden (vgl. für Deutschland: Becker et al. 2022).

In den weiteren soziodemografischen Merkmalen finden wir keine Unterschiede bei der Beurteilung einer etwaigen Chancengleichheit. In Bezug auf die subjektiv wahrgenommene Chancengleichheit sind unsere Hypothesen, welche Unterschiede nach dem Geschlecht, dem Bildungsniveau und der sozialen Herkunft angenommen hatten, zu verwerfen.

Dieser Befund unterscheidet sich von den Befunden für Deutschland, wonach vor allem akademisch gebildete Personen die Chancengleichheit im Bildungssystem in Frage stellen (Meulemann 1982; Becker et al. 2022). Des Weiteren ist er insofern bemerkenswert, weil diese Beurteilung offensichtlich unabhängig von tatsächlichen Chancen in der Bevölkerung in der Schweiz erfolgt. Obgleich das Gegenteil, nämlich deutliche sozial bedingte Ungleichheiten von Bildungschancen, seit den 1960er Jahren von der soziologischen Bildungsforschung berichtet und nach PISA 2000

Abbildung 3 Subjektive Wahrnehmung von Chancengleichheit im Bildungssystem



Quelle: Bildungsverständnisse im sozialen Wandel (SNF-Projekt-Nr.: 169748; SWISSUbase Ref. 13031), eigene Berechnungen.

stetig auch in Richtung der Bildungspolitik kommuniziert wurde (vgl. Moser 2001; Becker 2007; Becker und Schoch 2018), hat sie sich nicht flächendeckend in der Schweizer Bevölkerung sedimentiert. Und schliesslich ist es überraschend, dass diese Einschätzung auch unabhängig von der Erfahrung mit eigenen Bildungschancen erfolgt. Vermutlich wird diese in der Bevölkerung geteilte Sichtweise auch dadurch «verzerrt», dass in irreführender Weise von der nominellen Bildungsbeteiligung auf die relativen Bildungschancen geschlossen wird. Diese Vermutung müsste allerdings noch detailliert untersucht werden.

5 Diskussion

Ziel unserer Studie war es, die Bildungsvorstellungen in der Schweizer Bevölkerung empirisch zu beschreiben. Zum einen ging es darum, ob und inwiefern Bildung als ein wichtiges Gut angesehen wird. Zum anderen sollte die Sichtweise eruiert werden, ob Bildung als Selbstzweck oder als ein Mittel zum Zweck angesehen wird. Von besonderem Interesse war hierbei, wie sich diese Bildungsvorstellungen sozial-

strukturell in der Schweizer Bevölkerung verteilen. Für die Beschreibung wert- und zweckrationaler sowie traditionaler Bildungsvorstellungen in der Bevölkerung wurde im Frühjahr 2019 eine Befragung unter Erwachsenen in der deutschsprachigen Schweiz durchgeführt. Hierbei wurden zum Teil identische oder sehr ähnliche Items erhoben, die bereits in älteren Studien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland verwendet wurden (vgl. Meulemann 1982; siehe auch: Becker et al. 2022).

Die Ergebnisse wurden in drei Bereiche unterteilt. Erstens wird generell unter den Befragten die Ansicht geteilt, dass Bildung wichtig ist und dass keine Bildung mehr Nachteile nach sich zieht als aufwendige Investitionen in die Bildung. Jedoch bestehen, abgesehen vom Geschlecht und dem Bildungsniveau, allenfalls zufällige Unterschiede nach sozialer Herkunft. Der augenfälligste Unterschied in der subjektiven Beurteilung wurde für die älteren, vor 1960 geborene Jahrgänge und für die durch die Bildungsexpansion ab 1960 geprägten Kohorten festgestellt. Zweitens wurden im Anschluss daran, soziale Disparitäten in den wert- und zweckrationalen sowie traditionalen Bildungsvorstellungen detailliert untersucht. Männer teilen diese Bildungsvorstellungen in einem geringeren Mass als die Frauen. Sie werden auch von den jüngeren Geburtskohorten weniger geteilt als von den vor 1960 geborenen Jahrgängen. Während zweckrationale Bildungsvorstellungen, d.h. für den beruflichen Erfolg verwertbare Bildung, eher von den tiefer gebildeten Personen geteilt werden, vertreten höher gebildete Personen eher wertrationale Bildungsvorstellungen. Für traditionale Bildungsvorstellungen bestehen keine Unterschiede nach dem Bildungsniveau. Und schliesslich stimmen Personen aus tieferen Sozialschichten eher den zweckrationalen Bildungsvorstellungen zu als Personen, die aus höheren Sozialschichten entstammen, während für die anderen beiden Sinnkategorien keine sozialstrukturellen Differenzen vorliegen. Drittens wurden die Befragten gebeten, die Chancenungleichheit im Bildungssystem zu beurteilen. Die grosse Mehrheit der Befragten sieht eine geringe soziale Ungleichheit von Bildungschancen. Sie vertritt mehrheitlich die Ansicht, dass in der Schweiz jede Person die Möglichkeit hat, ihre Begabungen zu entfalten und sich ihren Fähigkeiten entsprechend auszubilden. Abgesehen von einem ausgeprägten Kohorteneffekt, wonach ältere Personen an Chancengleichheit im Bildungssystem glauben, während die jüngere Geburtsjahrgänge eine Chancengleichheit bezweifeln, gibt es keine weiteren Unterschiede zwischen Gruppen nach soziodemographischen Merkmalen wie etwa Geschlecht und nach sozialstrukturellen Merkmalen wie etwa Bildungsniveau oder soziale Herkunft. Dieser Befund ist insofern erstaunlich, weil sich die individuelle Einschätzung nicht mit den Befunden soziologischer Bildungsforschung zur sozialen Ungleichheit von Bildungschancen deckt. Offenkundig lenkt die Beobachtung des nominellen Zuwachses in der weiterführenden und höheren Bildung von der tatsächlichen Entwicklung relativer Bildungschancen ab (vgl. von Friedeburg 1989). Im Gegensatz zur Schweiz, konnte für Deutschland festgestellt werden, dass gerade die besser gebildeten und

aus den höheren Sozialschichten stammenden Personen eine Chancengleichheit im Bildungssystem stark bezweifeln (Meulemann 1982; Becker et al. 2022).

Der vorliegende Versuch, in Bezug auf Bildungsvorstellungen eine Forschungslücke für die Schweiz zu schliessen, weist methodische Grenzen auf. Weil unsere Daten im Querschnitt erhoben wurden, ist eine systematische Trennung von Alters-, Perioden- und Kohorteneffekten nicht möglich (vgl. Becker et al. 2022). In Zukunft müsste mittels Längsschnittdaten der Frage nachgegangen werden, ob die aufgezeigten Kohorteneffekte von Periodeneffekte des sozialen Wandels in unterschiedlichen gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen wie Wirtschaft, Politik und Kultur einhergegangen ist (vgl. Zangger et al. 2018). Sie könnten durch die periodenspezifischen Brüche in der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung und der Arbeitsmarktlagen, durch die kohortendifferenzierende Prägung durch die Bildungsexpansion und die altersspezifischen Erfahrungen von Bildungschancen zustande gekommen sein. Periodeneffekte würden neben dem «Zeitgeist» eher die Adaption von bildungspolitischen Diskussionen und Verbreitung bildungssoziologischer Befunde in der Bevölkerung widerspiegeln. Letztlich müssten bei vermeintlichen Alterseffekten neben den eigenen Erfahrungen im Bildungs- und Beschäftigungssystem auch die Bildungschancen und Bildungserträge für die Kinder und Kindeskinder in deren Lebensverlauf berücksichtigt werden (Becker und Mayer 2019). Möglicherweise decken solche Analysen mehr an sozialstrukturell bedingter Varianz auf, als wir es mit den vorliegenden Modellschätzungen im Querschnitt vermochten.

Nicht ausgeschlossen werden kann letztlich das Problem der sozialen Erwünschtheit. Die Entsprechung der in der Öffentlichkeit transportierten Informationen über Sinn und Zweck von Bildung und die in der Politik dargestellten Erfolge des Schweizer Bildungssystems anhand des inhaltlich und methodisch irreführenden Begriffes der «Chancengerechtigkeit» (siehe etwa im Schweizer Bildungsbericht) kann sich im Antwortverhalten der Befragten niederschlagen. Auch dieses Problem könnte durch wiederholte Befragungen im Paneldesign und durch faktorielle Surveys aufgeklärt werden (vgl. Gilgen 2022).

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7 Anhang

Tabelle A1 Deskriptive Statistik: Abhängige Variablen

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Anteile / MW (Std. dev.)	
Wichtigkeit von Bildung	2.055	1	10	9.32	(1.29)
Wichtigkeit von Bildung (binär codiert)	2.055	0	1	0.65	
Kosten fehlender Bildung	2.042	1	10	9.11	(1.44)
Kosten fehlender Bildung (binär codiert)	2.042	0	1	0.60	
Zweckrationale Bildungsvorstellungen	2.054	0	1	0.79	
Wertrationale Bildungsvorstellungen	2.055	0	1	0.84	
Traditionale Bildungsvorstellungen	2.055	0	1	0.70	
Chancengleichheit	2.038	1	4	3.08	(0.67)
Chancengleichheit (binär codiert)	2.038	0	1	0.86	

Quelle: Bildungsverständnisse im sozialen Wandel (SNF-Projekt-Nr.: 169748; SWISSUbase Ref. 13031), eigene Berechnungen.

Tabelle A2 Deskriptive Statistik: Unabhängige Variablen

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Anteile
Geburtskohorten				
vor 1960 geboren	2.056	0	1	0.20
ab 1960 geboren	2.056	0	1	0.80
Geschlecht – (Referenzkategorie: Frau)				
Mann	2.056	0	1	0.51
Berufsausbildung				
Abgeschlossene Berufsausbildung	2.056	0	1	0.40
Höhere Berufsbildung	2.056	0	1	0.31
Akademische Ausbildung	2.056	0	1	0.29
Beruf der Eltern – (Ref.: nicht manueller Beruf)				
Vater: Manueller Beruf	1.968	0	1	0.38
Mutter: Manueller Beruf	1.876	0	1	0.46

Quelle: Bildungsverständnisse im sozialen Wandel (SNF-Projekt-Nr.: 169748; SWISSUbase Ref. 13031), eigene Berechnungen.

Tabelle A3 Tabelle 4: Bedeutsamkeit von Bildung (Tabelle zu Abbildung 1)

	Wichtigkeit von Bildung		Kosten fehlender Bildung	
Ab 1960 geboren (vs. vor 1960 geboren)	–0.178***	(0.025)	–0.168***	(0.027)
Mann (vs. Frau)	–0.072**	(0.022)	–0.057*	(0.023)
Höhere Berufsbildung (vs. tiefere Schul- und Berufsausbildung)	0.007	(0.027)	0.071*	(0.028)
Akademische Ausbildung (vs. tiefere Schul- und Berufsausbildung)	0.085**	(0.028)	0.154***	(0.028)
Vater: Manueller Beruf (vs. nicht-manueller Beruf)	0.005	(0.025)	–0.018	(0.026)
Mutter: Manueller Beruf (vs. nicht-manueller Beruf)	0.003	(0.025)	0.015	(0.026)
N	1.850		1.850	
Pseudo-R^2	0.0192		0.0149	

Logistische Regression (AME; in Klammern: robuste Standardfehler). * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Tabelle A4 Bildungsvorstellungen (Tabelle zu Abbildung 2)

	Zweckrationale Bildungsvorstellungen		Wertrationale Bildungsvorstellungen		Traditionale Bildungsvorstellungen	
Ab 1960 geboren	–0.056***	(0.009)	–0.047***	(0.008)	–0.060***	(0.012)
Mann	–0.032***	(0.007)	–0.023***	(0.006)	–0.027**	(0.010)
Höhere Berufsbildung	–0.012	(0.009)	0.010	(0.008)	–0.010	(0.012)
Akademische Ausbildung	–0.050***	(0.010)	0.040***	(0.008)	–0.010	(0.012)
Vater: Manueller Beruf	0.016	(0.008)	0.003	(0.007)	–0.005	(0.011)
Mutter: Manueller Beruf	0.006	(0.009)	–0.004	(0.007)	0.003	(0.011)
Konstante	0.856***	(0.011)	0.882***	(0.009)	0.770***	(0.014)
N	1.820		1.820		1.820	
Adjusted R^2	0.060		0.033		0.019	

OLS-Regression (in Klammern: robuste Standardfehler). * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Tabelle A5 Subjektive Wahrnehmung von Chancengleichheit im Bildungssystem (Tabelle zu Abbildung 3)

	Modell 1		Modell 2	
Ab 1960 geboren (vs. vor 1960 geboren)	–0.070***	(0.018)	–0.076***	(0.018)
Mann (vs. Frau)			0.005	(0.017)
Höhere Berufsbildung (vs. tiefere Schul- und Berufsausbildung)			–0.006	(0.021)
Akademische Ausbildung (vs. tiefere Schul- und Berufsausbildung)			0.029	(0.021)
Vater: Manueller Beruf (vs. nicht-manueller Beruf)			–0.015	(0.019)
Mutter: Manueller Beruf (vs. nicht-manueller Beruf)			–0.019	(0.019)
N	1.814		1.814	
Pseudo-R^2	0.008		0.011	

Logistische Regression (AME; in Klammern: robuste Standardfehler). * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

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Fiorenza Gamba,
Sandro Cattacin,
Nerea Viana Alzola (dir.)

Ville et créativité

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La créativité fait preuve d'un lien très fort avec l'innovation. C'est justement la capacité d'imagination et la curiosité, aussi bien que son pouvoir de transformation qui font de la créativité un irremplaçable hub d'innovation pour les villes qu'on retrouve au fil des contributions de ce volume. Ainsi considérée, la créativité qui vient « d'en bas », qui est quotidienne et participative devient un élément novateur et transformateur dans des contextes traditionnellement tenus d'exclusive pertinence des politiques publiques. Il faut la soutenir, sans peur, même si son pouvoir est révolutionnaire.

Une perspective originale sur le lien solidaire entre ville et créativité

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The Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on Perceived Employment (In)Security in Switzerland

Susanne Edler* and Ivo Staub*

Abstract: The Covid-19 pandemic and the way this health crisis has been handled has changed labour market inequalities. We argue that workers are affected differently by changed work and employment conditions, depending on the workers' employment relations and study the impact of remote work, polarization of the core, and peripheral workforce as well as changes in working time during the Covid-19 pandemic on perceived employment insecurity. Based on data from the Swiss Household Panel and its special wave ("Covid-19 Study"), our results show that the perceived employment insecurity is related to employment strategies aimed at increasing flexibility in the labour market. In particular, short-time work increased perceived employment insecurity.

Keywords: Covid-19 pandemic, perceived employment insecurities, remote work, flexibilization, atypical employment

Die Auswirkungen der Covid-19-Pandemie auf die wahrgenommene Beschäftigungs(un)sicherheit in der Schweiz

Zusammenfassung: Die Covid-19-Pandemie und der Umgang mit dieser Gesundheitskrise haben die Arbeitsmarktungleichheiten verändert. Wir argumentieren, dass Arbeitnehmer:innen in verschiedenen Beschäftigungsverhältnissen von diesen Veränderungen unterschiedlich stark betroffen sind und untersuchen den Einfluss von Arbeit im Homeoffice, der Spaltung in Kern- und Randbelegschaft sowie Veränderungen der Arbeitszeiten während der Covid-19-Pandemie auf die wahrgenommene Beschäftigungssicherheit. Auf Basis des Schweizer Haushalt-Panels und der «Covid-19» Ergänzungswelle kann gezeigt werden, dass die wahrgenommenen Beschäftigungssicherheit davon abhängt, inwiefern es zu einer Flexibilisierung der Beschäftigung kommt. Dabei erhöht insbesondere Kurzarbeit während der Pandemie die wahrgenommene Beschäftigungsunsicherheit.

Schlüsselwörter: Covid-19-Pandemie, wahrgenommene Beschäftigungsunsicherheiten, Homeoffice Arbeit, Flexibilisierung, atypische Beschäftigung

Les effets de la pandémie de Covid-19 sur l'(in)sécurité professionnelle perçue en Suisse

Résumé : La pandémie de Covid-19 et la manière de faire face à cette crise sanitaire ont modifié les inégalités sur le marché du travail. Nous argumentons que les travailleurs et travailleuses dans différentes relations de travail sont affectés à des degrés divers par ces changements et étudions l'impact du télétravail, de la polarisation entre le personnel stable et le personnel périphérique ainsi que des changements du temps de travail pendant la pandémie de Covid-19 sur la sécurité d'emploi perçue. Sur la base des données du Panel suisse de ménages et l'enquête

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complémentaire « Covid-19 », nous démontrons que les inquiétudes perçues concernant la précarité de l'emploi dépendent de l'adoption de formes flexibles d'emploi. En particulier, le chômage partiel a accru la perception de l'insécurité de l'emploi.

Mots-clés : Pandémie de Covid-19, insécurités perçues sur le marché du travail, télétravail, flexibilisation, emploi atypique

1 Introduction

The Covid-19 pandemic and the political measures to contain it (Hale et al. 2020; Hale et al. 2021), including lockdown measures, (temporarily) altered many aspects of social life. Its social and political impact on health and economic risks was very unequal (e. g. Bambra et al. 2021).

In Switzerland, for example, pre-existing economic inequalities were exacerbated by the pandemic and households with the lowest incomes reported the largest reduction in income and subjective well-being at the beginning of the pandemic and the slowest normalization after the first semi-lockdown (Martínez et al. 2021). The Covid-19 crisis-induced economic and health risks were related to many different aspects of a person, such as gender (Imboden and Michel 2021) or citizenship (Plümecke et al. 2022). Work-related factors like employment status or the possibility of working remotely also had an influence on the economic risks of individuals and households, such as becoming unemployed or being in short-time work (e. g. Götz et al. 2021; Martínez et al. 2021).

In this article, we investigate changes in the perception of employment insecurity[1] of dependent employees in Switzerland due to the Covid-19 pandemic, including worries about losing their employment and becoming unemployed. Existing studies show differences in the effects of the pandemic between dependent employees and self-employed workers, indicating a higher economic vulnerability of self-employed workers during the crisis (Refle et al. 2020; Holst et al. 2021), but little is known about possible changes in inequalities within the group of dependent employees in Switzerland due to differences in the employment relationship and its flexibilization. We thereby focus on the role of (i) remote work, (ii) the polarization of the core and peripheral workforce, and (iii) changes in working time of employees and employment policies during the first two waves of the pandemic in 2020 and the beginning of 2021 (including short-time work, flexible working hours and increased or reduced overtime).

1 The concept of *job insecurity* reflects the perceived "threat to the continuity and stability of employment as it is currently experienced" (Shoss 2017, 1911), whereas the term *labour market insecurity* refers to workers' "immediate labour market opportunities if they are laid off" (Dixon et al. 2013, 1053). We therefore use *employment insecurity* to encompass both the perceived risk of losing one's job and becoming unemployed after losing that job.

As the digital transformation allows some jobs to be carried out more flexibly in terms of location, remote working from home has become increasingly important during the pandemic (Nagel 2020). However, not every employee has a job that can be done equally well from home. Therefore, our first question is: (1) Does the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on employment insecurities differ between employees in jobs that can be done remotely and employees who work on-site (i. e. who need to be physically present at their workplaces)?

Our second question deals with whether the Covid-19 pandemic changes or reinforces pre-existing labour market inequalities between employees belonging to the "core workforce" and those belonging to the "peripheral workforce". Specifically, our question is: (2) Does the Covid-19 pandemic affect the perceived employment insecurity of employees in employment relations typically found in the "peripheral workforce" more than employees in other employment relations?

Our third question addresses changes in working time of dependent employees during the first wave (spring 2020) and second wave (winter 2020/21) in Switzerland and its impact on employment insecurity. Therefore, we ask the following question: (3) Did short-time work, overtime, overtime reduction, and flexible working hours change the perceived employment insecurities?

Empirically, we take advantage of longitudinal data from the Swiss Household Panel (Tillmann et al. 2016) and the supplementary Covid-19 survey conducted during the Swiss semi-lockdown in spring 2020 that can be linked to the Swiss Household Panel (SHP Group 2021). These data contain information on the perceived impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on employees' employment security as well as on employees' jobs, employment status, and work trajectories.

In the next section, we develop hypotheses regarding changed employment practices and their impact on employees' employment (in)security during the Covid-19 pandemic. In Section 3, we describe the Swiss case and the situation during the first two waves of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and the beginning of 2021 in Switzerland when the data were collected. We then describe the methods and the data, including the Covid-19 survey that is linked to the Swiss Household Panel (Tillmann et al. 2016) (Section 4). In Section 5, we present our results, which is followed by a discussion in Section 6.

2 Covid-19 Pandemic and Employment Insecurity

2.1 Changes in Labour Market Inequalities During the Covid-19 Pandemic

Research that investigated employment insecurity in Switzerland before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic found a pronounced increase in employment insecurity between 2000 and 2010. For instance, Bühlmann (2018) categorized people according to formal aspects of their contract (stable or unstable employment) and

their assessment of the risk of becoming unemployed (secure, insecure, or very insecure employment). The results show that during this decade, there was a decrease in the number of people in stable and secure labour market positions and slightly less than 30 percent held such a position in 2010. The study documents an increase in the number of people who worry about their employment and, therefore, see themselves in a position with insecure or very insecure employment (Bühlmann 2018, 135): "The period between 2000 and 2010 was characterised by a massive growth of subjective employment insecurity". Moreover, Pfrombeck et al. (2020, 70–73) report an increase in job insecurity in Switzerland between 2007 and 2020, but not an increase in labour market insecurity.

Analysing the antecedents of employment insecurity in Switzerland in 2008, 2011 and 2013, Baruffini (2019) shows that socio-demographic characteristics, such as nationality, age and region of residence, and occupational characteristics, like atypical employment, whether the job is a public sector job or not and income, affect worries regarding the security of employment. With regard to atypical employment, the study indicates that workers who were employed on fixed-term contracts were more worried about their jobs and employment than workers on permanent contracts, whereas workers in part-time employment show inconstant results with no clear relation between part-time employment and worries about the security of their employment (Baruffini 2019).

Since the start of the pandemic, empirical studies have been able to document how employment and job insecurity during the Covid-19 pandemic influenced various outcomes, such as greater depressive symptoms in the U. S. (Wilson et al. 2020), depression and stress in Poland (Chirkowska-Smolak and Chumak 2021), depression and anxiety in Germany (Dragano et al. 2022), a reduction of life satisfaction in a sample of employees of a German public educational institution (Kovács et al. 2021), and emotional exhaustion, organizational deviance, and saving behaviour in China (Lin et al. 2021). In regard to the antecedents of changes in employment security during the pandemic, there are no studies for Switzerland yet. As for other countries, Holst et al. (2021) show for Germany that changes in employment insecurity caused by the first wave of the pandemic (April and May 2020) differ between occupations and class positions. Their findings demonstrate that the increase in insecurity is highest among self-employed workers. Looking at class positions, their findings indicate that employees in lower classes with a lower marketability of skills face a higher increase in employment insecurity than workers in academic and semi-academic occupations from the higher classes. These class-based differences in employment insecurity remained significant even after one year of the pandemic (Niehoff et al. 2022 with data from April and May 2021). Additionally, Bünning et al. (2020) study changes in worries regarding job loss in Germany based on an online survey conducted in in early 2020. Their results show among other things that self-employed and poorer people faced the most substantial increase in

job insecurity and they document substantial sectoral differences. In terms of remote work, it has been shown that being able to work remotely during the pandemic weakened the negative impacts of the pandemic such as reduced working hours (Eurofound 2020), or for Canada, job losses (Béland et al. 2020).

This article will contribute to the literature by documenting changes in employment insecurity in Switzerland since the outbreak of this new disease and by linking these changes to job characteristics.

2.2 Changes in Employment Insecurity During the Covid-19 Pandemic

Job insecurity is a perceptual phenomenon and its antecedents include not only individual but also contextual factors (Keim et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2018; Shoss 2017), such as organizational change and economic fluctuations (Sverke and Hellgren 2002) as well as labour market and welfare system institutions (Kalleberg 2018).

Looking at perceived job insecurity during difficult market conditions, Anderson and Pontusson (2007) show in a study with data from OECD countries that national unemployment rates are positively related to people's worries about losing their job. The announcement of cost-cutting measures by a work organization (Van Egdom et al. 2022) as well as the anticipation of lay-offs (Ito and Brotheridge 2007) increase the job insecurity of employees.

As regards employment insecurity in Switzerland, in early 2020, when the first semi-lockdown was announced, employees did not know for how long the pandemic and the lockdown measures would last or what long-term effects the Covid-19 pandemic would have on the availability of jobs and the organization of work. It was a period of rapid change regarding how jobs and working times were organized (Refle et al. 2020) and a time of an impending rise in unemployment. In this situation of high uncertainty, we hypothesize that the overall worries regarding employment stability would have increased even for those employees who were able to retain their jobs during the first wave (spring 2020) and second wave (winter 2020/21) of the pandemic.

› H1: The Covid-19 pandemic leads to an increase in perceived employment insecurity.

2.3 Remote Work, Labour Market Positions, and Changes in Working Time of Employees

The pandemic has led to a rapid digital transformation in the world of work and to a very strong increase in the number of people working remotely from home. Nagel's (2020) study on changes in work practices reveals that many people see the Covid-19 outbreak both as a trigger accelerating the digital transformation of work

and as a trigger diminishing the importance of traditional jobs[2] as a secure source of income. As a result, digital forms of work become more relevant as a secure source of income (Nagel 2020).

The abilities and opportunities to undertake remote work are unevenly distributed among employees. Before the crisis, remote work was often considered to be a privilege (Lott 2019). Mergener (2020) argues that jobs with manual tasks can be organized less well as remote work than those with cognitive tasks. In particular, tasks that are closely related to digital ICT, such as answering e-mails, using the Internet, researching and consulting, enhance the accessibility of remote work. The monitoring and coordination costs of remote work vary between different job positions and tasks (e. g. depending on interactions with clients and the importance of teamwork). This makes remote work more or less worthwhile for employers (Pabilonia and Vernon 2020).

Research on the consequences of ICT shows a "computer wage premium" (e. g. Buchmann et al. 2020; Kristal and Edler 2021) for people who work with computers and have novel ICT skills. The question of a similar "remote work wage premium" or other benefits, such as a higher employment security or faster promotions for employees who work remotely, is subject of current scientific research. Pabilonia and Vernon (2020), for example, find that some employees profit from a wage premium, but the effect of working from home on wages is structured by the occupation, gender, parental status, and remote-work intensity.

In a non-crisis context, organizations are expected to move the digital transformation of work forward, including the possibility of remote work, if it enhances the company's efficiency and creates new value propositions (Vial 2019). However, the Covid-19 pandemic and the political lockdown measures forced employers to accelerate the implementation of remote work suddenly. In the context of the crisis, we expect that employees who work remotely benefit in terms of higher employment security, because these employees are able to perform their usual tasks even in the context of a semi-lockdown. Following on, we expect that workers who don't have the possibility of working remotely experience the most negative impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic, as they are often not allowed to work to their full capacity.

› Hypothesis 2a: The Covid-19 pandemic increases the perceived employment insecurity of workers who work remotely less than that of workers that cannot work remotely.

The relationship between remote work and employment (in)securities might vary depending on whether the work can be done as well remotely as on-site. Cognitive and non-manual tasks (Mergener 2020) as well as knowledge-based tasks (Arlinghaus

2 In this context, traditional jobs are those jobs that remain little affected by the digital transformation but still correspond to a greater extent to the principles of standardized Taylorist-Fordist work models.

2017) are less dependent on physical locations and can therefore be done as well remotely. Thus, workers in knowledge-based fields are better suited to remote work than other jobs. In the context of this crisis, workers holding an academic position that are given the opportunity to work from home should perceive their employment insecurity as lower than workers in non-academic jobs.

› Hypothesis 2b: The negative impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on perceived employment insecurity is weaker for workers holding an academic job who work remotely than for workers that cannot work remotely.

Labour markets, as well as positions within companies, are structured according to the economic vulnerability and privileges of employees. Two concepts that describe this structure are the insider-outsider divide (e. g. Rueda 2005; Schwander and Häusermann 2013) and the core-peripheral workforce dualism (e. g. Atkinson 1984; Hakim 1990).

The literature on the insider-outsider dualization of the labour market argues that "labor is divided into two segments: those with secure employment (insiders) and those without (outsiders)" (Rueda 2005, 61). When employment flexibility is required during periods of fluctuation in labour demand, it is difficult to make external adjustments (such as lay-offs or temporary lay-offs) for permanent full-time workers (Edler 2020). This creates a mutual bond between employer and employee. These employees can be referred to as "insiders". They have long-term employment prospects, which also means that they are protected from competition from external labour markets (Sørensen 1983) and enjoy opportunities for advancement in the company's internal labour market (Lutz 1987; Sengenberger 1987), whereas labour market "outsiders" are not, or are less, protected by labour market institutions and are therefore at higher risk of being in precarious positions or being unemployed (Biegert 2019). Even though the insider-outsider divide can be assumed to be weaker in Switzerland than in other corporatist countries due to its lower employment protection (OECD.stat data 2023), a gap between employees can still be expected according to the core-peripheral workforce dualism (e. g. Atkinson 1984; Hakim 1990). Considering employment policies within companies Atkinson (1984) argues that there is a segmentation of workforces into core and peripheral to generate external flexibility, but at the same time to create a certain personnel stability. On the one hand, companies employ a core group of people who are responsible for the companies' key activities. Workers in this core group have company-specific skills and a functional flexibility and can be redeployed to different tasks and functions. The size of the core group is numerically stable and benefits from financial stability, e. g. in the form of full-time permanent careers (Atkinson 1984). The peripheral workforce, on the other hand, is subject to numerical flexibility adjustments. These workers have lower job security, more precarious job conditions and fewer career opportunities. This can also be shown empirically: studies show that there is a di-

vide between permanent and temporary workers regarding subjective employment insecurity, whereby temporary workers have greater employment insecurity than permanent workers (Balz 2017; Burgoon and Dekker 2010; Chung 2019; Debus et al. 2014). Consequently, in times of financial stress at the level of the company or in an economic crisis in general, the risk of dismissals for people in different jobs is unevenly distributed. The argument is that labour market outsiders or people in peripheral positions in companies face a higher risk of losing their jobs and having periods of unemployment (e. g. Rueda 2014).

We argue that the semi-lockdown during the Covid-19 pandemic has led to a reduced demand for labour in the course of the economic downturn. Companies that have to dismiss staff as a consequence of the economic downturn in early 2020 will lay off employees in positions that are more dispensable for the company. These positions are characterized by temporary employment or employment with reduced working hours, as this employment is designed to flexibly adapt the workforce to the labour demand: temporary employment serves to generate external flexibility through the use of external labour markets. In times of increased demand, employees are hired from the external labour market, and in times of lower demand, employment contracts are no longer extended. Part-time employment, on the other-hand, is used for internal flexibility, which means that the company keeps its workforce, but the work organization is flexibly geared to the needs of the company (Keller and Seifert 2006; Liebig and Hense 2007).

Also, workers may differ in their job security depending on their tenure and time spent in unemployment. When dismissing employees with less accumulated (company-specific) human capital, employers will lose less investment, e. g. in further education or on-the-job training. Moreover, long periods of unemployment also show a missing accumulation and devaluation of (job-specific) human capital, as the formation of human capital obtained on the job is interrupted and obsolescence and dismantling of human capital can lead to a plunge in human capital.

› Hypothesis 3: The Covid-19 pandemic increases the perception of employment insecurity of employees belonging to the "core workforce" less than that of employees belonging to the "peripheral workforce".

During the first wave of the pandemic (May and June 2020), employers quickly adapted their organizational practices and employment policies to respond to economic fluctuations and changes in legal obligations. Employees faced adjustments regarding their working time, such as short-time work, flexible working hours, and an increase or reduction in overtime (Refle et al. 2020).

We argue that the changes in working time function as a signal regarding the present and future viability of a job. Employees who face a reduction in working time, such as a state-subsidized short-time work arrangement or a requirement to reduce overtime, will perceive employment insecurity as higher. Conversely, people

who have to work more overtime have a lower perceived employment insecurity because it sends a positive signal to employees that their jobs are in high demand during a time of high uncertainty.

› Hypothesis 4: The Covid-19 pandemic affects the perception of employment (in)security for employees in jobs where the working time has changed (short-time work, flexible working hours, and increased or reduced overtime) due to the pandemic.

3 The Swiss Context

Before the pandemic, the Swiss labour market was characterized by a comparatively low unemployment rate (OECD 2018), and it has shown high resilience to large economic shocks in recent decades (Lalive and Lehmann 2020). Switzerland is known for its labour flexibility in terms of low employment protection (OECD.stat data 2023) related to a rather weak insider-outsider labour market. But due to the low unemployment rates owing to the high labour demand in pre-crisis times, labour relations were quite stable (Gebel 2013). However, the crisis may have triggered a change, as the mandated political measures and the changes in economic demand had a direct impact on employment relations in Switzerland (Refle et al. 2020; Götz et al. 2021).

Switzerland was strongly affected by the first wave of Covid-19 in early 2020. The first confirmed case was recorded on 25 February 2020. Within days, the authorities declared an "extraordinary situation", banned larger events with over 1,000 participants and started an information and prevention campaign (FOPH 2020a). Throughout March, the virus continued to spread quickly. At the time, Switzerland was among the countries with a high number of medically detected infections per capita across the world (Salathé et al. 2020) and the pandemic had a low-to-moderate effect on the overall death rate during the first wave (Kontis et al. 2020). The incidence was especially high in the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland (Ticino) and in the French-speaking cantons of Geneva and Vaud (Kuhn et al. 2021).

In mid-March 2020, the federal government implemented containment measures (Uhlmann and Scheifele 2021). These emergency policies prohibited social gatherings with more than five people and included distancing measures, travel restrictions, and the closure of non-essential retail businesses, bars, restaurants, schools, and other public institutions. Other business sectors like the industrial sector, construction, hotels and supermarkets did not have to close down. The government took measures to reopen in multiple steps from the end of April to mid-June. This semi-lockdown was accompanied by regulations regarding financial aid for businesses, state-subsidized short-time work, and other economic support measures (Eichenauer and Sturm 2020; Uhlmann and Scheifele 2021). In addition

to the legal measures, the authorities strongly encouraged the population to stay at home and to work from home whenever possible.

Economic activity in Switzerland started to decline after the first confirmed case was recorded and the federal authorities declared an "extraordinary situation" at the end of February 2020 and even before formal measures were implemented (Eckert and Mikosch 2020). It began to recover slowly at the end of April and accelerated when the containment measures ended. By late June 2020, sales activity had approached normal, pre-pandemic levels (Eckert and Mikosch 2020).

Even though the actual percentage of unemployed workers only increased slightly (around 1 percentage point) during the first and second waves of the pandemic (SECO 2022)[3], it is still likely that employment (in)security varied among groups of employees as research shows that the groups at higher risk of becoming unemployed in Switzerland at the beginning of the pandemic in 2020 were temporary employees, employees with little tenure and younger employees (Götz et al. 2021).

The initial employment shock of the Covid-19 crisis also triggered a rise in short-time work (Refle et al. 2020; FSO 2021; Götz et al. 2021). During the first wave in April and May 2020, there were substantial changes in the work situation of employees, apprentices, and interns in Switzerland: 22 percent reported that they worked partially and 25 percent entirely from home due to the semi-lockdown (Refle et al. 2020). A considerable share of employees self-reported that their overall working time and working time patterns had changed, e. g. 19 percent reported that they were working short-time, 13 percent had to work overtime and 17 percent reported a flexibilization of working hours (Refle et al. 2020).

The peak of the second, deadlier wave of the Covid-19 crisis (FOPH 2022) was in November and December 2020. At the same time, people realized that an end to the pandemic was not in sight anytime soon. In response to the rising number of cases, the national government decided to implement a new set of measurements to reduce the spread of the virus in October 2020, including a mask mandate. In November and December additional restrictions were implemented, including the closure of universities and other institutions of higher education, shorter opening hours, and later the closure of restaurants, museums, and other cultural institutions and the banning of spectators from sports events (Federal Council 2000a; 2020b). The roll-out of the vaccination campaign started in December 2020 (FOPH 2020b). In mid-February 2021 the federal government began to reverse some of the lockdown measures.

Short-time work compensations by the national unemployment insurance (UI) were a very important political instrument aimed at preventing lay-offs during an economic crisis in Switzerland (Eichenauer and Sturm 2020). Companies

3 The pre-pandemic registered unemployment rate (based on SECO definition) in January 2020 was 2.6 percent. It rose to 3.4 percent in May 2020 and peaked in January 2021 at 3.7 percent before it dropped back to pre-pandemic levels. In March 2022, the Swiss unemployment rate was 2.4 percent (SECO 2022).

could apply for this instrument when there is a temporary and substantial reduction in labour demand. The employees affected by short-time work were compensated with 80 percent of the income they lost due to the reduction of working hours.[4] In Switzerland, the use of short-time work had grown to 37 percent of the labour force by the end of May 2020 (Arni 2020).

4 Data and Methods

We use data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) on living conditions and societal change in Switzerland (SHP Group 2021). The SHP is an ongoing household and person survey, representative of the Swiss residential population conducted by the FORS (Swiss Foundation for Research in Social Sciences). Our study builds on (1) two panel waves of the SHP: the standard sample "wave 21" collected between September 2019 and March 2020 a few months before the outbreak of the pandemic and the beta version of the standard sample "wave 22" collected between September 2020 and February 2021 extending over the several stages of the second wave. (2) A further supplementary survey on the Covid-19 pandemic collected between May 2020 and June 2020 after the first peak of the pandemic is linked to the two SHP panel waves. In total, 5843 respondents of the supplementary survey on the Covid-19 pandemic 2020/21 could be linked to the standard sample wave 2019/20 and 5629 respondents from the beta version of the sample wave 2020/21. In this article, we analyse data for individuals aged 18 to 65 who were employed in both waves of the standard SHP as well as in the supplementary survey, bearing in mind that there could be a selection bias, as those workers that were unemployed at one of the data points might be inherently different from those who were not unemployed.[5]

We know from other studies that there are substantial differences in the effects of the pandemic between self-employed workers and dependent employees, indicating a higher economic vulnerability of self-employed workers during the crisis (Refle et al. 2020; Holst et al. 2021). However, the aim of this study is to examine possible changes in inequalities due to differences in the employment relationship and its flexibilization. Therefore, we exclude self-employed workers from our analytical sample and focus on dependent employees. Furthermore, employees enrolled

4 Before and at the very beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, short-time work was limited just to employees in permanent employment. By March 2020, the allowance of short-time work had been extended to fixed-term and temporary employees (Arni 2020). Employees with fixed-term contracts could receive this compensation until the end of August 2020 and from January to September 2021.

5 Workers belonging to the "non-core workforce" might have had a higher likelihood of being unemployed during the first wave (spring 2020) and second wave (winter 2020/21) of the pandemic. Thus, our estimated risks of job loss and the change scores of unemployment might be underestimated. However, this bias should be quite small as unemployment increased only by around 1 percentage point during the Covid-19 pandemic (see Chapter 3).

in education at the time of the survey are excluded. After restricting our data, our analytical sample I, consisting of data from the standard wave of 2019/20 linked to data from the supplementary Covid-19 survey, includes 2258 individuals. In our analytical sample II, the standard wave of 2020/2021 is additionally added. Due to missing values in the standard wave of 2020/2021 and changes in work status[6], the sample size of analytical sample II is reduced to 1959 people. Table A.1 shows the sample reduction after each data restriction and deletion of missing values of variables included in the analyses.

4.1 Dependent Variables

The purpose of this paper is to study changes in the perception of employment (in)security of employees due to the Covid-19 pandemic. We use two variables, one from the regular survey and one from the supplementary Covid-19 survey.[7]

In studying whether, according to the respondents, the employment insecurity changed during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic (spring 2020), we use the following question measured on a 10-point scale:

› How big do you assess the risk of losing your job as the result of layoffs or company closure due to the coronavirus crisis for yourself in the next 12 months? The risk of job loss was assessed on a scale of 0, meaning "no risk at all", to 10, meaning "very high risk".

As the data collection took place at the end of the first wave of the pandemic (spring 2020), the negative impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the perception of employment insecurity of dependent employees might vary from the further course of the pandemic. Therefore, we also consider change scores using a question with the same wording in both the standard waves (2019/20 and 2020/2021) to measure the perceived risk of losing one's job and becoming unemployed:

› How do you evaluate the risk of becoming personally unemployed in the next 12 months? The risk of job loss was assessed on a scale of 0, meaning "no risk at all", to 10, meaning "very high risk".

The change scores are built upon intra-individual difference of the variable "perceived risk of becoming unemployed" measured before the pandemic and during the second wave of the pandemic (winter 2020/21) encompassing several stages of the second wave.

6 Changes in work status are changes to self-employment, the start of further education or unemployment in 2020/2021.

7 The wording of the question in the supplementary survey is different from the regular panel surveys.

4.2 Explanatory Variables

The main independent variables in our analyses are, firstly, information about whether it is possible for employees to work remotely from home. The dummy variable is coded 1 if employees are working partly or fully from home and 0 otherwise. However, as remote work and the possibility of carrying out work without productivity losses vary according to whether the worker is holding an academic job, we use an interaction term of the variables "working remotely from home" and "academic job" in the analyses. We built the dummy variable "academic job" on the basis of the ISCO (3-digit) occupational qualification, classifying all people with professions for which academic training is commonly required as one.

Furthermore, we include information about whether workers are in job positions typically used for internal and external flexibilization. This is operationalized using two different variables. We use the employees' work status distinguished as (1) three different categories of work volume: less than 50 percent, between 50 and 80 percent, and more than 80 percent and, (2) whether the job is fixed-term or permanent, offering a different potential of labour flexibilization. To operationalize whether a worker belongs to the core or peripheral workforce we additionally use tenure and time in unemployment. Tenure is used as an indicator of belonging to the core workforce. With increasing tenure the accumulated company-specific skills and knowledge grow and the mutual bond between employer and employee becomes firmer.

The opposite is true with experienced unemployment. As peripheral workers alternate more often between employment and unemployment, we use the accumulated length of unemployment throughout the employment biography to depict that group of employees. We calculate the accumulated length of unemployment measured by a categorical variable with four categories: accumulated unemployment of (a) less than three months, (b) three to six months, (c) seven to eighteen months, and (d) more than eighteen months.

Additionally, we consider employment policies that were increasingly utilized during the Covid-19 pandemic to react to the changes in labour demand. First and foremost is (1) short-time work, a flexibility strategy that was very frequently used during the pandemic to keep employees in the labour market. Besides short-time work, we also consider (2) flexible working hours, (3) reduction of overtime, and (4) increased overtime[8] used to deal with changes in the labour demand during the pandemic.

We control for confounding factors by including gender, age and age squared[9], education[10], and firm size. While data collections during the pandemic took place

8 In Switzerland, overtime must be compensated by an additional wage supplement of 25 percent of the regular wage or by free time of at least the same duration as the overtime.

9 Because age has a non-linear effect, the squared terms of both variables are also included to model the diminishing marginal negative effect on economic vulnerability with increasing age.

10 Education is measured in four categories: low education encompasses individuals with incomplete compulsory school, completed compulsory school, elementary training, domestic science

over several months, we include the date of interview to control for timing issues and to avoid biased results deriving from differences in the development of the pandemic. Furthermore, as the economic structure and labour market situation as well as the spread of the Covid-19 virus vary regionally, dummy variables for each economic region are added as control variables (NUTS1[11]). Furthermore, employment relations of workers categorized as outsiders are spread very unequally across the individual sectors of the economy. We therefore include economic sectors measured by the General Classification of Economic Activities (NACE Rev. 1.1) grouped in 14 categories.[12] Since too many cases would be lost if missing values of economic sectors were excluded from the analyses, an extra category for missing values (MV) is included in the analyses. We additionally run all models using occupations measured by one-digit ISCO-88 codes instead of economic sectors; they show similar results.[13] Given that individuals living in a partnership might be less worried about losing their jobs as they can mutually support each other, we include the control variable "living with a partner". In this context, moreover, it might be significant whether the major share of the household's income relies more on one main earner. Consequently, we include an interaction term of the variable "living with a partner" and a variable capturing whether the individual earns more than 60 percent of the household earnings.

Since we have information about the work status in both standard SHP waves collected in 2019/20 and 2020/21, we use as additional control variables changes in the work volume as well as changes from fixed-term to permanent and vice versa to capture changes in the work status during the Covid-19 pandemic when using analytical sample II. The descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in the Appendix (Table 2).[14]

course, one year school of commerce or general training school; medium education encompasses individuals with completed apprenticeship (Swiss Federally Recognized Competence Certificate CFC, Swiss Federally Recognized Competence Certificate EFZ) or full-time vocational school; high education I encompasses individuals with a completed bachelor/maturity, vocational high school with master certificate or federal certificate, technical or vocational school or vocational high school (École Technique Supérieure ETS, Higher Technical Institute HTL etc.); high education II encompasses individuals with university, academic high school, HEP, PH, HES, FH.

11 Mittelland (BE, FR, SO, NE, JU), Lake Geneva (VD, VS, GE), North-West Switzerland (BS, BL, AG), Zurich, East Switzerland (GL, SH, AR, AI, SG, GR, TG), Central Switzerland, (LU, UR, SZ, OW, NW, ZG), Ticino.

12 (1) Agriculture, hunting, forestry; (2) manufacturing; (3) electricity, gas and water supply; (4) construction; (5) wholesale, retail, motor vehicle repairs, household goods; (6) hotels and restaurants; (7) transport, storage, and communication; (8) financial intermediation, insurance; (9) real estate, renting, computers, research; (10) public admin, national defence, compulsory social security; (11) education; (12) health and social work; (13) other community, social and personal service activities; (14) extra-territorial organizations and bodies.

13 These additional models are available upon request.

14 Testing for differences between the two datasets (a) the analytical sample I and (b) the analytical sample II with a t-test shows that the means do not differ between the samples for the majority of variables: one out of fifty variables has a significantly different mean at a 95 percent level and nine at a 99 percent level.

4.3 Analytical Strategy

In the statistical analyses, we estimate OLS regressions for (1) the perceived risk of job loss due to the pandemic during its first wave (spring 2020) using analytical sample I. We then estimate (2) the change scores of perceived job insecurity calculated on the basis of intra-individual differences of these variables measured before the Covid-19 pandemic and during the second wave (winter 2020/21) of the pandemic using analytical sample II. For each of these dependent variables we carry out a baseline model only including the control variables (see model 1), separate models with several sets of variables testing our hypotheses (see models 2–4) and a full model including all variables (see model 5). In all models, we use population-based weights to correct for potential biases.

5 Results

5.1 Descriptive Analyses

Both of the variables "risk of job loss due to the Covid-19 pandemic" and "change scores of risk of unemployment" (in Table A.2) show that employment insecurity increased during the Covid-19 pandemic. With regard to the first wave of the pandemic (spring 2020), perceived risk of job loss increased by an average of 1.618 points on a scale of 0 to 10. The variable "change scores of risk of unemployment" refers to the changes in the risk perception of becoming unemployed comparing the risk perception before the Covid-19 pandemic and during the second wave of the pandemic (winter 2020/21) (see Table A.3). The change scores show that the risk perception of becoming unemployed increased by an average of 0.271 points on a scale from –10 to 10. These results are in accordance with our first hypothesis: The Covid-19 pandemic leads to a increase in perceived employment insecurity.[15]

In the next paragraph we consider how changes in employment security due to the Covid-19 pandemic differ between employees.

5.2 Multivariate Analyses

Tables A.4 and A.5 present the results from the OLS regression analyses. These regressions predict changes in the perceived employment insecurity during the Covid-19 pandemic. While Table A.4 uses the perceived change of risk of job loss

15 The difference in means of the variables "risk of job loss due to the Covid-19 pandemic" and "change scores of risk of unemployment" suggests that perceived job insecurity went up during the first lockdown but then recovered. For further interpretation, however, it must be recalled that these statistical measures are not directly comparable. This is because the time of measurement is once in cross-section (sample I) and once in longitudinal section (sample II). In addition, the scale of the dependent variables differs from each other.

due to the Covid-19 pandemic as dependent variable, Table A.5 uses the change scores of risk of unemployment. Model 1 (in Tables A.4 and A.5) shows the results for the control variables. In models 2–4 (in Tables A.4 and A.5), the specific variables testing the hypotheses are added. Model 5 (in Tables A.4 and A.5) includes all variables together. To facilitate the interpretation of the variables that relate to our hypotheses, we show predicted margins based on model 5 for the central variables (see Figures 1 and 2). Our first model indicates that the control variables have little explanatory potential. This shows that job segmentation with regard to the risk of job loss is not primarily induced by industry, region, or company size. Only after including variables that measure polarization of the "core" and "peripheral workforce", as well as changes in employment policies and employees' working time during the first two waves of the pandemic in models 4 and 5, the explained variance increases substantially.

To test our second hypothesis, we estimate the effect of remote work on the changes in perceived employment insecurity in model 2. The results of the main effects show no differences between employees who work remotely and those who work on-site. However, when introducing an interaction effect between "academic job" and "working remotely", the hypothesis is supported in model 3 for the dependent variable "risk of job loss" referring to the first wave of the pandemic (spring 2020) but not for the change scores models with the dependent variable "change scores of risk of unemployment" referring to the second wave of the pandemic (winter 2020/21). This means that the perceived employment insecurity of employees in academic jobs who had the possibility of working remotely increased less severely than for employees who had no possibility of working remotely during the first wave of the pandemic (spring 2020) (see model 3 in Table A.4).

However, when including the variables measuring work status and accumulated length of tenure and unemployment (see model 5 in Table A.4), results for the first wave become insignificant. This suggests that working remotely in an academic job led to a decreasing risk of job loss at the beginning of the pandemic when there was a semi-lockdown during which all employers had been encouraged to instruct their employees to work from home whenever possible. But this is mostly moderated by variables regarding employment flexibility. This could be due to the fact that academic jobs are associated with other characteristics such as greater internal flexibility due to greater temporal flexibility (such as flexible working hours or the possibility of working part-time).

Building on our third hypothesis, we analyse whether the employment insecurity of employees belonging to the "core workforce" was increased less by the Covid-19 pandemic than that of employees belonging to the "peripheral workforce". Two forms of atypical employment – part-time and temporary work – as well as the accumulated tenure and length of unemployment are considered. Employees in part-time employment did not perceive greater employment insecurity during the Covid-19

Figure 1 Perceived Risk of Job Loss Due to the Covid-19 Pandemic



Note: Predicted margins of the OLS regression model 5 in Table A.4; N = 2258; $R^2 = 0.201$. Source: Authors' calculations of the SHP data (analytical sample II: analytical sample I: SHP standard sample "wave 21" 19/20 and Covid-19 survey 20).

Figure 2 Change Scores of Risk of Unemployment



Note: Predicted margins of the OLS regression model 5 in Table A.5; N = 1959; $R^2 = 0.132$. Source: Authors' calculations of the SHP data (analytical sample II: standard sample "wave 21" 19/20 and Covid-19 survey 20 and standard sample "wave 22" 20/21).

pandemic. This suggests that in times of crisis, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, when labour demand decreases, part-time work can be used flexibly to adapt the workforce to the labour demand[16] without making use of the employment policy of "hiring and firing". This holds true especially for the case of Switzerland: here the percentage of part-time workers is relatively high compared to other European countries, and part-time workers often have to reduce or extend their working hours depending on the workload to be done (Krone-Germann 2011). It is different for employees in fixed-term employment. The results indicate that employees who were in fixed-term employment showed an increased risk perception of becoming unemployed during the second wave of the pandemic (winter 2020/21) compared to employees with a permanent contract. This is in line with our hypothesis. According to hypothesis 3, employees in fixed-term employment potentially do not belong to the stable core of employees and thus run the risk, especially in times of crisis, of being dismissed or becoming unemployed as expiring employment contracts are not extended.

When considering tenure as a variable measuring whether workers belong to the "core workforce", it reveals that increasing employment insecurity is not dependent on tenure. Also, as regards the length of unemployment, the results do not support our hypothesis. Even though long periods of unemployment in the working life suggest that employees belong to the "non-core workforce", the perception of risk of becoming unemployed is less increased for employees with long periods of unemployment (more than 18 months) than for employees with short or medium unemployment (less than 18 months) during the second wave of the pandemic (winter 2020/21). Adopting Kraemer (2008) and Kraemer and Speidel's (2005) theoretical concept of the precarization of labour, where especially in times of labour precarization, fears of losing one's job and "slipping down" socially pass on to employees in standard employment relationships, provides a possible explanation for this finding. While workers who experienced long or frequent unemployment periods already had to cope with a lower level of employment security before the pandemic, but showed no or only a relatively limited increase of risk perception of becoming unemployed during the pandemic, the risk perception of becoming unemployed increases for workers who enjoyed stable employment during the pandemic. Therefore, the results suggest that the fear of losing one's job and becoming unemployed is not restricted to employees in unstable employment relationships but also affects employees in standard employment relationships in times of crises such as the Covid-19 pandemic.

So far, we have considered remote work of employees in academic and non-academic jobs, employment policies of part-time and fixed-term employment, as well as tenure and length of unemployment throughout the employment biography. Yet, as argued above, it is possible that new inequality patterns between employees in different employment relations have been created during the Covid-19 pandemic.

16 Also known as "internal flexibility" (see Liebig and Hense 2007).

In the following, we examine whether, and to what extent, the pandemic affected the employment insecurity depending on newly introduced employment policies to adjust the workforce to the changed demand. Figures 1 and 2 (Tables A.4 and A.5) show that short-time workers (explicitly due to the pandemic) experience an increase in employment insecurity. None of the other newly introduced employment policies used to adjust the workforce to the changed demand, such as overtime reduction, flexible working hours, and overtime work, showed any significant effects.

The rise in employment insecurity caused by short-time work can be attributed to two factors: the reduction in working hours signals, on the one hand, that one's own workforce is dispensable, but on the other hand, it can also indicate that there are structural factors leading to short-time work. Even though the primary objective of short-time work is to help companies to cope better with the crisis and thus help to retain jobs so that social costs are limited, this applies only for jobs threatened by a short-run lack of demand due to the Covid-19 pandemic shock. However, if structural factors lead to a company's difficult economic situation, the policy instrument of short-time work might hinder restructuring and lead to staff reduction at a later point in time (Arni 2020; Konle-Seidl 2020). Hence, the results reveal that some employees are concerned about the ability of their companies to absorb the crisis or about the future survival of their jobs. Similar results are shown by Arni (2020) indicating a striking increase in the job loss fear of employees in short-time work.

6 Discussion

The Covid-19 pandemic has brought about overarching changes in private and work life. The accompanying mobility and distancing restrictions have been fairly universal. Research early on in the pandemic suggests that the consequences of the crisis, such as earning losses (Martínez et al. 2021) and work-related mental (e. g. Dragano et al. 2022) and economic risks (e. g. Holst et al. 2021), for individual employees are not, however, universal. This paper investigates who is experiencing changes in their employment (in)security and thereby contributes to a better understanding of the impact of the pandemic. More precisely, our focus is on dependent employees in different jobs and employment relations.

Using the two most recent available standard surveys of the Swiss Household Panel ("wave 21" and "wave 22") linked with the supplementary Covid-19 survey, we investigate possible new labour market inequalities as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic and the reinforcement of pre-existing labour market inequalities among employees in Switzerland. Our multivariate analyses provide evidence that the employment insecurity of employees increased only for some employees through the first and second waves of the Covid-19 crisis in 2020 and the beginning of 2021. Working from home became increasingly important during the Covid-19 pandemic (Nagel 2020). Howev-

er, working from home is not equally suitable for all tasks and employees: while, for example, tasks for academic workers in knowledge-based fields of activities rely less on specific environments (such as factories or workshops), manual tasks still correspond to a greater extent to the principles of standardized Taylorist-Fordist work models linked to certain machines in production facilities or to customer services (Mergener 2020). Accordingly, the results confirm that employees in academic jobs who had the possibility of working from home experienced less employment insecurity than other employees during the semi-lockdown at the beginning of the pandemic when employees were required to work from home. However, this effect becomes insignificant when adjusting for other dimensions of labour market insecurities such as employment policies generating greater temporal flexibilities. Also the explained variance increases considerably (in models 3 and 4) when including these variables. This shows that job segmentation in terms of risk of job loss during the Covid-19 pandemic is primarily caused by variables measuring the polarization of the core and peripheral workforce, as well as changes in working time of employees and employment policies during the first two waves of the pandemic.

Investigating whether already existing inequalities in the Swiss labour market between employees belonging to the "core workforce" and employees belonging to the "peripheral workforce" were reinforced, some differences between the first and second waves of the pandemic become apparent. While employees in fixed-term employment did not show any differences in employment insecurity compared to employees with a permanent contract in the first wave of the pandemic, this changed in the second wave. This might be explained by the fact that during the first wave people were not yet aware of the extent and duration of the Covid-19 pandemic and employees may have had hopes that it would soon be over and the labour market situation would recover immediately afterwards. Similarly, companies might still have held back dismissals or cuts in compensations for employees. However, during the second wave of the pandemic it became clear that the end of the pandemic was not in sight and the political will to protect non-core workers subsided.

With regard to the employment biography, our analyses reveal that contrary to the expectations expressed in hypothesis 3, the accumulation of a rather long period of unemployment did not result in a greater increase in employment insecurity during the pandemic. Indeed, if one looks at the results referring to the second wave of the pandemic, employees with no or short to medium accumulated unemployment showed a higher increase in risk than those with long periods of unemployment. How should this striking result be interpreted against the background that these employees with low accumulated unemployment showed a relatively high level of employment security before the pandemic? According to Kraemer (2008) and Kraemer and Speidel's (2005) theoretical concept, the fear of losing one's job or falling into precarity is not restricted to employees in atypical employment, but in times of increasing labour precarization it also encompasses employees in standard

employment relationships. In line with this, our results suggest that employment security eroded through the pandemic, and this became apparent in the second Covid-19 pandemic wave.

Finally, if we consider different forms of employment, short-time work was the most widely used employment policy during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic (Refle et al. 2020). Short-time work is intended to help companies cope with crises, preserve jobs, and avoid social costs when jobs are threatened by a short-term lack of demand due to an external shock. However, it signals that one's own workforce is dispensable and it delays restructuring measures and downsizing in companies with structural problems (Arni 2020; Konle-Seidl 2020). This is reflected in our results: employees experiencing short-time work might anticipate a higher risk that their company will restructure and downsize when necessary. Hence, they showed higher employment insecurities due to the pandemic during the first and second waves of the Covid-19 pandemic.

What do these results imply for the future and the field of labour market research? The findings suggest that crises such as the Covid-19 pandemic lead to different implications for employees depending on the type of flexibility. In terms of numerical flexibility, employees in fixed-term and short-time employment seem to be exposed to greater employment insecurity in times of crises, while this is not the case with employment relations generating functional or spatial flexibility.

In respect of differences between temporary and permanent employees, Switzerland represents a weak insider-outsider divide in the labour market due to the low level of protection against dismissal (Gebel 2013; Biegert 2017; OECD 2022).[17] In such weak insider-outsider labour markets, employees in fixed-term employment tend to have a low risk perception of employment insecurity when the economic situation is as favourable as was the case in pre-pandemic times, particularly in Switzerland, with its high demand for labour (Lalive and Lehmann 2020). Our results suggest that in times of crisis such as the Covid-19 pandemic, when employers actually refrain from, and/or are assumed to refrain from, keeping someone employed after the end of the fixed-term contract or recruiting new employees, the perception of employment insecurity rises for employees on fixed-term contracts.

In this context, it would be interesting for further research to see whether there are parallels of our findings with changes in (in)security perceptions in other crises. An empirical comparison between this pandemic and a previous economic crises such as the 2008 financial crisis (e. g. Chung and van Oorschot 2011) would therefore give us a more accurate understanding of the scope and mechanisms of the impact on economic risk perceptions.

Another interesting avenue for future research would be a comparison between countries to further investigate how the Covid-19 pandemic led to different changes

17 Further characteristics of the weak insider-outsider job market in Switzerland are the relatively low union density, bargaining coverage, and strike incidence (Visser 2007).

in the employment insecurity and reach the "core workforce" depending on welfare state regimes to learn more about the different mechanisms leading to labour market inequalities in times of crises.

Besides, looking at remote work – a form of spatial flexibility – only academic professions seem to be partially protected by the increased perceptions of employment insecurity. Given the rise in remote work (Nagel 2020), it is still uncertain whether the use of remote work will endure after the pandemic and what consequences this will have. However, in this context, it should also be considered that remote work cannot be seen just as a positive opportunity offering increased autonomy and greater compatibility of work and private life. For some employees it turned out to be an additional strain (e. g. if they did not have a quiet workspace at home or were distracted by other obligations).

Moreover, as previous research showed that the Covid-19 pandemic affected well-being and the general health (e. g. Kuhn et al. 2021, Recchi et al. 2020, Tušl et al. 2021), it would be promising for further research to add this aspect and to examine the impact that employment insecurity has on health and well-being in Switzerland.

Last but not least, employees in short-time employment are affected by the increase in employment insecurity. But it remains open, whether short-time work actually lead to job losses later on. While during the first wave of the pandemic (spring 2020), Switzerland took swift action to protect workers from the markedly adverse effects of the economic instability by pledging short-time work with government income support, a further interesting research question would therefore be whether these employment measurements will have a lasting effect and contribute to securing jobs in the long run. In light of this, long-term analysis is required as many of the effects of the pandemic will only fully unfold in the long term.

This study is not without limitations. Firstly, the data we used relate only to the first and second waves of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and the beginning of 2021.

Secondly, we have used the "Covid-19 Study", a supplementary survey of the SHP, which provides cross-sectional data for studying the changes in the risk perception during the first wave of the pandemic. In contrast to the second wave, this data structure does not allow change score models to study the effects of the first wave of the pandemic. This can lead to biased estimation of the effects of the first wave, for example in the case when employees with different forms of employment relationships already differed in their general risk perception before the pandemic. It is therefore not clear whether differences in the results between the two waves of the pandemic derive from the differences in statistical modelling or from actual changes between the waves.

Thirdly, we have not considered the entire labour force, but only those who remained in work, excluding a small but vulnerable percentage of workers who

have lost their jobs or who were already unemployed but actively searching for a job before the outbreak of the pandemic.

Forth, we could not study how the pandemic affected the perceived job (in)security of foreign workers in the border regions daily commuting to work (which have been effected by border related restrictions) as the sample only includes individuals living in Switzerland.

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Appendix

Table A.1 Sample Size

(a) Analytical sample I		(b) Analytical sample II	
	N		N
Standard sample "wave 21" 19/20 and Covid-19 survey 20	5843	Standard sample "wave 21" 19/20 and Covid-19 survey 20 & standard sample "wave 22" 20/21	5629
Sample restriction to workers that are …		Sample restriction to workers that are …	
active in the labour market in wave 21	3419	active in the labour market in wave 21 and in wave 22	3572
employed in wave 21	3202	employed in wave 21 and in wave 22	3120
aged 18–65 years in wave 21	3039	aged 18–65 years in wave 21 and in wave 22	2985
in dependent employment in wave 21	2723	in dependent employment in wave 21 and in wave 22	2322
not enrolled in education in wave 21	2662	not enrolled in education in wave 21 and in wave 22	2175
After deletion of missing values in wave 21*	2258	After deletion of missing values in wave 21 and in wave 22*	1959

Note: *The exclusion of missing values does not involve missing values of the variable "economic sector" since too many cases would be lost. In the analyses missing values of the economic sector are included as an extra category.

Table A.2 Descriptive Statistics

Variables	(a) analytical sample I: standard sample "wave 21" 19/20 and Covid–19 survey 20					(b) analytical sample II: standard sample "wave 21" 19/20 and Covid–19 survey 20 and standard sample "wave 22" 20/21				
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Risk of job loss due to the Covid–19 pandemic	2258	1.618	2.164	0	10	–	–	–	–	–
Change scores of risk of unemployment	–	–	–	–	–	1959	0.271	2.284	–10	10
Date of interview: 1st half of May '20	2258	0.503	0.500	0	1	–	–	–	–	–
Date of interview: 2nd half of May '20	2258	0.171	0.376	0	1	–	–	–	–	–
Date of interview: 1st half of Jun '20	2258	0.288	0.453	0	1	–	–	–	–	–
Date of interview: 2nd half of Jun '20	2258	0.038	0.190	0	1	–	–	–	–	–
Date of interview: Aug '20	–	–	–	–	–	1959	0.044	0.205	0	1
Date of interview: Sep '20	–	–	–	–	–	1959	0.411	0.492	0	1
Date of interview: Oct '20	–	–	–	–	–	1959	0.342	0.474	0	1
Date of interview: Nov '20	–	–	–	–	–	1959	0.126	0.332	0	1
Date of interview: Dec '20	–	–	–	–	–	1959	0.034	0.181	0	1
Date of interview: Jan '21	–	–	–	–	–	1959	0.028	0.166	0	1
Date of interview: Feb '21	–	–	–	–	–	1959	0.014	0.120	0	1
Agriculture, hunting, forestry	2258	0.008	0.091	0	1	1959	0.005	0.073	0	1
Manufacturing	2258	0.118	0.322	0	1	1959	0.123	0.328	0	1
Electricity, gas, and water supply	2258	0.009	0.094	0	1	1959	0.010	0.098	0	1
Construction	2258	0.023	0.151	0	1	1959	0.021	0.143	0	1
Wholesale, retail, motor vehicle repairs, household goods	2258	0.090	0.286	0	1	1959	0.096	0.295	0	1
Hotels and restaurants	2258	0.013	0.114	0	1	1959	0.013	0.113	0	1
Transport, storage, and communication	2258	0.049	0.215	0	1	1959	0.054	0.225	0	1
Financial intermediation, insurance	2258	0.064	0.244	0	1	1959	0.067	0.249	0	1
Real estate, renting, computers, research	2258	0.123	0.329	0	1	1959	0.118	0.322	0	1
Public admin, national defence, compulsory social security	2258	0.111	0.314	0	1	1959	0.119	0.324	0	1
Education	2258	0.143	0.351	0	1	1959	0.143	0.350	0	1

Continuation of Table A.2 on the following page.

Continuation of Table A.2.

Variables	(a) analytical sample I: standard sample "wave 21" 19/20 and Covid–19 survey 20					(b) analytical sample II: standard sample "wave 21" 19/20 and Covid–19 survey 20 and standard sample "wave 22" 20/21				
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Health and social work	2258	0.172	0.378	0	1	1959	0.167	0.373	0	1
Other community, social, and personal service activities	2258	0.057	0.231	0	1	1959	0.055	0.229	0	1
Extra–territorial organizations and bodies	2258	0.003	0.051	0	1	1959	0.002	0.046	0	1
Missing values sector	2258	0.017	0.130	0	1	1959	0.007	0.083	0	1
Lake Geneva	2258	0.156	0.363	0	1	1959	0.164	0.370	0	1
Mittelland	2258	0.262	0.440	0	1	1959	0.258	0.438	0	1
North–West Switzerland	2258	0.138	0.345	0	1	1959	0.133	0.340	0	1
Zurich	2258	0.171	0.376	0	1	1959	0.172	0.377	0	1
East Switzerland	2258	0.117	0.322	0	1	1959	0.118	0.322	0	1
Central Switzerland	2258	0.123	0.329	0	1	1959	0.114	0.318	0	1
Ticino	2258	0.033	0.179	0	1	1959	0.042	0.200	0	1
Firm size: 1–49 employees	2258	0.385	0.487	0	1	1959	0.355	0.479	0	1
Firm size: 50–99 employees	2258	0.123	0.329	0	1	1959	0.124	0.330	0	1
Firm size: 100–499 employees	2258	0.232	0.422	0	1	1959	0.232	0.422	0	1
Firm size: >= 500 employees	2258	0.259	0.438	0	1	1959	0.289	0.453	0	1
Swiss nationality	2258	0.956	0.205	0	1	1959	0.957	0.203	0	1
Male	2258	0.452	0.498	0	1	1959	0.476	0.500	0	1
Age (per 10 years)	2258	4.642	1.148	1.8	6.5	1959	4.748	1.055	1.8	6.5
Living with partner	2258	0.758	0.429	0	1	1959	0.850	0.357	0	1
Main earner	2258	0.470	0.499	0	1	1959	0.451	0.498	0	1
Low education	2258	0.062	0.240	0	1	1959	0.048	0.214	0	1
Medium education	2258	0.317	0.466	0	1	1959	0.358	0.480	0	1
High education I	2258	0.278	0.448	0	1	1959	0.240	0.427	0	1
High education II	2258	0.343	0.475	0	1	1959	0.353	0.478	0	1
Supervisory task	2258	0.528	0.499	0	1	1959	0.548	0.498	0	1

Continuation of Table A.2 on the following page.

Continuation of Table A2.

Variables	(a) analytical sample I: standard sample "wave 21" 19/20 and Covid–19 survey 20					(b) analytical sample II: standard sample "wave 21" 19/20 and Covid–19 survey 20 and standard sample "wave 22" 20/21				
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Change to fixed–term job	–	–	–	–	–	1959	0.010	0.100	0	1
Change to permanent job	–	–	–	–	–	1959	0.013	0.115	0	1
Decrease in working hours	–	–	–	–	–	1959	0.069	0.254	0	1
Increase in working hours	–	–	–	–	–	1959	0.058	0.234	0	1
Academic job	2258	0.387	0.487	0	1	1959	0.395	0.489	0	1
Working remotely	2258	0.426	0.495	0	1	1959	0.431	0.495	0	1
Volume of working hours: >80%	2258	0.198	0.399	0	1	1959	0.169	0.375	0	1
Volume of working hours: <50%	2258	0.277	0.448	0	1	1959	0.278	0.278	0	1
Volume of working hours: 50–80%	2258	0.525	0.499	0	1	1959	0.553	0.553	0	1
Fixed–term	2258	0.050	0.217	0	1	1959	0.032	0.177	0	1
Tenure (in years)	2258	12.843	8.842	0.014	22.175	1959	13.270	8.711	0.014	22.170
Unemployment: <3 months	2258	0.892	0.892	0	1	1959	0.894	0.307	0	1
Unemployment: 3–6 months	2258	0.031	0.031	0	1	1959	0.032	0.176	0	1
Unemployment: 7–18 months	2258	0.060	0.060	0	1	1959	0.057	0.232	0	1
Unemployment: >18 months	2258	0.017	0.017	0	1	1959	0.016	0.127	0	1
Overtime reduction	2258	0.100	0.300	0	1	1959	0.103	0.304	0	1
Short–time work	2258	0.169	0.374	0	1	1959	0.170	0.375	0	1
Flexible working hours	2258	0.178	0.382	0	1	1959	0.179	0.384	0	1
Overtime	2258	0.146	0.353	0	1	1959	0.141	0.348	0	1

Source: Authors' calculations of the SHP data (a. sample "wave 21" 19/20 and the Covid-19 survey 20, b. sample "wave 21" 19/20, the Covid-19 survey 20 and the sample "wave 22" 20/21)

Table A.3 Change Scores

	Pre-Covid-19	2nd wave of Covid-19 (Aug '20–Feb '21)	Change scores
Risk of unemployment	1.891	2.162	0.271

Source: Authors' calculations of the SHP data (b. sample "wave 21" 19/20, the Covid-19 survey 20 and the sample "wave 22" 20/21).

Table A.4 Linear Regression on Risk of Job Loss due to the Covid-19 Pandemic

	1		2		3		4		5	
1st half of May '20	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
2nd half of May '20	–0.044	(0.144)	–0.046	(0.145)	–0.055	(0.144)	–0.016	(0.139)	–0.025	(0.140)
1st half of Jun '20	0.102	(0.153)	0.089	(0.153)	0.084	(0.153)	0.102	(0.149)	0.091	(0.149)
2nd half of Jun '20	–0.068	(0.301)	–0.076	(0.300)	–0.062	(0.298)	–0.095	(0.323)	–0.088	(0.322)
Sectors	Controlled		Controlled		Controlled		Controlled		Controlled	
NUTS regions	Controlled		Controlled		Controlled		Controlled		Controlled	
Firm size: 1–49 employees	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Firm size: 50–99 employees	0.058	(0.194)	0.069	(0.190)	0.074	(0.190)	0.154	(0.192)	0.162	(0.192)
Firm size: 100–499 employees	0.031	(0.140)	0.034	(0.140)	0.036	(0.139)	0.039	(0.137)	0.041	(0.136)
Firm size: >=500 employees	–0.162	(0.149)	–0.167	(0.151)	–0.162	(0.151)	–0.090	(0.151)	–0.090	(0.153)
Swiss nationality	–0.424+	(0.236)	–0.410+	(0.235)	–0.409+	(0.234)	–0.291	(0.236)	–0.282	(0.235)
Male	–0.312*	(0.125)	–0.295*	(0.125)	–0.295*	(0.125)	–0.253+	(0.134)	–0.242+	(0.133)
Age (per 10 years)	1.337**	(0.414)	1.348**	(0.419)	1.385***	(0.417)	1.295**	(0.407)	1.331**	(0.411)
Age (per 10 years)^2	–0.142**	(0.047)	–0.144**	(0.048)	–0.147**	(0.047)	–0.133**	(0.046)	–0.137**	(0.047)
Main earner	–0.529	(0.360)	–0.540	(0.363)	–0.547	(0.359)	–0.351	(0.346)	–0.355	(0.343)
Living with a partner	–0.728+	(0.377)	–0.739+	(0.379)	–0.738*	(0.374)	–0.527	(0.354)	–0.529	(0.349)
Main earner * living with a partner	0.723+	(0.396)	0.741+	(0.400)	0.741+	(0.394)	0.459	(0.380)	0.464	(0.376)
Low education	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Medium education	–0.327	(0.296)	–0.334	(0.296)	–0.354	(0.296)	–0.347	(0.291)	–0.368	(0.291)
High education I	–0.038	(0.304)	–0.019	(0.305)	–0.069	(0.307)	–0.030	(0.297)	–0.063	(0.303)
High education II	–0.272	(0.291)	–0.176	(0.300)	–0.212	(0.299)	–0.229	(0.286)	–0.209	(0.299)
Supervisory task	–0.167	(0.122)	–0.159	(0.122)	–0.158	(0.122)	–0.121	(0.129)	–0.118	(0.131)
Academic job			–0.188	(0.150)	0.060	(0.192)			0.092	(0.190)
Working remotely			–0.006	(0.139)	0.195	(0.182)			0.166	(0.187)
Academic job * working remotely					–0.500*	(0.248)			–0.396	(0.248)
Volume of working hours: >80 %							Ref.		Ref.	
Volume of working hours: <50 %							0.075	(0.193)	0.076	(0.193)
Volume of working hours: 50–80 %							–0.250+	(0.135)	–0.237+	(0.135)

Continuation of Table A.4 on the following page.

Continuation of Table A.4.

	1	2	3	4	5
Fixed–term				–0.102 (0.260)	–0.080 (0.260)
Tenure				–0.011 (0.007)	–0.011 (0.007)
Unemployment: < 3 months				Ref.	Ref.
Unemployment: 3–6 months				0.419 (0.265)	0.416 (0.266)
Unemployment: 6–18 months				0.005 (0.266)	–0.015 (0.268)
Unemployment: > 18 months				0.658+ (0.397)	0.614 (0.393)
Overtime reduction				0.234 (0.180)	0.222 (0.180)
Short–time work				1.199*** (0.191)	1.189*** (0.191)
Flexible working hours				0.068 (0.139)	0.079 (0.138)
Overtime				0.072 (0.151)	0.071 (0.151)
Constant	1.510+ (0.904)	1.491 (0.917)	1.387 (0.906)	0.755 (0.931)	0.659 (0.935)
R^2	0.154	0.155	0.157	0.199	0.201
Cohen's f^2	0.182	0.183	0.186	0.248	0.252
df_r	1805	1805	1805	1805	1805
BIC	9936.154	9948.81	9950.306	9896.334	9914.587
N	2258	2258	2258	2258	2258

Dependent variable: Risk of job loss '20 due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
Sample weights are applied. The coefficients are followed by robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors' calculations of the SHP data (analytical sample I: SHP standard sample "wave 21" 19/20 and Covid-19 survey 20)
Notes: The analysis covers (1) dependent employees; (2) not enrolled in education; (3) aged 18–65 years. Sectors included: (1) agriculture, hunting, forestry; (2) manufacturing; (3) electricity, gas and water supply; (4) construction; (5) wholesale, retail, motor vehicle repairs, household goods; (6) hotels and restaurants; (7) transport, storage and communication; (8) financial intermediation, insurance; (9) real estate, renting, computers, research; (10) public admin, national defence, compulsory social security; (11) education; (12) health and social work; (13) other community, social and personal service activities; (14) extra-territorial organizations and bodies NUTS regions included: Lake Geneva, Mittelland (Ref.), North-West Switzerland, Zurich, East Switzerland, Central Switzerland, Ticino.

Table A.5 Linear Regression on Change Scores of Risk of Unemployment

	1		2		3		4		5	
Aug '20	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Sep '20	−0.315	(0.326)	−0.323	(0.322)	−0.329	(0.324)	−0.245	(0.329)	−0.258	(0.327)
Oct '20	−0.461	(0.329)	−0.454	(0.326)	−0.459	(0.329)	−0.352	(0.334)	−0.350	(0.333)
Nov '20	−0.023	(0.381)	−0.034	(0.379)	−0.038	(0.382)	0.008	(0.383)	−0.005	(0.384)
Dec '20	0.366	(0.631)	0.371	(0.624)	0.363	(0.624)	0.460	(0.599)	0.456	(0.592)
Jan '21	−0.360	(0.411)	−0.382	(0.408)	−0.379	(0.409)	−0.163	(0.424)	−0.184	(0.421)
Feb '21	−2.046**	(0.660)	−2.046**	(0.662)	−2.029**	(0.661)	−1.867**	(0.648)	−1.853**	(0.651)
Sectors	Controlled		Controlled		Controlled		Controlled		Controlled	
NUTS regions	Controlled		Controlled		Controlled		Controlled		Controlled	
Firm size: 1–49 employees	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Firm size: 50–99 employees	−0.193	(0.187)	−0.167	(0.186)	−0.161	(0.187)	−0.152	(0.186)	−0.121	(0.186)
Firm size: 100–499 employees	0.361+	(0.188)	0.369*	(0.185)	0.371*	(0.185)	0.302	(0.185)	0.312+	(0.181)
Firm size: >=500 employees	0.040	(0.165)	0.038	(0.167)	0.038	(0.166)	0.043	(0.164)	0.041	(0.165)
Swiss nationality	−0.398	(0.317)	−0.387	(0.313)	−0.381	(0.313)	−0.351	(0.292)	−0.336	(0.288)
Male	0.244	(0.153)	0.267+	(0.155)	0.259+	(0.155)	0.318*	(0.158)	0.336*	(0.160)
Age (per 10 years)	−0.127	(0.566)	−0.047	(0.568)	−0.066	(0.568)	−0.043	(0.520)	0.006	(0.522)
Age (per 10 years)^2	0.006	(0.063)	−0.003	(0.063)	−0.001	(0.063)	0.001	(0.058)	−0.005	(0.058)
Main earner	−0.233	(0.583)	−0.214	(0.584)	−0.188	(0.588)	−0.055	(0.561)	−0.016	(0.564)
Living with a partner	−0.370	(0.554)	−0.338	(0.557)	−0.321	(0.561)	−0.248	(0.532)	−0.208	(0.538)
Main earner * living with a partner	0.266	(0.600)	0.257	(0.602)	0.249	(0.605)	0.148	(0.579)	0.136	(0.583)
Low education	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Medium education	0.128	(0.371)	0.129	(0.372)	0.129	(0.372)	0.112	(0.362)	0.115	(0.362)
High education I	0.270	(0.403)	0.332	(0.408)	0.350	(0.409)	0.281	(0.392)	0.354	(0.399)
High education II	−0.028	(0.375)	0.163	(0.384)	0.170	(0.384)	−0.018	(0.363)	0.168	(0.375)
Supervisory task	0.145	(0.153)	0.168	(0.151)	0.170	(0.151)	0.215	(0.153)	0.237	(0.150)
Change to fixed–term job	−1.049*	(0.482)	−1.065*	(0.480)	−1.069*	(0.475)	−0.961*	(0.435)	−0.979*	(0.423)
Change to permanent job	−1.738*	(0.789)	−1.737*	(0.785)	−1.744*	(0.786)	−2.729**	(0.934)	−2.764**	(0.929)
Decrease in working hours	0.143	(0.272)	0.160	(0.273)	0.153	(0.272)	−0.082	(0.252)	−0.073	(0.251)
Increase in working hours	−0.008	(0.280)	0.003	(0.281)	−0.001	(0.282)	−0.214	(0.286)	−0.211	(0.289)

Continuation of Table A.5 on the following page.

Continuation of Table A.5.

Academic job			–0.273+	(0.156)	–0.424+	(0.223)			–0.396+	(0.212)
Working remotely			–0.091	(0.185)	–0.215	(0.261)			–0.166	(0.248)
Academic job * working remotely					0.301	(0.321)			0.254	(0.305)
Volume of working hours: >80%							Ref.		Ref.	
Volume of working hours: <50 %							0.175	(0.228)	0.185	(0.227)
Volume of working hours: 50–80 %							0.166	(0.155)	0.172	(0.155)
Fixed–term							1.122*	(0.491)	1.155*	(0.486)
Tenure							–0.006	(0.008)	–0.006	(0.008)
Unemployment: <3 months							Ref.		Ref.	
Unemployment: 3–6 months							0.764+	(0.413)	0.757+	(0.416)
Unemployment: 6–18 months							0.218	(0.291)	0.204	(0.287)
Unemployment: >18 months							–1.335*	(0.546)	–1.305*	(0.530)
Overtime reduction							0.359	(0.240)	0.360	(0.240)
Short–time work							0.981***	(0.226)	0.973***	(0.223)
Flexible working hours							0.085	(0.147)	0.086	(0.147)
Overtime							–0.242	(0.155)	–0.236	(0.156)
Constant	1.738	(1.364)	1.536	(1.380)	1.593	(1.375)	–0.622	(1.377)	–0.714	(1.386)
R^2	0.090		0.093		0.094		0.130		0.132	
Cohen's f^2	0.099		0.103		0.104		0.149		0.152	
df_r	1549		1549		1549		1549		1549	
BIC	8659.290		8669.576		8675.572		8660.045		8677.114	
N	1959		1959		1959		1959		1959	

Dependent variable: Change scores of risk of unemployment. Sample weights are applied. The coefficients are followed by robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors' calculations of the SHP data (analytical sample II: standard sample "wave 21" 19/20 and Covid-19 survey 20 and standard sample "wave 22" 20/21). Notes: The analysis covers (1) dependent employees; (2) not enrolled in education; (3) aged 18-65 years. Sectors included: (1) agriculture, hunting, forestry; (2) manufacturing; (3) electricity, gas and water supply; (4) construction; (5) wholesale, retail, motor vehicle repairs, household goods; (6) hotels and restaurants; (7) transport, storage and communication; (8) financial intermediation,insurance; (9) real estate, renting, computers, research; (10) public admin, national defence, compulsory social security; (11) education; (12) health and social work; (13) other community, social and personal service activities; (14) extra-territorial organizations and bodies. NUTS regions included: Lake Geneva, Mittelland (Ref.), North-West Switzerland, Zurich, East Switzerland, Central Switzerland, Ticino.

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Intimate Partner Violence and the Complexity Turn. The Multiple Conceptions of Gender in IPV Policy in Switzerland

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Abstract: Based on socio-historical research of domestic violence treatment in the cantons of Vaud and Geneva, this article analyses how the co-presence of many actors and approaches has affected the definition of intimate partner violence (IPV) in Switzerland. IPV policies centred on gender and then reframed to define violence as a complex issue. We show what the consequences of framing complexity for policy are.

Keywords: Domestic violence, social problems, policy, gender

Le tournant complexe des violences dans le couple. Les conceptions multiples du genre dans le traitement des violences conjugales en Suisse

Résumé : Cet article montre comment la prise en charge des violences dans le couple en Suisse est marquée par la coprésence d'une multitude d'acteurs et d'approches qui influe sur la définition du problème. À partir d'une recherche socio-historique et en nous centrant sur les cantons de Vaud et Genève, nous analysons l'évolution des approches : des violences en termes de genre au registre cognitif de la complexité. Nous montrons quelles sont les conséquences de ce cadrage de la complexité pour l'action publique.

Mots-clés : Violence conjugale, problème public, action publique, genre

Der komplexe Wendepunkt der Gewalt in Paarbeziehungen. Vielfältige Geschlechtsvorstellungen im Umgang mit häuslicher Gewalt in der Schweiz

Zusammenfassung: Dieser Artikel zeigt, wie der Prozess im Umgang mit häuslicher Gewalt in der Schweiz durch die Kopräsenz einer Vielzahl von Akteuren und Ansätzen geprägt ist, welche die Problemstellung beeinflussen. Anhand der Kantone Waadt und Genf zeigen wir, wie sich die Konstituierung des öffentlichen Handelns um die Jahrhundertwende auf einen geschlechtsspezifischen Umgang mit Gewalt und in der Folge auf das Wahrnehmungsregister der Komplexität konzentrierte. Wir zeigen, welche Auswirkungen dies für die Ausrichtung der Komplexität für das öffentliche Handeln hat.

Schlüsselwörter: Häusliche Gewalt, öffentliches Problem, öffentliches Handeln, Geschlecht

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1 Introduction[1]

"Interdisciplinarity in support of complexity", the theme of the 11th Geneva Forum on Domestic Violence in 2014 underlines one transformation in intimate partner violence (IPV) policy in Switzerland in the 2000s: from a feminist issue, it came to be seen as a complex problem calling for the involvement of multiple actors with differing, if not diverging, knowledge and practice.

Originally put forward by feminist non-profit organizations and institutions working towards gender equality in the 1970s and 1980s, the problem of IPV in Switzerland was seen as a question arising from inequalities between men and women and male domination (Htun and Weldon 2012; Delage et al. 2020). This framing is anchored in a context where feminist movements in different countries defined violence against women as the "tool for maintaining and reproducing the domination of men over women, two antagonistic social groups" (Fargier 1976), and feminist researchers conceptualized this particular form of violence. For instance, Jalna Hanmer (1977) showed that male violence is one of the key mechanisms of social control exercized over women. Liz Kelly (1987) developed the concept of "continuum of sexual violence" to underline the various forms of violence and contexts where they occur, as well as their systemic aspect. This conceptualization of male violence has questioned the sociological approaches of violence, and helped to develop a new paradigm of violence as a central dimension of social relationships, particularly relationships of domination (Walby 2012). To do so, researchers also insisted on the need to take women's point of view on violence (Russel and Radford 1992; Corrin 1997). In that same vein, feminist scholars studied specific forms of violence, such as IPV (Romito 1997; Smyth 2002), and highlighted the idea of a quantitative and qualitative gender asymmetry in IPV (Kimmel 2002) – that there are differences in both the proportions and the forms of violence suffered from by men and women (Johnson 2008; Hardesty et al. 2015). This conception also implied the development of a feminist practice to avoid victim-blaming and respond to the survivors' needs.

From the early 2000s, federal framework laws and cantonal policies have institutionalized the problem of IPV in Switzerland (Delage et al. 2020). The approach towards IPV in Switzerland has evolved rapidly, integrating new actors and producing not only a diversity of approaches to and definitions of the problem, but also imposing a framing in terms of complexity. "Complexity" is to be understood as both a common-sense category – mobilized by some actors to define their approach, as in the example above –, but also scientific – referring to the development of a plurality of knowledge on IPV, directed towards elaborating practices deemed to be better adapted to address the problem. This plurality of approaches co-exists

1 We are very thankful to Gail Ann Fagen, who translated the article, and Michael Stambolis Ruhstofer for his advice and feedback.

and competes as definitional struggles shape the understanding of the problem. How have these changes occurred? What knowledge has been mobilized, and by what types of actors?

To better understand the mutations of the problem of IPV, we looked into the processes through which policy is undertaken, assessed, defined, redefined and circumscribed (Cantelli et al. 2009) in two French-speaking cantons, Geneva and Vaud. Our empirical material includes federal and cantonal archives (institutional reports of feminist organizations, medical units, shelters, local and national political commissions, laws, academic and media articles) and 45 comprehensive interviews with critical actors conducted between 2015 and 2018.

Our research underlines the activity of the actors involved in the emergence, shaping, and definitional changes of public problems (Spector and Kitsuse 1977; Wood and Doan 2003). It does so by considering the co-existence of different formulations and power relationships that they crystallize (Gusfield 1981; Haines 2016). In so doing, we highlighted how types of scientific and professional knowledge, established at a certain time and deployed in the different social worlds (academia, state agencies, and non-profit organizations), highlight changes in the understanding and categorization of violence, and shape its treatment. Differences in professional and scientific knowledge affect how causal responsibilities are seen (Bacchi 2009) – IPV can be linked to gender inequality, to other social problems, or to individual deviancies (Delage and Roca i Escoda 2018) – and have practical effects on which groups are the focus of policy intervention, and what methods are used to deal with violence.

First of all, to put the processes under study in context, we will describe how policy was created and institutionalized at the federal level, as well as in the Geneva and Vaud cantons. By studying surveys developed in criminology and public health, we will then show how gender came to be considered as a variable or a factor, rather than as a social relationship that shapes violence and asymmetry in IPV, both in the scientific and policy fields. Finally, within assistance organizations, the imposition of two types of professional knowledge, medicine and systemic psychology, in the IPV field has shaped the representation of IPV as a complex problem, marginalizing the feminist approach.

2 Methodology

This article is based on research that traced the formation and transformations of IPV in three Swiss cantons, from the 1970s until 2021, by showing how the problem was configured as well as the controversies surrounding so-called "domestic" violence. More specifically, we studied the social history of violence against women policies

in the cantons of Geneva, Vaud, and Zurich (Delage et al. 2020).[2] For this article, our analysis focuses on the turn of the 2000s and on two French-speaking cantons that are characterized by very different developments, which highlight the transformations in the definitional, cognitive, and practical aspects of the problem (Delage et al. 2020). Moreover, the linguistic unity in Geneva and Vaud helps to capture the changes in categorizations and discourses on violence, as well as their meanings. For instance, the cognitive transformation under study is supported by an evolution in the categories used by public actors to refer to IPV: in the late 1990s, in both cantons, the issue which was first coined "violence conjugale" became "violence domestique". While "violence conjugale" refers to the term traditionally used by feminist organizations to describe gender-based violence within a couple, "violence domestique" is a broader category which refers to violence committed between spouses or partners and encompasses any type of violence perpetrated in a family. To highlight this change, we will use these categories in French, while IPV is used as a generic category. Our empirical material is organized into three sections:

1. An analysis of content found in the archives of federal and cantonal bodies involved in the struggle against IPV (annual reports, institutional publications of feminist associations, medical units, refuges, local and national political commissions, legislative publications, academic studies and media articles);
2. Forty-five interviews conducted between 2015 and 2018 with key actors in various cantonal and federal bodies: police, legislators, desk officers for the equality offices (federal and cantonal), social workers, medical doctors, criminologists, psychologists, legal experts;
3. Approximately ten ethnographic observations at meetings of various cantonal, regional and federal bodies, between 2015 and 2017.

Anchored in a sociology of public problems, our approach consisted in showing how a problem emerges in the different arenas (institutional, activist, non-profit organizations, legal) that participate in formulating a policy category (Zimmermann 2003). By focusing on the cognitive aspect (Widmer 2010), we identified and analyzed the various approaches to deal with the problem and the "definitional struggles" around IPV (Gusfield 1981; Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Kingdon 2003, 3). The analysis of public problems that we use may be qualified as controlled constructivist, which is based on a form of constructivist "gerrymandering" (Woolgar and Pawluch 1985; Miller and Holstein 1993), as we understood IPV as male violence against women, and we sought to highlight how certain representations and practices are being imposed (Delage et al. 2020; Delage and Perrier 2020). We were inspired by Carol Lee Bacchi (1999) who looked at experts and the way they problematized the issue of violence against women, and saw policy as producing multiple, even contradic-

2 Marylène Lieber and Marta Roca i Escoda « Emergence et reconfigurations d'un problème public. Les violences faites aux femmes en Suisse (1970–2012) » (N° FNS 100017_149480).

tory meanings. By examining the variety of problem definitions, she showed that some of them came to be dominant while others were marginalized. Moreover, these representations and the underlying symbolic conflicts have an impact on practices and the way a problem is viewed and addressed.

3 Federal and Cantonal Perspectives on IPV

In Switzerland, like in other countries (Loseke 1992; Delage 2017), feminist movements were primarily at the fore in creating shelters and facilities for women survivors of violence and their children (Weldon 2002). Coming together under the banner of Solidarité Femmes, a national feminist movement founded in 1989, women's groups called for criminalization of marital rape as well as legal improvements to protect women survivors. Since the 1990s and 2000s, state policies against IPV have multiplied at the federal level in Switzerland. The first steps came about in the context of a step-up in the way violence against women was being addressed internationally, especially in Europe. With the 1993 Federal LAVI (Loi sur l'Aide aux Victimes – Law on Assistance to Victims of Offences), cantons had to establish mechanisms to assist and compensate victims, and measures more specifically targeting IPV were taken (Hamby et al. 2012). A study in 1997 on *violence conjugale* revealed the scope of the phenomenon in Switzerland and served to underpin demands by non-profit organizations and femocrats (Eisenstein 1996), occasionally referred to as State feminists (Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1996). A service devoted to domestic violence at the Federal Bureau for Equality was created in 2003. On 1 April 2004, legislation changed and defined repeated acts of violence committed within a couple as a crime. Also at the federal level, since 1 July 2007, civil courts can order a person exhibiting violent behaviour to vacate the common household and prohibit them from approaching or contacting the survivor.

While legal regulations are in place at the federal level, in the absence of a general law, policies are organized primarily at the level of the canton, which is also the case for most Swiss social policies (Lucas and Giraud 2009; Mueller 2012). Policies against *violence conjugale* developed in highly contrasted manners in the cantons of Geneva and Vaud. While policies were first driven by groups anchored in the women's movement in Geneva, the situation was different in Vaud.

In Geneva, IPV policies took shape quite early. The feminist movement set up the first shelter facilities for women, especially Solidarité Femmes in 1977. Thanks to intervention by the Office for Equality between Men and Women, the State took up their actions. In 1995, this service directed a first interdepartmental working group on marital violence to coordinate the members of canton institutions, health services, and non-profit organizations. In addition to the feminist structures, LAVI centers established by Federal law, and the Office, new actors appeared in the mid-1990s,

especially with the creation of VIRES, a structure to counsel perpetrators of violence, in 1994 and the CIMPV (Consultation interdisciplinaire de médecine et de prévention de la violence – Interdisciplinary Consultation for Medicine and Prevention of Violence) founded in 1997 at the HUG (Hopitaux Universitaires de Genève – Geneva University Hospital) to work with survivors, abusers, and witnesses.

The situation is completely different in the canton of Vaud, where a shelter was first set up to assist lone mothers before becoming specialized in supporting survivors of IPV – women and their children. This center is not historically associated with the women's movement (Bereni and Revillard 2018), but some of the workers aligning themselves with feminism joined efforts in the 1980s and 1990s. It was not until the 1990s that the Office for Equality between Men and Women, created in 1991, began to address the problem. The Equality Office then developed policies and delegated its lines of action to external agencies, in particular the UPIMS (Unité de Prévention de l'Institut de médecine sociale et préventive – Prevention Unit at the Institute for Social and Preventive Medicine) at the CHUV (Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois – Lausanne University Hospital Centre). In 1999, this Unit conducted a study on *violence conjugale* which, in 2000, led to a coordination and prevention programme entitled « C'est assez » ("Enough") (Hofner and Siggen 2001). It also led to the creation of the CCLVD (Commission cantonale de lutte contre la violence domestique – Cantonal Commission against Domestic Violence) and the Medical Unit on Violence (UMV) at the CHUV in 2005. Measures to deal with violence, awareness campaigns and information brochures multiplied, notably revolving around criminalization of the abusers; and in 2016 a specific law against *violence domestique*, the groundwork for the LOVD (Loi vaudoise d'organisation de la prévention et de la lutte contre la violence domestique – Law regarding the prevention and action against domestic violence) of 2018, was drafted.

The relationships between non-profit organizations and institutions, the temporality of laws' enactment, and the problematization of IPV differ in Vaud and the Geneva canton. Despite differences in configuration, in both cantons under study, the services for equality between women and men propelled and guided policy orientation and surveys on IPV until the 2000s. For these reasons, they were the "owners" of the problem (Gusfield 1981) who referred primarily to *violence conjugale* and considered the cause of the violence to be found in gender inequality.

4 From Violence As an Effect of Gender to Gender As a Variable

In the 1990s, both in Geneva and at the federal level, the struggle against *violence conjugale* was based on a feminist perspective which has developed since the 1970s (Delage 2017). As we explained in the introduction of this article, *violence conjugale* has been seen as part of the full set of unequal relations between men and women:

"(…) feminists shift the prevailing perspective and representations on *violence conjugale* to highlight the structural relationships that forge the relationship in a couple"[3] (Delage 2014). Along these lines, the causal responsibility of the problem is the structural relationship of domination in a gender system, while the political responsibility lies as much on male abusers as on society as a sexist system (Roca i Escoda and Lieber 2016).

This perspective was adopted by the Gillioz survey, commissioned by the Geneva Equality Office under the impetus of the feminist organization Solidarité Femmes, and later attaining a national scope (Gillioz et al. 1997). Concretely, the study attempted to "quantify the extent of *violence conjugale*" and "draw attention to a problem largely underestimated" (De Puy et al. 2002, 58). The authors of the study stated explicitly: "we adhere to the feminist theoretical current that sees *violence conjugale* in the context of gender-based social relationships and consider it to be a male strategy aimed at controlling women in order to maintain their privileges" (De Puy et al. 2002, 59).

This Swiss national representative study (Gillioz et al. 1997), conducted in 1993, among 15,000 women aged 20-60, revealed that one of five women (20.7 %) stated that a partner had submitted her to physical and/or sexual abuse during her life. When psychological abuse is considered, the rate of violence rises to 40.3 %. This survey is the only example in Switzerland that lays out the phenomenon of *violence conjugale* from a feminist perspective.[4] As shown from the title of the book based on the survey, *Domination et violences envers la femme dans le couple* (Domination and violence against women in the couple), male dominance and gender inequalities are factors that structure violence, and gender asymmetry was affirmed and inspired service practice from the very start. The feminist approach historically led to the development of a women-oriented practice and the creation of services specifically dedicated to women survivors. However, it also infused the creation of some structures for perpetrators, such as ViFa in the canton of Vaud, where practice was not only centred on men but also adapted by considering the effects of gender and socialization on violence.

With the development of policy undertaken in the 2000s, other types of knowledge legitimized representations and practices of other actors involved in the IPV field. Criminology and public health were two scientific fields where knowledge about violence was produced with an explanatory as well as prescriptive purposes. In these conceptions of IPV, gender is understood as one variable or factor among others, rather than as a social relationship.

In Switzerland, criminology has taken up most of the statistical studies on *violence domestique*. In these studies, *violence domestique* is defined and handled as

3 Quotes were translated by the authors and translator of this article.

4 It is hard therefore to compare its results with other more recent studies (especially in criminology) because of the way these forms of violence are counted and categorized (Chevillard, et al. 2016).

something that encompasses all the members of the extended family. It no longer makes a distinction between *violence conjugale* and violence between parents and children. The Swiss portion of the international victimization survey, which looked into the prevalence of violence experienced by women throughout their lives, used this extended definition (Killias et al. 2005).

For their study, the criminologists used victimization surveys as their main method.[5] This consisted in gathering data on violence both exercized and experienced (Cavalin 2013), focusing primarily on the frequency of violent acts without taking into account either the context, or the psycho-social consequence of these acts (Walby and Myhill 2001, 507). When the focus is shifted from gender to the acts of violence, a difference in the number of women affected by IPV is still recognisable, but gender is reduced to one of several variables of analysis. In these data, it is impossible to distinguish the types of violence as theorized by the feminist perspective (Roca i Escoda and Lieber 2015). Other criminology surveys used a different definition of *violence domestique* (Chevillard et al. 2016) to encompass the violence exercized within the extended family and include parent-children violence (Killias et al. 2012).

The public health approach also integrated gender as one of the variables to explain violence. Public health entities beyond Switzerland also gradually began to address violence. WHO stated that violence was a major public health problem in 1996, and published the *World Report on Violence and Health* in 2002. The *Report* defined violence as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation" (WHO 2002, 5). The WHO stressed the consequences on health rather than its social, psychological, or other causes. The phenomenon is thus presented as a set of interlacing factors working at various levels: individuals, relationships, communities, or society. Starting from the general framing on violence, the WHO work gradually focused on women (Heise and Garcia-Moreno 2002).

In Switzerland, this approach served as a discursive basis to legitimatize the development of policy (Delage and Roca i Escoda 2018). This was the case in Geneva, for example, where the CIMPV was created thanks to a context of growing treatment and visibility to violence in the field of health. In the canton of Vaud, the WHO perspective directly shaped policies against IPV. In 1999, the Office for

5 It was a telephone survey conducted from April to August 2003 with a sample of 1975 women from both French-speaking and German-speaking regions (Jaquier et al. 2006). A supplementary study was undertaken by the University of Zurich Criminology Institute. As part of a victimization survey, extended to domestic violence, and including contacts with victim assistance services and violence-reporting behaviour (Killias et al. 2012; Bourgoz et al. 2013). Statements made by survivors enhanced the data on this crime and provided information on victimizations that are not recorded by police statistics (Khazaei 2019).

Equality between Men and Women mandated the Prevention Unit at the Institute for Social and Preventive Medicine (UPIMS) at the Lausanne University Hospital Center (CHUV) to conduct a study on IPV. To create the programme called « C'est assez » ("Enough!"), a doctor and nurse specialized in public health deployed the WHO model locally to train and coordinate policy actors (WHO, 2005). This community-based public health approach was centered more on prevention and treatment by and in the community. It was based on a holistic view of a person's state of health (Stillwaggon 2006), which is influenced by the environment in the broad sense of the term, including the physical and psychological world, but also culture and society, where the causes are complex and interlocked (Delage and Roca i Escoda 2018).

In an interview, one of the two agents who initiated the « C'est assez » programme, explained the way they approached the question of gender and inequality:

> *We really did keep to a public health perspective. In a public health approach, you document the risk factors and the protective factors … In the list of risk or protective factors, you have the position that women hold in society. If you have a society where rights are, at least theoretically, respected, where men and women enjoy equal rights, it is a protective factor. If, for example, things like pornography that are humiliating for women are frowned upon, not tolerated or at least not valued, we know that this is a protective factor. If women have a good access to education, professions, etc., we know that it is a protective factor. So, we always spoke of the aspect of specific oppression, but seen through the fact that it is a protective factor in the epidemiology sense of the term.* (november 2014)

While affirming it, understanding the quantitative difference in the prevalence of men or women is not the issue at stake. Gender inequalities influence the private domain and are therefore understood as one of the risk factors, and in an almost symmetric manner, promoting women's rights protects them from violence. "Alcohol abuse, economic precarity, cultural affiliation associated with social isolating, the post-partum period, periods of separation and divorce, for example, were correlated with the appearance or increase of violence conjugale" (Hofner and Siggen 2001, 10) are other risk factors and periods of vulnerability associated with *violence conjugale*. As such, the notion of risk factor can be seen as a floating concept, fairly changeable with an instable definition. This type of knowledge shapes the discourse of actors who deal with survivors and abusers. Using public health language to understand gender differences, a social worker at the shelter service in Lausanne stressed the way violence was handled in practical terms:

> *So, for me, violence is the problem, it's not men or women, it's the violence itself. Of course, there are survivors and abusers, but these people are more than just abusers and survivors. There are all these risk factors, and gender*

> *inequality certainly predominates. But that is no reason not to study psychological mechanisms, relationships of dependence and all that. I thought [other factors] deserved [to be considered] as well.* (october 2014)

While in the feminist perspective, gender inequality is the main problem as it produces violence; here, violence, in general, becomes the heart of the problem. In criminology and public health surveys, a narrow focus on violence removes substance from the problem in terms of gender, reinforcing a process of "evaporation" of gender, to borrow Nina Eliasoph's (1998) words.

5 Complexity vs. Feminism?

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the different conceptions of the role of gender in IPV came along with the diversification of the professional tools to tackle the problem. Nonetheless, this process is anchored in symbolic struggles that create hierarchies not only among types of knowledge but also among perspectives on violence and gender. Therefore, some types of knowledge have come to prevail, in particular systemic psychology and medicine, both dedicated to healing individuals involved in violence, and contributed to contesting the relevance of gender in understanding and dealing with IPV.

Since the late 1990s, the victim assistance organizations in both cantons have adopted systemic psychology to better understand and support women, to the extent that training "in systemic psychology" is now required in most women's shelter structures. Systemic psychology offers a framework for understanding violence and the tools to transform family relationships. It is primarily based on a typology of violence: complementary violence – based on a relation of domination – ; bilateral or symmetrical violence, where both parties resort to violence, which also applies to violent transaction couples; and punitive violence with latent symmetry, that is unilateral violence that nevertheless entails resistance by the survivor. Although the approach offers multiple uses and is occasionally seen as compatible with affirming gender effects in the couple, the systemic language has opened the path towards interpreting the problem in terms of co-responsibility. In so far as it is hard to intervene in a couple's intimacy and determine the type of violence occurring, the idea that both parties are active in producing violence prevails in the policy field.

VIRES speaks of "violent transaction couples" *(couples à transaction violente)* in order to include situations where the perpetrator is a woman, or where both partners are perpetrators. The phenomenon of violence is thus never interpreted in terms of asymmetric relationships, domination, or power. The argument VIRES gave for changing *violence conjugale* into "violent transaction couple" is a good illustration:

> *(…) the difference that we were led to make between violence conjugale and violent transaction couples. In violence conjugale, the partners are in a complementary relationship where the man is the only one to commit physical aggression; violent transaction couples, however, are in a symmetrical relation where, quite often, both partners commit violence. This poses the problem of violence by women and the way it is addressed, and it justifies introducing the notion of person.* (Châtelain 2014)

Thus, it is no longer question of men and women, but of people, which it "paves" the way for the symmetrization of violence. Using this systemic language, medical discourse occasionally participates in this same movement. Although each has a different function, a medical structure linked to a hospital was created in the mid-1990s and early 2000 to tackle violence in both cantons: the CIMPV in Geneva and the UMV in Lausanne. The CIMPV aims to treat people who experienced, witnessed, or committed violence, while the UMV intends to establish medical affidavits. In both cases, however, anyone (survivor, abuser, or witness) can visit the institutions. An article written in 2002 by the CIMPV founder highlights the principle behind the creation of a medicine for violence: "Violence injures, it breaks, it weakens, it sickens. In short, it is not good for health" (Halpérin 2002, 207). With the establishment of the CIMPV in 1997 in Geneva, violence, in general, and *violence domestique* in particular, were framed as a question for general medicine.

Emblematic of the professional rhetoric of the medical sector, the insistence on suffering and care for all structures practical orientation of consultation. Explaining the type of activity undertaken by the CIMPV professionals, its founder explains:

> *(…) from the very start, we placed ourselves in a medical perspective: we weren't there to stigmatize or to work on victim protection or victimology. We were there to tackle a problem with violence, in all its facets: survivor, perpetrator, witness, indirect victim and so on.* (october 2014)

Gender identity and the shaping of individuals through gender order are thus not considered as relevant data to understand the problem and provide support. Disputing the importance of gender contributes to make IPV a symmetrical issue and completes the blurring of the border between survivor and abuser, and thus the treatment hitherto given to women and to men.

This process was especially clear in Geneva where new actors involved in the IPV field in the mid-1990s, explicitly questioned the feminist perspective of IPV. From the start, VIRES adopted an approach that criticized the feminist view of *violence conjugale* – qualifying it as a "victimist approach" or "victimary power" (Châtelain 2004, 105). Action was no longer focused solely on the female survivors, but also on the abusers, whether men or women. To this was added a disagreement with the moral and symbolic partition between the categories of abusers and survivors (Dobash et al. 1992; Romito 1997; Tolan et al. 2006). As such, the idea of women

being the main survivors of violence, and thus the main policy targets, was destabilized and called into question. This symbolic power relationship between actors appeared in reformulations of the question at the legislative level (Roca i Escoda and Lieber 2015). The divide became effective through a specific law on domestic violence (LVD, Loi sur les Violences Domestiques), adopted in 2005, which created an Office of the Delegate for Domestic Violence (BVD, Bureau aux Violences Domestiques), completely separate from the Equality Office. Feminist activists contested the person nominated to be the BVD delegate because he was an employee at VIRES, as well as the son of one of the structure's founders. Furthermore, the LVD used the category of *violence domestique* instead of *violence conjugale*, to include the violence that affected children, the elderly, and even violence by children towards their parents (Bacchi 1999; Lieber and Roca i Escoda 2015). As a result, the specificity of *violence conjugale*, and the fact that it was mainly violence against women perpetrated by men, tended to become invisible in policies.

Two recent events are signs of this process. Firstly, a shelter which was dedicated to female survivors of violence opened places for abusers; one reason cited by the structure's manager was that the "survivors were already abusers". Secondly, the non-profit organization Solidarité Femmes changed its name and became AVVEC (Aide aux Victimes de Violences en Couple – Assistance to Survivors of IPV). Along with this name change, their mission had indeed changed, as the director of the organization underlined in an interview:

> *(…) we are moving from the Solidarité Femmes association, providing help and support to women who are survivors of IPV and their children, to AVVEC which helps and supports people who are survivors of intimate partner violence and their children.* (Roselli 2017)

She added:

> *Forty years ago, women were the only people seeking assistance. The sole interest was physical violence committed between a husband and wife. The situations have become more diversified and complex. It might surprise some people, but men are also survivors of violence, in a smaller proportion.*

The discourse of complexity breaks from the feminist approach and justifies practices that the latter had banned, such as those generating a co-presence of survivors and abusers, in particular joint counselling. In its 2009 annual report, VIRES described this practice as follows:

> *Couple therapy is not to be understood as a new service offered by VIRES, a sort of method "in addition" to the others. For the therapists, it is a question of evaluating, case by case, the clinical opportunity for an intervention with the couple, in other words regarding the relationship between the two subjects. This change of perspective, as important as it is, reflects a perspective*

> *that differs in the perception of issues at stake in the "language of actions" inherent to the psychological processes reputed to be violent.* (Châtelain 2014)

The goal expressed by this idea was to break with the conceptualization of violence as the result of social relationships, which was considered as activism. On the occasion of its 20th anniversary, the director of VIRES explained:

> *I am in the field of assistance in the case of marital or domestic violence… Ten years ago it would have been unfathomable to do couples therapy… this required a discourse that legitimized it, making it possible to lift a burden weighing on the couple, the violence, the survivor… we are working on the question of responsibility and co-responsibility. The arrival of this discourse made it possible to do couples therapy.* (Châtelain 2014)

Viewing IPV as a complex problem is embodied in the professional tools developed to understand violence, and in the will to break with policies centered on women survivors: IPV becomes gender-neutral and the positions and roles of survivors and abusers are blurred and unstable. Or rather, it should be, because the emphasis on the phenomenon's complexity is also based on a normative framework that seeks to break from the perceived biases of a thinking that emerged from feminism and is deemed to be caricatural.

6 Conclusion

The complexity register in the problem of IPV has become the norm in both cantons and, more or less forcibly, tends towards destabilising the perspective in terms of gender. On the one hand, gender is seen as one explanatory factor among others, and on the other the way gender is addressed must be suitable for encompassing all types of situations, in particular those where men or women are survivors or abusers. These views are based on the fact that the policy goal is to curb violence, especially in the couple, rather than change the inequalities that produce it. The instruments implemented have adopted a perspective whereby the political specificity of violence against women is dissolved in multiple and multi-factor approaches.

In this article, we have attempted to show that the discourse on complexity ushers in contrasted approaches that no longer consider gender asymmetry in the couple relationship. Considering IPV as a risk, or mainly through its psychological mechanisms ("dysfunctions" in the couple or even as a problem of "co-dependency") such as suffering, its cycles and periods, tend to understate gender power relations. The inflation of discourses and instruments against IPV observed in Switzerland do not imply that policy considers gender inequality. On the contrary, this inflation converges towards dynamics of individualization and psychologization of the phenomenon, diminishing or even erasing gender inequality as a frame of analysis.

This comes about by making the discourse on violence symmetric and diluting, or even calling into question, the struggle against domination by men. In most of the recent policy instruments, the idea that there may be a gender dimension and a stable distribution in the category of "survivor" and "abuser" is dismissed as activist ideology or an outdated historical legacy. The successful institutionalization of the problem of domestic violence thus consecrates the failure of feminist thought on violence by men.

Emphasizing the complexity of the issue goes along with a growing and widespread focus on men, both perpetrators and survivors, in all the cantons we studied. This discursive tendency is particularly prominent in Geneva, but also in the canton of Vaud, where the policy plans against domestic violence emphasize the treatment of perpetrators, both in criminal and socio-educational terms. Thus, in 2015, the Office of Equality launched the « Qui frappe part » campaign ("The one who hits is the one who leave" campaign) to endorse policies of exclusion of violent spouses; in the same vein, a law on violence was drafted in the canton of Vaud in 2016, and explicitly aims to improve the repression of perpetrators. The movement to impose the register of complexity not only consecrates the difficulty of thinking about gender asymmetry; it radicalises it. This discourse constitutes the argumentative basis, sufficiently flexible to be appropriated by a diversity of actors, to reinforce the under-politicization of public policies and go along with a process of depoliticization. Research is still needed to show how the failure to question the phenomenon of IPV in terms of gender undermines a proper understanding of the problem and its treatment.

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La temporalité des solidarités. Variabilité des aides familiales et amicales reçues selon le degré de vulnérabilité économique des jeunes en Suisse

Cédric Jacot*, Gaël Curty**, Tristan Coste*** et Fabrice Plomb**

Résumé : À partir de données originales d'enquête auprès de 1500 jeunes de 18 à 29 ans, cet article vise à mieux comprendre l'influence de la vulnérabilité économique sur les solidarités familiales et amicales. En considérant deux types d'aide (l'aide pratique et l'aide financière), nos résultats montrent que pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement l'aide reçue de la part de la famille et des amis est plus durable et répond à une nécessité.

Mots-clés : Aide pratique, aide financière, vulnérabilité économique, jeunesse, finalité de l'aide

The Temporality of Solidarities. Family and Friend Support's Variability in Regard to Young People's Economic Vulnerability Degree in Switzerland

Abstract: Based on an original survey on 1500 young people aged from 18 to 29 years old, this article aims to better understand the influence of economic vulnerability on family and peers' solidarity. By considering two types of support (practical and financial supports), our results show that for economically vulnerable young people the support provided by family and peers is more durable and more intimately related to basic needs fulfilment.

Keywords: Practical support, financial support, economic vulnerability, youth, support's goal

Die Zeitlichkeit der Solidarität. Variabilität der Unterstützung durch Familie und Peers in Abhängigkeit vom Grad der wirtschaftlichen Benachteiligung der Jugendlichen in der Schweiz

Zusammenfassung: Auf der Grundlage einer Primärerhebung bei 1500 Jugendlichen im Alter von 18 bis 29 Jahren zielt dieser Artikel darauf ab, den Einfluss der finanziellen Benachteiligung auf die Solidarität von Familie und Peers besser zu verstehen. Durch die Betrachtung zweier Arten von Unterstützung (praktische und finanzielle Unterstützung) zeigen unsere Ergebnisse, dass für finanziell benachteiligte Jugendliche die Unterstützung durch Familie und Peers dauerhafter und notwendiger ist.

Schlüsselwörter: Praktische Unterstützung, Finanzielle Unterstützung, Finanzielle Benachteiligung, Jugendliche, Ziele der Unterstützung

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1 Introduction

Dans le contexte de récession économique et de politique d'austérité actuel dont les conséquences négatives affectent en premier lieu les jeunes[1] (Eurofound 2012 ; Papuchon 2014 ; Chauvel 2016), les aides familiales constituent une ressource importante. Leur rôle de régulation des besoins des jeunes varie selon les contextes nationaux et le degré de « défamilialisation[2] » permis par les États-providence de chaque pays (Esping-Andersen 2007 ; Van de Velde 2008a ; 2008b). Une enquête française sur les ressources économiques des jeunes illustre ce rôle de la famille : en 2014, sept jeunes sur dix sont aidés financièrement par leurs parents et en moyenne 30 % des ressources financières des jeunes proviennent des parents (Castell et al. 2016). En Suisse, les données quantitatives à ce sujet sont peu nombreuses. Mise à part l'Enquête sur les familles et les générations de l'Office fédéral de la statistique (Csonka et Mosimann 2017) qui concerne l'aide donnée dans la population adulte, il y a très peu de données disponibles sur cette thématique.

Le but de cet article est de combler cette lacune en présentant les résultats d'une enquête originale par questionnaire en ligne sur les transactions économiques que les jeunes effectuent avec leur famille et leurs amis en Suisse. Il s'intéresse ainsi à l'entraide familiale et à l'aide que les jeunes reçoivent de leurs amis selon leur degré de vulnérabilité économique[3]. Nous cherchons à comprendre le rôle de l'aide reçue dans les trajectoires « d'indépendantisation » des jeunes dans un système de production de ressources comprenant également les aides étatiques et le recours au marché. Nous postulons que cette aide reçue joue un rôle d'adaptation et d'ajustement dans le parcours des jeunes qui prend des formes différentes selon leur milieu et le degré de stabilité de leurs ressources économiques.

L'originalité de nos résultats réside ainsi, d'une part, dans la mise au jour du rôle des aides familiales et amicales dans le processus d'indépendantisation des jeunes et d'autre part dans la mise en lumière d'une relation entre le degré de vulnérabilité des jeunes et la durée de l'aide reçue.

1 La jeunesse est définie dans le cadre de cet article comme une période de transition vers l'indépendance financière, structurée par différentes étapes (fin des études, insertion professionnelle, décohabitation parentale) et aboutissant à la formation d'un nouveau ménage assurant sa propre subsistance (Galland 2008 ; Castell et Grobon 2020).

2 L'idée de « familialisation » est définie par Van de Velde de la manière suivante : « en l'absence d'un investissement proactif de l'État, l'augmentation de la pression financière sur les jeunes adultes – liée à la fois aux prix du logement, au financement du temps des études ou aux difficultés d'entrée sur le marché du travail – s'est traduite par une mobilisation accrue du soutien parental tout au long des parcours (Van de Velde 2019). A contrario, la « défamilialisation » se caractérise par l'attribution, par l'État social, de droits individuels (se traduisant par des aides matérielles) aux jeunes tout au long de leur parcours de formation et d'insertion professionnelle.

3 La vulnérabilité économique est considérée dans cet article comme une situation, un état ou un processus marqués par une insuffisance des ressources économiques (Spini et al. 2017) et non comme une caractéristique du jeune. Néanmoins, pour ne pas alourdir le texte, nous utiliserons par la suite la qualification de « jeunes vulnérables économiquement » en lieu et place de celle de « jeunes qui sont dans une situation de vulnérabilité économique ».

Les deux premières sections de cet article procèdent à une revue de la littérature sur la solidarité familiale et amicale et précisent le contenu de la contribution apportée ainsi que les hypothèses soumises à confirmation. La troisième section présente le questionnaire en ligne utilisé et explicite la façon dont les différents indicateurs ont été construits. La quatrième section, quant à elle, expose les résultats et, en particulier, un test empirique des trois hypothèses formulées dans la section précédente. La dernière section, enfin, synthétise les principaux résultats, discute leurs implications et dégage des pistes pour les recherches à venir.

2 L'aide reçue et ses déterminants

L'étude de la solidarité familiale et de ses déterminants est un classique de la sociologie de la famille. La littérature quantitative à ce sujet est importante et a développé différentes approches : des analyses de la solidarité familiale ont été effectuées en fonction des caractéristiques des receveurs et des donneurs, de la qualité des relations entre eux et du contexte social et culturel au sein duquel les aides familiales ont lieu. Dans notre revue de la littérature, nous allons nous intéresser aux caractéristiques des receveurs et des donneurs avec un intérêt particulier pour l'aide reçue par les jeunes.

La littérature sur les caractéristiques des donneurs se centre sur l'aide financière et met principalement en évidence une logique des ressources. Le niveau d'aide financière reçu est lié au niveau des ressources économiques des donneurs. L'aide financière familiale est donc plus importante au sein des familles aisées qu'au sein des familles pauvres. Ce résultat qui a été montré à de multiples reprises dans la littérature (Déchaux 1994b ; Paugam et Zoyem 1997 ; Renaut 2003 ; Schoeni et Ross 2005 ; Déchaux et Herpin 2006 ; Whightman et al. 2012 ; Portela et Raynaud 2019) a pour conséquence l'accentuation des inégalités sociales. Ainsi, contrairement à l'aide étatique, l'aide familiale n'a pas un effet redistributif sur les inégalités sociales (Déchaux et Herpin 2006). Elle a en revanche un effet redistributif sur les inégalités entre générations : la solidarité familiale qui est principalement descendante[4], a un effet de redistribution des ressources des générations les plus âgées (qui sont en moyennes mieux dotées en ressources) vers les générations les plus jeunes (Déchaux et Herpin 2006). Cette hypothèse du « lissage du cycle de vie » (Portela et Raynaud 2019) par les ressources familiales a notamment été vérifiée en ce qui concerne l'aide financière reçue par les jeunes. Nous pouvons retenir deux éléments importants à ce stade. D'une part, les dépenses des parents pour leurs enfants adultes augmentent avec le niveau de vie du ménage (Portela et Raynaud 2019). D'autre part, et même s'ils aident moins souvent et avec un montant plus faible (65 % des

4 Il convient toutefois ici de rappeler que les jeunes peuvent aussi dans certains cas soutenir leurs parents et leurs germains par leurs ressources économiques ou soutiens pratiques comme l'ont montré par exemple les travaux récents de Faure et le Dantec (2019).

enfants de cadres et professions libérales sont aidés par leurs parents contre 48 % des enfants d'ouvriers), la part de l'aide apportée aux enfants dans les dépenses des parents de ménage modeste est néanmoins plus forte (Portela et Raynaud 2019).

Du côté du rôle des caractéristiques des receveurs dans l'aide reçue, la littérature confirme que les jeunes constituent la classe d'âge, avec les personnes âgées, qui reçoit le plus d'aides[5] (Déchaux 2007). Les recherches quantitatives à ce propos montrent qu'il y a une adaptation de l'aide familiale à la situation et aux besoins des jeunes (Le Pape et al. 2020). Cette adaptation s'explique de plusieurs façons. Tout d'abord par un effet du cycle de vie : l'aide pratique et financière que les jeunes reçoivent de la part de leurs parents diminue avec la progression de l'âge et se concentre principalement au moment des études (Portela et Raynaud 2019). Avec la progression de l'âge, les jeunes deviennent de plus en plus indépendants économiquement et ont de moins en moins besoin de l'aide pratique et financière parentale. Ensuite, par un effet de l'activité : l'aide pratique et financière reçue par les jeunes est plus fréquente parmi ceux qui sont en formation ou inactifs que parmi ceux qui sont en emploi (Portela et Raynaud 2019). Ceci est bien entendu lié à la dépendance économique plus importante des jeunes inactifs et des jeunes en formation. A cet égard, on constate, du côté des étudiants, que l'aide financière parentale diminue lorsque le revenu du travail de ces derniers augmente. Cette aide s'avère également croissante lorsque les étudiants décohabitent par rapport à ceux qui restent vivre avec leurs parents (Portela et Raynaud 2019).

La littérature quantitative sur les aides données et reçues s'est principalement cantonnée à l'aide familiale. Si ce choix est compréhensible, la famille constituant la principale source de protection rapprochée (Castel 1995), les amis sont toutefois également une source d'aide importante, en particulier pour les jeunes qui sont dans des situations économiques difficiles (Fol 2010 ; Laé et Murard 2012). Lorsque les ressources économiques au sein de la famille sont limitées, d'autres ressources d'ajustement s'avèrent nécessaires. Celles des amis prennent une place non négligeable, notamment auprès des jeunes vulnérables comme nous l'avons démontré qualitativement (Poglia Mileti et al. 2014 ; Plomb et Poglia 2015 ; Plomb 2018). Ces ressources d'ajustement prennent une importance toute particulière en Suisse où la familialisation des jeunes durant leur parcours d'insertion, symbolisée par l'obligation alimentaire des parents jusqu'à 25 ans, donne peu de prise à ces derniers sur des droits individuels[6].

Une autre lacune de la littérature quantitative sur les aides reçues tient au manque de prise en compte de la situation économique du receveur au fil du temps. Nous partons du postulat que les aides reçues par la famille et les amis constituent des variables d'ajustement aux autres sources de production de ressources et de

5 Alors que les jeunes reçoivent plus d'aide pratique et financière, les personnes âgées reçoivent uniquement plus d'aide pratique.

6 Comme c'est le cas en particulier dans les pays scandinaves (voir sur ce point les travaux de Van de Velde 2008a et 2008b).

réponse aux besoins (notamment les aides étatiques et les revenus du travail). Ces aides revêtent donc une certaine plasticité qui dépend de la situation et des besoins des jeunes selon les étapes de leur trajectoire. Nous partons de l'hypothèse que les aides familiales s'adaptent à la situation des jeunes (ajustement selon l'activité et le degré de vulnérabilité) alors que les aides des amis s'adaptent au niveau donné de leurs ressources économiques (ajustement selon la vulnérabilité uniquement).

L'objectif de cet article est d'apporter une contribution empirique sur ces deux points en analysant le rôle de la vulnérabilité économique sur l'aide que reçoivent les jeunes de la part de leur famille et de leurs amis. Le terme de vulnérabilité, comme cela a été montré à de multiples reprises (Thomas 2010 ; Becquet 2012) tout en ayant une valeur heuristique certaine en sociologie de la jeunesse, revêt un caractère polysémique qui peut être problématique dans son opérationnalisation (Mellini et al. 2019). Signifiant à la fois un processus et un état, il s'agit d'en clarifier la portée pour cette enquête quantitative. En suivant en cela Spini et al. (Spini et al. 2017), nous reprenons l'idée selon laquelle la vulnérabilité est fortement adossée aux parcours de vie. Il s'agit ainsi d'un « processus d'affaiblissement et d'un manque de ressources dans un ou plusieurs domaines de la vie qui, dans des contextes spécifiques, expose les individus ou les groupes (1) à des conséquences négatives liées à des sources de stress, (2) à une incapacité à faire face aux facteurs de stress de façon effective, et (3) à une incapacité à se remettre des facteurs de stress ou à tirer parti des opportunités offertes à une échéance donnée » (Spini et al. 2017; cité par Mellini et al. 2019). Dans le cadre de cet article, nous nous intéressons plus spécifiquement à l'instabilité des ressources économiques qui découle des trajectoires – souvent non-linéaires – de transition des jeunes entre leur famille d'origine et l'établissement d'un ménage propre et indépendant. Les jeunes font face à cette instabilité en cherchant des modes de provisionnement, parfois au coup par coup, comme c'est le cas chez les plus vulnérables.

Les aides reçues par les jeunes, comme nous l'avons montré par ailleurs (Poglia Mileti et al. 2014 ; Plomb et Poglia Mileti 2015), sont à considérer dans un système de relations et une temporalité dynamique ainsi que dans leurs différents marquages sociaux (Zelizer 2005). Elles peuvent s'exercer sous le signe du don entre générations (cadeaux, transmission d'objets), sous forme de prêts conditionnels (en échange d'un investissement dans une formation, d'une participation aux tâches domestiques, etc.) ou de prêts dont l'échéance du remboursement est plus indéterminée que pour ceux des instituts financiers ; ou encore de manière moins visible par la mutualisation des ressources (repas, linge, mobilité, etc.) (Schwartz 2012 ; Scalambrin et al. 2019). Ces aides s'inscrivent alors soit dans des trajectoires stables et construites sur un horizon temporel préétabli par leur inscription dans une formation (apprentissage, études), soit dans les entre-deux des « yoyo transitions » (Biggart et Walther 2005 ; Plomb et Poglia Mileti 2015) des jeunes hors système de formation.

3 Hypothèses

Les résultats sur l'effet du cycle de vie mettent en évidence qu'avec la progression de l'âge, la fréquence de l'aide reçue de la part de la famille diminue car les jeunes deviennent de plus en plus indépendants économiquement et ont de moins en moins besoin d'une aide financière ou pratique (Portela et Raynaud 2019). Ces résultats, valables pour la population des jeunes en général, ne nous semblent pas forcément valables pour les jeunes en situation de vulnérabilité économique. En effet, l'avancement en âge se caractérise par un double processus : d'une part les ressources économiques des jeunes augmentent avec l'accès à l'indépendance économique via l'insertion professionnelle et les revenus du travail ; mais d'autre part, les dépenses ont également tendance à augmenter avec l'autodéfinition des besoins, l'augmentation des sphères d'autonomie et la décohabitation partielle ou totale (Plomb et Poglia Mileti 2015). Si pour les jeunes non-vulnérables économiquement, l'augmentation des ressources économiques est plus importante que celle des dépenses, il n'est pas sûr qu'il en soit de même pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement. Ces différences dans l'accès à l'indépendance économique selon le degré de vulnérabilité doivent se refléter au niveau de la durabilité de l'aide reçue.

> *Hypothèse : les aides reçues suivent des trajectoires temporelles différentes selon la vulnérabilité économique.*

Il est donc possible de faire l'hypothèse que les aides reçues suivent des trajectoires temporelles différentes selon le degré de vulnérabilité économique : pour les jeunes non-vulnérables économiquement, l'aide familiale se déploie de manière plus importante durant la période des études et des premières expériences professionnelles – période durant laquelle le volume d'aide reste à un haut niveau aussi bien du point de vue l'aide financière que de l'aide pratique. Sa fréquence diminue toutefois au fur et à mesure que les jeunes deviennent plus indépendants économiquement. Pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement, étant donné leur accès problématique à l'indépendance économique, nous formulons l'hypothèse selon laquelle l'aide parentale est plus durable, et ce, à la fois pour l'aide pratique et financière. Cette hypothèse sur le processus d'indépendantisation problématique des jeunes vulnérables par rapport à leur famille et leurs amis va être étudiée sous trois angles différents, chacun donnant lieu à une hypothèse séparée.

> H1 : La proportion de jeunes recevant une aide financière et matérielle de la part de leur famille et de leurs amis ne diminue pas en fonction de l'âge pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement, contrairement à leurs homologues qui ne sont pas dans une situation de vulnérabilité économique.
> H2 : Parmi les jeunes recevant une aide financière et matérielle de la part de leur famille et de leurs amis, la fréquence de l'aide reçue ne diminue pas en fonction

de l'âge pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement, contrairement à leurs homologues qui ne sont pas dans une situation de vulnérabilité économique.
H3 : Parmi les jeunes recevant une aide financière et matérielle de la part de leur famille et de leurs amis, la nécessité de l'aide reçue ne diminue pas en fonction de l'âge pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement, contrairement à leurs homologues qui ne sont pas dans une situation de vulnérabilité économique.

Ces trois hypothèses explorent différentes facettes du processus d'indépendantisation financière et matérielle des jeunes. Celui-ci peut effectivement se manifester par la cessation du recours à l'aide des parents et des amis, mais également par une diminution de sa fréquence et de sa nécessité.

4 Méthode

4.1 Questionnaire en ligne et échantillon

Les données analysées dans le cadre de cet article sont issues d'une enquête sur les pratiques économiques des jeunes. Un questionnaire en ligne d'une durée de 15 minutes environ a été envoyé à un échantillon représentatif de 1500 jeunes adultes de 18 à 29 ans de toute la Suisse[7] par l'institut de sondage LINK[8]. Ce questionnaire était composé de trois parties : une première partie visait à identifier la situation des jeunes avec des questions portant sur leur activité principale, une seconde partie visait à obtenir des informations à la fois sur l'aide donnée et reçue au sein des sphères familiales et amicales et la troisième explorait le thème de la reconnaissance au sein des différentes sphères d'échanges économiques. Dans cet article, nous nous concentrerons uniquement sur les questions permettant d'apporter un éclairage empirique aux hypothèses exposées à la section précédente.

L'échantillon a été sélectionné de façon aléatoire selon une structure représentative de sexe et de région à partir du pool de panélistes de LINK comprenant plus de 100 000 participants. Afin de pouvoir disposer d'effectifs plus consistants au sein des différentes régions linguistiques, les régions de la Suisse romande et du Tessin ont été surreprésentées. La taille de l'échantillon (N = 1528) ainsi que sa structure par sexe et région est présentée dans le tableau ci-dessous (tableau 1).

7 L'âge et le lieu de résidence sont donc les deux critères de participation à l'enquête. L'univers de référence de l'enquête est constitué par la population des 18–29 ans résidant en Suisse. La borne inférieure de cette classe d'âge se justifie par le fait qu'il était nécessaire que les personnes soient majeures pour participer à l'enquête. La borne supérieure a été choisie afin de garantir un échantillon d'environ 1500 jeunes. La tranche d'âge retenue (18–29) correspond également à celle de nombreuses études internationales sur les jeunes vulnérables (Eurofound 2012).

8 L'enquête en ligne s'est déroulée entre le 18 mai et le 19 juin 2020. Il est à noter que, de par sa nature électronique, la production des données n'a pas été entravée par la pandémie de la COVID-19.

Tableau 1 Structure de l'échantillon

	Hommes		Femmes		Total	
Suisse alémanique	500	(32.7 %)	485	(31.7 %)	985	(64.4 %)
Suisse romande	201	(13.2 %)	208	(13.6 %)	409	(26.8 %)
Tessin	64	(4.2 %)	79	(4.6 %)	134	(8.8 %)
Total	765	(50.1 %)	763	(49.9 %)	1528	(100 %)

L'échantillon final est constitué des 1401 jeunes avec des données complètes pour toutes les variables incluses dans les analyses. Les jeunes pour lesquels les données étaient incomplètes sur les variables d'analyses ont été exclus de l'échantillon final.

4.2 Mesures et opérationnalisation

4.2.1 Opérationnalisation de l'aide reçue

Deux types d'aide reçue par les jeunes ont été distingués : l'aide pratique et l'aide financière. Cette différenciation de l'aide reçue selon la nature de ce qui est donné est classique dans la littérature sur la solidarité familiale (Déchaux 1994a) : l'aide apportée peut consister en de l'argent remis (aide financière) ou en des services pratiques/matériels fournis (aide pratique). Les services relationnels (aide relationnelle) n'ont pas été inclus dans l'enquête pour deux raisons : d'une part, nous avons fait l'hypothèse qu'ils étaient d'un moindre intérêt par rapport à la problématique de la vulnérabilité économique ; d'autre part, la place était limitée au sein du questionnaire en ligne dont la durée ne devait pas excéder 15 minutes en moyenne. Ces deux types d'aide ont été distingués pour l'aide reçue de la famille et des amis, ce qui donne quatre items sur l'aide reçue. La proportion de jeunes ayant reçu ces différents types d'aide est présentée dans le tableau 2[9]. Que ce soit pour l'aide pratique ou l'aide financière, il y a moins de jeunes recevant de l'aide de la part des amis que de la famille.

Pour chaque type d'aide reçue, une question a été posée pour identifier la personne ayant apporté l'aide en question le plus fréquemment au sein de la famille et des amis (cf. à la liste des items utilisés disponibles en annexe). Les résultats à ce sujet (cf. tableau 2) montrent sans surprise que ce sont majoritairement les parents qui sont les personnes fournissant le plus fréquemment une aide pratique (91 % des cas) ou financière (86 % des cas) au sein de la famille. Ces résultats justifient que, par la suite, dans l'interprétation des résultats des modèles de régression, l'aide familiale soit parfois assimilée à l'aide parentale.

Pour chaque type d'aide reçue, la fréquence a été aussi mesurée à l'aide d'une question permettant de distinguer entre une aide journalière, hebdomadaire, mensuelle ou annuelle (cf. la liste des items utilisés disponibles en annexe). Les résultats

9 Pour chaque type d'aide, il a été précisé qu'il fallait prendre en considération l'ensemble des aides reçues au cours des 12 derniers mois. La liste des items opérationnalisant l'aide reçue est disponible en annexe.

du tableau 2 à ce propos mettent en évidence que c'est l'aide pratique de la famille qui est la plus fréquente (elle est journalière pour 30 % des jeunes), suivie par l'aide financière (qui est journalière pour 6,3 % des jeunes), l'aide pratique amicale (4,3 %) et enfin l'aide financière amicale (2 %).

Enfin, pour chaque type d'aide reçue, la finalité de l'aide a été appréhendée par une question sur l'évaluation subjective du degré de nécessité de l'aide reçue[10]. Une mesure dichotomique a été choisie permettant de séparer les jeunes évaluant que l'aide reçue satisfaisait un besoin de première nécessité, de ceux considérant que ce n'est pas le cas[11]. La fréquence de cette évaluation est présentée dans le tableau 2. Que ce soit pour l'aide pratique ou l'aide financière, l'aide reçue de la part des amis est considérée comme moins nécessaire que celle provenant de la famille[12].

Tableau 2 Distribution des jeunes sur les aides reçues et leurs caractéristiques (N = 1401)

Types d'aide reçue	Pourcentage de jeunes ayant reçu l'aide en question	Pourcentage de l'aide provenant des parents	Pourcentage de l'aide ayant une fréquence journalière	Pourcentage de jeunes considérant l'aide reçue comme étant de première nécessité
Aide pratique de la famille	67.3 % (N = 943)	91.0 % (N = 858)	29.9 % (N = 282)	82.6 % (N = 779)
Aide financière de la famille	39.4 % (N = 552)	86.4 % (N = 477)	6.3 % (N = 35)	76.8 % (N = 424)
Aide pratique des amis	26.6 % (N = 373)	–	4.3 % (N = 16)	56.6 % (N = 211)
Aide financière des amis	3.5 % (N = 49)	–	2.0 % (N = 1)	57.1 % (N = 28)

4.2.2 Opérationnalisation de la vulnérabilité économique et des autres variables explicatives

Etant donné la multiplicité des situations économiques des jeunes et la difficulté de quantifier les ressources économiques en leur possession (Portela et Raynaud 2019 ; Castell et Grobon 2020), il a été décidé de ne pas se limiter à des mesures monétaires pour étudier leur vulnérabilité économique, mais de prendre également en considération des indicateurs non-monétaires (Nolan et Whelan 2011). L'idée est de proposer un indicateur qui synthétise différentes dimensions de la situation économique des jeunes afin de pouvoir identifier ceux dont la situation est marquée par un déficit de ressources économiques, c'est-à-dire les jeunes vulnérables économiquement. Comme il n'existe pas, à notre connaissance, d'indicateur de vulnérabilité économique

10 Etant donné le caractère subjectif de cette mesure, elle sera désignée dans la suite du texte par le terme de finalité subjective de l'aide reçue.

11 L'item original sur la nécessité de l'aide reçue possédait quatre modalités de réponse : « tout à fait », « plutôt oui », « plutôt non », « pas du tout ». Il a été recodé en une variable dichotomique (oui-non) pour des raisons de commodité d'analyse.

12 Il est à noter que, en raison à la fois de la quantité élevée de valeurs manquantes, de problèmes d'estimation de la part des interviewés et de difficultés d'opérationnalisation, le montant de l'aide financière n'a pas été retenu dans nos analyses.

spécifique pour la population des jeunes dans la littérature, notre proposition a un caractère exploratoire. Celle-ci s'inspire de l'indicateur de vulnérabilité économique proposé par Nolan et Whelan (2011) mais en le modifiant de façon importante, à la fois pour adapter l'indicateur à la population des jeunes mais également au format de notre questionnaire en ligne. L'indicateur de vulnérabilité économique proposé par Nolan et Whelan se base sur trois dimensions : le revenu, la privation relative et les difficultés financières. Pour chacune de ces dimensions, des mesures au niveau du ménage ont été proposées : pour le revenu, le seuil de pauvreté relative de 60 % du revenu médian ; pour la privation relative et les difficultés financières, de nombreux items ont été proposés pour mesurer ces dimensions[13].

Le revenu a été inclus dans la construction de notre indicateur de vulnérabilité économique car il permet de renseigner sur le niveau de ressources économiques dont les jeunes disposent, mais il a été mesuré au niveau individuel et non au niveau du ménage[14]. Comme il était très difficile d'avoir une mesure précise des revenus des jeunes (étant donné la multiplicité des sources de leur revenu et la difficulté de les quantifier de façon précise), il n'a pas été possible d'utiliser le seuil monétaire de pauvreté relative. Une mesure très rudimentaire des revenus a été utilisée qui sépare dans la mesure du possible la distribution des revenus des jeunes en deux : les faibles revenus et les revenus élevés, pour les trois types d'activité principale, à savoir la formation/le stage, l'emploi et l'inactivité[15]. Le recours à une mesure discrète des revenus (par l'utilisation de catégories de revenu prédéfinies) implique qu'il n'a pas toujours été possible de séparer la distribution en deux groupes de taille équivalente et que les faibles revenus sont numériquement plus importants que les revenus élevés.

La privation relative et les difficultés financières ont également été incluses dans la construction de notre indicateur car ils permettent de compléter le revenu en donnant des renseignements sur la difficulté d'accès à certains biens et services, l'évaluation subjective de la situation financière et le rapport entre ressources financières et dépenses[16]. Étant donné la place limitée dans notre questionnaire, il n'a pas été possible de reprendre les différents items utilisés pour mesurer la privation relative dans le domaine de la consommation proposés par Nolan et Whelan (2011). À la place, une question globale sur la privation matérielle[17] a été utilisée et

13 Se référer à Nolan et Whelan (2011) pour en avoir la liste détaillée.

14 Le design de notre enquête ne nous permettait pas d'avoir des informations au niveau du ménage.

15 Les questions sur le revenu étaient différentes selon la situation du jeune (emploi, formation, inactivité). Pour les jeunes ayant une activité salariée (en apprentissage, en stage ou en emploi), la question portait sur leur salaire mensuel total net. Pour les jeunes inactifs ou en formation, la question portait sur le montant global à disposition en moyenne chaque mois après avoir payé les charges fixes. Étant donné le problème de comparabilité entre ces deux situations, la mesure dichotomique (bas/haut revenu) a été calculée de façon séparée pour les deux groupes et ensuite les bas revenus et les hauts revenus de chaque groupe ont été regroupés ensemble.

16 Comme pour le revenu et pour les mêmes raisons, la privation relative et les difficultés financières ont été mesurées au niveau individuel et non au niveau du ménage.

17 La question sur la privation matérielle visait à déterminer l'intensité de la privation dans la consommation avec une échelle en 11 points (de 0 « pas du tout » à 10 « totalement »). Cette

complétée par une question sur les raisons pour lesquelles celle-ci avait lieu. Deux conditions doivent donc être remplies pour qu'il y ait privation : une restriction dans la consommation en général et que cette restriction soit motivée par des raisons monétaires. Cette solution est certes critiquable, car elle ne permet par exemple pas de distinguer la privation élémentaire (pour les biens de première nécessité) de la privation secondaire (pour les biens qui ne sont pas de première nécessité) mais elle reste néanmoins cohérente dans la mesure où elle est corrélée de façon satisfaisante avec les autres dimensions de l'indicateur (cf. tableau 4). Les difficultés économiques ont été mesurées par deux items, une échelle subjective de la satisfaction avec la situation financière (Diener et al. 1999) et un item renseignant sur l'endettement[18].

Pour chacune des dimensions précitées, une variable dichotomique a été créée. La fréquence de ces différentes caractéristiques est présentée dans le tableau 3. Ensuite, une analyse des correspondances multiples (ACM) a été réalisée avec ces quatre variables dichotomiques. Les trois premiers vecteurs propres de cette ACM, qui expliquent plus de 70 % de l'inertie, ont été sélectionnés pour une classification automatique hiérarchique (CAH). Selon le dendrogramme de cette CAH, la solution en trois groupes semble être la meilleure[19]. Pour des raisons de faibles effectifs, les deux groupes avec les plus petits effectifs ont néanmoins été regroupés.

Les deux groupes distingués par la procédure statistique susmentionnée se distinguent fortement quant à leurs situations économiques (cf. le tableau 5 ci-dessous). Le premier groupe, les non-vulnérables économiquement (N = 1046), se caractérise par une absence de privation matérielle, une absence d'endettement, un faible taux d'insatisfaction avec la situation financière et une proportion équilibrée de personnes avec des revenus élevé et bas. Le deuxième groupe, les vulnérables économiquement (N = 355), se caractérise par une forte privation matérielle, une proportion importante de jeunes insatisfaits avec leur situation financière, une proportion non négligeable de personnes endettées et une forte proportion de personnes avec des bas revenus. Les deux groupes se distinguent également quant à la proportion de jeunes inactifs et de jeunes sans formation post-obligatoire en leur sein : la proportion d'inactifs est deux fois plus élevée parmi les jeunes vulnérables économiquement que parmi les jeunes non-vulnérables et la proportion de jeunes sans formation post-obligatoire est quatre fois plus élevée parmi les jeunes vulnérables économiquement.

En plus de l'indicateur de vulnérabilité économique, d'autres variables ont été sélectionnées comme variables explicatives de l'aide reçue ou comme variables de contrôle. Tout d'abord, étant donné l'importance des ressources des donneurs dans

échelle en 11 points a ensuite été recodée en une variable dichotomique en découpant l'échelle en deux parties égales.

18 L'item utilisé est un indicateur classique d'évaluation des revenus et des dépenses qu'on retrouve notamment dans l'enquête du Panel Suisse de ménages (PSM) et dans l'enquête sur les revenus et les conditions de vie (SILC).

19 Pour une présentation de cette méthode statistique utilisant conjointement l'ACM et la CAH, consulter Lebart et al. (2006).

Tableau 3 Pourcentage de jeunes sur les différentes dimensions de la vulnérabilité économique (N = 1401)

Dimensions de la vulnérabilité économique	Pourcentage de jeunes possédant cette caractéristique	
Bas revenu	56.5 %	(N = 791)
Endettement	4.1 %	(N = 57)
Insatisfaction financière	49.3 %	(N = 691)
Privation	23.6 %	(N = 331)

Tableau 4 Corrélations de Pearson entre les différentes dimensions de la vulnérabilité économique (N = 1401)

	Bas revenu	Endettement	Insatisfaction financière	Privation
Bas revenu	–	0.11**	0.27**	0.17**
Endettement		–	0.19**	0.17**
Insatisfaction financière			–	0.32**
Privation				–

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Tableau 5 Caractéristiques des groupes de vulnérabilité économique (N = 1401)

	Score Privation	Score Bas revenu	Score Insatisfaction financière	Score endettement	Score inactif	Score sans formation post-obligatoire*
Pas vulnérable économiquement (N = 1046)	0 %	51 %	39 %	0 %	5 %	1.5 %
Vulnérable économiquement (N = 355)	93 %	72 %	79 %	16 %	14 %	6.2 %

*Les jeunes en cours de formation n'ont pas été inclus pour déterminer ce score.

la littérature sur la solidarité familiale, un certain nombre de variables opérationnalisant l'origine sociale ont été sélectionnées : le niveau de formation le plus élevé des parents (regroupé en trois niveaux : primaire, secondaire et tertiaire), l'activité des parents (variable dichotomique pour le père et la mère distinguant les parents actifs des inactifs) et les problèmes financiers des parents[20] (mesure dichotomique

20 L'origine sociale n'est pas au cœur de nos analyses et constitue plutôt une variable de contrôle, d'où les mesures assez rudimentaires que nous avons employées pour son opérationnalisation. Une autre enquête avec des informations plus détaillées sur la situation des parents serait nécessaire pour pouvoir analyser de façon approfondie le rôle de l'origine sociale sur les aides familiales reçues.

oui-non). Ensuite, en suivant en cela la littérature mettant en évidence les variables susceptibles d'influencer l'aide reçue, nous avons intégré, comme variables explicatives, la cohabitation (mesure dichotomique distinguant les jeunes vivant avec leurs parents de ceux qui ne vivent plus avec eux) et l'activité du jeune (regroupé en trois catégories : la formation/le stage ; l'emploi et l'inactivité). Enfin, le genre, l'âge et la région linguistique de résidence ont été inclus comme variables de contrôle.

5 Résultats

Cette section est structurée en trois parties dont chacune est dédiée à la confirmation ou à l'infirmation d'une des trois hypothèses formulées précédemment. Tandis que dans la première partie, nous présentons les déterminants des aides reçues par la famille et les amis suivant leur degré de vulnérabilité économique (H1), nous analysons dans la seconde, la fréquence de l'aide reçue en fonction de celui-ci (H2). Dans la troisième partie, enfin, nous abordons la question de la finalité subjective de l'aide reçue suivant le degré de la vulnérabilité économique des jeunes considérés (H3).

5.1 Aide reçue et vulnérabilité économique

Les résultats du tableau 6 et des graphiques 1 à 3 sont présentés dans cette section. Pour tester notre première hypothèse, nous exposons d'abord les résultats des modèles de régressions logistiques sans effets d'interaction, puis ceux-ci sont discutés de façon approfondie dans la mesure où ils permettent de déterminer si les aides reçues suivent des trajectoires temporelles différentes selon le degré de vulnérabilité économique des jeunes.

Quatre types d'aide reçue ont été investigués : l'aide pratique reçue des parents et des amis ainsi que l'aide financière reçue de ceux-ci. Pour chaque type d'aide, un modèle de régression logistique modélisant les chances de recevoir l'aide en question a été élaboré. Pour chaque modèle de régression, trois types de déterminants ont été intégrés : ceux liés aux caractéristiques du receveur, ceux liés aux caractéristiques du donneur et enfin ceux liés au contexte culturel du receveur et du donneur.

Concernant les déterminants liés aux caractéristiques du receveur, trois résultats sont à relever. Tout d'abord, un effet de l'âge a été constaté. Conformément aux résultats de la littérature (Portela et Raynaud 2019), les quatre types d'aide étudiés tendent à diminuer avec la progression de l'âge. Selon les modèles de régression logistique présentés au tableau 6, l'aide reçue des jeunes diminue de 7–13 % (selon le type d'aide reçue) à mesure que l'avancement en âge progresse d'une année. Cela peut s'interpréter par l'indépendance progressive des jeunes avec l'avancement en âge rendant l'aide de la famille et des amis de moins en moins nécessaire[21]. Ensuite,

21 Ce résultat, valable pour les jeunes en général, ne se vérifie néanmoins pas pour toutes les catégories de jeunes comme on le verra par la suite avec la discussion des effets d'interaction.

un effet de l'activité a été observé. L'aide reçue de la famille (qu'elle soit pratique ou financière) est plus fréquente pour les jeunes en formation/en stage et inactifs que pour les jeunes en emploi. Les différences sont particulièrement fortes sur le plan de l'aide pratique reçue de la famille qui est six fois plus fréquente parmi les jeunes en formation que parmi ceux en emploi. Ce résultat peut s'expliquer par l'ajustement de l'aide familiale à la situation du jeune : les jeunes en formation et les jeunes inactifs sont considérés comme ayant plus besoin d'aide que les jeunes en emploi. En revanche, l'aide reçue des amis (qu'elle soit pratique ou financière) ne dépend pas de l'activité du jeune, ce qui suggère qu'elle est moins sensible à la situation scolaire et professionnelle du jeune récipiendaire que l'aide familiale. Enfin, il y a un effet de la vulnérabilité économique. Mise à part l'aide pratique reçue des amis, les aides reçues sont plus fréquentes parmi les jeunes vulnérables économiquement que parmi les jeunes non-vulnérables. C'est particulièrement le cas pour l'aide financière reçue des amis qui est trois fois plus fréquente parmi ceux qui sont vulnérables économiquement. Ces résultats peuvent à nouveau s'expliquer par l'ajustement de l'aide à la situation du jeune : les jeunes vulnérables économiquement sont considérés comme ayant plus besoin d'aide que les jeunes non-vulnérables. Cette interprétation ne permet néanmoins pas de comprendre pourquoi, à la différence de l'aide familiale, l'aide amicale s'ajuste plutôt en fonction de la vulnérabilité économique que de l'activité. Pour rendre compte de cette différence, il est possible de faire l'hypothèse que, de façon générale, la famille est plus sensible aux besoins du jeune que ne le sont les amis (ce qui explique que l'aide reçue de la famille varie selon l'activité et le degré de vulnérabilité économiques du jeune) mais que les jeunes vulnérables économiquement demandent plus d'aide à leurs amis que ne le font les jeunes en formation et les jeunes inactifs. En effet, toutes choses égales d'ailleurs, la fréquence de l'aide reçue dépend à la fois de la propension à donner du pourvoyeur d'aide et de la mobilisation de l'aide par le receveur. Cette hypothèse reste toutefois à être étayée empiriquement.

En ce qui concerne les déterminants liés aux caractéristiques des donneurs, seules certaines caractéristiques de la famille (et plus particulièrement des parents) sont connues, d'où le choix de nous concentrer, dans ce paragraphe, sur l'aide reçue de la part de la famille (qu'elle soit pratique ou financière). Deux résultats sont à relever sur ce point. Premièrement, l'aide reçue de la famille provient principalement des parents et plus leur niveau de formation est bas, moins l'aide pratique et financière reçue par les jeunes de la part de leur famille est fréquente[22]. Ce résultat est conforme à la logique des ressources mise en évidence dans la littérature (Paugam et Zoyem 1997 ; Renaut 2003 ; Portela et Raynaud 2019) : plus les parents sont dotés en capital culturel (et économique[23]) et plus ils vont aider leurs enfants.

22 Comme mentionné précédemment, il faut rappeler ici que l'aide reçue de la famille provient principalement des parents (cf résultats présentés dans le tableau 2).

23 N'ayant pas de question renseignant sur le volume de capital économique des parents dans notre questionnaire, nous ne pouvons pas affirmer que la dotation en capital économique des parents

Deuxièmement, il y a un effet de l'activité professionnelle de la mère : les jeunes dont la mère est en emploi reçoivent plus d'aide financière de leur famille que les jeunes dont la mère est inactive.

En ce qui concerne l'effet d'interaction entre l'âge et la vulnérabilité économique, il est à noter que ce dernier est significatif et améliore la qualité de l'ajustement des modèles aux données dans trois cas : pour l'aide pratique et financière reçue de la famille et pour l'aide pratique reçue des amis. Il est non significatif et n'améliore pas la qualité de l'ajustement pour l'aide financière reçue des amis – le faible nombre de jeunes concernés par ce type d'aide (N = 49) expliquant ce résultat non significatif.

Cet effet d'interaction implique que l'effet de l'âge sur l'aide reçue dépend du degré de vulnérabilité économique. Pour décrire de la façon la plus claire et simple possible cet effet d'interaction, la variation selon l'âge des probabilités[24] de recevoir les différents types d'aide a été représentée de façon distincte pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement (en noir) et les jeunes non-vulnérables économiquement (en gris) dans les graphiques 1 à 3 ci-dessous. Il ressort de la lecture de ces graphiques, que l'évolution des probabilités de recevoir une aide selon l'âge suit une trajectoire[25] différente selon le degré de vulnérabilité économique : pour les jeunes non-vulnérables, la probabilité de recevoir une aide diminue de façon nette avec la progression de l'âge pour les trois types d'aide représentés, alors que pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement, cette probabilité reste soit relativement stable, soit diminue de façon beaucoup moins forte (aide financière reçue de la famille).

Ces résultats sur l'interaction entre l'âge et la vulnérabilité sont importants car ils montrent que la diminution de l'aide reçue avec la progression de l'âge n'est pas valable pour toutes les catégories de jeunes. Pour les jeunes non-vulnérables, cette diminution se vérifie, ce qui confirme notre hypothèse suivant laquelle l'aide fournit un support transitoire et dégressif à l'indépendance et l'autonomisation. En revanche, pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement, l'aide reçue est plus durable. Elle ne diminue pas ou peu avec la progression de l'âge. Ce résultat corrobore notre première hypothèse : la proportion de jeunes recevant une aide matérielle ou financière ne diminue pas avec la progression de l'âge pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement, contrairement à leurs homologues qui ne sont pas dans une situation de vulnérabilité économique.

joue un rôle sur l'aide financière et pratique reçue par les jeunes. Néanmoins, étant donné la relation qu'il y a entre le niveau de formation des parents et leur revenu, il est possible de faire l'hypothèse que les deux types de capitaux jouent un rôle.

24 Ce sont les probabilités prédites par les modèles de régression qui sont représentées graphiquement et non les probabilités observées.

25 L'utilisation du terme de trajectoire peut ici prêter à confusion car nous n'analysons pas des données longitudinales. Il a néanmoins été utilisé par commodité de langage pour décrire l'évolution d'une courbe d'un graphique. Le lecteur doit garder à l'esprit que ce ne sont pas les mêmes individus aux différents âges.

Tableau 6 Rapport des chances (odds ratios) de recevoir une aide selon différents déterminants (régression logistique binaire)

	Aide pratique famille (N = 1401)		Aide financière famille (N = 1401)		Aide pratique amis (N = 1401)		Aide financière amis (N = 1401)	
Variables socio-démo								
Femme (réf. homme)	1.41**	1.41**	1.08	1.08	1.13	1.13	0.84	0.84
Âge	0.97	0.93**	0.94*	0.91**	0.94*	0.91**	0.86*	0.86*
Vit avec ses parents (réf. autres)	0.79	0.82	1.16	1.18	1.88***	1.93***	0.88	0.88
Situation du jeune								
En formation ou stage (réf. en emploi)	2.77***	2.74***	6.54***	6.45***	1.18	1.16	0.62	0.62
Inactif (réf. en emploi)	1.72*	1.71*	2.77***	2.72***	1.13	1.11	0.82	0.82
Vulnérable économiquement (réf. non-vulnérable)	1.48**	0.03**	1.51**	0.13*	1.25	0.14*	3.09***	2.87
Origine sociale								
Parents avec problème financier (réf. sans problème financier)	0.80	0.81	0.79	0.80	1.19	1.20	1.04	1.04
Parents avec bas niveau de formation (réf. élevé)	0.57*	0.54**	0.43**	0.41**	0.69	0.66	1.23	1.23
Parents avec niveau de formation moyen (réf. élevé)	0.82	0.81	0.75*	0.74*	0.95	0.94	0.84	0.84
Mère en emploi (réf. autres)	1.10	1.09	1.45**	1.44*	1.12	1.11	1.04	1.04
Père en emploi (réf. autres)	1.06	1.04	1.22	1.20	0.78	0.77	1.02	1.02
Régions								
Romandie (réf. Suisse alémanique)	0.70*	0.72*	1.64**	1.67***	0.66**	0.67**	0.78	0.78
Tessin (réf. Suisse alémanique)	0.99	1.00	1.57*	1.59*	0.49**	0.49**	1.09	1.09
Interaction Âge *Vulnérable économiquement		1.17**		1.11*		1.09*		1.00
Constante	1.36*	2.44**	–0.62	0.18	–0.41	0.32	0.29	0.33
Test du rapport de vraisemblance entre modèles avec et sans effet d'interaction		11.85**		5.30*		4.40*		0.01
Pseudo-R^2 de Nagelkerke	0.13	0.14	0.29	0.29	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure 1 Évolution des probabilités de recevoir une aide pratique de sa famille selon l'âge et la vulnérabilité économique



Figure 2 Évolution des probabilités de recevoir une aide financière de sa famille selon l'âge et la vulnérabilité économique



Figure 3 Évolution des probabilités de recevoir une aide pratique des amis selon l'âge et la vulnérabilité économique



5.2 Fréquence de l'aide reçue et vulnérabilité économique

Les résultats du tableau 7 sont présentés dans cette section. Pour chaque type d'aide précédemment analysé, nous avons élaboré un modèle de régression logistique ordinale modélisant les chances de considérer que celle-ci soit plus fréquente que le seuil de fréquence le plus bas. Nous avons intégré les mêmes types de déterminants que pour les modèles précédents. Par souci de concision, nous commenterons principalement certaines caractéristiques individuelles et l'effet d'interaction entre l'âge et la vulnérabilité économique.

Concernant les déterminants liés aux caractéristiques du receveur, deux résultats sont à relever. Premièrement, un effet de l'âge. La fréquence de l'aide pratique reçue de la famille tend à diminuer avec la progression de l'âge. Ce résultat peut – tout comme la diminution de la proportion de jeunes concernés par les aides familiales – s'interpréter par l'indépendance progressive des jeunes avec l'avancement en âge rendant l'aide de la famille de moins en moins nécessaire. Il est à noter que la fréquence des autres types d'aide ne diminue pas avec la progression de l'âge. Deuxièmement, un effet de l'activité. Les jeunes en formation et les jeunes inactifs reçoivent une aide financière plus fréquente de la part de leur famille que les jeunes en emploi. A nouveau, ce résultat peut s'expliquer par l'ajustement de l'aide familiale à la situation du jeune : les jeunes en formation et les jeunes inactifs sont considérés comme ayant plus besoin d'aide que les jeunes en emploi.

Par rapport aux effets d'interactions entre l'âge et la vulnérabilité économique, il est à noter qu'aucun n'est significatif et qu'aucun n'améliore la qualité de l'ajustement des modèles aux données. Ces résultats infirment donc notre seconde hypothèse. La fréquence des aides reçues ne suit pas des trajectoires temporelles différentes selon la vulnérabilité économique. Cela semble suggérer qu'il existe une forme de solidarité familiale et amicale fondamentale, qui, malgré des degrés variables de réalisations, est indépendante de l'âge et du degré de vulnérabilité économique des jeunes considérés.

5.3 Finalité subjective de l'aide reçue et vulnérabilité économique

Les résultats du tableau 8 et des graphiques 4 à 6 sont présentés dans cette section. Pour chaque type d'aide précédemment analysé, nous avons élaboré un modèle de régression logistique modélisant les chances de considérer que celle-ci satisfasse un besoin de première nécessité. Nous avons intégré les mêmes types de déterminants que pour les modèles précédents. Par souci de concision, nous commenterons principalement certaines caractéristiques individuelles et l'effet d'interaction entre l'âge et la vulnérabilité économique.

Concernant les déterminants liés aux caractéristiques du receveur, deux résultats sont à relever. Premièrement, un effet de l'activité. L'aide financière de la famille est plus souvent considérée comme satisfaisant un besoin de première nécessité parmi les jeunes en formation/en stage et les jeunes inactifs que parmi les

Tableau 7 Rapport des chances (odds ratios) de la fréquence de l'aide reçue selon différents déterminants (régression logistique ordinale)

	Aide pratique famille (N = 943)		Aide financière famille (N = 552)		Aide pratique amis (N = 373)		Aide financière amis (N = 49)	
Variables socio-démo								
Femme (réf. homme)	–0.16	–0.16	0.04	0.05	–0.14	–0.13	–0.90	–1.00
Âge	–0.07**	–0.08**	–0.03	–0.05	–0.06	–0.09	–0.10	–0.25
Vit avec ses parents (réf. autres)	2.46***	2.45***	0.33	0.32	0.30	0.28	–0.46	–0.52
Situation du jeune								
En formation ou stage (réf. en emploi)	0.12	0.12	1.40***	1.37***	0.47	0.45	0.80	1.16
Inactif (réf. en emploi)	0.001	–0.003	1.46***	1.42***	0.63	0.56	2.90*	3.20*
Vulnérable économiquement (réf. non-vulnérable)	0.10	–0.86	–0.13	–1.70	–0.05	–2.10	–0.05	–6.70
Origine sociale								
Parents avec problème financier (réf. sans problème financier)	0.18	0.18	–0.25	–0.25	0.78**	0.80**	–0.15	–0.10
Parents avec bas niveau de formation (réf. élevé)	0.47	0.45	–0.37	–0.37	-0.57	-0.66	–1.80	–1.80
Parents avec niveau de formation moyen (réf. élevé)	0.03	0.03	–0.27	–0.27	-0.13	-0.15	–0.70	–0.70
Mère en emploi (réf. autres)	0.21	0.20	0.22	0.23	-0.19	-0.20	–0.18	0.12
Père en emploi (réf. autres)	0.29	0.29	0.46	0.45	0.04	0.03	1.10	0.58
Régions								
Romandie (réf. Suisse alémanique)	0.10	0.10	–0.30	–0.27	–0.55*	–0.54*	–0.30	–0.74
Tessin (réf. Suisse alémanique)	–0.20	–0.20	0.90**	0.91**	–0.28	–0.24	–0.28	–0.37
		0.04		0.07		0.09		0.29
		0.80		1.25		1.83		1.80
	0.38	0.38	0.18	0.18	0.09	0.10	0.25	0.29

* $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.05$.

jeunes en emploi. Les situations de formation et d'inactivité ne garantissant pas une indépendance financière, les jeunes concernés sont plus dépendants de leur famille, y compris pour la satisfaction des besoins de base. Deuxièmement, un effet de la vulnérabilité économique. Mise à part l'aide financière reçue des amis qui ne concerne qu'un nombre limité de jeunes, les trois autres types d'aide reçue sont plus souvent considérés comme satisfaisant un besoin de première nécessité parmi les jeunes vulnérables économiquement que parmi ceux qui ne le sont pas. C'est notamment le cas de l'aide financière reçue de la famille qui est près de quatre fois plus souvent considérée comme relevant de la première nécessité parmi les jeunes vulnérables.

Par rapport aux effets d'interactions entre l'âge et la vulnérabilité économique, il est à noter que, comme précédemment, ils sont significatifs et améliorent la qualité de l'ajustement des modèles aux données dans trois cas : pour l'aide pratique et financière reçue de la famille et pour l'aide pratique reçue des amis.

Cet effet d'interaction implique que l'effet de l'âge sur le fait de considérer l'aide reçue comme satisfaisant un besoin de première nécessité dépend du degré de vulnérabilité économique. Pour décrire simplement cet effet d'interaction, la variation selon l'âge des probabilités de considérer les différents types d'aide reçue comme satisfaisant un besoin de première nécessité a été représentée de façon distincte pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement (en noir) et les jeunes non-vulnérables économiquement (en gris) dans les graphiques 4 à 6 ci-dessous. La lecture de ces graphiques fait apparaître que l'évolution des probabilités de considérer l'aide reçue comme étant de première nécessité selon l'âge suit une trajectoire différente selon le degré de vulnérabilité économique : pour les jeunes non-vulnérables, cette probabilité diminue de façon nette avec la progression de l'âge pour les trois types d'aide représentés, alors que pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement, cette probabilité soit reste relativement stable (aide pratique reçue de la famille), soit augmente avec l'âge (aide financière reçue de la famille et aide pratique reçue des amis).

Les résultats présentés dans cette section corroborent en partie notre troisième hypothèse. Pour les jeunes non-vulnérables, non seulement l'aide reçue de la famille et des amis diminue avec la progression de l'âge mais en plus, elle est de moins en moins considérée comme étant nécessaire. En revanche, pour les jeunes vulnérables, non seulement l'aide reçue ne diminue pas avec la progression de l'âge mais en plus elle est toujours considérée comme étant autant nécessaire au fil du temps. Il est possible d'en conclure que pour les jeunes non-vulnérables, l'aide parentale et, dans une moindre mesure, l'aide amicale reçue durant la période de préparation à l'indépendance (par exemple durant la formation), est principalement considérée comme étant de première nécessité. Au fur et à mesure que ces jeunes deviennent indépendants, cette aide est toutefois de moins en moins considérée comme nécessaire. Pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement en revanche, l'aide reçue est toujours autant, voire plus, considérée comme étant de première nécessité avec la progression de l'âge.

Tableau 8 Rapport des chances (odds ratios) de considérer l'aide reçue comme étant de première nécessité selon différents déterminants (régression logistique binaire)

	Aide pratique famille (N = 943)		Aide financière famille (N = 552)		Aide pratique amis (N = 373)		Aide financière amis (N = 49)	
Variables socio-démo								
Femme (réf. homme)	1.38	1.38	2.17**	2.20**	1.21	1.24	1.32	1.32
Âge	0.96	0.91*	1.00	0.93	0.97	0.91*	1.12	1.12
Vit avec ses parents (réf. autres)	0.33***	0.34***	0.70	0.73	1.02	1.09	0.63	0.63
Situation du jeune								
En formation ou stage (réf. en emploi)	1.39	1.37	4.72***	4.63***	0.82	0.80	0.88	0.88
Inactif (réf. en emploi)	1.21	1.22	2.60*	2.50*	0.85	0.78	4.72	4.72
Vulnérable économiquement (réf. non-vulnérable)	2.40***	0.02*	3.74***	0.003**	1.98**	0.02*	30.26	30.26
Origine sociale								
Parents avec problème financier (réf. sans problème financier)	1.36	1.36	0.73	0.73	1.76	1.82	4.53	4.53
Parents avec bas niveau de formation (réf. élevé)	1.26	1.19	6.49	7.16	1.55	1.39	4.85	4.85
Parents avec niveau de formation moyen (réf. élevé)	0.86	0.84	0.72	0.73	1.00	0.97	1.97	1.97
Mère en emploi (réf. autres)	1.36	1.35	0.95	0.97	0.84	0.84	0.67	0.67
Père en emploi (réf. autres)	0.77	0.76	0.94	0.88	0.73	0.71	4.11	4.11
Régions								
Romandie (réf. Suisse alémanique)	0.61*	0.63*	0.83	0.87	0.50**	0.50*	1.47	1.47
Tessin (réf. Suisse alémanique)	0.93	0.96	1.30	1.34	0.85	0.90	0.49	0.49
		1.21**		1.34**		1.20*		0.89
	4.12***	5.20***	0.38	2.07	1.28	2.80*	–3.73	–3.73
		6.70*		11.30**		6.60*		0.35
	0.15	0.16	0.25	0.28	0.09	0.12	0.24	0.25

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Figure 4 Évolution des probabilités de considérer l'aide pratique reçue de sa famille comme étant de 1ère nécessité selon l'âge et la vulnérabilité économique



Figure 5 Évolution des probabilités de considérer l'aide financière reçue de sa famille comme étant de 1ère nécessité selon l'âge et la vulnérabilité économique



Figure 6 Évolution des probabilités de considérer l'aide pratique reçue de ses amis comme étant de 1ère nécessité selon l'âge et la vulnérabilité économique



6 Conclusion

La contribution de cet article est double : d'une part, il apporte des résultats quantitatifs sur l'aide amicale reçue parmi les jeunes ; d'autre part, il montre que la vulnérabilité économique a une incidence sur la durabilité de l'aide reçue tant par la famille que les amis.

Premièrement, les analyses de l'aide amicale reçue par les jeunes font apparaître que celle-ci diffère de l'aide familiale sur plusieurs points. Tout d'abord, l'aide amicale est moins fréquente et considérée comme moins nécessaire que l'aide familiale. Une proportion beaucoup moins importante de jeunes reçoit une aide de la part de leurs amis que de leur famille, que ce soit pour une aide financière ou pratique. De plus, lorsqu'elle a lieu, l'aide amicale est moins fréquente et considérée comme moins nécessaire que l'aide familiale. Cette différence est sans doute liée aux normes régulant les rapports au sein de la famille et des amis : l'aide a un caractère plus institutionnalisé et obligatoire (obligation d'entretien, irrévocabilité des rôles familiaux, lien affectif durable, etc.) au sein de la famille que dans la sphère amicale (Honneth 2015). Ensuite, l'aide amicale semble moins sensible à la situation scolaire et professionnelle des jeunes que l'aide familiale. Il y a moins d'adaptation de l'aide reçue selon l'activité principale effectuée par les jeunes (emploi, formation, rupture, etc.). En revanche, l'aide amicale dépend de la vulnérabilité économique du receveur tout comme l'aide familiale. Étant donné le caractère moins formel et obligatoire de l'aide amicale, il est possible de faire l'hypothèse que celle-ci est moins automatique et qu'elle dépend plus de la demande des jeunes que l'aide familiale. Le caractère volontaire de l'aide amicale et sa plus grande dépendance à la demande plaident – et ceci est confirmé par notre recherche qualitative en cours – pour une caractérisation en termes d'appui à la consommation des jeunes et à leurs besoins quotidiennement formulés. Il s'agit d'une demande d'aide qui fait l'objet de négociations explicites. L'aide familiale se situe quant à elle dans une logique de réciprocité davantage formalisée en s'inscrivant dans le registre du droit et, dans certains cas, dans une logique de conditionnalité, variable dans le caractère implicite ou explicite de ses formulations, suivant laquelle l'aide apportée par les parents aux jeunes a pour contrepartie l'activité de ce dernier. À l'instar de l'aide amicale, l'aide apportée au sein de la famille dépend enfin, comme nous le suggérons plus loin, du degré de vulnérabilité économique des jeunes.

En deuxième lieu donc, les analyses sur le rôle de la vulnérabilité ont mis en évidence que les aides reçues suivent des trajectoires temporelles différentes selon le degré de vulnérabilité économique. Pour tous les types d'aide étudiés, l'aide reçue tend à diminuer avec la progression de l'âge pour les jeunes qui ne sont pas vulnérables économiquement alors qu'elle reste relativement stable pour les jeunes vulnérables. Ces différences sont importantes car elles suggèrent que l'aide reçue répond à des logiques différentes selon le degré de vulnérabilité économique. Pour

les jeunes non-vulnérables, l'aide reçue est transitoire, elle diminue avec l'âge et vise principalement à soutenir des projets d'indépendantisation et d'autonomisation. Pour les jeunes vulnérables économiquement, l'aide reçue est plus durable, elle ne diminue pas avec la progression de l'âge et est considérée comme nécessaire sur une période plus longue. Il convient d'ajouter sur ce point que l'aide reçue par les jeunes vulnérables, en s'égrenant sur la durée, sollicite les parents sur une période temporelle étendue dans une forme de dépendance économique qui peut paraître interminable ou « sans fin ». Les parents des ménages modestes auraient donc la charge d'une forme de « jeunesse éternelle », éternellement dépendante.

Des recherches empiriques supplémentaires sont néanmoins nécessaires pour pouvoir valider complètement cette hypothèse d'une logique différente de l'aide reçue selon le degré de vulnérabilité économique. D'une part, pour des raisons d'absence de données ou de données lacunaires, nous n'avons pas pu analyser l'évolution du volume d'aide reçue par les jeunes selon le degré de vulnérabilité, que ce soit pour l'aide pratique ou financière. Nous nous sommes limités à l'évolution de la fréquence de l'aide reçue. D'autre part, l'étude de la finalité de l'aide reçue s'est limitée à la question de savoir si elle satisfaisait un besoin de première nécessité. Il faudrait pouvoir connaître plus précisément à quoi l'aide reçue est destinée et les différences selon le degré de vulnérabilité et l'âge à ce sujet. Enfin, il serait également intéressant de compléter les analyses par une étude de la décohabitation selon l'âge et la vulnérabilité économique mais aussi par une étude de la variation des aides familiales reçues selon certaines caractéristiques des familles, comme la taille de la fratrie et le rang de naissance.

Toutefois, au vu de ces résultats, nous pouvons suggérer, pour terminer, quelques hypothèses à confirmer empiriquement. Comme cela a été montré par ailleurs, l'aide familiale a un effet non-redistributif – contrairement aux aides étatiques – et elle renforce plutôt les inégalités sociales. Ceci étant dit, au-delà du volume des aides familiales reçues, nos données démontrent que la forme de ces aides diffère selon le degré de vulnérabilité économique. Du côté des jeunes non-vulnérables, nous pouvons dire que l'aide est conditionnelle. Elle consiste en un « investissement » ou un « engagement » familial temporaire plus ou moins important selon la formation suivie (moindre en cas d'apprentissage qu'en cas d'études par exemple), en vue d'assurer l'indépendance future des enfants. En ce qui concerne les jeunes vulnérables en revanche, l'aide familiale relève plutôt d'une logique de « mutualisation » des ressources (Schwartz 2012 ; Plomb et Poglia Mileti 2015). L'interdépendance entre les apports des uns et des autres dans la famille s'avère beaucoup plus importante. Il s'agit de « faire face » aux besoins et aux charges au coup par coup. La mutualisation est une réponse rationnelle en condition d'incertitude temporelle sur les ressources à disposition. Les jeunes s'inscrivent ainsi dans le temps dans le réseau d'aide familial. Dans le contexte suisse, où les transferts sociaux en faveur des jeunes sont fortement conditionnés aux activités dans lesquelles ces derniers sont insérés et

non à des droits individuels liés à l'âge, le rôle de la famille dans l'accompagnement vers l'indépendance économique est crucial. En quelque sorte, la décision de son propre retrait dans l'aide aux jeunes lui appartient. Or, ce processus autonome de défamilialisation – porté sur l'émancipation des jeunes telle que le veut la conception moderne de l'individu dans nos démocraties européennes – n'est possible que dans certaines conditions de revenu (ressources économiques des familles) et de ressources sociales externes. La familialisation forte de cette période de vie crée ainsi d'importantes inégalités (Van de Velde 2019). Les formes que prend l'aide familiale mises en évidence dans cet article montrent, d'un côté, un modèle de défamilialisation émancipatrice et progressive typique des classes moyennes et supérieures et, de l'autre un prolongement de la dépendance des jeunes au travers des mécanismes de protection par mutualisation propres aux milieux défavorisés. Ces premiers résultats constituent des pistes de recherche prometteuses afin de comprendre plus finement les inégalités qui découlent du poids laissé aux aides familiales dans le contexte des États-providence européens.

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Annexe : liste des items utilisés pour opérationnaliser l'aide reçue

Tableau A1 Aide pratique et financière reçue de la famille

Variables	Question	Modalités de réponse
Aide pratique reçue de la famille	Avez-vous reçu une aide matérielle (nourriture, vêtements, transports, etc.) ou une aide pratique (p. ex. en recevant des coups de main) de votre famille au cours des douze derniers mois ?	1 / Oui 2 / Non
Personne ayant apportée l'aide pratique dans la famille	Qui au sein de votre famille vous a aidé le plus fréquemment ?	1 / Votre père/votre mère 2 / Votre frère/votre sœur 3 / Votre grand-père/votre grand-mère 4 / Votre oncle/votre tante 5 / Votre cousin/votre cousine 6 / Autre membre de votre famille
Fréquence de l'aide pratique reçue de la famille	A quelle fréquence cette personne de votre famille vous a-t-il/elle aidée ?	1 / Tous les jours ou presque 2 / Toutes les semaines ou presque 3 / Tous les mois ou presque 4 / Moins souvent
Nécessité de l'aide pratique reçue de la famille	Selon vous, l'aide reçue répondait-elle à un besoin de première nécessité ?	1 / Tout à fait 2 / Plutôt oui 3 / Plutôt non 4 / Pas du tout
Aide financière reçue de la famille	Sans tenir compte des cadeaux d'anniversaire ou de Noël, avez-vous reçu de l'argent de la part d'un membre de votre famille de manière régulière ou occasionnelle au cours de ces douze derniers mois ?	1 / Oui 2 / Non
Personne ayant apportée l'aide financière dans la famille	Quel membre de votre famille vous a versé cet argent le plus souvent ? Veuillez sélectionner le membre de votre famille qui vous a aidé financièrement le plus souvent.	1 / Votre père/votre mère 2 / Votre frère/votre sœur 3 / Votre grand-père/votre grand-mère 4 / Votre oncle/votre tante 5 / Votre cousin/votre cousine 6 / Autre membre de votre famille
Fréquence de l'aide financière reçue de la famille	A quelle fréquence cette personne de votre famille vous a-t-il/elle aidée financièrement ?	1 / Tous les jours ou presque 2 / Toutes les semaines ou presque 3 / Tous les mois ou presque 4 / Moins souvent
Nécessité de l'aide financière reçue de la famille	Selon vous, l'argent reçu répondait-il à un besoin de première nécessité ?	1 / Tout à fait 2 / Plutôt oui 3 / Plutôt non 4 / Pas du tout

Tableau A2 Aide pratique et financière reçue de la part des amis

Variables	Question	Modalités de réponse
Aide pratique reçue des amis	Avez-vous reçu une aide matérielle (nourriture, vêtements, transports, etc.) ou une aide pratique (p. ex. des coups de main) d'un(e) ami(e) ou d'une connaissance au cours de ces douze derniers mois ?	1 / Oui 2 / Non
Personne ayant apportée l'aide pratique parmi les amis/connaissances	Quel(le) ami(e) ou quelle connaissance vous a aidé le plus fréquemment au cours de ces douze derniers mois ?	1 / Un(e) ami(e) proche de mon quartier 2 / Un(e) ami(e) proche qui n'est pas de mon quartier 3 / Une connaissance de mon quartier 4 / Une connaissance qui n'est pas de mon quartier
Fréquence de l'aide pratique reçue de la part des amis	A quelle fréquence cette personne vous a-t-elle aidée ?	1 / Tous les jours ou presque 2 / Toutes les semaines ou presque 3 / Tous les mois ou presque 4 / Moins souvent
Nécessité de l'aide pratique reçue des amis	Selon vous, l'aide reçue répondait-elle à un besoin de première nécessité ?	1 / Tout à fait 2 / Plutôt oui 3 / Plutôt non 4 / Pas du tout
Aide financière reçue des amis	Sans tenir compte des cadeaux d'anniversaire ou de Noël, avez-vous reçu de l'argent de la part d'un(e) ami(e) ou d'une connaissance de manière régulière ou occasionnelle au cours de ces douze derniers mois ?	1 / Oui 2 / Non
Personne ayant apportée l'aide financière parmi les amis/connaissances	Quel(le) ami(e) ou quelle connaissance vous a versé cet argent le plus souvent ?	1 / Un(e) ami(e) proche de mon quartier 2 / Un(e) ami(e) proche qui n'est pas de mon quartier 3 / Une connaissance de mon quartier 4 / Une connaissance qui n'est pas de mon quartier
Fréquence de l'aide financière reçue de la part des amis	A quelle fréquence cette personne vous a-t-elle aidée financièrement ?	1 / Tous les jours ou presque 2 / Toutes les semaines ou presque 3 / Tous les mois ou presque 4 / Moins souvent
Nécessité de l'aide financière reçue des amis	Selon vous, l'argent reçu répondait-il à un besoin de première nécessité ?	1 / Tout à fait 2 / Plutôt oui 3 / Plutôt non 4 / Pas du tout

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

Margarita Sanchez-Mazas

Migration forcée et vulnérabilité éducative

Parcours et expériences de familles déplacées et (dé)scolarisation de leurs enfants

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Les déplacements forcés impliquent invariablement une mise en péril de l'éducation. En donnant la parole aux parents et aux enfants, cette étude se penche sur les situations inextricables – guerres, répressions, crises humanitaires – les contraignant à l'exil. Elle retrace les parcours d'enfants marqués par la déscolarisation ou la scolarité chaotique dans les pays de provenance ou de transit. Elle révèle les défis que pose l'arrivée de cette population d'élèves particulièrement vulnérable pour le travail éducatif et social des établissements scolaires.

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« Ce livre se penche sur les situations inextricables dans lesquelles se retrouvent parents et enfants, les contraignant à l'exil et compromettant leur droit à léducation. »

Margarita Sanchez-Mazas est professeure honoraire à l'Université de Genève, spécialiste de migration et d'asile, notamment en contexte scolaire, et auteure de nombreux articles et ouvrages sur ces questions. les politiques sociales à l'Université de Genève et à la HES-SO.

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